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We dedicate the book to the memory of Dave Heeschen, whose wise and forceful 
leadership and commitment to Open Skies led NRAO to become the world’s 
premier radio astronomy observatory.
An optical telescope is visual and interesting. A radio telescope is an 
electronic  instrument and you can’t really see a lot of what makes it work. 
When it’s done all you get is a computer printout.  
Comments from an anonymous NSF referee.
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Foreword
I know Ken Kellermann, well. We both did our PhDs in radio astronomy in the 
1960s, supervised by the famous radio astronomer John Bolton. Ken got his 
lessons on how to build a telescope and do research when John was building 
the Owens Valley Observatory at Caltech while I started building the interfer-
ometer at Parkes when John and Ken moved from Caltech to Australia. Many 
years later I spent a challenging but rewarding 7 years working for NRAO as 
the first director of the newly completed VLA radio telescope in New Mexico. 
This was sandwiched between my time at Westerbork and the Australia 
Telescope. To Ellen Bouton, we owe a great debt for the legacy of NRAO’s 
extensive archives of historical material which underpin the impressively 
detailed source material used in this book. Sierra Brandt’s background as a 
historian of twentieth-century science nicely complements the contributions of 
the other two authors.
While this book is very clearly focused on the development of the US 
National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO), it touches on many more 
broader issues, including the birth of a national facility, the open access policy 
for scientific research, the wider societal implications of searching for extrater-
restrial intelligent life, and lessons learned from major construction projects. It 
is far more than just the history of NRAO. By discussing the development of 
NRAO in an international context the authors have also written a history of the 
development of radio astronomy as seen from a US perspective. They start 
from the well-covered ground when Karl Jansky of the Bell Telephone 
Laboratory discovered radio emission from the Milky Way in 1933, through 
the somewhat idiosyncratic but innovative experiments over the next decade by 
one individual, Grote Reber, to the major technology developments during 
World War II.
Radio astronomy had started in the USA, but in the immediate postwar 
period, other countries, notably the UK and Australia, embarked on vigorous 
programs of exploration of the radio sky, taking advantage of the influx into 
astronomy of the high caliber scientists and engineers who had developed the 
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radar technology. Quoting the authors: “Early American radio astronomy did 
not have the same big impact as the programs in the UK and Australia.” This 
external pressure was a major factor galvanizing the US scientific community 
into activity. In this time period, the obvious way forward was to build an even 
bigger dish than the British (250 foot) or the Australian (210 foot) radio tele-
scopes. With the vision of building a very large antenna of perhaps 600 foot 
diameter this was “big science.”
The establishment of a national radio astronomy facility in the USA is a fas-
cinating story with many obstacles and detractors. The authors provide excel-
lent context for the formation of NRAO by including detailed archival research 
on the steps that were involved. This is a well-informed and deep analysis of 
how decisions were being made. The National Science Board had already made 
a declaration for government support of large-scale basic scientific facilities 
(i.e., support for big science) and had given the construction of a major radio 
astronomy facility as an example. This impacted NSF policy and was the begin-
ning of the national facility concept. A concept which was pioneered by the 
USA and later adopted in many other countries. However, establishing a 
national facility was not supported by all parties and throughout the book we 
can read lively accounts of the ongoing debate for and against the “big science” 
national facility concept instead of smaller groups of young innovative scientists 
based in the universities. This reached an extreme in the ongoing disagree-
ments and confrontations between Merle Tuve (DTM) and Lloyd Berkner 
who was the president of AUI, the organization that ran the Brookhaven 
National Laboratory, a “big science” national facility for particle phys-
ics research.
Lloyd Berkner had a huge impact on the development of the National Radio 
Astronomy Observatory. The authors note that Berkner may not have the 
name recognition as some of the other American postwar science policy leaders 
such as Vannevar Bush, Robert Oppenheimer, or I.I. Rabi, but perhaps no one 
had a broader impact on mid-twentieth-century science policy. They include 
one extraordinary example: Berkner became the first Chair of the National 
Academy of Science Space Studies Board and he sent a strongly worded memo-
randum to NASA Administrator James Webb stating that “Scientific explora-
tion of the Moon and planets should be clearly stated as the ultimate objective 
of the U.S. space program. … Scientific exploration of the Moon and planets 
must at once be developed on the premise that man will be included. Failure to 
adopt and develop our national program upon this premise will inevitably pre-
vent man’s inclusion, and every effort should be made to establish the feasibil-
ity of manned space flight at the earliest opportunity.” Less than 2 months 
later, in a special address to joint session of Congress, President John F. Kennedy 
conveyed Berkner’s message stating that “this nation should set as a goal before 
this decade is out, of landing of a man on the moon and returning him safely 
to the Earth.”
When David Heeschen became Director of NRAO in late 1962 he pre-
sented a clear view of the role of a National Facility. NRAO’s multiple 
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 responsibilities included providing equipment and aid for visiting scientists, 
anticipating the need for future developments in radio astronomy, and playing 
a leading role in developing new instrumentation. As Director of one of 
NRAO’s facilities (VLA) in the 1980s, I came to appreciate the value of 
Heeschen’s vision, and I later implemented similar policies when establishing 
the CSIRO radio telescopes in Australia as a National Facility.
The book is most appropriately titled Open Skies, a concept which values 
open access to research facilities as the most effective way to make scientific 
progress. The NRAO has been the leading advocate for this concept in astron-
omy and has set the path which has been followed by almost the entire radio 
astronomy community worldwide. One of the authors, Ken Kellermann, has 
been a visionary advocate for Open Skies so it is no surprise that it features both 
in the title and throughout this book.
At the inception of the National Facility concept, Berkner and his deputy 
Richard Emberson proposed the open access model: “all qualified scientists 
without regard to institutional affiliation would have access to the facility,” 
thus “insuring maximum scientific progress.” This was the policy adopted by 
NRAO and is referred to as “open skies,” following the nomenclature adopted 
by the international airlines governing reciprocal landing rights. In October 
1959, Heeschen famously wrote to the editors of the three main astronomy 
journals in the USA requesting that they publish the following statement: “The 
facilities of the Observatory are open to any competent individual with a pro-
gram in radio astronomy, regardless of institutional affiliation.” NRAO then 
took this a step further by not requiring previous radio experience and by 
including international as well as national institutes.
For over 50 years almost all radio observatories in the world have obtained 
mutual advantage from this policy but, sadly, as discussed in the last chapter, 
the SKA participating countries are now questioning whether to continue this 
tradition.
When reading the account of the construction of the first big dish in Chap. 
4, I was struck by the various comments about the need to finish construction 
before the telescope was obsolete. Similar comments had been made during 
the construction of the Parkes 210 foot telescope, and there seemed to be a 
feeling that there were only a few projects that the single dish would do well, 
so after a short burst of activity the big dishes would have no lasting impact. At 
the time, there seemed to be almost no realization that in reality it was these 
flexible instruments that would go on to study many of the new unanticipated 
discoveries.
Many of us in the broader radio astronomy community had heard about the 
problems encountered in the construction of the NRAO 140 Foot Telescope 
in the USA and the practical limitations that were imposed by some poor 
design decisions, such as the use of an equatorial mount rather than an alt-az 
mount. However, this is the first time we can read a frank and detailed account 
of how it overran its budget by a factor of 3, was 5 years late on a 2-year con-
struction timescale, and still did not reach the specifications of the larger and 
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cheaper 210 foot Parkes telescope completed in Australia a few years earlier. 
Bernard Burke described the 140 Foot radio telescope as having “served well, 
but its equatorial geometry is antique, its structural flexure is dreadful, its sur-
face quality is inferior, its maintenance is expensive and man-power intensive, 
and its pointing is substandard.” An interesting quote, and measure of the 
times, was related to the use of computers for coordinate conversion if using an 
alt-az mount: “... the operation of a precision scientific instrument should not 
be trusted to a computer.” This is almost identical to the view that Bernard 
Mills expressed in Australia at that time when he suggested that aperture syn-
thesis would never be practical if it depended on the use of an elec-
tronic computer.
But this book goes further; the authors have analyzed, like a scientific 
research paper, the reasons behind the decisions and the implications of the 
management structure that had been established. This concludes with an excel-
lent summary of lessons learned; some written by Dave Heeschen, who was the 
senior member of the NRAO Scientific Staff during most of the 140 foot con-
struction, and others summarized by the authors. Since it is clear that we have 
still not learned from these mistakes in our subsequent and even current man-
agement of big projects, I repeat them here in this Foreword for maxi-
mum impact.
In 1992, Dave Heeschen summarized the 140 Foot project as follows:
The 140 Foot is a classic example of how not to design and build a telescope. The 
design specs were set by a committee of outside consultants who had no respon-
sibility or accountability for the final result, and who gave liberally of poor advice. 
The 140-foot project leader, a very nice gentleman who was [assistant] to the 
president of AUI and responsible for the entire feasibility study that led to the 
establishment of NRAO, uncritically accepted all this advice. The telescope was 
originally going to have an alt-az mount because the consulting engineers thought 
that was the most feasible…. But the steering committee membership changed 
from time to time and finally had on it a prominent and outspoken scientist who 
insisted the mount should be equatorial…. Then the solar astronomer on the 
steering committee decided that the telescope should be able to observe the Sun 
from sunrise to sunset on June 22 each year. The errors made in bidding, con-
tracting, and construction were even worse…. AUI wound up with a fixed price 
contract, for $4 million, with a company—E W Bliss—that really didn’t want the 
job, except for one enthusiastic vice [president] who apparently bullied them first 
into accepting the final contract. He quit shortly afterward and AUI was left with 
a semi-hostile contractor.
Some important lessons were learned, or should have been learned, from 
the 140 Foot experience:
 1. Beware of the lowest bidder
 2. Be sure the contract is clear about who is responsible for what
 3. Finish the design before starting construction
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 4. Establish clear points of contact, authority, and responsibility on 
both sides
 5. Have a firm understanding of when the antennas will be delivered, with 
penalties for late delivery
 6. Do not take committee advice too seriously
 7. Have good in-house expertise
In October 1961, Joe Pawsey, from the CSIRO group in Australia, was 
offered the directorship of NRAO. He visited in March 1962 and started mak-
ing plans for the future of NRAO, including the use of interferometers to 
increase angular resolution. Pawsey was diagnosed with a brain tumor in May 
1962, returned to Australia, and died in November 1962. Dave Heeschen, 
from the NRAO staff, had been acting director and became director on 
October 19, 1962.
The concept of a radio telescope with angular resolution comparable to that 
obtained in the optical emerged in the early 1960s. While it was clear that a 
single dish could never achieve this, the radio interferometers certainly could, 
and this was already being demonstrated in Australia and in the UK. NRAO 
started down this path in competition with Caltech and its proposed Owens 
Valley Array based on John Bolton’s highly successful interferometer. In 1970, 
NRAO finally won this competition (described as the period of the NRAO- 
OVRO wars) after they had hired some of the best young radio astronomers 
from Caltech.
Dave Heeschen certainly learnt from his own list of lessons and under his 
leadership NRAO brought the VLA project to completion in 1980, on sched-
ule and close to the planned $78M budget appropriation. The VLA exceeded 
almost all its design specifications and has been by far the most powerful and 
most successful radio telescope ever built and, arguably, the most successful 
ground-based astronomical telescope ever built.
“The Bar is Open” was a well-known Heeschen alternative to an after- dinner 
talk which is used as the title for a chapter on one of the most productive peri-
ods of radio astronomy research at NRAO. When Dave Heeschen retired, he 
gave a talk: “advice to future directors and managers”:
 1. Hire good people, then leave them alone.
 2. Do as little managing as possible.
 3. Use common sense.
 4. Do not take yourself too seriously
 5. Have fun
I also recall another item of wise advice I received from Dave as I embarked 
on my first serious management role as VLA Director: “It’s sometimes more 
important to make a clear decision than to get the decision right—but do try 
to get it right more than half the time!”
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The chapter on millimeter wavelength (mm) astronomy is not just a sum-
mary of NRAO’s involvement in mm astronomy, a field which was opened up 
and led by the USA, but an overview of all international mm astronomy efforts. 
The radio astronomy millimeter field developed in a very different way com-
pared to the meter and centimeter wavelength astronomy. In the beginning 
millimeter wave receivers were bolometers with no spectroscopic capability and 
with poor sensitivity. As a result, there was a very limited scientific case with few 
observable sources, so the NRAO 36 foot at Tucson was a high-risk explor-
atory development. But with the unexpected discoveries of a plethora of spec-
tral lines, millimeter radio astronomy became one of the hottest topics in radio 
astronomy, leading eventually to the billion-dollar ALMA project.
The book includes a great sequence of stories about building big telescopes 
for radio astronomy. These are all linked to NRAO, but reach well beyond 
NRAO as a result of NRAO’s strong influence on developments in radio 
astronomy throughout the world.
The authors analyze in some detail the actual US funding process for a num-
ber of major proposals: 140 foot, VLA, VLBA, GBT, and ALMA. In particular, 
one author (KIK) was directly involved in the VLBA proposal and associated 
funding process. These actual situations illustrate the difference between the 
simplistic notions of proposal, review, and funding decision, with the real-life 
process. This chapter on the VLBA is not just a part of NRAO history but a 
great historical overview of all VLBI developments by an expert who lived 
through this era. VLBI experiments, especially those involving space missions, 
are among the most complex international projects that ever succeeded, involv-
ing different institutes, countries, and science agencies. These firsthand stories 
provide exceptional examples of successful scientific collaboration. Kellermann 
recounts his involvement in a VLBI collaboration with Russia in the peak of 
the Cold War.
The Sugar Grove 600 foot radio telescope, referred to by Harvard radio 
astronomer Edward Lilley as “a radio telescope fiasco,” is also included. It is a 
story about a classified defense telescope being built near the Green Bank 
Observatory that has not been told before.
To maintain its viability through the period of traumatic delays in the con-
struction of the 140 Foot dish, NRAO built a simpler, inexpensive 300 Foot 
transit antenna. At this time this 300 Foot Radio Telescope was one of the 
most powerful radio telescopes in the world and became an immediate success. 
For the first time, NRAO had a world-class instrument that was attractive to 
both visitors and NRAO staff. The successful completion of the 300 Foot tran-
sit radio telescope probably saved Green Bank from a premature closing result-
ing from the continued debacle with the 140 Foot antenna project. From the 
start of 300 Foot observations, the observatory operated as the first true visitor 
facility for radio astronomy.
But the 300 Foot story does not stop there. In 1988, NSF planned that the 
27-year-old NRAO 300 Foot transit telescope be closed in order to provide 
funds for operating other new astronomical facilities. But when the 300 Foot 
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Telescope unexpectedly collapsed in November 1988, it was reported in the 
media as a national disaster for US astronomy. West Virginia’s Senator Byrd 
demanded that the telescope be replaced. The NSF had other plans, but Byrd 
was able to include $75M in the 1989 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Bill, which funded the world’s largest (100-m) fully steerable dish for the 
Green Bank Telescope, and its chequered story makes another fascinat-
ing chapter.
As we approach the end of this book about the genesis of a national big sci-
ence facility with all the fascinating stories about the many projects it engen-
dered, we again return to the theme of collaboration at an international level 
with the construction of ALMA and the US involvement in the beginning of 
the SKA. The book concludes with discussions of closures and divestments, but 
this is offset by a vision for the Next Generation VLA (ngVLA) which is the 
US-proposed incarnation of the originally conceived SKA-high.
After 60+ years of progress we still find many lessons that still have not been 
learned, but this book may go some way to redressing this with its eloquent 
discussion of what happened in one field, coauthored by one of the experts 
who has participated directly in many of these developments.
 Ron Ekers Sydney, Australia
xv
PreFace
On April 27, 1933, at the annual meeting of the US National Committee for 
the International Union of Radio Science (URSI) in Washington DC, less than 
50 years after Heinrich Hertz had demonstrated the propagation and detection 
of radio waves, Karl Guthe Jansky reported that he had detected radio signals 
from the center of the Milky Way. Jansky had no background in astronomy and 
was not searching for extraterrestrial radio signals, but was working for the 
AT&T Bell Laboratories to locate the source of interference to transatlantic 
telephone circuits. Only about 30 people were present to hear Jansky’s dra-
matic announcement, one that would change the course of twentieth-century 
astronomy and lead to at least eight future Nobel Prizes. Although Jansky’s 
discovery aroused great public interest, nearly two decades would pass before 
the American scientific community became sufficiently interested to invest in 
this emerging new field of astronomy. By that time, scientists trained in war-
time radio and radar technology, primarily in Britain and Australia, had made a 
series of spectacular astronomical discoveries, and the USA was in danger of 
falling behind in this rapidly growing field, with obvious implications for tech-
nology, for military use, and for national prestige.
Prior to Jansky’s discovery, astronomical research was confined to the nar-
row optical window between 4000 and 7000 Angstroms (400–700 nm), only 
about a factor of two in wavelength. With the spectacular postwar development 
in electronic instrumentation and the resulting march toward shorter and 
shorter wavelengths, radio observations today cover the broad spectrum 
between less than 1 mm to more than 10 m, a range of about 105 in wave-
length. The subsequent rapid growth of space programs extended astronomers 
access to the entire electromagnetic spectrum from the infrared to the ultravio-
let, X-ray, and gamma-ray, all of which are obscured by the earth’s atmosphere. 
However, radio astronomy was the first outside the traditional optical window 
and resulted in the discovery of a wide range of previously unrecognized cos-
mic phenomena and many new previously unrecognized constituents of the 
universe. These included solar radio bursts, electrical storms on Jupiter, the 
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 so- called greenhouse effect on Venus leading to its extraordinarily hot surface 
temperature, precise tests of general relativity, the rotation of Mercury, the first 
exoplanets, radio galaxies, quasars, pulsars, cosmic masers, and cosmic evolu-
tion. The discovery of the microwave background by Arno Penzias and Bob 
Wilson in 1965 revolutionized cosmology and, interestingly, was made at the 
same AT&T Bell Laboratories as the initial discovery by Jansky of cosmic radio 
emission some three decades earlier.
The early pioneering radio astronomy observations were largely carried out 
by a single individual or small group who conceived of an experiment, designed 
and built the equipment, carried out the observations, and analyzed the result-
ing data. The 1956 establishment in the USA by the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) of the National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO), 
operated by Associated Universities, Inc. (AUI), changed the culture and ulti-
mately impacted all astronomy, not just radio astronomy. Before NRAO, US 
astronomical observatories were primarily privately funded through generous 
gifts from wealthy individuals like Charles Yerkes, James Lick, Percival Lowell, 
Andrew Carnegie, and John D. Rockefeller, and the philanthropic foundations 
which they established. The European-based observatories were often state 
supported, but they, like their private American counterparts, were used nearly 
exclusively by their own staff members.
Following the lead of the physicists who had created the Brookhaven 
National Laboratory (BNL), the NRAO was established to provide scientific 
instruments that were too costly for individual universities to build and oper-
ate. Although originally intended to provide opportunities for American radio 
astronomers to compete in the rapidly developing new field, with the availabil-
ity of its first instrument, the 85 Foot Howard E.  Tatel Telescope, NRAO 
developed a more broadly welcoming policy and announced its visiting scien-
tist program on page 1179 of the October 30, 1959, issue of Science:
The National Radio Astronomy Observatory was established by the National 
Science Foundation to make available to scientists from any institution facilities 
for research in radio astronomy…. The facilities of the observatory are open to 
any competent scientist with a program of work in radio astronomy, regardless of 
institutional affiliation.
Under the wise leadership of its young Director, Dave Heeschen, as addi-
tional telescopes were completed—the 300 Foot, the 140 Foot, the Green 
Bank Interferometer, the 36 Foot millimeter telescope, and eventually the Very 
Large Array (VLA)—NRAO facilities continued to be available to any scientists 
with a good program, independent of their institutional or national affiliation. 
This concept, which has become known as “Open Skies,” after the Open Sky 
agreements which regulate international airline traffic, ultimately was adopted 
by nearly all major ground- and space-based American as well as international 
astronomical facilities. When two of us (Kellermann and Bouton) interviewed 
Dave Heeschen on July 13, 2011 (see https://science.nrao.edu/about/pub-
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lications/open-skies), we asked, “What was the best thing you did during your 
years as Director, the thing that had the biggest impact?” Heeschen responded, 
“I think it’s the establishment of the concept of the national observatory and 
the free use of the telescopes by people…. [T]hat I think was a really good 
thing that came out of it, and it’s something which is persisting, you know, till 
this day. Everybody uses everybody else’s telescopes in one way or another.”
In his definitive book, Cosmic Noise (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), Woodruff T. Sullivan III documented the explosive growth of 
radio astronomy from Jansky’s unexpected discovery to the exciting postwar 
programs in Australia, in the UK, and, to a lesser extent, in the USA. Sullivan’s 
book ends in 1953, 20 years after Jansky’s discovery. The first discussions lead-
ing to the establishment of a national radio astronomy facility started in the 
early 1950s, and began the evolution of astronomy to a user-based, hands-off, 
big-science culture. In Open Skies, we have tried to pick up where Sullivan left 
off, describing the tumultuous circumstances leading to the creation of the 
NRAO, the difficult years which almost led to the closing of the observatory 
before it really got started, the later construction of the VLA, the Very Long 
Baseline Array (VLBA), and the Green Bank Telescope (GBT), along with the 
pioneering explorations into millimeter wavelength astronomy. It was a period 
which saw an unprecedented series of astronomical discoveries, mostly made 
possible by the explosive growth in radio astronomy techniques during the lat-
ter half of the twentieth century.
In planning the organization of Open Skies, we opted against a strictly 
chronological story, but instead deal with each major area of NRAO’s contri-
butions, arranged in separate chapters in approximate time sequence with each 
chapter organized in roughly—but not completely—chronological order. As 
background for those readers not familiar with the extensive literature on the 
early development of radio astronomy, we have included two introductory 
chapters about events which led to the start of discussions about establishing a 
national radio astronomy facility. A more detailed account of the people and 
activities during the early years in Green Bank is given in But It Was Fun, ed. 
J.  Lockman et  al. (Green Bank: NRAO). We have included a listing of 
Abbreviations and Acronyms, which includes abbreviations used in the text and 
in endnote citations (Appendix A) as well as a Timeline (Appendix B) at the 
end of the book.
Two of the authors of Open Skies, Ellen Bouton and Ken Kellermann, have 
had a long association with NRAO. Bouton began work in the NRAO library 
in 1975; in 1983, she became the NRAO Librarian and since 2003 has been 
the NRAO Archivist. Kellermann joined the NRAO scientific staff in 1965. He 
was involved in most of the activities described in Open Skies since that time, 
especially the development of VLBI and planning for the VLBA, and from 
1995 to 2003 was the NRAO Chief Scientist. Sierra Brandt brought her back-
ground in the history of astronomy to the NRAO/AUI Archives between 
2011 and 2013 and has been a consultant since.
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In researching the growth of NRAO and American radio astronomy, we 
have been aided by the collections in the NRAO/AUI Archives. Holdings 
include the formal records of NRAO, papers of many early NRAO staff mem-
bers, as well as the personal papers of some of the pioneers of US radio astron-
omy, especially Grote Reber, as well as Ronald Bracewell, Bernard Burke, 
Marshall Cohen, John Kraus, and Gart Westerhout.
We are grateful to the AUI Board, and especially Patrick Donahoe and 
Robert Hughes, for making the records of AUI Board meetings available. We 
must also acknowledge the resources of many other institutional archives and 
of the Library of Congress. Shelly Erwin and Loma Karklins gave their gener-
ous help and support during many visits to the Caltech Archives to examine the 
papers of Jesse Greenstein, Lee DuBridge, Alan Moffet, and Gordon Stanley. 
Gordon’s children, Teressa and Luise, kindly made available some of their 
father’s personal papers. Janice Goldblum at the National Academy of Sciences 
Archives provided us with access to the records of the 1964 Whitford and the 
1972 and 1973 Greenstein reviews of astronomy and astrophysics, as well as 
records of the early meetings of the USNC-URSI commission on radio astron-
omy. Elise Lipkowitz facilitated access to the records of the NSF’s National 
Science Board (NSB) during the critical period surrounding the establishment 
and early years of NRAO. Shaun Hardy helped us research the papers of Merle 
Tuve at the Carnegie Institution Department of Terrestrial Magnetism. Robin 
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CHAPTER 1
A New Window on the Universe
In April 1933, at a small gathering at a meeting of the US National Committee 
of the International Scientific Radio Union (URSI), Bell Labs scientist Karl 
Guthe Jansky announced that he had detected 20.5 MHz (14.6 m) radio emis-
sion from the Milky Way. Jansky used a novel directional antenna based on an 
invention by AT&T Bell Labs colleague, Edmond Bruce, that rotated every 
20 minutes to determine the direction and source of the interfering noise that 
was plaguing the telephone company. Jansky’s remarkable discovery of what he 
called “star noise” was widely publicized in the media, but had little immediate 
impact in the astronomical community, as astronomers, who typically had little 
background in electronics or radio, saw no relation to their own work.
For more than a decade, the only significant progress was made by one indi-
vidual, Grote Reber, who had just graduated from college with a degree in 
electrical engineering. His 32 foot parabolic dish, which he built in the yard 
next to his mother’s house using his own funds, was the forerunner of the 
much larger radio telescopes later built in the UK, in Australia, and later the 
United States, as well as the millions of smaller dishes which have proliferated 
throughout the world for the reception of satellite-based TV broadcasting. 
With his home-built radio telescope, Reber detected galactic radio noise first 
at 160 MHz (1.9 m) then 480 MHz (62 cm), which he called “cosmic static.” 
Reber recognized the nonthermal nature of the galactic radio emission, made 
the first radio maps of the Milky Way, discovered the intense radio emission 
from the Sun, and brought radio astronomy to the attention of the astronomi-
cal community.
1.1  Star NoiSe at the telephoNe CompaNy1
The first transatlantic telephone circuits were established by AT&T in 1927 
between New York and London using very long wavelength 5 km (60 kHz) 
radio transmissions (Bown 1927). The following year, the AT&T Bell System 
2
inaugurated a short wavelength circuit to provide a greater capacity. Although 
the Bell System transatlantic telephone calls were very expensive, they were 
subject to interference and fading and were not very reliable. Little was known 
at the time about short wave radio propagation or the limits to weak signal 
reception. Some noise originated in the receiver systems, but some was exter-
nal. Some of the external static clearly came from passing automobiles and 
airplanes or from local thunderstorms, but some came from an unknown origin 
(Oswald 1930). According to Al Beck (1984), members of the Bell Labs radio 
research staff were aware that when connected to an antenna, the receiver noise 
was greater than when connected to a load, and that the level of noise depended 
on the antenna and the time of the day. So, it was understood that at least some 
of the noise was apparently external to the receiver system.
Still only 22 years old, on 20 July 1928, Karl Jansky reported for his first day 
of work at the AT&T Bell Telephone Laboratories, joining the tightly knit 
members of the Radio Research Division (Fig. 1.1). By August, after a two- 
week orientation class, Jansky was working at the Cliffwood Laboratory in 
New Jersey, little realizing that he was about to embark on an engineering 
Fig. 1.1 Members of the Bell Labs Radio Research Division. Shown in the first row 
from left to right: Art Crawford, Carl Feldman, Sam Reed, Joe Johlfs, Lewis Lowery, 
Russell Ohl, Bill Mumford, Karl Jansky, Merlin Sharpless, Archie King, Edmund Bruce, 
and Al Beck. In the second row are Carl Englund, Harald Friis, Douglas Ring, Otto 
Larsen, Carl Clauson, Morris Morrell, Carl Peterson, Maurice Collins, Dan Schenk, and 
Jim Morrell. Credit: Courtesy of J.A. Tyson
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study leading to a series of discoveries that would fundamentally change our 
understanding of the Universe and its constituents. Radio galaxies, quasars, 
pulsars, the Cosmic Microwave Background (CMB), cosmic evolution, cosmic 
masers, gravitational lensing, electrical storms on Jupiter, and other now com-
monly known cosmic phenomena were all unknown until Karl Jansky opened 
the new radio window to the Universe.
Karl Guthe Janksy was born on 22 October 1905  in the territory of 
Oklahoma, where his father Cyril was Dean of the University of Oklahoma 
College of Engineering. Karl was named after Karl Guthe who was a former 
professor of his father at the University of Michigan. Karl grew up in Madison, 
Wisconsin, where his father became a Professor of Electrical Engineering at the 
University of Wisconsin.
Karl’s older brother, Cyril Moreau Jansky, Jr., known as C.M. Jansky, Jr., 
and to his family and to his friends as “Moreau,” received a BA in Physics in 
1917 and MS in 1919, both from the University of Wisconsin. Following his 
graduation, he taught at the University of Minnesota, where one of his first 
students was Lloyd Berkner, who would go on to become the driving force 
behind the formation of the National Radio Astronomy Observatory as the 
first President of Associated Universities (Sect. 3.1). C.M. Jansky, Jr. worked 
briefly for Bell Labs, and played a leading role in the development of radio 
technology and regulation in the US. In 1930, with his former student, Stuart 
Bailey, he established the consulting firm of Jansky and Bailey, where he 
remained active until his death in 1975. In 1934, Jansky became President of 
the Institute of Radio Engineers (IRE), the predecessor to the current Institute 
of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
Like his brother, Karl also studied physics at the University of Wisconsin and 
received his BS in Physics in 1927, graduating Phi Beta Kappa with a thesis 
titled, “Conditions for Oscillations in a Vacuum Tube Circuit.” While at 
Wisconsin, Karl was the fastest skater and a prolific scorer on the university ice 
hockey team, and later while working at Bell Labs, he was the table tennis 
champion of Monmouth County, New Jersey. After a year in graduate school,2 
Karl sought a job at Bell Labs. Although Bell Labs was initially unenthusiastic 
about hiring Karl, who had a chronic kidney disease, Moreau intervened on 
behalf of his brother and urged the Bell Labs president to hire Karl (Jansky 
1957).3 In recognition of his illness, instead of locating him at their main labo-
ratory in industrial New York City, Karl was sent to their then small rural labo-
ratory in Cliffwood Beach, New Jersey, where he began work to study the 
propagation of short wave radio transmissions and the noise limits to transat-
lantic telephone communications. He married Alice Larue Knapp the follow-
ing year, and along with most of the other Bell Labs Cliffwood employees, Karl 
and his growing family lived in nearby Red Bank. Karl enjoyed the informal 
social life shared with his fellow engineers. In spite of his illness and against 
medical advice, he remained active. He played chess, tennis, and golf, enjoyed 
bowling and skiing, had the highest batting average on the softball team, and 
was a passionate bridge player who claimed to know what cards each of the 
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players held. Karl was an avid Brooklyn Dodgers baseball fan and had very 
strong political opinions. He was critical of the Roosevelt administration and 
speculated that if the president’s term was ten years instead of four that, “We 
might have another civil war.”4 
Throughout his career at Bell Labs, Karl’s immediate boss was Harald Friis, 
a Danish-American radio engineer who had immigrated to the United States 
from Denmark and had established a reputation in radio antennas and propa-
gation. Later Friis and his wife Inge became close personal friends of the Jansky 
family, and were godparents to Jansky’s daughter Anne Moreau. With time, 
tensions developed between Jansky and Friis over Karl’s work assignments, but 
apparently their personal relationship remained intact.
Jansky’s discovery of cosmic radio emission is a classic example of the scien-
tific method, complete with false leads, that George Southworth (1956) later 
compared to a Sherlock Holmes detective story. Jansky’s story is described in 
his series of papers in the Proceedings of the IRE (Jansky 1932, 1933b, 1935), 
his laboratory notebook entries,5 and regular weekly work reports, as well as 
the running account of his work documented in his detailed letters to his father 
back in Madison.6 These letters provide a glimpse into the development of 
Karl’s thinking as he acquired and interpreted new data, and reflected on the 
difficult economic challenges he and his young family faced during those trying 
depression years.
In order to determine the direction of interfering signals, Jansky needed a 
directional antenna whose orientation could be varied. His notebook entries 
for 22 to 29 June 1929 indicate that he devoted this period to the design of a 
rotating antenna. On 24 August, he noted, “Mr. Sykes was interviewed and 
will start work on the ‘merrygoround’ next Monday.” The next months were 
spent designing and building the instrumentation with special attention to 
reducing receiver noise and obtaining good gain stability (Beck 1984). During 
this period, Jansky also planned the rotating Bruce Array7 at Cliffwood Beach 
which was constructed by Carl Clausen, a member of the Bell Labs staff. 
Jansky’s rotating array used a parasitic reflector to enhance the forward gain 
and directivity, and was mounted on the wheels and axles taken from an old 
Ford Model T car.8 Motor driven, the array made a complete rotation in azi-
muth every 20 minutes. Jansky’s work was interrupted by a decision to move 
the Laboratory to a new location at Holmdel, New Jersey, which would pro-
vide more room for the growing laboratory staff and less noise and local inter-
ference. A new circular track was constructed away from the laboratory 
building, and the rotating Bruce array was relocated to the new site (Fig. 1.2).
One of Karl’s first tasks at the new site was to find a frequency free of inter-
fering signals. On 10 May 1930, he wrote, “It was decided to operate upon a 
frequency of 20,689.7 [kc] or 14.5 meters.”9 He then calculated the size of the 
quarter wave antenna elements as “142.72 inches = 11 feet 10.72 inches or 11 
ft 10¾ approx.” A week later, on 17 May he wrote, “I designed the supporting 
framework for the array proper. The diagrams have been turned over to the 
shop office.”
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
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During the summer and autumn of 1930, Karl used his rotating array to 
determine the direction of arrival of signals from transmitting stations in 
England and South America and easily detected static from nearby thunder-
storms.10 In November he became aware of static coming from a direction 
where there was no obvious weather disturbance, but apparently much of 
Jansky’s time during his period was spent on other activities (Southworth 
1956). Following an overhaul of his receiving system, he began in the summer 
of 1931 to keep more systematic records of displayed static on a running paper 
chart recorder (Fig. 1.3). During the 1931/1932 winter, after the summer 
thunderstorm activity had subsided, he noted that the anomalous noise was 
highly peaked in a direction that appeared to move with the time of the day, 
being strongest in the morning toward the east, toward the south at noon, and 
toward the west late in the afternoon. Jansky naturally concluded that it had 
something to do with the Sun, and wrote to his parents, “That would be inter-
esting wouldn’t it?”11 Coincidently, in December the Sun lies in the direction 
of the Milky Way, and over the following months the peak noise came earlier 
each day, and Jansky noted that it was well removed from the Sun. However, 
he apparently did not yet realize that the source was extraterrestrial.
Fig. 1.2 Karl Jansky and his rotating Bruce Array known as the “merry-go-round,” 
which he used in 1932 to detect radio emission from the Milky Way Galaxy. Credit: 
NRAO/AUI/NSF
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At the April 1932 Washington meeting of the US National Committee for 
the International Union of Radio Science (URSI), Jansky presented a paper on 
“Directional Studies of Static on Short Waves,”12 which he later published in 
the Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers (Proc. IRE). In this, the first 
of his three classical papers, Jansky (1932) described in some detail his antenna 
and receiving system and reported that he had found three distinct groups 
of static.
The first group is composed of the static received from local thunderstorms and 
storm centers. Static in this group is almost always of the crash type. It is very 
intermittent… The second group is composed of very steady weak static coming 
probably from [ionospheric] refractions from thunderstorms some distance away. 
The third group is composed of a very steady hiss type static the origin of which 
is not yet known.
Jansky then goes on to discuss the crash type static in some detail, but adds,
The static of the third group is also very weak. It is, however, very steady, causing 
a hiss in the phones that can hardly be distinguished from the hiss caused by 
[receiver] noise.
He remarks that he did not recognize this third type of static until January 
1932, but he was able to go back to reexamine his earlier data and rec-
ognized that
Fig. 1.3 Karl Jansky 
examining the output of 
his paper chart recorder. 
Credit: NRAO/AUI/
NSF
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the direction of arrival of this static coincided with … the direction of the sun. 
However, during January and February, the direction has gradually shifted so 
that now [March 1] it precedes in time the direction of the sun by as much 
as an hour.
Still assuming that the source of static was terrestrial, and not having any 
background in astronomy, Jansky continued to speculate that the hiss type 
static might be related to the Sun, and that the change in apparent direction 
might somehow be due to the Sun’s changing declination after the winter sol-
stice. He concluded, however, that, “the data as yet cover only observations 
taken over a few months and more observations are necessary before any hard 
and fast deductions can be drawn.”
Throughout 1932, Jansky meticulously continued his observations. Indeed, 
after the summer solstice when the Sun reached its northern declination limit, 
instead of changing direction the shift in apparent position of the star noise 
continued. According to Southworth (1956) Jansky discussed his results with 
many of his associates, including his supervisor, Friis, Southworth, Edmond 
Bruce, Al Beck, Art Crawford, and probably most importantly, Melvin [Mel] 
Skellett. Skellett, who was a close friend of Jansky’s, was studying for his PhD 
in astronomy at Princeton. He apparently recognized the sidereal nature of 
Jansky’s data and advised Jansky to look at elementary astronomy text books. 
Jansky studied these text books and mastered the trigonometric transforma-
tions between terrestrial and celestial coordinates. He went back and reexam-
ined his data, and on 21 December 1932 he wrote to his father, 
I have taken more data which indicates definitely that the stuff, whatever it is, 
comes from something not only extraterrestrial but from outside the solar system. 
It comes from a direction that is fixed in space.
Karl apparently fully recognized the implications of his findings. Showing 
the same competitive spirit that his colleagues associated with his sports and 
bridge activities, he continued, “I’ve got to get busy and write another paper 
right away before someone else interprets the results in my other paper in the 
same way and steals my thunder from my own data.” In an 18 January 1933 
letter, he backed off somewhat, writing, “I have data which shows conclusively 
that the hiss type static comes from a direction which I know at least lies in a 
plane fixed in space and I think the direction is fixed in that plane but I am not 
sure of that as yet.”13
Around this time, Karl’s work was disturbed by a move to a new home in 
Little Silver with his wife and baby daughter, and an announced reorganization 
of Bell Labs with a threatened 30 percent cut in the engineering staff. He 
noted that a close friend and former roommate who had behaved “indepen-
dently,” but who had recently become a father and purchased a home was let 
“out.”14 This may have unnerved Jansky, who commented on the low morale 
at the lab and queried his father about possible teaching jobs at the University 
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of Wisconsin or elsewhere. However, Karl escaped the layoffs and was able to 
present his remarkable results at the annual meeting of the US National 
Committee for URSI, which was held in Washington DC on 27 April 1933. 
Karl described URSI to his family as “an almost defunct organization … 
attended by a mere handful of old college professors and a few Bureau of 
Standards engineers.”15 “Beside this,” Karl continued, “Friis would not let me 
give the paper a title that would attract attention but made me give it one [“A 
note on hiss type atmospheric noise”] that meant nothing to anybody but a few 
who were familiar with my work.”
Karl’s brother, Moreau, who himself was an influential leader of the URSI 
National Committee, was clearly impressed by his younger brother’s paper and 
apparently convinced the AT&T publicity department to issue a press release 
describing Jansky’s star noise.16 As Karl wrote to his father, “the science editors 
of the N.Y. papers were alert enough to realize the importance of the subject 
and yesterday afternoon pestered the life out of the publicity department.” The 
5 May 1933 edition of the New York Times featured an “above the fold” article 
titled, “New Radio Waves Traced to the Centre of the Milky Way.” Other 
headlines on the same front page ominously referred to the anticipated inva-
sion of China by Japan and Nazi threats at the French border. The following 
day, the Times “Week in Science” section noted that Jansky’s star noise was at 
the extreme end of the same electromagnetic spectrum that included the famil-
iar visible spectrum that was the basis of all previous astronomical knowledge. 
On 15 May, the NBC Blue Network, which later became the ABC, interviewed 
Jansky and played three 10-second segments of Jansky’s star noise received at 
Holmdel and sent over the AT&T Long Lines. In describing his star noise dur-
ing his interview, Jansky explained,
The observations show definitely that the maximum of hiss comes from some-
where on the celestial meridian designated by astronomer as “18 hours right 
ascension.” … But my measurements further show that the radio hiss comes from 
a point on that 18-hour meridian somewhat south of the equator, that is at about 
minus ten degrees in declination … that seems to confirm Dr. Shapley’s calcula-
tion that the radio waves seem to come from the center of gravity of our galaxy.17
Jansky’s extraordinary discovery was reported in national and international 
newspapers as well as in the 15 May edition of Time Magazine. The publicity 
generated by the media exposure resulted in the usual crank letters. As he 
wrote to his father, “I received a letter today from spiritualist [who] thinks I am 
receiving messages from the ‘other’ world [and] from some crank mathemati-
cian [who] advises me to watch for numerical messages based on the factor ‘2, 
4, 8 etc’ indicating a ‘superior’ intelligence.”18 There is little doubt that Karl 
was aware of the impact of his discovery and that he relished the publicity. In 
October, he gave an invited lecture at the American Museum of Natural 
History in New York with the provocative title, “Hearing Radio from the Stars.”
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Perhaps sparked by the attention resulting from the New York Times article 
and realizing that his published Proc. IRE paper incorrectly suggested that the 
hiss type noise originated in the Sun, on 8 May, Karl sent a short note to 
Nature, titled, “Radio Waves from Outside the Solar System,” (Jansky 1933a). 
In this paper, published on 8 July, Jansky states, “the direction of arrival of this 
disturbance remains fixed in space, that is to say the source of this noise is 
located in some region that is stationary with respect to the stars.” He goes on 
to give the direction of the radio noise as “right ascension of 18 hours and 
declination of -10 degrees.” In a paper meant for a more popular audience, 
Jansky (1933c) confidently used the more specific and provocative title, 
“Electrical Phenomena that Apparently Are of Interstellar Origin.” 
Jansky originally had wanted to announce his discovery at the Chicago IRE 
meeting which was held in June 1933, but Friis had rejected his request and 
“insisted” that he give the talk instead at the April URSI meeting. Following 
the attention resulting from the New York Times article and the NBC broad-
cast, at Karl’s request, his brother Moreau again stepped in to use his influence 
to get Karl invited to the June IRE meeting.19 At this point, ignoring Friis’ 
reservations, but with the encouragement of more senior Bell Labs manage-
ment, Karl decided on his own to change his title “to suit myself.”20 His IRE 
talk was published in the Proc. IRE (Jansky 1933b) as his now classic paper on 
“Electrical Disturbances Apparently of Extraterrestrial Origin.” For the benefit 
of the IRE engineering readers, he first reviewed the relationship between ter-
restrial and astronomical coordinate systems and the difference between solar 
and sidereal time. In his introductory summary, he concludes “that the direc-
tion of arrival of these waves is fixed in space, i.e., that the waves come from 
some source outside the solar system,” and here he gives this direction as the 
“center of the huge galaxy of stars and nebulae of which the sun is a member.” 
Following his talk, Karl sent a copy of his paper to the well-known Princeton 
astronomer, Henry Norris Russell, and arranged to meet with Russell to dis-
cuss the meaning of his star noise. 
For the next two years, Jansky was apparently preoccupied with other 
research activities, but found the time to analyze his data more carefully. In July 
1935, he again gave a talk at the Annual IRE Convention in Detroit, and was 
able to report that the radio emission came from the entire galactic plane with 
the strongest radiation coming from the Galactic Center.21 In his third Proc. 
IRE paper, following his Detroit talk, Jansky (1935) explained that the noise 
peaks correspond to those times when the antenna beam is oriented along the 
plane of the Milky Way, and second, that the largest peak comes from the “that 
section of the Milky Way nearest the center.” Although he concluded that the 
“most obvious explanation of these phenomena … is that the stars themselves 
are sending out these radiations,” he did not exclude the possibility “that the 
waves that reach the antenna are secondary radiations caused by some form of 
bombardment of the atmosphere by high speed particles which are shot off by 
the stars.” In this paper, Jansky also made the first attempt to understand the 
physics behind his star noise noting that “one is immediately struck by the 
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similarity between the sounds they produce in the receiver headset and that 
produced by the thermal agitation of electrical charge. In fact the similarity is 
so exact,” he explained with some prescience, “that it leads one to speculate as 
to whether or not the radiations might be caused by the thermal agitation of 
charged particles.”22 
Jansky also commented on the important contrast between the optical and 
radio sky, pointing out that while visually the Sun appears brighter than the 
radiation from all the stars combined, the reverse was true at radio wavelengths. 
He realized that if all the stars in the Milky Way are like our Sun, that could not 
explain his observed noise from the Milky Way. He speculated that “a possible 
explanation … [is] that the temperature of the sun is such that the ratio of 
energy radiated by it on the wavelengths studied to that radiated in the form of 
heat and light is much less than for some other classes of heavenly bodies found 
in the Milky Way.” It is clear from this third Proc. IRE paper and from his short 
notes in Nature and Popular Astronomy (Jansky 1933a, c) that Jansky was not 
satisfied just to have solved the problem of short wave radio noise, but he 
wanted to understand and disseminate the implications to the astronomy and 
astrophysics communities as well as to the broader public. 
More than a decade later, URSI President Sir Edward Appleton commented 
in his 1948 Presidential address, “Jansky’s work seems to me to have all the 
characteristics of a fundamental discovery. In the first place he recognized 
something that was unexpected. In other words, he discovered something 
when he was actually looking for something else. But he then went further, for 
he recognized his unexpected result as being significant. And pursued it with 
zeal until much of its true meaning emerged.”23 As John Kraus (1981) later 
noted, Jansky’s system contained all the elements of future radio telescopes: (1) 
a directional antenna, (2) a broad band low noise receiver, and (3) a radio quiet 
site. Somewhat later, Grote Reber (1988) added, “Reading Karl Jansky’s arti-
cles is an enlightening example of how a first class human mind works, and how 
one hypothesis is discarded for another as more evidence rolls in.”
Woodruff Sullivan (1978) later reanalyzed Jansky’s data from 16 September 
1932, and presented it in a modern form as a contour map in galactic coordi-
nates (Fig. 1.4). Sullivan’s map, which displays the concentration along the 
galactic plane and the maximum toward the Galactic Center, also shows the 
maximum later recognized as the Cassiopeia A supernova remnant as well as 
evidence for the Cygnus A/Cygnus X complex.
The Later Years In order to enhance Bell Labs’ transatlantic radio communica-
tions capability, Friis developed the highly directional Multiple Unit Steerable 
Array (MUSA) rhombic antenna (Friis and Feldman 1937).24 In his continuing 
study of short wave noise and radio wave propagation, Jansky (1937, 1939) 
used MUSA to show that in the absence of manmade interference, the sensitiv-
ity of short wave radio systems was limited by interstellar noise, and not by 
receiver circuit noise. During this period, he also tried to use the MUSA system 
with a goal of measuring the frequency dependence of his “star noise.” The 
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
11
published results were inconclusive, most likely due to the increasing solar 
activity and the corresponding D-layer ionospheric attenuation, but also to 
broadband interference generated by nearby diathermy machines. Al Beck, 
who worked with Jansky at the time, later noted that the cosmic signal was 
strongest at the longer wavelengths25 but there is no contemporaneous record 
or documentation that Jansky or Beck had understood the nonthermal nature 
of the star noise. Interestingly, 1932 was near the bottom of the sunspot cycle. 
Had Jansky done his pioneering work five years earlier or five years later, the 
ionosphere probably would not have allowed him to detect extraterrestrial 
radio noise at 21 MHz (15 meters), although he would then probably have 
detected radio emission from the active Sun.
Although AT&T was quick to exploit the popular interest in Jansky’s dis-
covery, further investigation of “star-noise,” other than as a noise floor, did not 
rank high in AT&T’s priorities. Even during the critical period of 1932 and 
1933, Jansky did not work full time on star noise, as his laboratory notebook 
shows considerable effort spent on understanding the direction of arrival of 
short wave radio transmissions. As noted by George Southworth (1956), 
“Somewhat later he was assigned to other duties and his work on radio astron-
omy came to an end. His interest nevertheless continued.” 
For some years after 1935, Jansky’s “merrygoround” was used by Beck 
(1984) and others for testing antennas, but it ultimately fell into disrepair and 
the remnants were destroyed. Following a suggestion by Grote Reber26 to 
Southworth, and with the encouragement and support of Al Beck, in 1964, a 
Fig. 1.4 Contour map of the 14.6 meter cosmic radiation derived by W.T. Sullivan III 
from observations made by Karl Jansky on 16 September 1932. The contours are nor-
malized to a peak value of 100 corresponding to brightness temperature of 
100,000 K. The dashed line shows the track of a typical 20 min rotation of the antenna. 
Credit: Courtesy of W.T. Sullivan III
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replica of Karl Jansky’s antenna was erected at the entrance of the NRAO 
Green Bank Observatory. Years later, former Bell Labs scientists J. Anthony 
(Tony) Tyson and Robert (Bob) Wilson located the site of the original antenna 
at Holmdel, and on 8 June 1998, Bell Labs dedicated a memorial model 
antenna on the site of Jansky’s original array.
With the rapidly deteriorating international situation in the late 1930s, 
Jansky became increasingly involved in classified defense work, particularly 
related to electronic detection of submarines, for which he received an Army- 
Navy citation. Following the end of World War II, he worked on the emerging 
AT&T microwave repeater network for long distance telephone communica-
tion and followed with interest the rapidly developing field of radio astronomy. 
After the Bell Labs invention of the transistor in 1947, Jansky was one of the 
first to use transistors to build low noise preamplifiers and received several pat-
ents on a radio direction finder or sextant based on the radio emission from the 
Sun which was later developed by the Collins Radio Co. for the Naval Research 
Laboratory. His deteriorating health limited his activities and, after a series of 
strokes, on 14 February 1950, Jansky succumbed to his long illness and died at 
the young age of 44. This was a year before the discovery by Ewen and Purcell 
(1951) of the 21 cm hydrogen line at Harvard (Chap. 2) brought radio astron-
omy to the attention of the broad astronomical community. Just before his 
death, Karl was transferred to a small group under George Southworth that 
also included Russel Ohl, who played a prominent role in the Bell Labs devel-
opment of the transistor. 
Controversy John Pfeiffer was a free-lance author who wrote the first popular 
book about the new science of radio astronomy called The Changing Universe: 
The Story of the New Astronomy. Prior to writing his book, Pfeiffer traveled to 
the major observatories and laboratories working in radio astronomy. In 1954 
he visited Bell Laboratories and spent a day talking with Harald Friis and mem-
bers of his Radio Research Section about Karl Jansky and his discovery of inter-
stellar radio emission. In his book, Pfeiffer (1956, p. 17) claimed that Jansky 
“did all he could to convince his associates and superiors that the work was 
worth pursuing for practical reasons. But his arguments failed to produce 
results.” Pfeiffer further incited the issue stating, “Rarely in the history of sci-
ence has a pioneer stopped his work completely, at the very point where it was 
beginning to get exciting. Yet Jansky did just that.”
In his review of Pfeiffer’s book in Science, Frank Edmondson (1956), a well- 
known optical astronomer, writing from the National Science Foundation, 
threw coals on the fire when he hinted that “Jansky’s failure to secure support 
for continued pure research at Bell Laboratories” may have led the US to be 
“lagging far behind other countries in the development of radio astronomy.” 
This generated a strong rebuttal from Karl’s associate J.C. Schelleng who wrote 
to the editor of Science, Graham DuShane,27 arguing that, “It is news to Mr. 
Jansky’s associates at Holmdel to be told that he tried seriously to continue the 
work and failed …. If the astronomers showed any excitement at the time, we 
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saw no sign of it.” Schelleng went on to point out that after reading Grote 
Reber’s paper, Jansky “cheerfully” noted that “he had skimmed the cream,” 
and “showed no sign of disappointment.”
Karl’s brother, C.M. (Moreau) Jansky, Jr. (1958) further incited controversy 
when he wrote the introductory article in the Proc. IRE special issue on radio 
astronomy describing his brother’s discovery of extraterrestrial radio emission. 
In his paper, Jansky wrote that, “his superiors transferred his activities to other 
fields. He would have preferred to work in radio astronomy.” Picking up on 
Jansky’s remarks, the popular magazine, Readers Digest, reported, “Astronomers 
were slow to recognize [Karl] Jansky’s discovery, [and that] his boss told him 
to stick to ordinary static, and reluctantly he did so.” (Kent 1958). In a letter 
to Karl’s brother Moreau,28 and in a later paper in Science, Friis (1965) denied 
that this was true, and said Karl “was free to continue work on star noise if he 
had wanted to,” and that Karl had never indicated to him “a desire to continue 
his star noise work.” Moreover, noted Friis, during this period there had been 
no interest or encouragement from astronomers and it was not clear in what 
directions such research should go and what kind of equipment was needed. 
Essentially, he argued that Karl felt that having found the source of noise, he 
had completed that particular project. Much later, on several occasions Friis 
(1965, 1971) commented that Jansky should have received a Nobel Prize for 
his discovery of cosmic radio emission.29
Moreau reacted to Friis by writing to Karl’s widow, Alice, to seek her com-
ments.30 Alice responded,
Harald says that Karl never expressed to him a desire to continue work on his 
star  noise. How incredible, how preposterous, how positively unbelievable. 
Periodically, over the years that Karl worked under Friis, he would come home 
and say, “Well, Friis and I had a conference today to discuss what my next project 
should be, and, as usual, Friis asked what I’d like to do, and as usual, I said, ‘You 
know I’d like to work on my star noise,’ and as usual, Friis said, ‘Yes, I know, and 
we must do that some day, but right now I think—and—is more important, don’t 
you agree?’”31
Moreau decided not to respond to Friis, but thanked Alice for “substantiat-
ing the statements made in the last two paragraphs of my paper,” and added, 
“I have been informed that quite a number of people have expressed the opin-
ion that they are glad that I said what I did.”32 It is perhaps significant that 
while Friis portrays a close personal relationship with Jansky, in all of his letters 
to his parents, Jansky always referred to “Friis,” or “Mr. Friis,” never using his 
first name. To Karl and Alice’s children, Anne Moreau and David, they were 
Uncle Harald and Auntie Inge. However, at least at work, Friis apparently just 
called Karl “Jansky.”
Radio astronomy again came to the forefront at Bell Labs in 1965 following 
the detection of the cosmic microwave background by Arno Penzias and Bob 
Wilson (Penzias and Wilson 1965). Bell Labs wanted to clarify the growing 
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and clearly embarrassing controversy over Jansky. Ray Kestenbaum of their 
Public Relations Department conducted a series of interviews with Jansky’s 
boss Harald Friis, his colleagues Al Beck, John Schelleng, and Art Crawford, as 
well as Karl’s brother Moreau.33 Everyone from Bell Labs described Karl as 
friendly, modest, and easy to get along with. They also noted that he was very 
competitive in sports and bridge. All, especially Friis, denied ever hearing any 
expression from Karl that he felt constrained from pursing his star noise 
research, and they all noted that it was not clear to any of them, Karl included, 
what might be the next steps. Karl, they maintained, was never “stopped” from 
pursuing further work on star noise, that he was happy with his work, that his 
primary research interests were in antennas and receiver noise, and that he 
enjoyed working at Bell Labs.
Although George Southworth was not interviewed, Kestenbaum later wrote 
to Southworth for his views on this controversial issue. His initial response was 
equivocal,34 but recalling Southworth’s (1956) earlier remark that Jansky “was 
assigned to other duties,” Lloyd Espenschied, then retired from a senior man-
agement position at Bell Labs, later wrote to Southworth commenting on a 
paper in the Bell Labs Record that claimed that Jansky did not continue his star 
noise research “due to a lack of theoretical understanding … and by the inabil-
ity to detect radio noise from the Sun.”35 “I wonder who concocted this fabri-
cation as the ‘cover-up’ it is?” wrote Espenschied, “I remember very well how 
Karl’s foundling babe was left out in the cold, much to his distress, simply 
because it was regarded as not being pertinent to the Bell system.”
Southworth responded with a brief factual summary of Jansky’s career at 
Bell Labs, his own satisfaction with Jansky’s productivity at Bell Labs, but con-
cluded that, “Other matters like the handling of Jansky’s case bespoke many 
unpleasant, if not indeed tragic experiences. Most of us, without knowing why, 
thought intuitively that he had not been dealt with fairly.”36
Were Friis and the other Bell Labs staff who were interviewed by Kestenbaum 
just trying to protect the reputation of the Labs? Or were Southworth and 
Espenschied expressing broader pent up dissatisfaction with the Labs? And 
were Moreau and Alice carried away with family loyalties and a desire to pre-
serve and enhance Karl’s reputation?
Contemporaneous insight to what happened between Friis and Jansky is 
documented in the series of Karl’s letters to his parents which were often criti-
cal of Friis and do not support Friis’ position. Friis was described by another 
Bell Labs employee, Russel Ohl, as a “dictator [who] wanted things done 
exactly the way he said.”37 When Karl complained to his father about the title 
of his 1933 URSI paper, he went on to mention that his brother Moreau 
reported that the IRE Board of Directors considered that “my paper was the 
outstanding paper of the Washington meeting,” … and “that they all agreed 
that the title to the paper was too commonplace [a direct slap at Friis].” Karl’s 
father expressed sympathy, but cautioned Karl, “Do not antagonize him. Keep 
on consulting him as formerly. He is your boss and loyalty ultimately pays no 
matter whether it is deserved.”38
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A month later, Karl wrote “I have not the slightest doubt that the original 
source of these waves whatever it is or wherever it is, is fixed in space. My data 
proves that, conclusively as far as I am concerned. Yet Friis will not let me make 
a definite statement to that effect but says I must use the expression ‘apparently 
fixed in space’ or ‘seems to come from a fixed direction’ etc. etc. … But I sup-
pose it is safer to do what he says.”39 Following the announced layoffs in the 
spring of 1933, Karl wrote to his parents, “Nothing has happened yet at the 
labs in the matter of firing some of the engineers. The ax is still hanging over 
our heads…. What a h - l of a way to run an organization.” 40
In January 1934, he wrote41
I now have what I think is definite proof that the waves come from the Milky way. 
However, I am not working on the interstellar waves any more. Friis has seen fit 
to make me work on the problems and methods of measuring noise in general. A 
fundamental and necessary work, but not very interesting as the interstellar 
waves, nor will it bring me near as much publicity. I’m going to do a little bit of 
theoretical research of my own at home on the interstellar waves however.
Grote Reber (1982) later reported that toward the end of World War II, he 
had met Jansky during a Washington URSI meeting, and that over lunch, 
Jansky had mentioned that in 1936 he wrote a memorandum proposing con-
struction of a 100 foot diameter transit dish operating at 5  m wavelength 
(60 MHz). Apparently, as Jansky explained to Reber, he had been informed, 
“that the proposal was outside the realm of company business.”42 However, no 
record of such a proposal has been found in the Bell Labs Archives or among 
any of Karl’s existing personal papers and letters.
To better appreciate the situation surrounding Jansky’s important discovery, 
it is important to understand the political, social, and economic revolutions 
that were ravaging the world in 1933 and that only became worse over the fol-
lowing decade. Only a few months earlier Adolph Hitler had become Chancellor 
of Germany, and two days later he dissolved the German Parliament, starting a 
series of edicts and decrees that within a few years would lead to global catas-
trophe. Just six weeks before Jansky’s announcement of his detection of radio 
noise from the Milky Way, Franklin Delano Roosevelt became the 32nd 
President of the United States, and promptly closed the banks. Later that year 
the United States would abolish the gold standard and prohibition; Babe Ruth 
would hit a home run to win the first major league all-star baseball game; the 
world’s first drive-in theater would open in New Jersey; and the infamous John 
Dillinger would rob his first bank. Erwin Schrödinger and Paul Dirac won the 
1933 Nobel Prize in Physics for their development of quantum mechanics, and 
the astronomy community was still absorbing the implications of Hubble’s 
expanding Universe (Hubble 1929) with its emphasis on building large new 
optical telescopes to detect ever more distant galaxies.
The US and the world were in the throes of a major depression. It is said 
that fully one third of the US population was out of work. Rather than lay off 
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staff, Bell Labs had cut its work week to four days, although many staff mem-
bers, including Jansky, continued to work five days a week while getting paid 
for four. Bell Labs employees worried about their livelihood and many explored 
other opportunities. Anticipating the potential prospects for more time to pur-
sue his research, but conscious of his chronic illness and uncertain life expec-
tancy, Karl asked his father about possible positions at the University of 
Wisconsin or even teaching at a high school. With encouragement from Alice 
he applied for a position at Iowa State University, but was unsuccessful, and 
there is no evidence that he again seriously entertained leaving Bell Labs. By 
1944, to meet the demands of the defense effort, Jansky was working overtime 
and enjoying the extra pay, which he needed to meet his increasing medi-
cal expenses.
While it is likely that Harald Friis did not encourage further work on Karl’s 
star noise to the extent that Karl might have wished, neither did he apparently 
discourage Karl, other than by assigning him new tasks. Nevertheless, it seems 
Karl was not unhappy with his work or with Bell Labs. Aside from the critical 
comments to his father, he apparently did not push Friis hard to continue his 
star noise research. He understood the corporate nature of his employer and 
the constraints imposed first by the Depression, then by the War, as well as 
considerations of his health and the well-being of his young family. So while he 
may have shared his frustrations about Friis with his family, his father, and his 
wife, he also respected Friis as his boss, as well as valued him as a personal 
friend. It is also important to recognize that Friis, himself, was under pressure 
from senior management and directly from defense contractors to deliver on a 
multitude of contracts with limited staff, and Jansky was surely aware of this.43 
As many of his colleagues emphasized, the important thing may not be why 
Karl stopped his pioneering work after receiving broad national and interna-
tional recognition, but that he accomplished so much in such a short time.
Recognition Although Karl Jansky’s discovery of galactic radio emission did 
not have an immediate direct impact on astronomy, the discovery of radio 
noise from the Milky Way was widely recognized and discussed among astron-
omers as well as by the general public. Karl’s father reported being at a talk by 
the University of Illinois astronomer Joel Stebbins, who drew attention to 
Karl’s discovery.44 Harlow Shapley, Director of the Harvard College 
Observatory (HCO), even wrote to Jansky asking for copies of his IRE paper 
and Jansky reported that they had a vigorous discussion at the Harvard Physics 
Department about Jansky’s work.45 At a later meeting in New York, Shapley 
asked about the cost of repeating the experiment, but was discouraged by 
Jansky’s initial response. Subsequently, however, Jansky realized that the equip-
ment he had used was originally built for another purpose, and he felt that it 
would be possible to confirm his results at much lower cost by using a com-
mercial short wave receiver. But, apparently, by this time, Shapley had either 
lost interest or was discouraged by Harvard’s unfamiliarity with anything to do 
with radio or electronics.
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Two Harvard astronomers who thought hard about Jansky’s star noise were 
graduate student Jesse Greenstein, and Fred Whipple, then a young Harvard 
faculty member. They had read Jansky’s papers, and tried to interpret the radio 
noise as thermal radiation from cold dust (Whipple and Greenstein 1937). 
However, Jansky’s star noise exceeded their model predictions by a factor of 
10,000 (Sullivan 2009, p. 41). Henyey and Keenan (1940) tried to interpret 
the observations in terms of free-free emission from ionized hydrogen, and 
remarked, “in the case of Jansky’s data the discrepancy is serious.” Although 
these papers were unsuccessful in trying to explain the nature of the radio sig-
nals as thermal emission from interstellar dust, they underscored the need for 
unconventional nonthermal interpretations of cosmic radio emission. It would 
be another 15 years before the Russian scientists, Vitaly Ginzburg (1951) and 
Iosef Shklovsky (1952) would explain that the nonthermal galactic radio emis-
sion is due to synchrotron radiation from ultra-relativistic electrons moving 
near the speed of light in a weak magnetic field.46
At Caltech, Professor R.M. Langer was inspired by Jansky’s papers to con-
sider possible mechanisms to explain the observed radio emission from the 
Milky Way, and gave a talk to the American Physical Society proposing that 
Jansky’s star noise was the result of free electrons combining with ionized dust 
particles (Langer 1936). Langer’s ideas did not make the New York Times but 
did appear on the front page of the 13 March 1936 edition of the Los 
Angeles Times.
So Jansky’s discovery was well known to the scientific community, and was 
certainly not ignored by astronomers. They considered it interesting and even 
important. However, no one, Karl included, appreciated the extent to which 
other new discoveries would follow from further research using this new win-
dow on the Universe, or, with the exception of a few individuals like Grote 
Reber, what should be the next step.
In 1948, Jansky was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Physics by the 
German physicist Winfried Schumann, who was known for his research on 
lightning-generated extremely low frequency radiation. But this was before the 
explosive growth of radio astronomy in the 1950s and the importance of 
Jansky’s work was not widely appreciated. Perhaps not coincidently, Appleton’s 
presentation at the 1948 URSI General Assembly in Stockholm may have been 
intended to call the Nobel committee’s attention to Jansky’s achievements. 
After the meeting, Karl’s widow, Alice wrote to Appleton thanking him for his 
recognition of Karl’s work with a passing reference to the Nobel Prize.47 Most 
likely, had he lived longer, Karl Jansky would have been recognized with the 
Nobel Prize, which eight other scientists have subsequently received for work 
in radio astronomy.48
In 1959, the new laboratory building at NRAO was named the “Jansky 
Laboratory” and, after a major upgrade, the NRAO Very Large Array, was 
rededicated in 2012 as the “Karl G. Jansky Very Large Array.” (Sect. 7.8) At 
the 1973 IAU General Assembly held in Grenoble, France, the Commission 
on Radio Astronomy passed the following resolution. “RESOLVED, that the 
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name ‘Jansky,’ abbreviated ‘Jy’ be adopted as the unit of flux density in radio 
astronomy and that this unit, equal to 10−26 Wm−2 Hz−1, be incorporated into 
the international system of physical units” (Contopoulos and Jappel 1974). 
Increasingly, the unit of Jansky has been used not only in the radio part of the 
spectrum, but at IR, optical, and X-ray wavelengths as well.
1.2  early Follow-Up to JaNSky’S DiSCovery
Since Jansky did not follow up his historic discovery, it was left to others to 
exploit the new window on the Universe that Jansky had opened. At the 
University of Michigan, John Kraus (1984) and his colleague Arthur Adel tried 
to detect the Sun at 1.5 cm wavelength just a few months after Karl’s New York 
Times announcement. About the same time, Caltech Physics Professor Gennady 
Potapenko read about Jansky’s work, and in October 1933, just six months 
after Jansky’s New York Times announcement, Potapenko gave a talk at the 
Caltech Astronomy and Physics Club on “The Work of the Bell Laboratories 
on the Reception of Shortwave Signals from Interstellar Space.”
In the spring of 1936, Potapenko and his student Donald Folland tried to 
reproduce Jansky’s work, using first a pair of small loop antennas on the roof 
of the Caltech Physics Lab. Their receiver was tuned to 20.55  MHz 
(14.6 meters), close to the frequency used by Jansky, but due to ignition noise 
from passing automobiles they did not obtain any useful data. To get away 
from the noise of Pasadena, they moved their experiment out to the nearby 
Mojave Desert, where they fastened one end of a 35 foot wire to a 25 foot 
mast. One person walked the slanted wire around the pole to exploit the direc-
tivity of the arrangement while the other took data. Later Folland returned to 
his home in Utah, and in the summer of 1936 repeated the experiment. 
According to Jesse Greenstein,49 Potapenko and Folland were able to detect a 
maximum in the Sagittarius region and later a second maximum in Cygnus.
Based on the success of their simple experiment, Potapenko, along with 
Fritz Zwicky, proposed constructing a rhombic antenna on a rotating mount 
designed by Russell Porter. Zwicky (1969, p. 90 and 91) estimated the cost to 
be about $200, although Greenstein later told Reber that it was more like 
$1000.50 Zwicky and Potapenko tried to get funding from Caltech for their 
venture but were apparently turned down by Caltech President Robert 
Millikan, who, moreover, discouraged Potapenko from publishing his results.51 
There is no evidence that either  Potapenko, Russell, or Folland ever returned 
to radio astronomy, although Zwicky, who remained at Caltech as a Professor 
of Astrophysics until his retirement in 1968, later maintained informal contact 
with the young Caltech radio astronomers and students. Considering that 
Caltech, with its strong basic research background and significant technical, 
academic, and financial resources, either did not chose to build on Jansky’s 
discovery, or did not have a clear vision of what to do, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that the telephone company also did not seize the initiative.
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Around the same time, according to Grote Reber (1982), in 1936, Fred 
Whipple, at Harvard, “considered doing a test to confirm Jansky’s discovery.” 
His innovative plan was to put outriggers on the dome of the Harvard 60 inch 
telescope, then string wires around the ends of the outriggers as a rhombic 
antenna. When the dome was rotated, the antenna would scan around the 
horizon. However, the HCO Director, Harlow Shapley, was reluctant to sup-
port Whipple’s proposed initiative and Whipple never pursued his plan.
Sullivan (2009, p. 113) discusses 1940 observations by John DeWitt, who 
had previously worked at Bell Labs and who, working alone, was able to detect 
galactic radio emission at 111 MHz using a simple rhombic antenna.52 About 
the same time, Kurt Franz, working at the German Telefunkenen laboratories 
noticed an increase in the noise of his directional navigational system whose 
intensity shifted by four minutes a day. Franz (1942) knew about Jansky’s 
work, and correctly realized that he had detected radio noise from the Galaxy.
1.3  Grote reber aND CoSmiC StatiC53
Aside from the short experiments by Friis, by Potapenko and Folland, DeWitt, 
and Franz, the only known attempt to continue or expand on Jansky’s discov-
ery was by Grote Reber (Fig. 1.5), working by himself in Wheaton, Illinois. 
Reber had graduated in 1933 from the Armour Institute of Technology (now 
the Illinois Institute of Technology) with a degree in electrical engineering, 
specializing in the fledgling fields of electronics and communications. After 
graduation, he held a series of jobs with various Chicago companies, including 
Fig. 1.5 Grote Reber in 
1975 during one of his 
visits to Green Bank. 
Credit: NRAO/AUI/
NSF
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General Household Utilities (1933–1934), the Stewart-Warner Corporation 
(1935–1937), the Research Foundation of the Armour Institute of Technology 
(1939), and finally the Belmont Radio Corporation. Initially, he worked on 
developing broadcast receivers, but later worked on military electronics. His 
starting salary after graduation was $25 per week. Reber enjoyed telling how 
his parents forgot to name him, so his birth certificate merely gives his name as 
“Baby Reber.” Although he was called Grote by his parents, it wasn’t until he 
was 20 years old that he officially had his name verified on a revised birth cer-
tificate by the authority of the Cook County Clerk, Richard E. Daley, who later 
became the infamous major of Chicago.
Reber (1958) later related that he had read Jansky’s papers in the Proceedings 
of the Institute of Radio Engineers and had listened intently when Jansky’s “star 
noise” was rebroadcast by the NBC Blue network. When he was only 16 years 
old, he obtained his amateur radio license, W9GFZ, signed by then Secretary 
of the Interior, Herbert Hoover. Reber (1958) recalled that in the late 1920s 
and 1930s, he noticed that if he connected an antenna to his receiver, the noise 
level would increase when the various receiver stages were tuned to the same 
frequency, but not when the antenna was disconnected. Probably he, as well as 
other radio amateurs, had detected Karl Jansky’s galactic radio noise at 10 m 
wavelength, but did not realize this until many years later.
After contacting more than 60 countries with his amateur radio station, 
Reber was looking for new challenges. He was intrigued by the concept of 
cosmic radio emission, and in 1933, he wrote to Jansky to get more informa-
tion about his work and to see if he could come to Bell Labs to work with 
Jansky,54 but he was surprised and disappointed to learn that Bell Labs did not 
plan any further work in this area. Reber then contacted various observatories 
and university departments to see what they were doing, but like Jansky, he 
found little interest among the astronomers of the time who were busy with 
their own projects. He tried to interest Otto Struve and other astronomers at 
Yerkes Observatory, but they also showed little enthusiasm. As Reber later 
described it, “The astronomers were afraid, because they didn’t know anything 
about radio, and the radio people were not interested, because it was so faint it 
didn’t even constitute an interference—and so nobody was going to do any-
thing. So I thought, well if nobody is going to do anything, maybe I should do 
something.” 55
Working by himself for nearly a decade, Grote Reber relentlessly pursued his 
own investigations of Jansky’s fundamental discovery and set the stage for the 
extraordinary developments in radio astronomy which occurred over the next 
half a century. Reber did not wish to merely confirm Jansky’s work but wanted 
to address two fundamental questions that still motivate radio astronomers 
today: “How does the intensity at any wavelength change with position in the 
sky,” and “How does the intensity at any position change with wavelength?” 
(Reber 1958, 1982). He recognized that the then conventional wire arrays 
were effectively monochromatic, so borrowing techniques used in optical 
astronomy, as he later related, “I consulted with myself and decided to build a 
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dish.”56 To supplement his background in engineering and to enhance his 
understanding of optics and astronomy, he took classes at the University of 
Chicago, including a course in astrophysics from Philip Keenan. As part of the 
requirements for Keenan’s class, Reber prepared a survey paper titled “Long 
Wave Radiation of Extraterrestrial Origin,” in which he discussed the results of 
Jansky, Friis and Feldman, and Potepenko.57
Cosmic Static Reber first experimented with a paraffin lens, but found that it 
was too heavy and too unwieldy.58 During the summer of 1937, he took leave 
from his Chicago job, and using his own funds, designed and built a 32 foot 
parabolic transit dish in a vacant lot next to his mother’s house. Except for the 
galvanized iron reflecting surface and fasteners, Reber constructed his antenna 
entirely out of wood. Like Jansky, Reber made use of scrapped parts from an 
old Model T truck as part of the elevation drive system. Curious neighbors 
could only speculate about the purpose of the unfamiliar structure rising in the 
small town of Wheaton, but Reber’s mother found it a convenient place to 
hang her wash. Before her marriage, his mother, Harriet Grote, was an elemen-
tary school teacher. Among her seventh and eighth grade students at Longfellow 
School in Wheaton were Edwin Hubble and Red Grange, later to become a 
legendary football hero. Reber recalled that, as a teenager, Grange delivered ice 
to their home, and later he corresponded with Hubble to question the inter-
pretation of redshifts.59
In April 1937, Reber wrote to Jansky asking about the gain of Jansky’s 
equipment so that he could better estimate the sensitivity he would need to 
detect interstellar radio emission.60 Using his experience and skills as an electri-
cal engineer and radio amateur, he designed, built, and tested a series of radio 
receivers which he placed at the focal point of his antenna, with the connecting 
wires running through a coal chute to his observing room in the basement of 
his mother’s house. Although Jansky’s work was carried out at a wavelength of 
15 m (20.6 MHz) in the short wavelength band, Reber initially decided to 
observe at a much shorter wavelength of 9 cm (3300 MHz) which, at the time, 
was the shortest feasible wavelength for existing technology. At 9 cm, he would 
get better angular resolution than Jansky had,61 and he also expected that, fol-
lowing the Rayleigh-Jeans radiation law, the celestial radio noise would be very 
much stronger at the shorter wavelength.62 His receiver, which he installed at 
the focal point of his antenna, used a homemade crystal detector followed by 
an amplifier.
By the spring of 1938 his antenna and 9 cm receiver were completed, but 
Reber was unable to detect any radio noise from the Galaxy, from several bright 
stars, nor from the Sun, the Moon, or the nearby planets. Although his obser-
vations gave negative results, Reber (1958, 1982) was able to draw the impor-
tant conclusion that “the celestial radiation did not conform to the 
Rayleigh-Jeans Law.” He rebuilt his receiver operating at the longer wave-
length of 33 cm (910 MHz) where more sensitive and more stable instrumen-
tation was available, but still he had no success. Undaunted, he built a new 
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receiver to operate at 1.9 m (160 MHz), where he used a newly developed 
RCA tube as a radio frequency amplifier to give better sensitivity (Fig. 1.6). 
Finally, in the spring of 1939, just a few months before the start of World War 
II, on his first night of observing with his newest receiver, Reber succeeded in 
detecting Jansky’s galactic radio noise at 1.9 m wavelength, which he called 
cosmic static. 
While working to develop military electronics in Chicago, Reber continued 
to make 1.9 meter observations at home in Wheaton. Attempts to detect radio 
emission from a few bright stars such as Vega, Sirius, and Antares, or Mars as 
well as the Sun were unsuccessful, and he concluded that there was little cor-
respondence between the brightness of the sky at radio and optical wave-
lengths. Grote’s younger brother, Schuyler, who was a student at the Harvard 
Business School, put Grote in contact with Fred Whipple and Harlow Shapley 
at the Harvard College Observatory.63 Although Whipple expressed interest in 
Reber’s accomplishments,64 Shapley, who had already been in contact with 
Jansky several years earlier, remained reluctant to get involved with something 
that no one at Harvard knew anything about, and claimed that they could not 
start any new activities as they were already over-committed to other programs.
Reber submitted the results of his findings in a short paper titled “Cosmic 
Static” to the Proc. IRE where Jansky had published most of his pioneering 
papers. However, also wanting to reach out to astronomers, Reber sent a simi-
lar paper with the same title to the Astrophysical Journal (ApJ). The editors of 
both journals questioned the validity of his interpretation of Jansky’s results, 
although the Proc. IRE promptly accepted the paper for publication in the full 
form as submitted (Reber 1940a). The second paper was received with skepti-
cism by Astrophysical Journal editor, Otto Struve, who asked Bart Bok from 
Harvard to act as the referee. According to Jesse Greenstein, by then a young 
Fig. 1.6 Some of Reber’s Wheaton equipment used to study cosmic radio emission. 
On the left is his receiver monitor and control system. On the right is his 160 MHz 
amplifier. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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astronomer at the Yerkes Observatory, since Reber had no academic  connection 
and unclear credentials, his paper produced a flurry of excitement at the 
Astrophysical Journal editorial offices at the Yerkes Observatory located north 
of Chicago.65 Reber (1982) later commented that since the astrophysicists 
didn’t understand how the radio waves could be generated, they felt that “the 
whole affair was at best a mistake and at worse a hoax.”66 At various times, Bart 
Bok, Otto Struve, Chandrasekhar, Philip Keenan, Jesse Greenstein, and Gerard 
Kuiper traveled to Wheaton to evaluate Reber’s radio observations and equip-
ment and also to evaluate Reber. As later claimed in a footnote by Reber (1982),
Otto Struve didn’t reject my 160 MHz paper. He merely sat on it until it got 
moldy. I got tired of waiting, so I sent some other material to the Proceedings of 
the IRE. It was published promptly in the February, 1940 issue [Reber 1940a]. 
From a much slower start, this beat the ApJ by four months. During the early 
days of radio astronomy, the astronomy community had a poor track record. The 
engineering fraternity did much better!
Bart Bok cautioned Struve that he could not afford to turn down the paper 
because it might “be a great success” (Levy 1993, p.  45). Following an 
exchange of correspondence with Philip Keenan, Reber’s paper was finally 
published as a short note in the ApJ (Reber 1940b) along with the companion 
paper by Henyey and Keenan (1940) that discussed Jansky and Reber’s data in 
terms of free-free emission from interstellar ionized hydrogen. In a later paper, 
sent to Proc. IRE, Reber (1942) published a more detailed report of his obser-
vations along with an extensive technical description of his instrumentation 
and a discussion of the impact of automobile ignition noise. As in his two previ-
ous papers, as well as those to follow, Reber again used the title, “Cosmic Static.”
Among the few traditional astronomers who paid serious attention to Reber 
were Bengt Strömgren, who was then visiting Yerkes from Denmark, Otto 
Struve, Bart Bok, and Jesse Greenstein. Greenstein, also had been fascinated by 
Jansky’s discovery of cosmic radio noise, and following his visit to inspect 
Reber’s equipment, Greenstein and Reber became “moderately good friends.”67 
Grote Reber had forged the first lasting links between radio scientists and 
astronomers.
In 1940 with the encouragement of Otto Struve and Jesse Greenstein, 
Reber tried to negotiate with the University of Chicago and the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) to move his antenna to a quieter site at the McDonald 
Observatory in Texas. But they could not agree on how to recover the cost of 
moving the antenna and operating a radio observatory in Texas. Greenstein 
and Struve suggested that Grote receive an appointment at the University of 
Chicago, so the university could administer the program and collect overhead 
costs from ONR. Reber insisted on preserving his independence and was not 
interested in working for the university. He explored the possibility of continu-
ing his astronomy research while remaining an employee of his company, which 
he proposed would administer ONR funding, but this never came to fruition.
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Following the onset of World War II, Reber worked for a limited time at the 
Naval Ordnance Laboratory in Washington on the electronic protection of 
naval vessels. Due to a chronic hearing impairment, he was exempt from mili-
tary service, and in 1943 Reber returned to Wheaton, to his job in Chicago, 
and to continue his radio astronomy investigations. Encouraged by his earlier 
success, he purchased a chart recorder to relieve him of the task of writing 
down the receiver output every minute. After making further improvements to 
his receiver and feed system, Reber went on to systematically map the 160 MHz 
cosmic static. In order to keep the cost down, Reber’s homebuilt antenna was 
limited to motion in elevation only. He laboriously observed the entire sky vis-
ible from Wheaton by changing the elevation of the antenna each day and let-
ting the rotation of the earth scan the sky. Automobile ignition noise interfered 
with Reber’s measurements, so he observed only at night. In the daytime Reber 
returned to his job designing broadcast radios at Stewart Warner in Chicago, 
where he commuted by train. The train journey to Chicago took one hour 
each way.68 Upon returning home, Reber would catch a few hours’ sleep each 
evening before returning to his night’s observing. On weekends, he analyzed 
his data, and converted his fixed elevation scans to a two dimensional map of 
the sky which he published in the Astrophysical Journal (Reber 1944).
Reber’s maps (Fig.  1.7) clearly showed the pronounced maxima at the 
galactic center and what were later recognized as the Cygnus A/Cygnus X 
complex of sources, as well as the Cas A radio source (Reber 1944). As a result 
of his job as a radio engineer, Reber had access to state-of-the-art test equip-
ment and the latest microwave vacuum tubes. In order to improve his angular 
resolution, he built new equipment to work to a shorter wavelength of 62 cm 
(480 MHz). Over a 200 day period in 1946 he repeated his observations at the 
Fig. 1.7 Reber’s (1944) contour maps of the 160  MHz radio emission from the 
Milky Way Galaxy. Contours are shown as a function of right ascension and declination. 
Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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shorter wavelength producing a more detailed map of the galactic radio emis-
sion which now also showed what was later recognized as the strong radio 
galaxy Cygnus A (Reber 1948a).
In his classic paper in the ApJ (Reber 1944), and later in the Proc. IRE 
(Reber 1948a), he noted that his radio maps trace the distribution of material 
in the Milky Way, commented on the evidence for spiral arms, and confirmed 
that the strongest radio noise was coming from the center of the Galaxy. He 
noted, with surprise and disappointment, that the 62 cm radiation was weaker 
than at 1.9 meters, indicating that the celestial radiation was nonthermal in 
origin. Later he remarked, “If the data doesn’t fit the theory, change the theory 
not the data.”69
In 1947, Reber and Greenstein (1947) published what became the first 
review of radio astronomy. It included not only summaries of the pioneering 
investigations by Jansky and by Reber, but also covered the emerging postwar 
results now coming from radio scientists in England and Australia (Sect. 2.1). 
Trying to reach a broader audience, the following year Reber published an 
account of “Cosmic Radio Noise” in the semi-popular magazine Radio- 
Electronic Engineering (Reber 1948b), followed by papers in Sky and Telescope 
(Reber 1949a), Scientific American (Reber 1949b), and in the popular Leaflets 
of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific (Reber 1950).
1.4  impaCt oF karl JaNSky aND Grote reber
Karl Jansky was the first person to look at the Universe outside the traditional 
visual wavelength band. Following the initial flurry of public interest and activ-
ity resulting from the 1933 New York Times article and NBC broadcast, there 
was little reaction or encouragement from the astronomical community. As 
evidenced by Potapenko, Folland, Zwicky, Greenstein, and Whipple, and per-
haps Jansky himself, it was apparently not so much a lack of interest, but no one 
seemed to know what to do next. The gap between the radio scientists and the 
astronomers was just too great. Moreover, at the time the astronomical com-
munity was preoccupied with Edwin Hubble’s announced expansion of the 
Universe and the need for larger optical telescopes to study more distant galax-
ies. Jansky’s reports of radio emission from the Galaxy were received with inter-
est, but did not really didn’t fit into the then current mainstream astronomy. 
No one knew what to do next until Reber demonstrated radio observations 
could reveal new information about the Galaxy.
As John Pierce wrote on the occasion of the 1998 commemoration of the 
Jansky Memorial at Holmdel, “Jansky’s work shows that very important phe-
nomena can be disregarded when they don’t find a niche in the science of their 
times.”70 As a result of the Depression, the threat of war, a chronic and ulti-
mately fatal disease, and the commitment of AT&T to its commercial and 
defense related obligations, Jansky spent the rest of his short career working in 
other areas. He became a recognized expert on noise, and was decorated for his 
defense work. Jansky’s seminal papers in Proc. IRE were widely read  throughout 
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the world. In his third IRE paper (Jansky 1935) he commented, “this star static 
… puts a definite limit upon the signal strength that can be received from a 
given direction at a given time and when a receiver is good enough to receive 
that minimum signal it is a waste of money to spend any more on improving 
the receiver.” Later, scientists working on the development of radar facilities in 
the UK, as well as in Germany, recognized that their inability to lower the noise 
temperature of their meter wave radar, navigational, and communication sys-
tems was due to the Galactic radio emission which they referred to as “Jansky 
noise” (Lovell 1984).
Although he operated outside the mainstream of the astronomical commu-
nity and often ridiculed conventional research, Grote Reber, unlike Karl Jansky, 
was recognized by the astronomy profession with most of its major prizes, 
including the Catherine Bruce Medal of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific, 
the prestigious Elliot Cresson Medal of the Franklin Institute, and the 1962 
Russell Prize of the American Astronomical Society. Reber received an honor-
ary Dr. Sc. Degree from Ohio State University, and in 1999 he was named by 
the Illinois Institute of Technology as a Man of the Millennium. In 1987, he 
was inducted into the DuPage County (Illinois) Heritage Gallery Hall of Fame, 
and was inducted posthumously to the National Inventors Hall of Fame in 2013.
Grote Reber was the world’s first radio astronomer, and for nearly a decade 
the only person in the world devoting significant effort to this new field of 
astronomy. He went to great effort to demonstrate the importance of his work 
to the astronomical community. His maps of the radio emission from the Milky 
Way and his report of intense nonthermal radio emission from the Sun pro-
vided much of the incentive for the dramatic growth in radio astronomy fol-
lowing the end of World War II and also stimulated the theoretical research 
which led to Henk van de Hulst’s prediction of the 21 cm hydrogen line. His 
32 foot home-built radio telescope was the largest parabolic dish ever built at 
that time, and his development of focal plane feeds and receivers set the stage 
for later generations of radio telescopes and the ubiquitous home satellite 
receivers.71 His innovative receiver designs became known to British radar 
workers and were implemented in World War II radar systems.72
Reber also had another, perhaps less well recognized, impact on radio 
astronomy. Of the many astronomers who were first exposed to radio astron-
omy through early visits to Wheaton, three went on to play major roles in the 
future development of the field. Otto Struve would become the first director of 
NRAO; Bart Bok, perhaps influenced by his student, Jesse Greenstein, began 
the radio astronomy program at Harvard where many of the early NRAO staff 
got their start in radio astronomy; and Greenstein himself went on to start the 
radio astronomy group at Caltech. Both Greenstein and Bok were also to play 
major roles in the creation of NRAO (Chap. 3). Later, Reber’s contacts with 
science policy leaders such as Lloyd Berkner, Vannevar Bush, and Merle Tuve 
may have helped to stimulate their interests in radio astronomy and their con-
tributions to the establishment of and large investment in radio astronomy in 
Australia, at Caltech, and at NRAO.
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Although Karl Jansky was the first to detect cosmic radio emission, it was 
Grote Reber, who through his innovative experiments, forceful personality, 
and stubborn persistence finally convinced astronomers that radio astronomy 
might be important, thus opening a new window on the Universe. He worked 
alone in a previously unexplored part of the electromagnetic spectrum, design-
ing and building his own equipment, and he was surely the only astronomer, 
perhaps the only scientist, in the modern era to accomplish so much while 
working alone as an amateur.
Over a period of less than a decade, working alone and only part time, Grote 
Reber established the nonthermal nature of the galactic radio emission, recog-
nized that the radio sky was very different from the visual sky, based on his 
radio maps speculated on the spiral arm nature of the Galaxy, and published the 
first observations of radio emission from the Sun and later the remarkably 
intense solar radio emission associated with the active Sun. He showed, for the 
first time, that radio observations were more than a curiosity. He was the first 
to appreciate the potential of shorter wavelengths for radio astronomy and was 
the first to introduce the parabolic dish for radio astronomy. Throughout his 
life, he argued in support of long wavelength radio astronomy and the devel-
opment of phased arrays over expensive steerable dishes. Microwave technol-
ogy had not yet caught up with his ambitions. It would take the wartime 
development of microwave electronics to open up the microwave, then later 
millimeter-wave, bands for radio astronomy, and it would take the later devel-
opment of high speed digital electronics before radio astronomers again seri-
ously considered observing the meter and decameter wavelength sky.
Both Jansky and Reber made the profound observation that the radio sky is 
very different from the visual sky, foreshadowing the remarkable radio astron-
omy discoveries of the next half century. Ironically, after the end of World War 
II, it was in the UK and Australia that former radar scientists followed up on 
Jansky and Reber’s observations of galactic and solar radio emission. In the US 
the few radio astronomy programs were largely driven by Cold War defense 
interests and, until the NSF initiative to develop a national radio astronomy 
facility, the embryo US radio astronomy programs were largely funded by the 
military  – the Office of Naval Research (ONR) or the Air Force Office of 
Scientific Research (AFOSR).
NoteS
1. This section is based in part on correspondence between Karl and his parents 
held at the University of Wisconsin Archives, from Jansky’s notes and reports 
held in  the  Bell Labs Archives, from  other Jansky family correspondence, 
and from discussions and correspondence with former Bell Labs Scientist, J.A. 
(Tony) Tyson, as well as with Karl’s wife, children, and sister. We are grateful 
to David Jansky who has kindly made family correspondence and documents 
available to us.
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2. Jansky did not receive his Master’s degree until 1936, after submitting a thesis 
based on his work at Bell Labs.
3. H. Friis confirmed the influence of C.M. Jansky, Jr. in hiring Karl at Bell Labs 
during his 1965 interview with R.  Kestenbaum, NAA-KGJ, Bell Labs Oral 
Interviews, and also in a 22 November 1955 letter to J.R.  Howland, 
NAA-KGJ.
4. KGJ to parents, 5 May 1933, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1. Karl and his wife 
Alice regularly corresponded with Karl’s parents. As a Professor of Electrical 
Engineering at the University of Wisconsin, Karl’s father was interested in Karl’s 
work, which Karl carefully described in his letters. Although addressed to Karl’s 
mother and father as well as his younger siblings still living at home, Karl’s tech-
nical remarks were clearly directed to his father. When Karl’s parents sold their 
home in Madison, the new owners found these letters in the attic, and, aware of 
their historical value, donated them to the University of Wisconsin Archives. We 
are indebted to the University Archivist, Bernard Schermetzler, for making 
these letters available.
5. Jansky’s notebook and his work reports were located in the Bell Labs Archives 
by J.A.  Tyson, who kindly made copies available to the authors. NAA-KIK, 
Open Skies, Chap. 1.
6. KGJ to parents, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
7. Edmond Bruce was a Member of the Bell Labs Technical Staff who had invented 
the antenna array which bears his name. There is some evidence that he had 
independently detected excess noise which appeared to be extraterrestrial, but 
he never followed this up.
8. The classical Bruce Array was bidirectional. By adding a parasitic reflector ele-
ment, Jansky’s array was omni-directional. The array had an azimuth beamwidth 
of 24 degrees and elevation beamwidth of 36 degrees (Sullivan 1978).
9. Jansky’s notebook entry, pg. 81. Bell Laboratory Archives, Photocopy: NAA- 
KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1. Jansky later found interfering signals at 14.5 meters 
and changed his observing wavelength to 14.6 meters.
10. KGJ to his parents, 5 December 1930, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
11. KGJ to his parents, 27 November 1932, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
12. Karl’s older brother Moreau later recalled that he was probably the chair of the 
session. R. Kestenbaum interview with C.M. Jansky, Jr., 11 May 1965, NAA- 
KGJ, Bell Labs Oral Interviews. See also note 29.
13. KGJ to parents, 18 January 1933, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
14. KGJ to parents, 31 July 1932, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
15. KGJ to parents, 5 May 1933, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1. We are indebted 
to J. Goldbaum, NASEM Archivist, for providing us with a copy of the 27 April 
1933 URSI agenda.
16. Russell Ohl, oral history conducted in 1965 by F. Polkinghorn, IEEE History 
Center, Hoboken, NJ; R. Ohl interview by L. Hoddeson, 20 August 1976, AIP.
17. Transcript of the 15 May 1933 NBC WJZ interview with Karl Jansky, NAA- 
KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
18. KGJ to parents, 10 May 1933, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
19. C.M. Jansky Jr. to C.M. Jansky, 16 May 1933; KGJ to parents, 25 May 1933, 
NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
20. KGJ to his parents, 10 May 1933, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
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21. John Kraus (1984) later reported that less than two dozen people heard Jansky’s 
historic talk.
22. KGJ to his parents, 22 January 1934, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
23. Copies of Sir Edward Appleton’s 1948 URSI Presidential Address were found 
in the papers of C.M. Jansky, Jr., donated to the NRAO/AUI Archives by Karl’s 
son David. NAA-KGJ, Correspondence, Family Correspondence.
24. The MUSA array near Manahawkin, New Jersey was used together with an 
identical array in the UK by President Roosevelt to communicate with British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill during WWII.
25. R.  Kestenbaum interview with A.  Beck, 10 February 1965, NAA-KGJ, Bell 
Labs Oral Interviews.
26. GR to G.  Southworth, 15 April 1960, NAA-GR, General Correspondence. 
https://science.nrao.edu/about/publications/open-skies#section-1
27. J.C.  Schelleng to G.  Du Shane, 16 October 1956, and 8 November 1956, 
NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
28. H. Friis to C.M. Jansky, Jr., 23 January 1958, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
29. In his 1965 interview with Ray Kestenbaum and in the referenced publications, 
Friis firmly and repeatedly held the position that Jansky never asked to continue 
his star noise work, but at the same time he noted that had Karl lived longer, he 
surely would have received the Nobel Prize for his discovery of galactic radio 
emission. NAA-KGJ, Bell Labs Oral Interviews.
30. C. M. Jansky, Jr. to Alice Jansky Knopp, 7 February 1958, NAA-KIK, Open 
Skies, Chap. 1 (Alice had remarried Otto Knopp).
31. Alice Jansky Knopp to C.M. Jansky, Jr., 11 February 1958, NAA-KIK, Open 
Skies, Chap. 1.
32. C.M. Jansky, Jr. to Alice Jansky Knopp, 26 March 1958, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, 
Chap. 1.
33. Audio recordings of these interviews were retained at the Bell Labs Archives. In 
1997, J.A. Tyson kindly made copies available to NRAO. With Tyson’s permis-
sion, the recordings have been transcribed and posted on the Web, See NAA- 
KGJ, Bell Labs Oral Interviews.
34. G.  Southworth to R.  Kestenbaum, 10 March 1965, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, 
Chap. 1.
35. L. Espenschied to G. Southworth, 21 February 1965, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, 
Chap. 1.
36. G. Southworth to L. Espenschied, 23 February 1965, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, 
Chap. 1.
37. R. Ohl, 1976, op. cit.
38. C.M.  Jansky, Jr. to Karl, Alice and Anne Moreau, 9 May 1933, NAA-WJS, 
Cosmic Noise, Working Papers, K.G. Jansky.
39. KGJ to parents, 10 June 1933, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
40. KGC to parents, 5 May 1933, NAA-KIK, Open Skies, Chap. 1.
41. KGJ to his parents, 22 January 1934, NAA-WJS, Cosmic Noise, Working 
Papers, K.G. Jansky.
42. G. Reber to J. Pfeiffer, 31 January 1955, NAA-GR, General Correspondence I.
43. R. Ohl, 1975 op. cit.
44. Cyril Jansky to Karl, Alice and Anne Moreau, 9 May 1933, NAA-WJS, Cosmic 
Noise, Working Papers, K.G. Jansky.
45. KGJ to his parents, 22 January 1934, op. cit.
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46. The first suggestions that the nonthermal cosmic radio emission was due to 
synchrotron radiation was by Alfvén and Herlofson (1950) and Kippenheuer 
(1950), but it was the quantitative papers by Ginzburg (1951) and Shklovsky 
(1952) that convinced the astronomical community of its relevance.
47. Alice Jansky Knopp to Sir Edward Appleton, 17 April 1950, NAA-KGJ, 
Correspondence, Family Correspondence. The letter indicates that Alice had 
previously written to Appleton while Karl was still alive to promote his case for 
the Nobel Prize.
48. Martin Ryle and Anthony Hewish in 1974, for aperture synthesis and pulsars 
respectively; Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson in 1978, for their discovery of the 
cosmic microwave background; Russell Hulse and Joseph Taylor in 1993, for 
their discovery of a new type of pulsar that opened up new possibilities for the 
study of gravitation; and John Mather and George Smoot in 2006, for their 
discovery of the blackbody form and anisotropy of the cosmic microwave 
background.
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CHAPTER 2
The Postwar Explosion in Radio Astronomy: 
The US Falls Behind
During the Second World War, a number of radar scientists independently dis-
covered powerful radio emission from the Sun. Following the cessation of hos-
tilities, and making use of their wartime experience, scientists, mostly at Jodrell 
Bank and Cambridge in the UK and in Sydney, Australia, used discarded radar 
systems to further investigate the complex solar radio emission, discovered 
powerful radio emission from old supernova explosions, and even more power-
ful radio sources from what later became known as radio galaxies. Encouraged 
by their early successes with relatively primitive equipment and the potential for 
new discoveries, scientists in the UK, Australia, the USSR, and the Netherlands 
developed plans to build more powerful radio telescopes and sophisticated new 
instrumentation.
In the US, support for radio astronomy was largely driven by Cold War 
defense concerns, with funding mostly from the Office of Naval Research 
(ONR) and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR). Radio astron-
omy projects were begun at several universities, research institutes, and govern-
ment and military laboratories. Despite the considerable investment in resources 
under the direction of skilled scientists and engineers, the early American radio 
astronomy research did not have the same impact as the programs in the UK 
and Australia.
In this chapter we discuss the postwar explosion in radio astronomy leading 
to concerns that the United States had fallen behind other countries, namely 
the UK and Australia, in this rapidly developing field of astronomy with obvi-
ous commercial and military implications to the growing Cold War environ-
ment. These concerns, whether real, imagined, or invented, would lead to 
efforts, begun in the mid-1950s, to establish a national radio astronomy facility 
to compete with the rapidly developing programs in Europe and Australia. 
Edge (1984), Edge and Mulkay (1976), Elbers (2017), Frater et al. (2017), 
Kellermann (2012), Orchiston et al. (2007), Robertson (1992), and especially 
Sullivan (2009) have described these developments in more detail, while more 
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personal accounts are given by Bolton (1982), Bowen (1984, 1987), Bracewell 
(2005), Christiansen (1984), Denisse (1984), Ginzburg (1984), Graham- 
Smith (2005), Haddock (1984), Hanbury Brown (1991), Hey (1973), Kraus 
(1984, 1995), Lovell (1984a, b, 1990), Mills (1984, 2006), Salomonovich 
(1984), Tanaka (1984), Wang (2009), and in the compilations by Kellermann 
and Sheets (1984) and Sullivan (1984).
2.1  Postwar radio astronomy
By the end of WWII, it was increasingly apparent that the discoveries by Jansky 
and Reber, as well as the wartime serendipitous discoveries of powerful radio 
emission from the Sun, presented a new way to study the Universe. Scientists 
and engineers in a number of countries, particularly in Australia, the UK, The 
Netherlands, Russia, and in the US turned their attention to following up these 
opportunities. With a few exceptions, namely in the Netherlands and at Harvard 
University and Berkeley, these programs were initiated by scientists and engi-
neers with backgrounds in physics and radio science, rather than by astronomers.
The MIT Radiation Laboratory The MIT Radiation Laboratory, known as the 
“Rad Lab,” was a remarkable example of wartime success that employed over 
3500 skilled scientists and spent nearly $4 million a month developing and 
producing radar systems. As the end of WWII approached, Robert (Bob) 
Dicke, then a young PhD from the University of Rochester, together with 
other Rad Lab colleagues, conducted a series of groundbreaking experiments 
that would later have a major impact on the development of radio astronomy. 
Using a small 1.5 foot (46 cm) dish, Dicke and Berringer (1946) measured the 
1.25 cm (24 GHz) radio emission from the Sun and the Moon, and reported 
black body temperatures of 11,000 K and of 292 K respectively. During a par-
tial solar eclipse on 9 July 1945, they demonstrated that the 1.25 cm emission 
from the Sun came from the same region as the visual solar disk. These mea-
surements were at by far the shortest wavelength that had been used for radio 
astronomy. During the same period, Dicke et al. (1946) observed, for the first 
time, the thermal radio emission from the atmosphere at 1.0 cm, 1.25 cm, and 
1.5  cm, confirming that the suspected opacity that had been indicated by 
erratic 1.3 cm radar operation was due to atmospheric water vapor. They were 
unable to detect any radio emission from any stars, and also put an upper limit 
of 20 degrees on any “radiation from cosmic matter,” although Dicke did not 
appreciate its importance until two decades later.
In order to suppress the effect of receiver gain instabilities which could 
mimic the response of a cosmic source, in all of these studies, Dicke (1946) 
rapidly switched his receiver between the antenna and a reference source 30 
times per second, and measured only the difference signal which was nearly 
independent of receiver gain fluctuations. This synchronous detection scheme 
which has come to be known a “Dicke switch” became the basis of all non- 
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interferometric radio astronomy continuum measurements and, in a modified 
form, spectroscopic observations as well.
This series of observations, which took place during the summer of 1945, 
led to seven key results: the first radio astronomy observations at short centi-
meter wavelengths, the first detection of radio emission from the Moon, the 
first measurements of microwave attenuation by atmospheric water vapor, the 
development of the Dicke switch, the quantitative development of the funda-
mental radiometer equation, calibration using a variable temperature resistive 
load, and the first upper limit on any isotropic cosmic background radiation. 
While these contributions of Dicke and his colleagues marked the beginning of 
the postwar era of radio astronomy, at the time they went largely unnoticed by 
the astronomical community.
Radio Astronomy in the UK Following the end of WWII, radio astronomy in 
Britain was pursued in three places: at Cambridge University under Martin 
Ryle, at the University of Manchester’s Jodrell Bank Observatory under 
Bernard Lovell, and at the UK Army Operational Research Group (AORG) 
under J. Stanley Hey. Ryle, Lovell, and Hey had each been involved in wartime 
radar research. Only Ryle and Lovell returned to university life after the War, 
while Hey began a radio astronomy program within the AORG.
Hey’s background was in physics, having received a Masters’ degree in X-ray 
crystallography at Manchester University (Hey 1973). He had no previous 
training in radio engineering prior to a six week military training program, and 
no background in astronomy. After seven years leading the AORG radio 
astronomy program at Richmond Park, just 10 miles from downtown London, 
Hey built a research group at Malvern where he later constructed a two- 
element variable spacing radio interferometer with baselines up to 1 km.
Lovell returned to the University of Manchester to set up a radar system first 
to study cosmic rays and then to study the ionization trails left by meteors. To 
enhance their sensitivity, Lovell and J.A. Clegg built a fixed 218 foot (66 m) 
reflector at Jodrell Bank near Manchester. Although Lovell planned to use the 
telescope for a meteor scatter program, he was joined by Robert Hanbury 
Brown and Cyril Hazard, who used the dish for a variety of radio astronomy 
programs at 1.89 meters (159 MHz), including observations of M31 (Hanbury 
Brown and Hazard 1951) and a survey that disclosed 23 discrete radio sources 
(Hanbury Brown and Hazard 1953). Inspired by the success of the 218 foot 
dish, Lovell went on to build the iconic fully steerable 250 foot (76 meter) 
dish, which went into operation in 1957 (Sect. 6.6) following an agonizing 
engineering and financial near-fiasco that almost sent Lovell to prison (Lovell 
1984b, 1990). Later, under the leadership of Henry Palmer, Jodrell Bank radio 
astronomers also built a series of radio-linked interferometers of ever increasing 
angular resolution (Sect. 8.1).
Radio astronomy at Cambridge was established under the forceful leader-
ship of Martin Ryle, who, over a period of several decades, guided the develop-
ment of interferometer systems of ever increasing sophistication and angular 
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resolution, coupled with the formulation of the concepts of aperture synthesis 
(Sect. 7.1). With these innovative radio telescopes, Ryle and a group of tal-
ented students made a series of radio source surveys, including the 1C (Ryle 
et al. 1950), 2C (Shakeshaft et al. 1955), 3C (Edge et al. 1959), and its revision 
3CR (Bennett 1962). The 3CR survey, in particular, became for many years the 
basis of detailed radio source studies, at least in the Northern Hemisphere.
The Australian CSIRO Radiophysics Laboratory As the War was winding 
down, E.G. (Taffy) Bowen left the MIT Radiation Lab to take up an appoint-
ment at the Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organization (CSIRO, then called CSIR or Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research). Two years later he became Chief of the CSIRO Radiophysics 
Laboratory, where he began programs in cloud physics and radio astronomy. 
Joseph L. Pawsey, who had joined the Radiophysics Lab in 1940, led the new 
radio astronomy program. John Bolton (Kellermann 1996; Robertson 2017), 
Paul Wild (Frater and Ekers 2012), Bernard (Bernie) Mills (Frater et al. 2017, 
p. 23), and Wilbur Norman (Chris) Christiansen (Frater et al. 2017, p. 59) all 
joined the group, and along with Pawsey, began their own independent 
research programs. 
Pawsey (1946), with support from Bolton and Gordon Stanley, observed 
the Sun from field stations at Collaroy and Dover Heights in the Sydney sub-
urbs, confirming that the intense radio emission from the Sun was associated 
with sunspot activity. Although their radar antenna did not have sufficient 
angular resolution to determine the location of the radio emission on the Sun, 
Pawsey used a trick to enhance the resolution of his simple antenna.
During WWII, shipboard radar operators would sometimes note that when 
an aircraft was approaching at low elevation, two signals were received, one 
directly from the aircraft and one reflected off the ocean. The two signals inter-
fered with each other, and as the angle of approach changed due to the chang-
ing differential path length, there would be a series of interference maxima and 
minima.1 Pawsey exploited this “sea interferometer” effect to study the struc-
ture of solar radio emission using a small antenna located on a Dover Heights 
cliff overlooking the Pacific Ocean (McCready et al. 1947).2
Both Christiansen and Wild continued to study solar radio emission. Initially, 
Wild concentrated on studying the solar dynamic spectra, and established the 
now standard nomenclature used to classify solar radio bursts. He later built a 
96-element circular array to obtain dynamic images of the Sun with a resolu-
tion of up to about 2 arcmin (Wild 1967), and went on to become first Chief 
of the CSIRO Division of Radiophysics and then Chairman of 
CSIRO. Christiansen built a series of interferometer arrays of increasing sophis-
tication, and developed novel synthesis imaging techniques complementing 
the development of aperture synthesis by the Cambridge group (Sect. 7.1). 
Bernie Mills developed an alternate approach to obtain high resolution by 
building large cross arrays (known as a Mills Cross) with each arm built of 
many simple dipoles (Mills and Little 1953). John Bolton, assisted by Gordon 
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Stanley and Bruce Slee, identified the first radio sources with optical  counterparts 
(Sect. 2.3). Together with Stanley, Bolton left Australia in 1955 to start the 
radio astronomy program at Caltech, only to return six years later to direct the 
operation of the Parkes 210 foot radio telescope (Kellermann 1996; Robertson 
2017). However, when Bowen decided to concentrate the Radiophysics 
resources on the new Parkes 210 foot radio telescope, Mills and Christiansen 
left CSIRO to join the schools of physics and electrical engineering at the 
University of Sydney (Robertson 1992; Frater et al. 2017). 
Radio Astronomy in Europe Although recovery from the devastating effects of 
WWII was slow, modest radio astronomy programs began in the Netherlands 
and in France using captured German radar systems, particularly the 7.5 meter 
Würzburg parabolic dishes.
The French radio astronomy program began under the leadership of Jean- 
Francois Denisse and Jean-Louis Steinberg, who were later joined by Emile 
Blum and others. As France was occupied from the early days of WWII, French 
scientists were somewhat isolated from the technical advances that led to the 
rapid development of radio astronomy in the “Anglo-Saxon world” (Denisse 
1984). As elsewhere, the first programs were in solar radio astronomy, largely 
because the Sun was the brightest source in the sky and did not require sophis-
ticated equipment. Other observations included a 900  MHz survey of the 
galactic plane using a 7.5 meter Würzburg antenna (Denisse et al. 1955). Later 
Lequeux et  al. (1959) built a variable spacing interferometer at the Nançay 
Observatory using two Würzburg antennas with baselines up to 1.5 km, which 
was used by Lequeux (1962) at 1.4 GHz to observe the structure of 40 dis-
crete sources, many for the first time. The Nançay interferometer observations 
were among the first to demonstrate the double nature of many extragalactic 
radio sources. However, with limited sensitivity and lack of phase stability, the 
Nançay interferometer could not compete with the almost contemporaneous 
Caltech Owens Valley Interferometer.
Unlike those in other countries, the Dutch radio astronomy program began 
not with radio physicists, but under the leadership of the well-known astrono-
mer, Jan Oort. Indeed, due to the lack of scientists experienced in radio instru-
mentation, the Dutch program initially suffered until the electronics engineer 
C. Alexander (Lex) Muller was recruited from Dutch industry by Oort. As in 
other countries, the Dutch radio astronomy program was initially focused on 
the Sun. But for the decade after the 1951 detection of the hydrogen 21 cm 
line (Sect. 2.4) it was nearly exclusively devoted to 21 cm research, with the 
goal of using Doppler shifts to determine the kinematics of the Galaxy.
Radio astronomy in Sweden started in 1949 when Olof Rydbeck brought 
five Würzburgs from the remote Norwegian coast to his Onsala Space 
Observatory (OSO) which was part of the Chalmers University of Technology. 
Early research was concentrated on the Sun and 21 cm observations of galactic 
structure. Following the construction of 25 and 20 meter telescopes, the OSO 
became one of the European leaders in very long baseline interferometry 
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(VLBI) (Sect. 8.1) and molecular spectroscopy. Some of the first successful 
maser amplifiers used for radio astronomy were developed at the OSO. Hein 
Hvatum, later to become head of NRAO technical programs, began his career 
at Chalmers under the strong supervision of Rydbeck. Like many of the other 
pioneers of radio astronomy, Rydbeck’s background was in electronics and 
radiophysics (Radhakrishnan 2006). Although Sweden was neutral during 
WWII, Rydbeck was one of the leaders in developing the wartime radar 
defenses needed to maintain Sweden’s neutrality.
In Germany, research in radio physics was initially forbidden by the occupy-
ing Allied powers but developed starting in the 1950s, especially after 1962 
when Otto Hachenberg became director of the University of Bonn’s 25 meter 
Stockert radio telescope (Sect. 9.2).
Radio Astronomy in Japan As related by Tanaka (1984), just as in Germany, 
the start of radio astronomy in Japan was delayed by their defeat in 
WWII. Separate projects using relatively simple equipment to study the Sun 
were started by Minoru Oda, F. Hatanaka, A. Kimpara, Koichi Shimoda, and 
Haruo Tanaka. Later Tanaka led the development of a five-element interferom-
eter for high resolution solar imaging which was expanded to eight elements in 
1954. As pointed out by Ishiguro et al. (2012), perhaps one of the most impor-
tant Japanese contributions to early radio astronomy was the development by 
Shintaro Uda and his professor Hidetsugu Yagi of the Yagi-Uda antenna, more 
commonly known as the Yagi antenna, which was used world-wide in many of 
the early radio astronomy systems, as well as in a multitude of other short wave 
communication systems. With the creation of the Nobeyama Radio Observatory 
in 1970 following the construction of the 84-element heliograph, the six-ele-
ment millimeter array of precision 10 meter dishes, the 45 meter radio tele-
scope (Sect. 10.5), and the establishment of a vigorous space VLBI (Sect. 8.9) 
program, Japan became a major player in cosmic as well as in solar radio astron-
omy, and a pioneer in the development of millimeter wave interferometry 
(Sect. 10.5).
Radio Astronomy Behind the Iron Curtain As in Western countries, early radio 
astronomy research in the USSR was primarily the domain of scientists profi-
cient in radio physics and electronics who had developed their skills while 
working on wartime radar programs. Although postwar support for radio 
astronomy in essentially all countries had its origin in military radar, in most 
countries it was implemented in universities and in civilian research laborato-
ries. However, in the USSR radio astronomy remained within military-oriented 
and tightly controlled laboratories that limited the distribution of research 
findings. Even when results of radio astronomy investigations were published 
in the open literature, critical data on the instrumentation and techniques used 
in the observations were often restricted, leading to skepticism or disregard of 
Soviet papers by Western scientists. Within the Soviet Union itself, there was 
little communication among the  different radio astronomy groups who were 
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competing for limited resources, and even less contact with the broader inter-
national astronomical community.
Starting in 1958, many of the most important Soviet journals were trans-
lated into English, but Soviet observational results had little impact outside of 
the USSR.  In contrast, however, the theoretical work of people like Iosef 
Shklovsky, Solomon Pikel’ner, Vitaly Ginzburg, and Yakov Zel’dovich in 
Moscow, as well as Viktor Ambartsumian in Armenia, and later their students, 
Nikolai Kardashev, Igor Novikov, Vyacheslav Slysh, and Rashid Sunyaev, was 
widely recognized and greatly influenced both theoretical thinking as well as 
motivating new observational programs in the US, Europe, and Australia. 
Indeed, the English language translation of Shklovsky’s book, Cosmic Radio 
Waves (Shklovsky 1960) was used by generations of students around the world.
Postwar Soviet observational radio astronomy programs were led by 
S.E.  Khaikin (Lebedev Physical Institute), N.D.  Papalesky (Lebedev), 
V.S. Troitsky (Gorky), and V.V. Vitkevich (Lebedev). One of the earliest pro-
grams involved a 1947 eclipse expedition to Brazil. Using a 1.5  meter 
(200 MHz) phased dipole array mounted on the deck of their ship, Khaikin 
had the ship’s captain maneuver the vessel to track the Sun during the solar 
eclipse and was able to demonstrate that the radio emission came from the 
much larger coronal region rather than the totally eclipsed Sun (Salomonovich 
1984). Starting in 1948, under the leadership of Vitkevitch, Lebedev radio 
astronomers set up a series of observing stations on the south coast of Crimea, 
including a refurbished captured German Würzburg-Riese antenna. In 1959, 
Lebedev constructed a 22 meter (72 foot)  precision dish at one of the sites on 
the shore of the Black Sea that operated at wavelengths as short as 8 mm, and 
for a long time was the largest radio telescope in the world operating at such 
short wavelengths. Twenty years later, it became the focal point of the first 
US-USSR VLBI observations (Sect. 8.2).
Radio Astronomy in China As in other countries, early post-war radio astron-
omy in China concentrated on solar research at meter wavelengths, but with 
instrumentation imported from the USSR. Even more than in the USSR, radio 
astronomy activities in China were cloaked in secrecy and hidden from Western 
scientists. Likewise Chinese scientists had little contact with the West (Wang 
2009). But in remarkable contrast to pervading policies, starting in 1963, 
Chris Christiansen from Australia made more than a dozen visits to China, 
where he helped implement a series of advanced radio astronomy arrays. As a 
result of his frequent trips to China, Christiansen for many years was denied 
visas to visit the United States. Following the end in 1976 of the Cultural 
Revolution in China and the resumption of diplomatic relations with Western 
countries, exchanges between Chinese and Western scientists flourished; a new 
generation of young radio astronomers were trained, and China went on to 
develop strong programs in radio astronomy.
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2.2  radio waves from the sun3
Although the Sun is the strongest radio source in the sky other than the Milky 
Way Galaxy, especially during periods of solar activity, neither Jansky nor Reber, 
until 1944, were able to detect radio emission from the Sun. However, during 
the 1920s and 1930s US, British, and Japanese amateur radio operators, mostly 
operating in the 10  m (28  MHz) band, reported noise or hissing that was 
probably due to radio emission from the Sun during periods of intense solar 
activity. Probably the first documented report of solar radio emission was by 
the British radio amateur D.W. Heightman who operated the amateur radio 
station G6DH. Heightman (1936) reported a “smooth hissing sound when 
listened to on a receiver,” which he suggested, “apparently originates on the 
Sun, since it has only been heard during daylight.”
Solar radio emission was independently detected and documented on mul-
tiple occasions during World War II by radar operators in the UK, in Germany 
(Schott 1947), in Japan (Tanaka 1984), and in the South Pacific by Elizabeth 
Alexander.4 Hey (1973, p. 15) and Lovell (1984a) have described one of the 
best known and perhaps the most dramatic serendipitous detection of solar 
radio emission which occurred in February 1942 when Britain was on high 
alert for an impending German invasion. On 12 February two German destroy-
ers, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, passed through the English Channel 
undetected by the jammed 4.2 m (71.4 MHz) British coastal radar. Concerned 
about the effectiveness of their coastal defense radar chain, the UK War Office 
assigned the AORG’s J.S. Hey the job of understanding and eliminating the 
jamming. On 27 and 28 February, the coastal radar systems again became 
inoperable due to apparent German anti-radar activity, but Hey noticed that 
the apparent jamming occurred only in the daytime when the radar antennas 
were pointed toward the Sun, and that it was a time of exceptional sunspot 
activity. He concluded that the Sun was a source of powerful 4–8  m 
(37–75 MHz) radio emission about 100,000 times greater than expected from 
a 6000 K black body. Hey described his discovery in a secret report5 which 
became known to scientists in other Allied countries. However, wartime secrecy 
precluded any publication of his discovery in the scientific literature until the 
close of hostilities (Hey 1946).
Just a few months later, on 29 June 1942, Bell Labs scientists, A.P. King and 
George Southworth succeeded in detecting the thermal radio emission from 
the quiet Sun, first at 9.4 GHz (3.2 cm) and later at 3.06 GHz (9.8 cm). As 
with  Hey’s discovery, Southworth’s study of the radio emission from the quiet 
Sun wasn’t published until after the War (Southworth 1945, 1956). However, 
Southworth’s 1942 classified report was distributed to various groups, includ-
ing the Harvard College Observatory and the British War Office for further 
distribution within the British Commonwealth.6 During this period, many Bell 
Labs visitors, including Bowen and Pawsey from Australia, became aware of 
Southworth’s detection of solar radio emission.
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In his 160 MHz (1.9 m) survey paper, Reber (1944) commented, only in 
passing, that, in spite of daytime interference, he was able to detect radio emis-
sion from the Sun, and realized that the radio emission was more than 100 
times more intense than expected from a 6000 K black body.7 Since the earlier 
observations of solar radio emission by Hey and Southworth remained under 
military classification until after the end of WWII, Reber’s (1944) paper was 
the first published report of solar radio emission. With great perception, he 
noted that even if all the stars in the Galaxy radiated with the same intensity as 
the Sun, that would fail to account for the observed radio emission from the 
Milky Way. Again, in his later paper on his 480 MHz (62 cm) survey, Reber 
(1944) comments only in the last sentence of the paper that he also obtained 
data on solar radio emission. Although there had been numerous classified 
observations of solar radio emission in the UK, in the South Pacific, and in the 
US, Grote Reber (1944), unrestricted by wartime security constraints, was the 
first to report radio emission from the Sun in the scientific literature and the 
first to recognize and report the observation of the near 1  million degree 
solar corona.
While demonstrating his equipment to National Bureau of Standards (NBS) 
visitors on 21 November 1946, Reber was surprised to observe that intense 
radio bursts from the Sun drove his chart recorder off scale.8 Re-inspection of 
his earlier records indicated that a similar, but much weaker phenomenon had 
also occurred on 17 October. In surprising contrast to his earlier slow meticu-
lous work and his 1944 indifference to solar radio emission, Reber dashed off 
a hastily written letter to Nature (Reber 1946).9 In this report, Reber also 
noted that “the apparent solar temperature [of the quiet Sun] was about a mil-
lion degrees,” in good agreement with the Australian work (Pawsey 1946).
2.3  radio stars and radio Galaxies
Grote Reber’s 160 MHz (1.9 m) and especially his 480 MHz (62 cm) maps 
indicated several peaks in the radio emission in addition to the one near the 
Galactic Center, but it would be another serendipitous discovery by J. Stanley 
Hey, that suggested the first evidence for discrete sources of cosmic radio emis-
sion. Hey first learned about Jansky’s work from his supervisor when he 
reported his 1942 discovery of solar jamming of the British coastal radar sys-
tems, and had since read Jansky’s and Reber’s papers in Proc. IRE. Just a few 
months after the end of the War in Europe, Hey, Phillips, and Parsons (1946b) 
used a 64 MHz (5 m) radar antenna to map out the galactic radio emission 
between declinations −3 and +60 degrees. With a beamwidth of 6 by 15 
degrees, they observed the peaks previously noted by Reber at the position of 
the Galactic Center and also in the Cygnus region near right ascension 20hr30m 
and declination +35 degrees. Continued observations with improved equip-
ment led to a remarkable discovery. Hey, Parsons, and Phillips (1946a) found 
that the observed emission from the Cygnus region appeared to fluctuate by 
about 15% on time scales considerably less than one minute and concluded 
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that, “such marked variations could only originate from a small number of 
discrete sources.”
Halfway around the world, in Sydney, Australia, Hey’s discovery excited 
John Bolton. Assisted by Gordon Stanley, Bolton constructed an antenna at 
Dover Heights overlooking the Pacific Ocean which they used as a 100 MHz 
sea interferometer to show that the Cygnus source was less than 8 arcmin in 
extent (Bolton and Stanley 1948). Using this same sea interferometer, Bolton 
(1948) went on to discover six new discrete sources. Simultaneous observa-
tions made from Australia and New Zealand, as well as from sites at Cambridge 
and Jodrell Bank showed that the intensity variations were independent at the 
two sites, confirming that they were not intrinsic to the source, but were the 
result of the signal propagation through the Earth’s ionosphere.10 After months 
of painstaking observations, Bolton, Stanley, and Slee (1949) succeeded in 
measuring the positions of three strong radio sources with accuracy better than 
half a degree. For the first time it was possible to associate radio sources with 
known optical objects. They identified the strong radio sources, Taurus A, 
Centaurus A, and Virgo A with the Crab Nebula, and the galaxies NGC 5128 
and M87 respectively. NGC 5128, with its conspicuous dark lane, and M87, 
with its prominent jet, were well known to astronomers as peculiar galaxies. In 
their Nature paper, Bolton et  al. mostly discussed the nature of the Crab 
Nebula, but in a few paragraphs near the end of their paper, they commented,
NGC 5128 and NGC 4486 (M87) have not been resolved into stars, so there is 
little direct evidence that they are true galaxies. If the identification of the radio 
sources are [sic] accepted, it would indicate that they are [within our own Galaxy].
As implied by the title, of their paper, “Positions of Three Discrete Sources 
of Galactic Radio-Frequency Radiation,” Bolton et al. incorrectly dismissed the 
extragalactic nature of both Centaurus A and M87. When asked many years 
later by one of the authors (KIK) why he did not recognize that he had discov-
ered the first radio galaxies, Bolton responded that he knew they were extraga-
lactic, but that he also realized that the corresponding radio luminosity would 
be orders of magnitude greater than that of our Galaxy and that he was con-
cerned that, in view of their apparent extraordinary luminosity, a conservative 
Nature referee might hold up publication of the paper.11 Nevertheless, in spite 
of their stated reservation, their 1949 paper is generally regarded as the begin-
ning of extragalactic radio astronomy (Bolton 1982). Yet, for the next few 
years the nature of discrete radio sources remained controversial within the 
radio astronomy community. While Ryle and his group at the Cavendish 
Laboratory continued to refer to radio stars, the extragalactic nature of NGC 
5128 and M87 and their powerful radio luminosity was broadly recognized 
and caught the attention not only of astronomers, but of the physics commu-
nity as well. How could there be such strong radio sources? Where did the 
energy come from? How was this energy converted into radio emission?
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The nature of the broader population of radio stars remained uncertain. 
Among the four brightest sources, there was one galactic supernova remnant, 
two nearby galaxies, and one unidentified source with no apparent optical 
counterpart. Mills and Thomas (1951), using a two-element interferometer, 
succeeded in measuring a more accurate position of the Cygnus A radio source. 
Mills communicated an apparent identification with a faint galaxy to Rudolph 
Minkowski, a well-known astronomer at Caltech’s Mt. Wilson and Palomar 
Observatories. But Minkowski could not accept that such a faint, and presum-
ably distant galaxy could be such a strong radio source, and dismissed Mills’ 
identification. Only after F. Graham-Smith (1951) used his two-element inter-
ferometer in Cambridge to obtain an even more accurate radio position did 
Minkowski accept the identification with what appeared to be two galaxies in 
collision. However, the classic paper by Baade and Minkowski (1954) which 
reported the identification of Cygnus A gave only footnote recognition to 
Mills’ previous identification.
The identification of the second strongest radio source in the sky with a faint 
distant galaxy was remarkable. Already both Cambridge and Australian radio 
astronomers were cataloguing radio sources as much as a 100 times fainter than 
Cygnus A. The galaxy identified with Cygnus A was near the limit of what was 
then the largest optical telescope in the word, the 200 inch Palomar telescope. 
Radio telescopes were apparently poised to open a new approach to exploring 
the distant and correspondingly early Universe.
The Source Count Controversy After years of considering that the radio stars 
were part of a galactic population, Martin Ryle was finally convinced, by the 
observed isotropy of the source distribution, that they were powerful extraga-
lactic objects that could be used to address broad cosmological problems. 
During the 1950s, there were two fundamentally different approaches to cos-
mology. On the one hand, Herman Bondi, Thomas Gold, and Fred Hoyle 
were promoting their non-evolving Steady-State cosmology in which the 
Universe is, and always was, everywhere the same. A unique characteristic of 
the Steady-State model was that to maintain the requirement of an unchanging 
but expanding Universe, their model required the controversial continuous 
creation of new matter by an unknown process. This stood in contrast to what 
Hoyle sarcastically called the “big bang” cosmology which has a characteristic 
time scale beginning with a mysterious singularity and a Universe that evolves 
with time.
Although even the simplest radio telescopes were able to record data from 
very great distances, there was a serious problem in using radio measurements 
for cosmological investigations, since radio observations alone give no indica-
tion of distance. Any one radio source might be a nearby galactic supernova, a 
relatively close low luminosity radio galaxy, or a much more powerful distant 
radio galaxy. Without optical identifications of radio sources and measurement 
of their redshift (distance), radio astronomers were unable to determine the 
distance or even the nature of their radio sources, and the positions of only a 
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few of the strongest radio sources were known with sufficient accuracy to 
 identify an optical counterpart. Although most of the fainter radio sources had 
no optical identification, Martin Ryle and Peter Scheuer at Cambridge reached 
a profound conclusion from the count of the observed number of radio sources 
as a function of limiting flux density.
In a static, uniformly filled universe with Euclidian geometry, the number of 
radio sources, N, above a given flux density, S, should increase as S−1.5 or log 
N = −1.5 log S.12 Based on the Cambridge 81 MHz 2C survey of 1936 sources, 
of which 1906 sources were small diameter and isotropically distributed, Ryle 
and Scheuer (1955) concluded that since the observed exponent was closer to 
−3 than −1.5, “Attempts to explain the observations in terms of a steady-state 
theory have little hope of success.” In other words, the Cambridge survey con-
tained many more faint, presumably more distant, radio sources than would be 
expected in a universe with a uniformly distributed population. This meant that 
in the past, there were either more radio sources or that they were more lumi-
nous than at present, concepts referred to as density evolution or luminosity 
evolution respectively.
However, contemporaneous observations, from the Sydney group led by 
Bernie Mills using his Mills Cross at essentially the same frequency, disagreed. 
The Sydney source count had a slope of only −1.7 which they argued, in view 
of experimental errors, did not differ significantly from −1.5 (Mills and Slee 
1957). Moreover a one-to-one comparison of the overlapping survey region, 
indicated very little agreement, and Mills and Slee concluded that the “discrep-
ancies … reflect errors in the Cambridge catalogue, and accordingly deduc-
tions of cosmological interest derived from its analysis are without foundation.”13 
In the ensuing years, Martin Ryle had to deal with challenges from two direc-
tions: first from the theoretical side from his Cambridge colleague, Fred Hoyle, 
who questioned his interpretation of the data, and second, probably more seri-
ously, from the Australian radio astronomers who questioned his data. In sev-
eral well-publicized lectures Ryle (1955, 1958) vigorously defended his 
position that the source-count was inconsistent with Steady-State cosmology. 
Further observations indeed showed that probably three-fourths of the 
Cambridge 2C sources were not real, but were blends of weaker sources, 
known as confusion.
A new more reliable Cambridge 3C survey (Edge et al. 1959) of 242 sources 
away from the galactic plane, made with higher angular resolution, reduced the 
claimed source count slope to −2.0. However, the complete Sydney survey of 
1658 sources indicated a slope of −1.5 after correction for the effects of noise 
and confusion, and concluded that “the source counts indicate no divergence 
from uniformity and no obvious cosmological effects” (Mills et  al. 1960). 
However, Ryle and Clarke (1961) still maintained that “the results appear to 
provide conclusive evidence against the Steady-State model.” The new and 
more reliable Cambridge 4C and 5C  surveys, as well as the Parkes 408 MHz 
survey, each indicated a slope near −1.8, consistent with the Sydney value, but 
still apparently in excess of the steady-state theory (Hewish 1961; Ryle 1968). 
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Mills and Hoyle continued to argue that the source count could equally well 
be interpreted as a local deficiency of only a few dozen strong sources rather 
than a cosmic excess of weak sources. Ryle responded that even these strong 
sources are so distant that their distribution is cosmologically significant.14 The 
debate, which went on for more than a decade, was intense, bitter, and per-
sonal (Kragh 1996, p. 305), and was only decided in 1965, not from radio 
source counts, but from the discovery by Penzias and Wilson (1965) of the 
cosmic microwave background, which was almost universally accepted as con-
vincing evidence for an evolving or Big Bang universe. Ryle was right; we live 
in an evolutionary universe. However, his arguments were wrong and based on 
unreliable data. Mills had much better data, consistent with contemporary 
source counts, but he got the wrong answer.
It is interesting to look back on the source count controversy in light of cur-
rent data and understanding. Both the Sydney and, especially, the Cambridge 
data contained serious instrumental errors as well as errors of interpretation. 
Because there are more weak radio sources than strong sources, even random 
errors due to noise or confusion make more weak sources appear stronger and 
strong sources appear weaker than any given flux density level, thus making the 
observed source count appear steeper than the real value. Secondly, both Ryle 
and Mills continued to use cumulative counts, where each point was the sum 
of all the stronger sources. So the data points were not independent and the 
estimated errors were unrealistically too small. Moreover, features in the source 
count at some flux density, S, would propagate to lower flux densities.15 Finally, 
in a real expanding universe, whether Steady-State or Big Bang, the effect of 
the redshift is to make sources weaker than would be the case if their flux den-
sity fell off as an inverse square of the distance, so the expected slope, in a non- 
evolving universe should be smaller than −1.5. Modern radio source counts go 
about a million times fainter than the Cambridge or Sydney surveys. Except for 
the strongest one hundred or so sources, the slope of the radio source count is 
−1.5 or flatter, so it is not clear that the steeper slope reported by the Cambridge 
observers has any relevance.
The long controversy over the radio source counts did not help the image 
of radio astronomy within the broader astronomical community. Among radio 
astronomers, the 2C fiasco  gave interferometers a bad name, which took years 
to overcome. Although the evidence for an evolving universe is now widely 
accepted, it is interesting to remember that the Steady-State model made the 
specific predication that the rate of expansion must increase with time, as con-
firmed only in 1998 with the Nobel Prize winning discovery that the expansion 
of the Universe is indeed accelerating and the recognition that 70% of the 
Universe is composed of so-called dark energy (Riess et al. 1998; Perlmutter 
et al. 1999).16 It is interesting, however, to speculate how the history of cos-
mology might have been different if the acceleration of the Universe had been 
discovered before the discovery of the cosmic microwave background by 
Penzias and Wilson (1965). 
2 THE POSTWAR EXPLOSION IN RADIO ASTRONOMY: THE US FALLS BEHIND 
48
2.4  the 21 cm hydroGen line: the BeGinninG 
of radio sPectroscoPy
When Jan Oort in the Netherlands learned about Grote Reber’s (1944) paper, 
he suggested to his student, Henk van de Hulst, that he might consider the 
possibility of spectral line radiation from interstellar hydrogen, the most abun-
dant element in the Universe.17 Van de Hulst’s (1945) classic paper, written in 
1944 and published after the end of the war, primarily dealt with thermal emis-
sion from stars and interstellar dust (called “smoke” by van de Hulst), free-free 
(Bremsstrahlung) emission from ionized hydrogen, neutral hydrogen recombi-
nation lines from Δn = 1 atomic transitions, and in only two paragraphs, he 
discussed the 21 cm (1420 MHz) hyperfine line from the spin flip transition in 
neutral hydrogen atoms.18 Due to a calculation error (Sullivan 1982, p. 299), 
Van de Hulst (1945) pessimistically concluded that the recombination lines 
“are unobservable” due to the Stark effect, and that the hyperfine line “does 
not appear hopeless,” but that “the existence of this line remains speculative.”
Shortly after the end of the war, Oort wrote to Reber asking his advice on 
the construction of an antenna to study interstellar gas.19 Keeping his cards 
close to his chest, Oort made no mention of their plan to search for the 21 cm 
hydrogen line. However, about the same time, van de Hulst was visiting the 
Yerkes Observatory, and went to Wheaton to ask Reber’s opinion on whether 
the 21 cm line of neutral hydrogen could be detected (Reber 1958). Van de 
Hulst’s inquiry apparently ignited Reber’s interest in searching for the hydro-
gen line himself. He consulted Greenstein20 about the probable strength of the 
21 cm line and started to build a 21 cm receiver and horn feed. He also had 
ambitious plans to return to 3 cm and even to work at 1 cm, but unfortunately, 
he never completed any of these projects, perhaps discouraged by van de 
Hulst’s pessimism about detecting the hydrogen line.
Later, Iosef Shklovsky (1949) published a paper in Russian discussing the 
possibility of detecting monochromatic radio emission. Shklovsky had not seen 
the Dutch language paper by van de Hulst, but was aware only of the brief 
mention by Reber and Greenstein (1947) in their review of radio astronomy. 
Working independently of van de Hulst, Shklovsky calculated the transition 
frequency, but reached a more optimistic conclusion, writing,
In summary, we must say that the resources of contemporary radio techniques 
fully allow one to detect and measure the monochromatic radio emission of the 
galaxy…. It is of fundamental importance that the interstellar hydrogen can in 
this case be directly studied in its ground state. In direct contrast, all methods 
now existing in astrophysics allow one to determine the population of only the 
excited states of the hydrogen atom…. Study of the intensity distribution of 
monochromatic radio emission from the Milky Way would give the distribution 
of interstellar gas in various regions of the galaxy…. Soviet radiophysicists and 
astronomers should endeavor to solve this absorbing and important problem.
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Shklovsky’s paper did not go unrecognized in the US.  Following a year 
teaching astronomy at Amherst and three years as a Second Lieutenant in the 
US Naval Air Corp, where he took courses in electronics at Princeton and 
MIT, Harold I. (Doc) Ewen, while maintaining an appointment as a Naval 
Reserve officer, entered Harvard graduate school to pursue a PhD in physics.21 
His commanding officer was Donald Menzel, then a Captain in the Naval 
Reserves. Menzel sent Ewen for a two week assignment at the National Bureau 
of Standards, where he worked under the supervision of Grote Reber. Returning 
to Harvard, Ewen contacted Edward Purcell, who suggested that Ewen inves-
tigate the literature on the neutral hydrogen hyperfine line. Using his naval 
connections, Ewen was able to obtain a translation of van de Hulst’s (1945) 
paper from the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). Although discouraged by 
van de Hulst’s conclusion, Ewen and Purcell agreed that Ewen’s thesis topic 
would be to assemble a microwave spectrometer with the objective of setting 
the “level of non-detectability” of galactic hydrogen. Meanwhile, to earn 
money, Ewen worked nearly full time building a proton accelerator at the 
Harvard Cyclotron Lab.
Resigned to a negative thesis, Ewen later claimed that he had little interest 
in the project until he saw Shklovsky’s 1949 paper.22 Although he had assumed 
that the Dutch were not going to try to detect the hydrogen line, he then wor-
ried that the Soviets, encouraged by Shklovsky’s remarks, were probably already 
hard at work in pursuit of a detection. Full of enthusiasm and excitement, 
Shklovsky had tried to convince Victor Vitkevich, the leading Soviet radio 
astronomer, to attempt to detect the 21 cm line. But, after showing some ini-
tial interest, according to Shklovsky (1982), Vitkevich suggested that while it 
was easy for theoreticians to throw out ideas, experimental radio astronomy is 
real work and that he had enough ideas of his own. Years later, Shklovsky 
noted, Vitkevich admitted that he had been intimidated by Lev Landau, the 
famous Russian physicist, who claimed that the whole idea was “pathological.”
Purcell was able to obtain a $500 grant from the American Academy of Arts 
and Science that enabled Ewen to purchase components to build a 21 centime-
ter receiver and to construct a pyramidal horn antenna (Figs. 2.1 and 2.2). For 
the next year, while continuing to work trying to produce a proton beam at the 
Cyclotron Lab in the daytime, on weekends Ewen worked on his hydrogen line 
system. He built a horn out of plywood and copper foil, which he pointed 
outside the window of the Lyman Physics Building at a declination of −5 
degrees. The instrumentation needed to measure the 21 cm hydrogen line was 
developed using test equipment “borrowed” from the Cyclotron Lab on Friday 
afternoon and returned by Monday morning. At Purcell’s suggestion, Ewen 
designed and built a frequency switched system patterned after Dicke’s load 
switching radiometer.23 His search for the hydrogen line was aided by the 
recent laboratory measurement of the line frequency of 1420.405 MHz (Kusch 
and Prodell 1950), so he knew precisely where to tune his receiver. Due to 
Doppler broadening, the galactic hydrogen emission is smoothed over a broad 
frequency range. With comparable signal strength in both the line and  reference 
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channels separated by only 10 kHz, Ewen initially missed seeing the 21 cm 
hydrogen signal. Supported by another $300 from Purcell’s personal funds, 
Ewen purchased a commercial shortwave receiver to use as the final stage of his 
receiver. This permitted him to use a sufficiently wide 75  kHz separation 
between the signal and reference frequency to avoid any galactic hydrogen 
radiation in the reference channel.
On 25 March 1951, Ewen detected the galactic 21 cm radiation peaking 
near 18  hours right ascension, although the observed frequency was about 
150 kHz above the laboratory value. A quick consultation with the Harvard 
astronomers confirmed Ewen’s suspicion that the discrepancy was due to the 
Doppler shift caused by the Earth’s orbital motion and the motion of the Solar 
System. At the time, van de Hulst happened to be visiting Harvard, where he 
was teaching a course in astronomy. There had been no previous contact 
between Ewen and van de Hulst until, at Purcell’s suggestion, Ewen informed 
him of their successful detection. Ewen recalled that van de Hulst seemed 
“shocked” and did not appear particularly “delighted to learn that his ‘long 
Fig. 2.1 Doc Ewen and his 21  cm receiver at Harvard University, March 1951. 
Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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shot speculation’ proved to be correct.”24 Only then did Ewen learn that the 
Dutch had been unsuccessfully trying for years to detect the 21  cm line. 
Although van de Hulst had not expected that the hydrogen line could be 
detected, he explained that Oort appreciated its importance, and continued to 
encourage the attempt at Leiden. Van de Hulst peppered Ewen with questions 
about where he found hydrogen emission in the Galaxy and how to build the 
receiver. Lex Muller adopted the Harvard frequency switching concept, and on 
11 May 1951, using a 7.5 meter Würzburg antenna at Kootwijk on the Dutch 
coast, Muller and Oort (1951) were able to confirm the Harvard result. 
Characteristically, not satisfied with a simple confirmation, the Dutch paper 
included observations made at different positions in the Galaxy and com-
mented on the distribution of hydrogen gas and the kinematics of the Galaxy.
Another Harvard visitor at this time was Frank Kerr from the CSIRO 
Radiophysics Laboratory. Following a visit to Ewen’s lab in early April 1951, 
Kerr informed Joe Pawsey in Australia about Ewen’s successful detection of 
galactic hydrogen. Kerr explained Purcell’s frequency comparison technique 
and requested possible confirmation from Australia. Pawsey wrote back to 
Purcell that they had not previously been working on the hydrogen line detec-
tion, but upon hearing from Kerr of Harvard’s success, he informed Purcell 
they had initiated two separate programs to confirm Ewen’s result.
Fig. 2.2 Doc Ewen and his original horn antenna at NRAO in Green Bank, West 
Virginia, May 2001. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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Ewen claimed that he wrote his 47 page thesis in three days and defended it 
in May, just two months after his detection of the hydrogen line. After manag-
ing to finagle his way through his German language exam,25 Ewen received his 
PhD in Physics from Harvard. Ewen and Purcell (1951a) presented their dis-
covery at the Schenectady meeting of the American Physical Society on 16 
June 1951. The Harvard (Ewen and Purcell 1951b) and Dutch (Muller and 
Oort 1951) papers were sent to Nature on June 14 and 20 respectively and 
published in successive papers in the 1 September 1951 issue. The Dutch paper 
was followed by a brief note from Joe Pawsey, dated 12 July, announcing that 
Christiansen and Hindman had also confirmed Ewen’s discovery but with no 
details. Christiansen and Hindman (1952a, b) published a brief report in 
Observatory followed by a more detailed paper in the Australian Journal of 
Scientific Research. Using a tracking antenna, they showed that the distribution 
of galactic hydrogen was concentrated along the galactic plane and based on 
observed frequency splitting of the line profiles, they suggested evidence for 
the galactic spiral arms.
All three programs were enabled by using frequency switching, and all three 
programs used a variable capacitance to scan in frequency. Ewen later com-
mented that there was never a real competition to make the first detection. But 
rather “we gave them the Heath kit, the parameter values of the signal, and 
instructions on where to look. The Australians freely admit this, the Dutch 
never have.”26
A few months after these papers appeared, Paul Wild from Australia submit-
ted a paper to the Astrophysical Journal (Wild 1952) discussing expected fre-
quencies for various possible hydrogen atom transitions, including high order 
recombination lines, fine structure lines, as well as the spin-flip hyperfine struc-
ture line and the effect of Zeeman splitting in a magnetic field. Although not 
submitted until after Wild became aware of the actual detections at Harvard, 
Leiden, and Sydney, his paper was based on two pre-discovery papers which he 
wrote in 1949 for private distribution.27
When Grote Reber learned about Harvard’s successful detection of hydro-
gen, he wrote to congratulate Ewen and urged him to try for the 92  cm 
(327 MHz) deuterium line.28 But Ewen had other ideas. He enrolled in the 
Harvard Business School to pursue an MBA to complement his PhD in Physics. 
He was called to active duty during the Korean War, but served for only a 
month before negotiating his return to Cambridge as a civilian. Although he 
later participated in several radio astronomy conferences, and took part in the 
search for a site for NRAO, Ewen never continued his pioneering research on 
the 21 cm hydrogen line, but helped Bart Bok start the Harvard radio astron-
omy project and served as co-director with Bok. Together with his friend, 
Geoff Knight, Ewen started his own business, the Ewen-Knight Company to 
construct a new hydrogen line receiver for Harvard. Ewen Knight went on to 
be a major supplier of equipment to many radio observatories including 
NRAO. Building on Karl Jansky’s patent, Ewen later developed a form of radio 
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sextant which was used on Polaris submarines when they needed to know their 
location, independent of weather conditions, before firing their missiles. 
2.5  early us university radio astronomy ProGrams
Unlike in other countries, US postwar radio astronomy was largely funded 
through contracts between universities and the military research programs at 
the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the Air Force Office of Scientific 
Research (AFOSR). Still buoyed by the scientific successes of WWII and fur-
ther stimulated by the Korean War, in the 1950s US universities, including 
Caltech, Cornell, Stanford, the University of California, and the University 
Illinois, received generous support from the ONR and the AFOSR to begin 
modest radio astronomy programs. Other programs in the US began at the 
Carnegie Institution’s Department of Terrestrial Magnetism (DTM) and at the 
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). Starting in 1948, Grote Reber pursued 
radio astronomy programs at the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) until 
1951 and then, with modest support from the New  York based Research 
Corporation, in Hawaii. Except at Harvard and Ohio State, the National 
Science Foundation played little role in these early years of US radio astronomy.
Harvard University As Ewen later remarked, “The discovery of the 21  cm 
interstellar hydrogen line radiation in 1951 initially generated little interest at 
Harvard.”29 However, after several years of military service, Campbell Wade 
had just returned to Harvard to complete his undergraduate degree in astron-
omy. While in the military, Wade had acquired some skills in radio technology. 
He heard about Ewen’s discovery and was excited about the prospects for 
further work in what he foresaw as an exciting new field of astronomy. He 
naturally went to Bart Bok, who was widely recognized among the student 
body as probably the friendliest Harvard astronomy professor, and who had 
just returned from an extended period in South Africa. Bok contacted his friend 
Ed Purcell to discuss the prospects for establishing a radio astronomy program 
at Harvard, but he had no encouragement from his peers. Walter Baade sug-
gested that at age 51, Bok was too old to get involved in this new field with 
uncertain prospects. After all, Jansky and Reber had measured the continuous 
radiation from the Galaxy and Ewen and Purcell had discovered the 21 cm 
radiation from galactic hydrogen. Nothing was left! Nevertheless, with Purcell’s 
encouragement, Bok sent Wade, along with two senior graduate students, 
David Heeschen and Edward Lilley, to see Ewen and learn how to operate his 
equipment. However, the three of them found the room locked and learned 
that all of the equipment had been sent to DTM in Washington, where Merle 
Tuve wanted to start a new radio astronomy program.30
A few months later Bok obtained the first NSF grant for radio astronomy, 
for $32,000 to purchase a 24 foot (7.3 meter) antenna, but he needed addi-
tional funds for the instrumentation. He convinced Mabel Agassiz, a wealthy 
Harvard benefactor, to contribute another $40,000 toward the construction 
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and operation of the telescope that was located in the town of Harvard, 
Massachusetts, about 30 miles distant from the Harvard University campus in 
Cambridge. Bok was able to get additional support from the University, as well 
as from the Research Corporation, to operate the telescope and to provide 
additional instrumentation. Ewen built a new hydrogen line receiver and 
Heeschen, Lilley, and Wade helped to put the telescope into operation and 
conducted the first research programs. Heeschen and Lilly went on to be 
among the first Americans to receive their PhD degree for work in radio astron-
omy, when they both passed their Harvard oral exams on 26 November 1954.31 
They were followed by T.K. (Kochu) Menon in 1956, Thomas Matthews in 
1956, W.E. (Bill) Howard III in 1958, May A. Kaftan-Kassim in 1958, 
Nannielou (Nan) Hepburn Dieter Conklin in 1958, Frank Drake in 1958, and 
Campbell (Cam) Wade in 1958.
In 1954, Bok and Dave Heeschen convinced Mrs. Agassiz to help fund the 
design of a 60 foot (18 meter) radio telescope. Only in this way, they explained, 
could American astronomers keep up with radio astronomers in England, and 
the Netherlands, who were using their captured German Würzburg antennas 
for a variety of research programs. Bok received another NSF grant of $132,000 
for the construction and initial operation of the telescope. When completed in 
the spring of 1956 by D. S. Kennedy and Co., the Harvard 60 foot dish became 
one of the largest fully steerable radio telescopes in the world and the largest 
equatorially mounted telescope.32 The Ewen-Knight Corporation built new 
receiving equipment for 21 cm research, including a 20 channel spectrometer. 
NSF Director Alan Waterman spoke to more than 200 people at the dedication 
of Harvard’s new radio telescope, referring to radio astronomy as “a new win-
dow on the universe,” and acknowledging the responsibility of the Federal 
Government to support basic research “when such support is necessary and in 
the interest of science.”33
Unlike the radio astronomy programs in Australia and the UK, the Harvard 
project was managed by astronomers, not radio scientists. Even at the other 
American universities involved in radio astronomy the programs were led by 
people with backgrounds in radiophysics such as William Gordon, Charlie 
Seeger, and Marshall Cohen at Cornell, John Kraus at Ohio State, and Ronald 
Bracewell at Stanford. Bok insisted that Harvard students had to learn astron-
omy as well as radio technology. The research programs at the 24 and 60 foot 
antennas were heavily concentrated on studying galactic H I emission, particu-
larly in the direction of various nebulosities, star clusters, and the Galactic 
Center along with the delineation of the Galaxy’s spiral structure. However, 
they found time to search, unsuccessfully, for the galactic hydroxyl (OH) mol-
ecule based on a calculated frequency provided by Charlie Townes (1957), and 
Heeschen observed H I in the Coma cluster (Fig. 2.3).
Dave Heeschen, Frank Drake, Kochu Menon, Cam Wade, and Bill Howard 
all went on to become prominent members of the NRAO Scientific Staff, with 
Heeschen later becoming the NRAO director from 1962 to 1978. Drake 
became director of the Cornell Arecibo Observatory. Nan Dieter went to the 
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nearby Air Force Cambridge Research Lab, then to Berkeley where she played 
a key role in the discovery of cosmic hydroxyl masers (Dieter et al. 1966). Tom 
Matthews went to Caltech where he contributed to the discovery of quasars. 
John (Jack) Campbell became one of Ewen’s first employees before going on 
to become Systems Engineer for the VLA. Cam Wade, while still a graduate 
student, worked for Ewen-Knight before taking up a postdoctoral position in 
Australia, followed by a long career on the NRAO Scientific Staff where he led 
the VLA site search and procurement. After a postdoc at NRAO followed by a 
faculty position at the State University of New  York, May Kaftan-Kassim 
returned to her native Iraq where she became Director of the Iraqi National 
Astronomy Observatory Project,34 and later the Iraqi representative to the 
1968 UN Vienna Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space. After a period at NRL and Yale, Ed Lilley returned to join the Harvard 
faculty where he spent the rest of his career.
Cornell University The Cornell solar radio astronomy program began in the 
Electrical Engineering Department in the late 1940s with support from the 
AFOSR and ONR. Under the leadership of Charles Burrows, William (Bill) 
Gordon, and Charles (Charlie) Seeger, older brother of the well-known folk 
Fig. 2.3 Kochu Menon, Dave Heeschen, Russell Anderson, and Bart Bok at the base 
of Harvard’s 60 foot Agassiz telescope in early 1956. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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singer, Pete Seeger, this was probably the first US university based program in 
radio astronomy. Martha Stahr, who was a Professor of Astronomy and the first 
female faculty member in the Cornell School of Arts and Sciences, conducted 
daily observations of the Sun at 205 MHz which she related to sunspot activity 
(Stahr 1949). Later the group extended their research program to include 
mapping the galactic radiation (Seeger and Williamson 1951). From 1948 to 
1960, Stahr (later Stahr Carpenter) also issued a valuable series of bibliographic 
reports listing publications in radio astronomy that brought radio astronomy 
work, which at the time was largely published in engineering journals, to the 
attention of the broader astronomical community.35
After Seeger left Cornell for Sweden in 1950, then the Netherlands, Marshall 
Cohen, who had received his PhD in physics from Ohio State, joined the 
Cornell group in 1954 and began a program to study the polarized solar radio 
emission. Cohen later recalled, “What we were doing at Cornell when I got 
there—I found out very quickly was really quite primitive compared to what 
was going on in Australia.” And in fact, part of the Cornell program was termi-
nated not long afterward.36
Starting in 1958, under the leadership of Bill Gordon, Cornell scientists 
began discussing the construction of a 1000 foot (305 meter) diameter back 
scatter radar system to study the ionosphere. Cohen realized that with the pro-
posed antenna it would also be possible to get radar echoes from Mars and 
Venus and pointed out other passive radio astronomy applications of the 
Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory (See Sect. 6.6) which was later funded by 
the AFOSR. 
The University of California at Berkeley The radio astronomy program at 
the University of California began somewhat later than the other university 
programs, and, like the program at Harvard, was initiated and initially man-
aged by classical astronomers with backgrounds in optics rather than radio 
engineering. The Berkeley Astronomy Department was rejuvenated after 
WWII by Otto Struve, who came to Berkley as department chair in 1950. The 
following year, he brought Harold Weaver to Berkeley from the Lick 
Observatory, and in 1954, at Weaver’s invitation, Ron Bracewell came to 
Berkeley from the CSIRO Radiophysics Laboratory and taught a course in 
radio astronomy. With the urging of Otto Struve, who was perhaps reflecting 
on his unsuccessful effort a decade earlier to help Grote Reber get established, 
the Dean established a faculty committee to investigate how the university 
could enter the new field of radio astronomy.37 A favorable committee report 
provided the incentive for Otto Struve and Harold Weaver to propose a new 
observatory, but considerably larger than the one envisioned in the committee 
report. In 1958, following Weaver’s sabbatical at Harvard and the Carnegie 
Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, Weaver and Struve found the funding 
from ONR needed to establish the Berkeley Radio Astronomy Laboratory. 
They selected a site at Hat Creek in northern California to build first a 33 foot 
(10  meter) radio telescope, and in 1962 an 85 foot (26  meter) telescope 
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 constructed by the Philco Corporation. Doc Ewen built the 1420 MHz and 
8 GHz receivers.
Over the next three decades Weaver led a vigorous observational program 
concentrating on 21 cm galactic research, and in 1965, Hat Creek made the 
first observations of interstellar OH masers, opening a whole new field of 
research. In January 1991, the Hat Creek 85 foot radio telescope collapsed in 
a storm with 100 mile per hour winds. But by that time, under the leadership 
of Jack Welch, the emphasis at Hat Creek had moved to millimeter wave-
lengths (Sect. 10.4) and the telescope was not replaced. 
Stanford University Following a one year visiting appointment at Berkeley, 
Ron Bracewell went to Stanford, and, with funding from AFOSR, built the 
Stanford Microwave Spectroheliograph. The Spectroheliograph, based on the 
design by Christiansen, consisted of two orthogonal arrays of sixteen 10 foot 
(3  m) dishes each 375 feet (114  m) long (Bracewell and Swarup 1961). 
Operating at 3.3 GHz (9.1 cm) the Stanford array was used until 1980 to make 
daily maps of the microwave emission from the solar corona with an angular 
resolution of 3.1 arcmin. During this period, more than 200 astronomers vis-
ited the site and engraved their names on the telescope piers. In 2012, ten of 
the piers were moved to the VLA site in New Mexico where they form part of 
an innovative sundial designed by Woody Sullivan (Frater et  al. 2017, p. 1; 
Sullivan et al. 2019) (Fig. 2.4).
Ohio State University John Kraus was a radio engineer and an expert on 
antenna design who was known for his invention of the helical antenna. Also, 
as a prominent radio amateur, he designed the popular W8JK antenna. Kraus 
was present at Jansky’s 1935 Detroit IRE presentation, where he recalled that 
there were less than two dozen people in the audience (Kraus 1984). In 1941, 
Kraus and Grote Reber worked together at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory 
degaussing naval ships, and they lived in the same rooming house in Washington. 
Kraus (1995, p. 114) later recalled Reber’s “contagious enthusiasm,” about his 
equipment and observations. Apparently, his exposure to these two pioneers of 
radio astronomy ignited Kraus’ interest and excitement about this new field of 
research, and a decade later he initiated a radio astronomy program at Ohio 
State University.
Kraus was captivated by the ongoing source count controversy and the 
desire to push radio catalogues to weaker sources. This meant building the 
largest possible collecting area for a given cost, which Kraus translated into a 
transit radio telescope. His initial radio telescope consisted of an array of 96 
helical antennas mounted on a tiltable ground plane. Over a period of three 
years, Ko and Kraus (1957) used this early radio telescope to map the sky north 
of −40 degrees declination at 1.2 meters wavelength (250 MHz) with a resolu-
tion of 1 by 8 degrees. In addition to tracing out the radio emission from the 
galactic plane, the Ohio State Survey isolated a number of discrete sources, 
which they noted are concentrated along the galactic plan. 
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2.6  us Government and military radio 
astronomy ProGrams
National Bureau of Standards Grote Reber’s mother died in 1945 and there 
was little reason for him to remain in Wheaton. He sought support from the 
Carnegie Institution’s Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, Harvard, MIT, 
and various government agencies. In a 1946 letter to Harlow Shapley, Reber 
estimated the cost, including labor, of reproducing his telescope to be 
$15,278.38 At Harvard, Shapley discussed Reber’s proposal with Donald 
Menzel, who had a background in radiophysics and had many contacts in the 
military industrial complex (Needell 2000, p.  60). As with Reber’s earlier 
approach to Harvard, Shapley decided they were too busy and had insufficient 
resources to take on any new projects. Reber’s letter stirred up interest for both 
Merle Tuve and Lloyd Berkner at DTM as well as their Carnegie boss, Vannever 
Bush. Probably inspired by Reber, Tuve started the DTM radio astronomy 
program led by Lloyd Berkner. A few years later, Berkner would become 
President of Associated Universities, Inc. (AUI), where he forcefully led the 
effort to establish the National Radio Astronomy Observatory, an initiative first 
started by Bush and Lee DuBridge (Chap. 3).
Fig. 2.4 Ron Bracewell 
touches up paint on a pier 
at the Stanford 
Spectroheliograph with 
the signatures of visiting 
astronomers, including 
one of the present authors 
(KK). Ten of the original 
piers are now part of a 
sundial at the VLA site. 
Credit: NRAO/AUI/
NSF
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Reber realized that he was no longer able to compete with these larger gov-
ernment and university activities. He accepted an offer from E.U. Condon to 
set up a radio astronomy program at the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) 
Central Radio Propagation Laboratory (CRPL) in Washington, DC, with the 
prospect of building a 75–100 foot diameter dish. He sold his Wheaton dish 
and all instrumentation, including a 1400 MHz (21 cm) amplifier and feed, to 
the US government for $18,570. Everything was moved from Wheaton to 
Sterling, Virginia, near the location of the current Dulles Airport. His dish was 
reassembled on a turntable so it could be moved in azimuth as well as eleva-
tion, but there is no record that it was ever used again by Reber or by anyone 
else for radio astronomy. Reber’s dish was later disassembled and transported 
to Boulder, where it remained unassembled until it was moved to Green Bank 
to be erected under Reber’s supervision at the entrance to NRAO in 1959–1960 
(Fig. 2.5).
Arguing that a 100 foot dish would only be a small improvement over his 
Wheaton dish, one of Reber’s first actions in Washington was to develop 
detailed plans for building a large, fully steerable dish 220 feet in diameter 
operating to wavelengths as short as 10 cm (3 GHz), which he later estimated 
might cost $650,000 to build.39 Realizing that an equatorial mount for an 
antenna of this size would be prohibitively expensive, he proposed using an 
alt-azimuth mount with an innovative “combination of cams and levers” to 
control the telescope (Fig. 2.6).
Reber approached CRPL management, the Pentagon, and Merle Tuve at 
Carnegie, but his ambitious initiative was either rejected or ignored. Later, 
Lloyd Berkner at AUI expressed interest, but on the advice of his steering com-
mittee, AUI pursued a different approach (Sect. 4.4), and Reber was never able 
to obtain the funds to build his 220 foot antenna. Indeed, it would be nearly 
another half a century before a fully steerable antenna of this size would be 
built in the US (Chap. 9).
While working at NBS, Reber participated in a NRL expedition to observe 
a total solar eclipse on the island of Attu, at the westernmost end of the Aleutian 
Islands. Multi-wavelength observations on 12 September 1950 showed that 
the radio Sun was larger than the optical disk, and that the apparent size 
increased with increasing wavelength (Hagen et  al. 1951). As Reber later 
reported, this “was probably the first total solar eclipse of the Sun which was 
successfully observed in a pouring rain during a hurricane.”40
Naval Research Laboratory 50 Foot Radio Telescope41 Perhaps the biggest 
 organized postwar radio astronomy program in the United States, or at least 
the most expensive, was at NRL, which began as an outgrowth of wartime 
radar and communications research. The operation of NRL is led by a Naval 
Captain, but the research program is led by a civilian. Early NRL postwar 
research programs concentrated on the Sun, partly because the military was 
interested in the Sun and how it affected communications, but perhaps, like 
elsewhere, more because that was all they could see with their limited 
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 equipment. In 1951, under the leadership of John Hagen, who had led a war-
time NRL centimeter wavelength radar development program, NRL obtained 
a 50 foot (15 meter) antenna from the Collins Radio Company. The antenna 
was designed by University of Iowa engineering professor Ned Ashton, whose 
previous experience was primarily in designing bridges. Ashton would go on to 
play a major role in the troubled NRAO 140 Foot Telescope project (Sect. 
4.4). With a background in radio engineering rather than astronomy, NRL 
chose an alt-az mount for its radio telescope, using a surplus five inch gun 
mount for the azimuth bearing and an analogue coordinate converter to pro-
vide pointing instructions. But the 1.5  arcminute pointing accuracy made 
operation difficult at 8 mm, where the beamwidth was only 3 arcminutes, and 
Fig. 2.5 Grote Reber in 1960 beside his reconstructed 32 foot Wheaton radio tele-
scope at the entrance to NRAO in Green Bank. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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gave alt-az mounts a bad name during later debates over the nature of NRAO’s 
140 Foot Telescope. The machined surface, which was composed of 30 sepa-
rate solid aluminum panels, had a maximum deviation from a true paraboloid 
of 0.8 mm in the inner 20 meter diameter and 1.2 mm in the outer part of the 
dish (Holzschuh 1958).
When completed in 1951, the NRL antenna (Fig. 2.7) was the largest filled 
aperture radio telescope in the world, and would remain so until the Harvard 
60 foot and the 25 meter Dwingeloo dish went into operation four years later 
(Fig. 2.8). However, working primarily at short centimeter wavelengths, the 
sensitivity and research opportunities were limited. As Graham-Smith remarked 
to Joe Pawsey “it was the world’s most expensive radio telescope and all it can 
see is the Sun and the Moon” (Haddock 1984). Led by Fred Haddock and 
later Ed McClain and Cornell Mayer, the 50 foot telescope was used by NRL 
scientists at 9.4 cm (3.1 GHz) to study the thermal radio emission from galac-
tic H II regions and the planets Venus (Mayer et al. 1958a), Mars, and Jupiter 
(Mayer et  al. 1958b), to make the first observations below 21  cm of a few 
Fig. 2.6 Grote Reber’s model for a 220 foot telescope design. Credit: Feld, J. Radio 
Telescope Structures. 1962. Ann. NY Acad. Sci. 93: 353–456. Used with permission of 
the NYAS
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strong radio galaxies (Haddock et al. 1954), and the first measurement of radio 
polarization (Mayer et al. 1957). NRL also pioneered 21 cm absorption line 
studies (Hagen and McClain 1954). However, in what proved to be an embar-
rassment, Lilley and McClain (1956) reported the detection of the redshifted 
21 cm absorption line from Cygnus A which not only was never confirmed by 
others, but it turned out Lilley and McClain had incorrectly used the optical 
redshift to calculate the radio frequency of the expected absorption and were 
observing at the wrong frequency.
As it was at the time the most important and the most influential American 
radio astronomy observatory, NRL scientists, particularly John Hagen, had 
considerable influence on the later formation of NRAO (Chap. 3). The NRL 
telescope still sits on its original location on the roof of a laboratory building 
overlooking the Potomac River. For more than half a century it served as an 
NRL icon, visible from commercial aircraft landing over the Potomac River at 
nearby Reagan National Airport.
The location of the NRL dish in Washington and near National Airport 
meant it was subject to considerable RFI; NRL needed to find a new site for 
radio astronomy. In 1955, NRL obtained an 84 foot (26 meter) antenna from 
the D.S. Kennedy Company, patterned after Harvard’s Kennedy-built 60 foot 
radio telescope (McClain 1958). The site for the 84 foot dish was chosen fol-
lowing a survey using the same equipment that had been used in 1955 to 
Fig. 2.7 NRL’s iconic 50 foot radio telescope on the roof of the main laboratory 
building, visible from commercial flights into and out of nearby Reagan National 
Airport. Credit: NRL
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locate the Green Bank site (Sect. 3.4). The chosen site at Maryland Point, 
Maryland, about 45 miles from the NRL Washington Lab, was found to be the 
quietest site within 50 miles of Washington. The Kennedy dish had a perfo-
rated aluminum surface and was effective at wavelengths as short as 10 cm.
2.7  Private initiatives
Carnegie Institution Department of Terrestrial Magnetism (DTM) Shortly 
after the end of WWII, Lloyd Berkner and Merle Tuve initiated a modest pro-
gram in radio astronomy at DTM. According to Burke (2003), Tuve rejected 
Fig. 2.8 Prof. Jan Oort and Mrs. Oort leaving the 1955 dedication of the Dwingeloo 
25 meter radio telescope. Credit: NFRA
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Berkner’s ambitious plan to build a large dipole array, probably contributing to 
the long-running animosity between Tuve and Berkner that would soon impact 
Berkner’s plans to develop a national radio astronomy facility (Chap. 3). As 
explained in Sect. 2.4, before Bok and his students got involved in 21  cm 
research, Tuve had talked Purcell into sending him Ewen’s 21  cm receiver, 
which he initially used on a German Würzburg. DTM’s Howard E.  Tatel 
designed an equatorial mount for the 7.5 meter telescope, making it unlike the 
Würzburgs used in European radio observatories.
In 1953, Tuve was joined by Bernard Burke, a recent graduate from MIT, 
and by F.  Graham-Smith, on a one-year leave from Cambridge. Together, 
Graham-Smith and Burke built a 22 MHz Mills Cross at a site in Maryland. 
After Graham-Smith returned to Cambridge, Burke, working with Ken 
Franklin, who was on leave from New York’s Hayden Planetarium, accidently 
discovered the strong 22 MHz bursts from Jupiter (Burke and Franklin 1955). 
In 1959 DTM purchased a 60 foot (18 meter) dish from Blaw-Knox, which 
was used by Tuve and others for mapping the distribution of galactic hydrogen.
Grote Reber Goes to Hawaii42 After only a few years working at the NBS, 
Grote Reber became discouraged by the lack of support for his planned large 
radio telescope. He had also become increasingly frustrated working under 
government bureaucracy, as well as by the deteriorating atmosphere in 
Washington reflected by the growing impact of McCarthyism. He was intrigued 
by the discoveries reported by Australian radio astronomers using the sea inter-
ferometer technique (Sect. 2.1) which could determine the positions of radio 
sources from the precise timing as they rose or set over the sea. He realized that 
in order to obtain the accurate two- dimensional coordinates needed for iden-
tification with optical counterparts, he would need to make measurements at 
both rising and setting, and that the best place to do this was from a mountain-
top in Hawaii. In a letter to Joe Pawsey, Reber wrote “I got tired of working 
for Uncle Harry [Truman] and his Boys so I took a vacation in Hawaii. Things 
looked so good I decided to stay.”43 He went on vacation to Hawaii, and never 
came back to NBS, apparently abandoning his last paycheck.
From 1951 to 1954, Reber worked on top of Haleakala on the Island of 
Maui, Hawaii, where he built a rotating antenna to observe between 20 and 
100 MHz. By replacing the fixed antenna used by the Australians with one that 
rotated in azimuth, and by working on the top of a 3000 meter high island 
mountain, he could observe sources both rising in the east and setting in the 
west with an interferometer having an effective baseline of 6000 meters. In 
principle his sea interferometer had a resolution of about one arcminute, but 
he was plagued by ionospheric refraction and terrestrial interference and was 
only able to obtain useful results on a few of the strongest radio sources (Reber 
1955, 1959). As a result of his experience, he finally concluded that mountain 
tops were not suitable for radio telescopes. But Reber’s sea interferometer was 
the first mountain-top telescope in the Hawaiian Islands and set the stage for 
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the proliferation of optical and radio telescopes later constructed on both 
Haleakula and Mauna Kea. The site of Reber’s radio telescope was preserved 
until 2014, when it was destroyed to make room for a parking lot for the 
Daniel K. Inouye Solar Telescope.
2.8  why did the us fall Behind the uK 
and australia? or did it?
Looking back after more than half a century, it is natural to ask—did the United 
States really fall behind the radio astronomy programs being pursued elsewhere 
even in other, much smaller countries such as the Netherlands and Australia? 
Or, did American radio astronomers just move in a different direction, or just 
imagine that they were behind, or perhaps even exaggerate the situation in an 
attempt to acquire more resources? In the UK, Australia, and the Netherlands, 
radio astronomy programs were generally concentrated at one or two major 
laboratories. In both Australia and the UK, early postwar radio astronomy 
research was conducted primarily at meter wavelengths, using relatively simple 
and relatively inexpensive technology with equipment derived from wartime 
radar research. In the United States, reflecting the broad enthusiasm to get 
into this exciting and promising new field of research, modest radio astronomy 
programs sprang up at a few universities, but primarily at government and mili-
tary laboratories. The early postwar US radio astronomy programs were mostly 
funded by the military, and so were driven, at least in part, by Cold War mili-
tary needs. This translated into facilities that operated at centimeter wave-
lengths where there was considerable expertise and experience carried over 
from the War, but where receiver sensitivities were much poorer than at the 
meter wavelengths used in the UK and Australia, and where the cost and the 
complexity of antennas and instrumentation were greater.
At least for the first decade following the end of WWII, there was no focused 
effort in the US to develop any major radio astronomy research programs of 
the type being pursued at Cambridge and Jodrell Bank or in Sydney or Leiden. 
The US entered the postwar era with relatively great wealth, especially when 
compared with Australia or war-torn Europe. So why did this new field that 
had been pioneered by the Americans Karl Jansky and Grote Reber appear to 
thrive in the UK and Australia, but not in the US?
In part, the answer may lie in the enormous prestige of postwar American 
science and scientists, brought about by the very successful atomic energy pro-
gram which had led to an abrupt and unanticipated, but greatly welcomed, end 
to the war in the Pacific. The related areas of atomic and nuclear physics over-
shadowed the equally important—some will say more important—develop-
ments in radiophysics and electronics resulting from the wartime radar research 
at the MIT Radiation Laboratory, Bell Labs, and elsewhere. Although, as Lee 
DuBridge remarked, “the bomb ended the war, but radar won the war,”44 
atomic and nuclear physics became the golden areas of research for American 
2 THE POSTWAR EXPLOSION IN RADIO ASTRONOMY: THE US FALLS BEHIND 
66
scientists, with a seemingly endless flow of money leading to powerful particle 
accelerators being built at Harvard, the University of California, Caltech, 
Cornell, Rochester, and other universities, as well at the new Brookhaven 
National Laboratory.
At the end of 1945, the MIT Rad Lab was shut down. Robert Dicke 
(Princeton), Lee DuBridge (Rochester), E.O.  Lawrence (Berkeley), Edwin 
McMillan (Berkeley), Ed Purcell (Harvard), and I.I. Rabi (Columbia), all left 
for universities where they applied their skills in microwave electronics to 
atomic spectroscopy and particle accelerator physics. Charlie Townes, who was 
one of the first to recognize the possibility of observing cosmic molecular lines 
in the radio spectrum (Townes 1957), moved to Columbia University, where 
he worked on quantum electronics and the development of the maser and later 
the laser. Taffy Bowen, the Rad Lab liaison to the British radar program, left 
for Australia, where he started the very successful CSIRO radio astron-
omy program.
For nearly a decade, almost no one in the US paid much attention to radio 
astronomy after Jansky and Reber and the casual experiments of Potapenko 
and Folland. Reber, in particular, was unable to obtain funding or even recog-
nition of his ambitious plan to build a 220 foot dish for radio astronomy, and 
he ultimately left the United States for Tasmania, where he carried out a pro-
gram in long wavelength radio astronomy as well as publishing papers in bot-
any and archaeology. NRL did build the then largest steerable radio telescope 
in the world, and one that operated at much shorter wavelengths than any 
other contemporary radio telescope, but the motivation was more to address 
military needs than astronomy. The NRL 50 foot dish also pioneered the use 
of the alt-az mount in astronomy but, working at short centimeter and milli-
meter wavelengths, the scientific returns were perceived to be limited.
Much good research was done by US radio astronomers. Berkeley, Cornell, 
Harvard, Ohio State, and Stanford started important university programs in 
solar radio astronomy. NRL made the first detailed studies of the thermal radio 
emission from the Moon and planets. Franklin and Burke at DTM discovered 
intense radio bursts from Jupiter. Ewen and Purcell at Harvard were the first to 
detect the 21 cm hydrogen line, beating the Australian and Dutch radio astron-
omers and starting the new field of cosmic radio spectroscopy. Ewen and 
Purcell also invented the important frequency switched spectral line radiome-
ter, following Robert Dicke’s invention of the switched radiometer, since used 
by generations of radio astronomers for continuum observations. However, 
none of these programs captured the attention of the US astronomy community 
as did the Australian and British discoveries of supernova remnants and distant 
powerful radio galaxies. As it developed, the cosmological Cambridge-Sydney 
log N – log S debate was a red herring, full of observational errors and naive 
interpretation on both sides, but for over a decade, the apparent impact to 
 cosmology captivated the astronomical community.
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The discovery of the 21 cm hydrogen line by Ewen and Purcell at Harvard 
did create a unique opportunity, but one that was exploited first by the Dutch 
and Australian radio astronomers in mapping the dynamics of the Milky Way. 
While Purcell continued his research on nuclear magnetic resonance, Ewen 
went into business, manufacturing and selling radio astronomy receivers. Bart 
Bok built the Harvard radio astronomy project around 21 cm research, but the 
Australian and Dutch radio astronomers skimmed the cream, and the Harvard 
program suffered from lack of leadership after Bok went to Australia. However, 
Bok did develop what was probably the first graduate program in radio astron-
omy, a program from which many of the first generation of students went on 
to lead the establishment of the National Radio Astronomy Observatory in 
Green Bank.
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CHAPTER 3
A New Era in Radio Astronomy
By the early 1950s the US Department of Defense, especially the Navy, and the 
newly created National Science Foundation (NSF) began to play a major role 
in American science, especially in astronomy. Meanwhile, Associated 
Universities, Inc. (AUI), which founded and operated the Brookhaven National 
Laboratory, was looking for new business. During these Cold War times, the 
United States could not afford to fall behind in the exciting and rapidly devel-
oping new area of radio astronomy. Caltech, MIT, Harvard, and Naval Research 
Laboratory scientists discussed how to get the United States more involved in 
this emerging field that had clear commercial and military applications as well 
as extraordinary opportunities for basic research. Two key conferences held at 
the end of 1953 and the start of 1954 provided the catalyst for an NSF-funded 
feasibility study aimed toward the goal of establishing a national radio astron-
omy facility.
After an exhaustive search, a site was chosen in a remote part of West Virginia 
between the small hamlets of Arbovale and Green Bank. Following more than 
two years of confrontational discussions about the nature of the proposed 
national radio astronomy facility and how it would be managed, the NSF 
awarded a contract in November 1956 to AUI to manage the construction and 
operation of the National Radio Astronomy Observatory.
3.1  The Business of science
As a result of their widely recognized contribution to the development of 
nuclear weapons and radar, American scientists emerged from WWII with a 
prestige that afforded them great influence during the post-war decades of the 
Cold War. Their influence increased after the 1957 Soviet launch of Sputnik as 
more money started flowing to US science and technology. Prior to the war, 
the center of physics was in Europe, but as a result of the physical devastation 
in Europe brought about by six years of conflict and the migration of many 
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eminent scientists from Europe to the United States, the US emerged after 
1945 as the dominant scientific power in the world, fueled by unprecedented 
government spending on science. Although research was mostly concentrated 
at the universities, the generous government financial support, which had been 
prompted by the urgencies of the war, continued during the post-war period. 
Initially much of the federal support for science came from the military for 
defense of the country, driven, at least in part, by competition among the ser-
vices. At this time, federal leadership in science fell to the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC), the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), and the military 
services. The Office of Naval Research (ONR), in particular, developed close 
ties with American universities to support a variety of basic and applied research 
programs, even those that had no direct bearing on defense programs.
The National Science Foundation1 As early as 1942, Senator Harley Kilgore 
from West Virginia introduced a bill to create a National Science Foundation 
to distribute grants and contracts supporting both basic and applied research. 
Kilgore’s bill paid particular attention to a broad geographic distribution of the 
funds. By contrast, the Vannevar Bush (1945) classic report, Science—The 
Endless Frontier, which argued for continued federal support for research, was 
more elitist than the Kilgore bill, and argued that the most public good would 
come from supporting only the best scientists and the best universities and 
laboratories.
It would be eight years before Congress and the Truman administration 
could agree on language addressing issues such a geographic diversity, the 
inclusion of the social sciences, applied research, patent rights, and administra-
tive control. A 1947 bill, giving control to a board of scientists that appointed 
a director who reported to the board, was vetoed by President Truman, who 
wanted to appoint the director himself, with the board acting only in an advi-
sory capacity.
The National Science Foundation was finally established in 1950. Alan 
Waterman, former Chief Scientist at ONR, was appointed as the first NSF 
director and recruited other senior ONR personnel to fill key positions at the 
new organization. In particular, Admiral Tom Owen, who later became 
Assistant Director for the Division of Astronomy, Atmospheres, Earth, and 
Oceans (AAEO), colloquially referred to as “Earth, Air, Fire, and Water,” later 
played a major role in funding the Very Large Array (Chap. 7). Dan Hunt, who 
was a former Navy Captain, headed the NSF National Centers and then later 
the Astronomy Division. Although the 1950 NSF enabling act authorized an 
annual budget of $15,000,000, the initial budget for fiscal year 1951 was only 
$224,000. By 1951, the Korean War had begun and national priorities were 
turning elsewhere. The NSF budget was increased to $3.5 million for fiscal 
year 1952, still well below the authorization level, but sufficient to begin a 
modest grant program to support individual investigators. But with the limited 
NSF funds, many highly qualified proposals were left unfunded.
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Waterman was looking for ways to enable the new NSF to make an impact 
on American science beyond just supporting research grants for individual 
investigators. Coming from ONR, he was aware of the emerging opportunities 
in radio astronomy, with its obvious cutting edge commercial and military 
applications and its potential impact on basic research. He was also aware of the 
ambitious plans in the UK and Australia to construct large new facilities for 
radio astronomy research and the potential for important new discoveries. 
Under Waterman’s leadership, the NSF gave early support to the construction 
of the Harvard 24 foot and then 60 foot radio telescopes, as well as to Ohio 
State University for John Kraus’s helical array. But the bulk of federal support 
for radio astronomy still came from the defense related programs at ONR and 
the Air Force Office for Scientific Research (AFOSR), as well as the privately 
funded program at the Carnegie Institution’s Department of Terrestrial 
Magnetism (DTM).
An important NSF policy change occurred in May 1955 when the National 
Science Board (NSB) issued a statement declaring that2:
 1. The NSF should recommend as a national policy the desirability of government 
support of large-scale basic scientific facilities when the need is clear, and it is 
the national interest, when the merit is endorsed by panels of experts, and 
when the funds are not readily available from other sources,
 2. A national astronomical observatory, a major radio astronomy facility, and uni-
versity research installations of computers, accelerators and reactors are exam-
ples of such desirable activities for the NSF.
Although there was no specific Congressional authorization for the NSF to 
use its funds to pay for scientific equipment and facilities, apparently Congress 
did not object (Lomask 1976, p. 139). More importantly, the NSF was explic-
itly forbidden by law to operate any facilities or laboratories,3 so any funds used 
for this purpose had to be routed through a university or other research institu-
tion. What was not specified, however, was the degree of control that the NSF 
would have over the construction, operation and maintenance of any facility 
that they might fund.
Recognizing that there might be opposition to the diversion of funds from 
the NSF mandate to support individual investigators to the funding of con-
struction and operation of large scale facilities, the NSB further stipulated that 
“Funds for such large-scale projects should be handled under special budgets.”4 
In August, NSF Director Alan Waterman informed the White House that the 
“1957 NSF budget request will include an item for support of certain research 
facilities now urgently needed,” and that “this item is in addition to the estab-
lished program of the foundation in support of research by grants for basic 
research.”5 Unfortunately, the separation of research grants and facility funding 
was never firmly implemented at the NSF and remained a matter of contention 
for many decades.
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The establishment of the 1995 Major Research Equipment or MRE (later 
Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction or MREFC) funding 
line (Sects. 9.6 and 10.7) somewhat addressed the problem of funding the 
construction of new facilities, but left unresolved the source of annual funding 
to operate these large and expensive facilities, leading to increased tensions and 
competition for funds between facilities and investigators.
The Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy (AURA) and the 
National Astronomy Observatory6 The broad ranging 1955 NSF policy deci-
sion was motivated largely by the growing demands of astronomy. Even before 
radio astronomers had begun to rally around the construction of one or more 
large (and expensive) radio telescopes to be located at a national radio astron-
omy facility, optical astronomers began what would be a parallel effort leading 
toward a National [Optical] Astronomy Observatory. At the time, the major 
US optical astronomy facilities, which were constructed largely through phil-
anthropic support, were available primarily to scientists located only at those 
institutions that owned and operated the telescope, such as the Caltech Mt. 
Wilson and Palomar Observatories (MWPO), the University of California 
(Lick Observatory) and the Universities of Texas and Chicago (McDonald and 
Yerkes Observatories). Astronomers from other universities, particularly from 
the East Coast or Midwest, had at best access to smaller less competitive facili-
ties and unfavorable skies. Indeed, with only limited opportunities for research 
in observational astronomy, universities were not able to attract the most tal-
ented students. Even at Harvard University, which once had the largest tele-
scope in the world and probably the largest astronomy faculty in the US, the 
instrumentation had deteriorated, and the site 25 miles from Boston suffered 
from light pollution and poor weather.
Concerned about the lack of opportunity for the disenfranchised astrono-
mers from the East and Midwest, John Irwin (1952) suggested that a clear site 
should be found in Arizona for photoelectric photometry that could be used 
by all astronomers. In August 1952, NSF convened an “Ad Hoc Meeting of 
Astronomical Consultants,” which was later constituted as the NSF Advisory 
Panel for Astronomy with Jesse Greenstein from Caltech as the Chair.7 However, 
apparently concerned that a search for a site would not yield any astronomical 
research results, a joint $21,200 proposal from Ohio State University and the 
Universities of Arizona and Indiana to search for a suitable location was not 
approved by Greenstein’s Committee (Edmondson 1991; Goldberg 1983). 
The following year, during a meeting at Lowell Observatory on photoelectric 
photometry, Leo Goldberg stressed the need for a co-operative center for 
astronomy located at a good site with a 100-inch-class telescope to provide 
better opportunities for all optical observing, not just photometry, particularly 
for those without other access to competitive facilities and clear skies. In 
January 1954, following a recommendation from the NSF Advisory Panel for 
Astronomy, Waterman appointed an additional Advisory Panel for a National 
Astronomical Observatory with Robert McMath, Director of the University of 
Michigan’s McMath-Hulbert Observatory as the Chair (England 1982, 
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p. 281).8 As conceived, the national observatory would be owned by the US 
government but operated by a consortium of private universities.9 With grants 
totaling $818,400 to the University of Michigan, Aden Meinel and Helmut 
Abt studied some 150 potential sites located throughout the Southwest lead-
ing to the choice of Kitt Peak, Arizona, some 60 miles west of Tucson 
(Goldberg 1983).
The McMath Panel proceeded with ambitious plans to construct a 30 inch 
telescope within 18 months, to be followed by an 84 inch telescope and also a 
large telescope dedicated to solar observations. The proposed 1957 NSF bud-
get included funding for what was called the “American Astronomical 
Observatory,” and the NSF wrote to McMath that “the Foundation would 
welcome a proposal from a group of universities organized for the purpose of 
managing and operating an astronomical observatory facility” (Goldberg 
1983). Following an organizational meeting in March 1957, the Association of 
Universities for Research in Astronomy (AURA) was incorporated. Seven uni-
versities, California, Chicago, Harvard, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio State, and 
Wisconsin, became charter members of AURA, and the first contract with the 
NSF to operate the national observatory was signed in December 1957. 
Although the McMath Panel initially anticipated that the new observatory 
would be federally funded but privately owned, the NSF decided that the fed-
eral government would maintain ownership.
Princeton, citing their commitment to space astronomy, and Caltech, with 
their own 100 and 200 inch telescopes, did not initially join AURA.10 In March 
1958, Kitt Peak was selected as the site of the Kitt Peak National Observatory 
(KPNO) which was soon to house 36 inch, 84 inch, and 158 inch telescopes, 
and later the McMath Solar Telescope. Nicholas Mayall was appointed as the 
first Director of KPNO, and when he retired in 1971, Leo Goldberg became 
KPNO Director. In 1963, AURA formed the Cerro Tololo Inter-American 
Observatory (CTIO) in Chile and purchased the land surrounding the 
Observatory as well as land in the nearby town of La Serena to house the 
Observatory headquarters. In 1983, AURA reorganized their observatories to 
include the KPNO, CTIO, and the National Solar Observatory as parts of the 
National Optical Astronomy Observatory (NOAO). AURA moved their cor-
porate offices from Tucson to Washington to be closer to the political action, 
and John Jefferies became the new director of NOAO.
Associated Universities Inc.11 Following the end of the Second World War, 
American research in nuclear physics was concentrated at the University of 
California Radiation Laboratory at Berkley, Los Alamos, the University of 
Chicago Argonne Laboratory, and at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 
Tennessee. Scientists from the Northeast felt excluded from pursuing the rap-
idly developing opportunities in nuclear and high energy particle physics, in 
spite of the earlier pioneering work at Harvard, MIT, and Columbia University. 
Following separate initiatives to develop two new regional centers for nuclear 
physics in the New York and Cambridge areas, it became clear that the newly 
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created Atomic Energy Commission would not fund more than one new cen-
ter, and if the two groups could not agree, there would be no new nuclear 
physics laboratory in the Northeast. On 23 March 1946, scientific and admin-
istrative representatives of nine Northeast universities12 assembled at Columbia 
to promote the establishment of a government facility for nuclear physics. Lee 
DuBridge from Rochester, former Director of the MIT Radiation Laboratory, 
was chosen to lead the discussion which culminated in a resolution to join 
together to further their mutual interests.
The group wisely rejected a suggested name, PYJOHMITCH, based on the 
initials of the nine founding universities, and instead adopted the name of 
“Associated Universities Incorporated” (AUI). Except for Harvard, each AUI 
member university agreed to contribute $25,000 toward the new laboratory. 
When it was pointed out to George Kistiakowski, the Harvard representative, 
that Harvard was the richest of the nine institutions, Kistiakowski quickly 
retorted, “How do you think it got that way?”13
Initially AUI was incorporated in New Jersey, since it was thought that the 
new nuclear physics laboratory would be located in New Jersey, but when it 
was decided to locate the laboratory at Camp Upton on Long Island, Associated 
Universities Inc. was created as a New York corporation on 18 July 1946. The 
18-member Board of Trustees included one administrator and one scientist 
from each member university (Fig. 3.1). Edward Reynolds, Vice President for 
Fig. 3.1 First meeting of the AUI Board of Trustees in 1947. Credit: NRAO/AUI/
NSF
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Administration at Harvard and retired Brigadier General in the Army Medical 
Supply Services, was elected as the first Chairman of the Board and President 
of AUI, while MIT Professor Philip Morse was named as the first Director of 
the new Brookhaven National Laboratory. AUI Secretary Norman Ramsey 
later noted that “initially almost all the details and plans had to be made by the 
Trustees themselves. After there existed a Brookhaven staff, it was a somewhat 
difficult transition for the Trustees to acquire the confidence in the Brookhaven 
staff and to allocate to that staff its full responsibility.”14 Many of the same 
issues were to arise a decade later with the newly formed NRAO.
For the first five years, AUI did not have a separate President. Rather the 
position of President was assumed by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees. 
But, wanting to expand its activities beyond Brookhaven, AUI recruited Lloyd 
Berkner (Fig. 3.2), who started as its full time President in February 1951. 
His mandate was to bring in new business needed to smooth out the financial 
fluctuations in the AEC Brookhaven contract, new business which might also 
act as a deterrent to AUI micromanagement of Brookhaven.15 Berkner was on 
the short list, and apparently the choice to be the first NSF Director, but with-
drew from consideration to accept the AUI appointment (England 
1982, p. 124).
Fig. 3.2 AUI President 
Lloyd V. Berkner led the 
effort to establish a 
national radio astronomy 
facility managed by 
AUI. Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
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Lloyd Viel Berkner16 was born in 1905 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and grew 
up in Sleepy Eye, Minnesota and in North Dakota. Like many youths of the 
time, Berkner became fascinated with airplanes and radio, and held an amateur 
radio license, 9AWM. Following a year spent as a shipboard radio operator, he 
attended the University of Minnesota where he received his bachelor’s degree 
in electrical engineering in 1927. One of his professors was Curtis M. Jansky, 
who had worked hard to persuade Bell Labs to hire his younger brother Karl in 
spite of Karl’s chronic illness (Sect. 1.1). After graduation, Berkner worked on 
developing aircraft VHF radio navigation systems. Later, while working at the 
Bureau of Standards, he provided communications support for Admiral Richard 
E. Byrd and accompanied Byrd on his first Antarctic expedition as the expedi-
tion’s radio engineer. His contributions were later recognized by the naming 
of what was then the most southerly known island in the world as Berkner 
Island. With perhaps somewhat less success, Berkner also became involved in 
assisting with radio support for Amelia Earhart on her airplane adventures. 
While at the Bureau of Standards, Berkner began his long research program in 
ionospheric physics, leading to the discovery of the F layer of the ionosphere 
responsible for long distance short wave radio propagation. Moving to the 
Carnegie Institution’s Department of Terrestrial Magnetism (DTM), and 
building on techniques developed earlier by Merle Tuve, Berkner developed an 
advanced ionospheric sounding system which he deployed in Washington, DC, 
at Huancayo, Peru, at Watheroo in Western Australia, and near Fairbanks, 
Alaska to help predict optimum frequencies for short wave radio communica-
tion. During this period, he also worked with Tuve in the development of the 
proximity fuse, which was to play a critical role during WWII.
Tuve, who later started a radio astronomy program at DTM (Needell 2000, 
p. 265) is credited with having developed ionospheric sounding techniques, 
and, along with James Van Allen, for the WWII invention of the proximity 
fuse. But by this time, according to Needell (1987 p. 267), Tuve had become 
concerned about the growth of Federal investments in “big science” and the 
justification of basic research “as a basis for the defense of the free world,” 
which he argued compromised individual creativity. Prior to the War, Tuve was 
Lloyd Berkner’s boss at DTM, where their very different research styles led to 
conflicts and lasting tensions. Moreover, questions of priority and credit sur-
rounding Berkner’s contribution to both ionospheric sounding and the prox-
imity fuse may have contributed to their subsequent confrontations around the 
establishment of NRAO a decade later.
During the War, Berkner had served as head of the Radar Section in the 
Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, where he developed aircraft radar systems and was 
instrumental in starting a program at the MIT Radiation Laboratory to protect 
American ships from Japanese attacks. It was in this capacity that he got to 
know I. I. Rabi and others who later became leaders of AUI.17 As a result of his 
continuing work on naval electronics, Berkner rose to the rank of Rear Admiral 
within the Naval Reserve and was recognized by the British Government with 
the “Order of the British Empire.”
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Following the end of WWII, Berkner became head of the DTM Section for 
Exploratory Geophysics of the Atmosphere and also led DTM’s fledging radio 
astronomy program. He was an active member of URSI Commission V on 
“Extraterrestrial Radio Noise” (later changed to “Radio Astronomy”) as well 
as Chair of the US National Committee for URSI. As a regular advisor to the 
Department of Defense and to NATO, Berkner was instrumental in establish-
ing the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line radar system and in organizing the 
NATO Military Assistance Program. From 1956 to 1959, he served as a mem-
ber of the President’s Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC) where he led a 
study leading to the detection of underground nuclear tests and helped draft 
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. He was a Fellow of the Arctic Institute, a Member 
of the National Academy of Sciences, and a Fellow of the American Philosophical 
Society. He was rumored to be part of a 1947 alleged secret group, known as 
the Majestic-12, appointed by President Truman to investigate the nature of 
UFOs. Later, he became Treasurer of the National Academy of Sciences, and 
was the founder and Chair of the 1957 International Geophysical Year, presi-
dent of the International Council of Scientific Unions (1955) where he led the 
effort to found COSPAR, the joint IAU/URSI Committee on Space Science, 
president of the American Geophysical Union (1959), and president of the 
Institute of Radio Engineers (1961).
In 1958, Berkner became the first Chair of the National Academy of Science 
Space Studies Board (SSB). Following a three-year study, on 31 March 1961, 
on behalf of the SSB he sent a strongly worded memorandum to NASA 
Administrator James Webb stating that18:
Scientific exploration of the Moon and planets should be clearly stated as the 
ultimate objective of the U.S. space program. … Scientific exploration of the 
Moon and planets must at once be developed on the premise that man will be 
included. Failure to adopt and develop our national program upon this premise 
will inevitably prevent man’s inclusion, and every effort should be made to estab-
lish the feasibility of manned space flight at the earliest opportunity. … The Board 
strongly urges official adoption and public announcement of the foregoing policy 
and concepts by the U.S. government.
Less than two months later, in a special address to joint session of Congress, 
President John F.  Kennedy conveyed Berkner’s message stating that “this 
nation should set as a goal before this decade is out, of landing of a man on the 
moon and returning him safely to the Earth.”19
Although Berkner may not have the name recognition as some of the other 
American post-war science policy leaders such as Vannevar Bush, Robert 
Oppenheimer, or I.  I. Rabi, perhaps no one had a broader impact on mid- 
twentieth century science policy than Lloyd Berkner. He held numerous high 
level national and international positions which he was able to use to promote 
the case for increased Federal government funding of science. He died on 4 
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June 1967, following a heart attack suffered while attending a meeting of the 
Council of the National Academy of Sciences.
Among Berkner’s first moves as AUI President was to transfer the AUI 
office from Brookhaven to the Empire State Building in New York City to 
escape the day-to-day issues surrounding the operation of this complex opera-
tion and to hire Richard (Dick) Emberson (Fig.  3.3) as Assistant to the 
President. A year later Emberson also became Assistant Secretary of the AUI 
Corporation. After receiving his PhD in Physics from the University of Missouri 
in 1936, Emberson spent three years building infrared detectors at the Harvard 
College Observatory. He was at the MIT Radiation Laboratory during the 
War, then at NRL. Immediately before joining AUI, Emberson spent five years 
at the Department of Defense Research and Development Board.
3.2  firsT sTeps Toward a naTional radio 
asTronomy faciliTy20
Oddly, the first stimulus toward creating a national radio astronomy facility in 
the US, came not from American scientists, but from Australia. By the late 
1950s it was becoming clear that Australia could no longer remain competitive 
Fig. 3.3 AUI Assistant 
to the President, Richard 
M. Emberson, ca. 1962. 
Credit: © 1962 IEEE; 
used with permission
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in the rapidly growing field of radio astronomy by simply continuing their 
modest individual investigator-initiated programs discussed in Chap. 2. While 
a small country like Australia could not compete in popular, but expensive sci-
entific research areas such as nuclear or high energy physics, the modest CSIRO 
radio astronomy program was probably the most successful area of scientific 
research in Australia, and one that had brought considerable visibility and pres-
tige to this country of only ten million people. CSIRO Radiophysics Chief 
Edward (Taffy) G. Bowen (Fig. 3.4) wanted to maintain the prominence of 
Australian radio astronomy, but was aware of the growing radio astronomy 
programs in the UK and in Europe. He wanted to make an impact, and in 
particular not be outdone by Bernard Lovell’s planned 250 foot radio tele-
scope under construction in the UK. But he knew that he would need to look 
beyond Australia for the kind of funding he needed to compete with Lovell at 
Jodrell Bank and Martin Ryle at Cambridge.
Bowen had been a key player in the British and later Allied radar effort dur-
ing WWII. He was part of the secret 1940 Tizard Mission to the United States 
to discuss British radar developments, and carried plans and a prototype for a 
cavity magnetron, a key component to the development of microwave wave-
length radar (Bowen 1987). During the following War years, Bowen spent 
considerable time in the US acting as liaison between the US and UK efforts to 
develop microwave radar systems. He helped set up the MIT Radiation 
Laboratory, which became the center for American radar development. During 
a three year stay at MIT he became close friends with influential American radar 
scientists, including Radiation Lab director Lee DuBridge, Robert Bacher, 
Alfred Loomis, Chair of the American Microwave Committee, and Vannevar 
Bush, later to become President of the Carnegie Institution and probably the 
most influential science policy maker in the post-war period. During this time, 
Fig. 3.4 Chief of the 
CSIRO Division of 
Radiophysics, E.G. (Taffy) 
Bowen played a major role 
in alerting US scientific 
leaders to the growing 
opportunities in radio 
astronomy. Credit: 
CSIRO Radio Astronomy 
Image Archive
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Bowen visited a number of laboratories involved in radar development, includ-
ing Bell Laboratories where he met Karl Jansky (Bowen 1987, p.  170). In 
1944, Bowen joined the Australian Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR, reorganized in 1949 as Commonwealth Scientific and 
Research Organization, CSIRO) to help develop Australia’s radar defenses. In 
1946, he became Chief of the Division of Radiophysics where he led the transi-
tion from wartime radar toward a variety of peaceful programs, including radio 
astronomy in which Australia quickly became a world power (Hanbury Brown 
et al. 1992). 
Following the War, Lee DuBridge became president of the California 
Institute of Technology (Caltech), and Robert Bacher head of the Caltech 
Division of Physics, Mathematics, and Astronomy. Caltech operated the Mt. 
Wilson and Palomar Observatories (MWPO) together with the Carnegie 
Institution of Washington (CIW), but Caltech had no formal astronomy pro-
gram in spite of owning the largest and most powerful telescope in the world, 
the 200 inch Mt. Palomar telescope. Soon after he took over at Caltech, 
DuBridge hired Jesse Greenstein, then a young but already highly respected 
astronomer, away from the Yerkes Observatory to begin an astronomy pro-
gram at Caltech and to train students in astronomy. Greenstein quickly 
recruited a strong faculty, and the department started to turn out a series of 
very successful PhD graduates. Their work was all based on research done at 
the MWPO’s 60 and 100 inch telescopes on Mt. Wilson and the 200 inch 
telescope on Mt. Palomar. When Berkner left Carnegie’s DTM for AUI, it was 
apparently a setback to Tuve’s radio astronomy ambitions, so with the support 
of his boss, Vannevar Bush, Tuve exchanged ideas with his Carnegie counter-
part, MWPO Director Ira Bowen, about initiating some sort of cooperative 
radio program in conjunction with MWPO optical astronomers (Needell 1991, 
p. 63). But Ira Bowen was concerned that any support for radio astronomy 
might come at the expense of the more traditional MWPO programs in optical 
astronomy (Needell 1991, p. 65).
The Pasadena radio astronomy ambitions began at Caltech, two miles dis-
tant from the MWPO offices. While he was still a graduate student at Harvard, 
Jesse Greenstein had become fascinated with Karl Jansky’s 1933 discovery of 
galactic radio emission. Although he went on to be recognized for his pioneer-
ing optical and theoretical research on interstellar dust, the chemical composi-
tion of stars, and the physical properties of white dwarfs (Gunn 2003; Kraft 
2005), perhaps more than any other single individual, Jesse Greenstein 
(Fig. 3.5) later became a powerful force in raising the US to world leadership 
in radio astronomy, even though he himself never did any observational or 
experimental work in radio astronomy. Later Greenstein recalled that as a youth 
he had gazed at the giant radio antennas on the New Jersey shore being used 
by AT&T for transatlantic telephone communications (Greenstein 1984a, b) 
and that he had illegally operated an amateur radio station without bothering 
to obtain the required FCC license. Together with Fred Whipple, while still a 
graduate student, Greenstein wrote the first theoretical paper in radio astron-
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omy, trying to explain galactic radio emission as the result of thermal emission 
from interstellar grains, but their predictions were low by nearly a factor of 
10,000 (Whipple and Greenstein 1937).
As discussed in Sect. 1.3 Greenstein had been part of the delegation that 
Otto Struve sent to Wheaton to evaluate Grote Reber’s work. Following his 
several trips to Wheaton, Greenstein and Reber ultimately became good 
friends, and together with Reber, Greenstein wrote the first review paper in 
radio astronomy which served as an important trigger in bringing the work of 
radio astronomers to the attention of the broader astronomical community 
(Reber and Greenstein 1947). At Caltech, aware of the exciting discoveries in 
radio astronomy being made in the UK, in Australia, and elsewhere in the US, 
Greenstein argued that Caltech needed to get into this exciting new field 
(Gunn 2003; Greenstein 1994).21 Although Greenstein had strong support 
from the MWPO astronomers Walter Baade and Rudolph Minkowski, President 
DuBridge wanted “assurance that radio astronomy would uncover enough in 
the way of new, fundamental knowledge.”22 Ultimately, DuBridge would be 
convinced, but the persuasive arguments were to come not from Greenstein, 
but from DuBridge’s old wartime friends, Taffy Bowen and Vannevar Bush.
Faced with the need to raise funds for his planned large radio telescope, 
Taffy Bowen suggested that Caltech needed to get into radio astronomy, and 
pointed out the unique opportunity that would be created by combining a 
large radio telescope with the unique facilities of the MWPO. Bowen suggested 
that he could come to Caltech along with some of “his boys” to take charge of 
Fig. 3.5 Caltech 
Professor Jesse 
L. Greenstein started the 
radio astronomy program 
at Caltech and was 
instrumental in gaining 
support for a national 
radio astronomy facility. 
Credit: 
Greenstein-10.12-12, 
Courtesy of the Archives, 
California Institute of 
Technology
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running the radio telescope. To press his case, during a 1951 visit to the US, 
Bowen met not only with DuBridge, but also with his other former Radiation 
Lab friend, Robert Bacher, and with MWPO Director, Ira Bowen (no rela-
tion). DuBridge and Bacher were impressed by Taffy Bowen’s enthusiasm for 
radio astronomy, although Ira Bowen, an atomic spectroscopist still unim-
pressed by the potential of radio astronomy, commented that radio astronomy 
was too hard and too complicated for his observatory.23 Earlier, Bowen had 
apparently discouraged Charles Townes (1995, p. 195) from working in radio 
astronomy with the remark, “I don’t think radio waves are ever going to tell us 
anything about astronomy.”
Following his Caltech visit, Taffy Bowen traveled to the East Coast where he 
met with Vannevar Bush, Alfred Loomis, a Trustee of both the Carnegie and 
Rockefeller Foundations, as well as other former Rad Lab colleagues Ed Purcell 
at Harvard, and Jerry Wiesner at MIT. Bowen was pursuing a two-pronged 
approach to support his ambitious radio telescope project. Either he would get 
American backing to finance the building of a radio telescope in Australia, or at 
least convince the Americans to build one in the US that he, along with “his 
boys” would come and help run.
The identification by Baade and Minkowski (1954) of the strong radio 
sources Cas A and Puppis A with Galactic nebulosities and of Cygnus A with a 
distant galaxy sparked interest among Caltech and MWPO astronomers includ-
ing, finally, Ira Bowen. Encouraged by Vannevar Bush, Alfred Loomis, and Ira 
Bowen,24 DuBridge wrote to [Taffy] Bowen asking him to “estimate where the 
subject stands at the present time and where it ought to go from here.”25 
Although a large steerable dish of the order of 200 feet in diameter remained 
the centerpiece of Caltech’s focus, DuBridge was already thinking more broadly 
of a “radio astronomy laboratory or radio astronomy observatory” and sug-
gested to Bowen that they were “particularly enthusiastic about your being the 
director of such a laboratory.”26
Bowen responded with a thoughtful “Draft Programme for a Radio 
Observatory.”27 In his 11 page document, Bowen pointed out that radio 
astronomy “has tended to grow up in radio laboratories which are not closely 
associated with astronomical observatories,” but that “the time appears ripe, 
therefore, to bring the radio and visual observations into closer contact.” 
Bowen added that “the biggest single advance in the technique of radio astron-
omy is likely to come from the use of a very large radio telescope … 200 to 250 
feet in diameter.” Following a brief summary of the outstanding observational 
areas of radio astronomy, including the Sun, the so-called “radio stars,” and the 
recently discovered 21 cm hydrogen line, Bowen outlined the design concepts 
of a 200 to 250 foot diameter dish which he estimated could be built for about 
$1,000,000 and operated by an initial staff of 13 scientists, engineers, and 
technicians, plus clerical and support staff, at an annual cost of about $100,000. 
Bowen’s report was well received by Bacher and DuBridge, although, around 
this time, DuBridge became aware of Lovell’s plans to build a 250 foot radio 
telescope at the University of Manchester, and wrote to Bowen asking for his 
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reaction to Lovell’s telescope.28 Ever confident and enthusiastic, Bowen 
responded with more details of a possible antenna design, but noted that since 
“there is no point in making a telescope smaller than the one at Manchester, 
there may be some point in adopting a new unit of size namely 100 yards (or 
perhaps 100 meters).”29
But Bowen had not given up hope of building his antenna in Australia, and 
he also asked Bush “if there is any possibility” of getting support from the 
Carnegie Foundation.30 In spite of Bush’s initial uncertainty about Carnegie 
funding, Bowen ultimately received grants from the Carnegie and Rockefeller 
Foundations and secured further funds from Australia to build his Giant Radio 
Telescope near the farming community of Parkes, several hundred miles west 
of Sydney (Sect. 6.6), and he dropped any further discussions with Caltech 
(Robertson 1992, p.  115). But he had planted the seeds of ambition in 
Pasadena, as well as in Cambridge and Washington, to bring the United States 
back into the field pioneered by Janksy and Reber. However, it remained 
unclear how Caltech might actually organize and operate a radio astron-
omy program.
Meanwhile, Greenstein and Bacher continued to pressure DuBridge to 
begin a radio astronomy program at Caltech. Greenstein recognized the poten-
tial power of combining a radio astronomy program with the optical facilities 
of the MWPO, and tried to convince DuBridge that Caltech needed to get 
more involved in this new window on the Universe. Greenstein was also the 
Chair of the new NSF Advisory Committee for Astronomy, and wrote to 
DuBridge that at their meeting on 5 and 6 February 1953, the committee 
discussed the need for a new observatory “in the southwest for use by scientists 
from other institutions and specifically devoted to photoelectric research” and 
the “need for a larger national effort in the field of radio astronomy.”31 
Greenstein conveyed to DuBridge that his committee had pointed out that 
“we lag far behind Australia, Great Britain, and the Netherlands” and the need 
for “closer collaboration among the radio engineers and physicists who have 
thus far led this field, and astronomers who must interpret and use the results; 
the very great talents in applied electronics in the United States; and that 
important technical advances in electronics may arise in the course of 
this work.”32
Raymond Seeger was then the NSF Acting Assistant Director for 
Mathematical, Physical, and Engineering Sciences (MPE) and a close confident 
of Waterman. Looking for an entry into radio astronomy with its broad poten-
tial industrial and military implications, Seeger wrote to Greenstein, suggesting 
that Greenstein explore with DuBridge whether he “would sponsor a meeting 
of a group of active workers in the field, and of astronomers, to discuss our 
national situation in this field and to work out in outline a national program.”33 
Seeger even suggested that the NSF would be willing to support such a meet-
ing. Seeing the opportunity to establish Caltech’s authority in the field, 
DuBridge responded favorably, and saying he felt it “desirable to have this 
conference in Pasadena.”34 But DuBridge could not ignore the fact that the 
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active radio astronomy programs in the US were at Cornell, Harvard, NRL, 
the Bureau of Standards, Ohio State, and DTM, and more broadly, that the 
power center for American science was on the east coast, particularly in 
Washington and Cambridge.
As Mt. Wilson and Palomar Observatories were jointly operated by Caltech 
and the CIW there was naturally close contact between the Caltech and 
Carnegie managements. With the encouragement and support of Greenstein, 
Bacher and Ira Bowen, DuBridge wrote on 20 March 1953 to Merle Tuve, 
DTM Director, as well as to Ed Purcell and Jerry Wiesner, offering to hold an 
international conference in Pasadena on radio astronomy in the autumn of 
1953 and inviting them to be members of the organizing committee with him-
self as Chair and Greenstein as Executive Officer. In his letter, DuBridge 
explained that the purpose of the conference would be to
 1) obtain a broad picture of the current status of the experimental work in radio 
astronomy in the United Sates,
 2) to attempt to evaluate the probable major goals of radioastronomical [sic] work 
for the near future and the probable contributions to fundamental knowledge 
of the universe,
 3) In light of the above, to reach conclusions relative to undertaking further 
research in radioastronomy [sic] in the United States.35
Ed Purcell responded with enthusiastic support, but commented that he 
was aware “of one or two other projected US conferences in radio astronomy,” 
including ones at the National Academy of Sciences and at URSI, both planned 
for April 1953 in Washington, DC, and he commented that “radio astronomy 
conferences are springing up all over the place.” Purcell also noted that while 
the proposed Caltech conference appeared more comprehensive than the oth-
ers, there might be a problem in that some of the potential international par-
ticipants are unlikely to attend two meetings on radio astronomy held in the 
US around the same time period. Purcell also passed a copy of DuBridge’s 
letter to Bart Bok (Fig. 3.6), head of the Harvard radio astronomy program.36 
But Bok wrote to Greenstein that he had already organized a radio astronomy 
symposium at the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS) to be held in Boston starting on 26 December 1953, and he invited 
Greenstein to be a speaker.37
Merle Tuve (Fig. 3.7) responded to DuBridge confirming that, indeed, he 
was already organizing a radio astronomy meeting at the National Academy of 
Science (NAS) on 29 April 1953 which would include talks by Martin Ryle, 
Walter Baade, Ed Purcell, H. C. van de Hulst, and John Hagen (Fig. 3.8), and 
also that John Hagan had scheduled three sessions on radio astronomy at the 
Spring URSI meeting in Washington on 27–29 April 1953.38 DuBridge and 
Greenstein were surprised to learn that three other radio astronomy meetings 
had already been planned without their knowledge, especially considering that 
their MWPO colleague Walter Baade was an invited speaker at the NAS confer-
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Fig. 3.6 Harvard 
Professor Bart Bok started 
the radio astronomy 
program at Harvard 
where many of the future 
NRAO leaders were 
trained, and also was a 
vocal supporter of AUI’s 
plan to manage 
NRAO. Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
Fig. 3.7 DTM Director 
Merle Tuve, 1946. Tuve, 




about the planned role of 
AUI as the manager of 
NRAO. Credit: Courtesy 
of Carnegie Institution, 
Department of Terrestrial 
Magnetism
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ence, that DuBridge was a member of the NAS, and that Greenstein and Bok 
were long-time friends. Trying to salvage some role for Caltech, Greenstein 
proposed that perhaps they could combine Bok’s scheduled short meeting with 
the more comprehensive one that he and DuBridge had planned and suggested 
that perhaps they “could join forces, and apply to the NSF for travel funds.”39 
Although Bok was supportive of Greenstein’s suggestion,40 citing the Christmas 
holiday on one end and the AAS Nashville meeting on other end, DuBridge 
declined the opportunity for a joint meeting with Bok’s AAAS conference. 
Instead, following discussions with Seeger at the NSF, DuBridge, at Vannevar 
Bush’s invitation, reluctantly agreed to hold his proposed meeting during 
January 1954 at the Carnegie Institution in Washington and not in Pasadena 
as he had proposed.41
Greenstein and DuBridge discussed possible speakers and the need for travel 
funds, but, as Greenstein complained, they had their signals crossed with regard 
to publication.42 With the endorsement of the NSF, Greenstein and Bok had 
discussed the possibility of publishing some of papers from the January 1954 
Washington meeting in the proceedings of the December 1953 Boston meet-
ing. But DuBridge claimed he wanted to keep things informal and had declined 
the opportunity.43 An organizing committee for the Washington meeting was 
established, consisting of Greenstein as Chair, DuBridge, Bok, Hagen (NRL), 
Tuve, Wiesner (MIT), and Seeger (NSF). 
The NSF agreed to provide financial support particularly for participant 
travel expenses. Although Merle Tuve volunteered to provide administrative 
support from the Carnegie Institution, including administering the NSF funds, 
he had very different views from Greenstein and DuBridge on the nature and 
purpose of the Washington meeting. As it was the last of four US meetings, 
Tuve echoed Graham Smith’s comment that the Washington conference “can 
hardly be intended for their benefit; they surely feel no strong need for getting 
together to inform and stimulate each other.”44 While he agreed with the goal 
of bringing together “astronomers and electronic physicists into warm and 
stimulating contact with the current state of radio astronomy,” Tuve, charac-
teristically, was strongly opposed to “the idea that one of the purposes of the 
Fig. 3.8 John Hagen, 
Head of radio astronomy 
at the Naval Research 
Laboratory and Chair of 
the AUI Radio Astronomy 
Steering Committee. 
Credit: NRL
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conferences might be to figure out what kind of a large-scale effort the United 
States might, or could, or should undertake in this field.” Rather, he wrote 
Greenstein, “The only way to nurture a subject is by finding and encouraging 
young men who are interested in the subject.” Tuve wrote that he was con-
cerned that Greenstein and DuBridge “have not really moved away from the 
original idea of holding a conference in order to figure out what large-scale 
equipment and activity is appropriate for the United States, and presumably 
appropriate for NSF support,” and he went on to say that “I do not wish to be 
a party of any such thing,” and urged that “you and Lee should reexamine your 
own ideas before you write the invitation letters.” In suggesting participants 
for the meeting, Tuve again stressed that, “the meeting is not for radio astron-
omy workers to inform each other of their latest activities, but rather to interest 
and stimulate toward active participation investigators from astronomy and 
research electronics, especially with the hope of inducing some young men to 
work in this interesting new area.”45 This was to be the start of Tuve’s three 
year struggle against a major government-funded national facility for radio 
astronomy, first with Greenstein and DuBridge, and later, even more forcefully, 
with Lloyd Berkner and AUI.
The Washington Conference Sets the Ball Rolling Greenstein maintained that 
one of the objectives of the Washington conference was to explore opportuni-
ties for constructing a large antenna to allow American scientists to compete 
with those in England and Australia. However, in response to Tuve’s concern 
about the goals of the meeting, Greenstein agreed that the invitations would 
state only that the meeting was intended to “encourage increased activity and 
participation of various American groups in this … area of research.”46 But 
Tuve’s definition of increased activity was to “encourage young people who 
want to do something, rather than the deans and other officials who would like 
to start up a given activity, whether they have competent and enthusiastic per-
sonnel or not.” Tuve went on to point out that “radio astronomy has been 
given quite a bit of financial help in this country.” Indeed, as it would turn out, 
over the next half century, radio astronomers would receive a disproportional 
share of the NSF astronomy budget for new construction.
Bok’s meeting was held in Boston on 26 and 27 December 1953, at the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and was sponsored by the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science. Both organizations were known 
as the AAAS, contributing to some confusion. Bok, characteristically full of 
enthusiasm and undaunted by holidays, initially planned for an early morning 
start on 26 December, the day after Christmas. But facing objections from the 
participants, he moved the start to the afternoon so participants could travel 
overnight after celebrating Christmas with their families. Participants were also 
challenged by some of the coldest Boston temperatures ever recorded with 
overnight temperatures reaching −26F (−34C). But the meeting went off 
without incident and included reviews by John Hagan, Harold (Doc) Ewen, 
John Kraus, Merle Tuve, Graham-Smith and Bernard Mills. Grote Reber, 
although invited, decline to come, characteristically citing his preference to 
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remain in Hawaii to take data, but interestingly, a week later he did participate 
in the Washington meeting. Graham Smith and Bernard Mills, who were both 
on long term visits to DTM, inspired the group with their reports of the excit-
ing work going on at Cambridge and Sydney. In spite of Bok’s announced 
good intentions, there were no publications from the Boston meeting, nor was 
there any attempt made in Boston to influence any policy decisions regarding 
future US activities in radio astronomy.
The program of the Washington meeting was arranged primarily by 
Greenstein, following consultation with Tuve, with only minor input from the 
other members of the organizing committee. Greenstein convinced DuBridge 
to act as the titular Chairman of the meeting and, as such, to chair at least the 
opening and closing sessions. The conference, which was more elaborate than 
Bok’s Boston meeting, ran from 4 to 6 January 1954 and was attended by 
about 75 people from universities, government, and industry. With the support 
of Vannevar Bush, Greenstein was able to secure funding from the new National 
Science Foundation to help support the participation of internationally promi-
nent scientists such as Fred Hoyle, Graham Smith and Hanbury Brown from 
the UK, Hannes Alfvén from Sweden, Taffy Bowen and Bernard Mills from 
Australia, and Henk van der Hulst from the Netherlands. In addition to the 
organizers, other American participants included John Kraus from Ohio State, 
as well as representatives from NRL, DTM, Harvard, Princeton, MWPO, and 
the US Naval Observatory. The conference ignited the enthusiasm, not only of 
the astronomers present, but, perhaps more importantly, the influential east 
coast science power brokers. It would be this conference that provided the 
impetus toward establishing a US national radio astronomy facility, but the 
path would be a tortuous one, fraught with turf battles and long-standing per-
sonality conflicts.
The published reports of the conference in Volume 59 of Journal of 
Geophysical Research (pp. 149–198) only included short abstracts of the pre-
sentations (See also Hagan 1954). There were no formal discussions or recom-
mendations from the conference about planning for the future, but after the 
close of the conference, a small group got together at the NSF “to consider 
some questions of national policy in this field.”47 In a report authored by 
Greenstein, citing recent US work on discrete sources, the 21 cm hydrogen 
line, ionized gas regions, and the Sun, the group was unanimous in their belief 
that there were important new scientific results to be expected in the field of 
radio astronomy. Most, but notably not all, participants agreed that the exist-
ing US effort was inadequate, and argued that since existing radio astronomy 
programs at Harvard and Ohio State, as well as at several research centers 
would provide adequate training for young scientists, “consideration should be 
given to constructing at least one major research center with large equipment, 
such as a 250-foot steerable paraboloid.” Noting the limitations of private, 
industrial, and Department of Defense funding, they recommended that the 
NSF appoint a committee to “be responsible for a more detailed estimate of 
the budgetary needs, suggesting opportunities for immediate expansion and 
planning for the ultimate large scale capital expansion.”
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Alan Waterman (Fig. 3.9) had become the first director of the NSF just two 
weeks after Ewen and Purcell’s detection of the 21 cm hydrogen line, and saw 
radio astronomy as an opportunity for the young NSF to make an impact. In 
February 1954, following a visit to Caltech and the MWPO, Waterman lost no 
time in responding to the January recommendation and created an NSF 
Advisory Panel for Radio Astronomy with Merle Tuve as Chair.48
The Menzel Report Inspired by the Washington meeting, Donald Menzel 
(Fig. 3.10), Director of the Harvard College Observatory, together with Ed 
Purcell, Doc Ewen, Fred Whipple, Cecilia Gaposchkin, and Bart Bok, met with 
MIT Vice President Julius Stratton and MIT Professor Jerome Wiesner, to 
discuss the possibility of a joint Harvard-MIT effort to acquire and operate a 
large research tool for radio astronomy.”49 But they soon realized that their 
ambitious plans were probably too big, not only for a combined Harvard-MIT 
Fig. 3.9 NSF Director Alan T. Waterman speaking on 28 April 1956 at the dedication 
of the Harvard 60 foot antenna; Donald H. Menzel is seated behind him. Credit: NAA- 
DSH, Photographs
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effort, but even if NRL were brought into the picture. Following Stratton’s 
suggestion to establish “a radio observatory to be operated on behalf of all 
United States scientists” (Emberson 1959), Harvard Vice President for 
Research and Harvard member of the AUI Board, Edward Reynolds, sug-
gested to Menzel that Associated Universities, Inc. might undertake the job of 
creating and operating a research facility.
Donald Menzel was trained as a physicist and was known primarily for his 
work in stellar spectroscopy, but he was not unknown to the radio community. 
In his youth, he held an amateur radio license (W1JEX), and as early as 1937, 
he had speculated on the possibility of communication with Martians by short 
wave radio. During WWII, working for the US Navy, Menzel studied the rela-
tion between radio propagation and solar activity. In this capacity he got to 
know Lloyd Berkner, who was in charge of naval aviation electronics. Menzel 
also remembered Grote Reber’s 1936 letter to Harlow Shapley as well as 
Reber’s 1946 proposal to build a 200 foot diameter radio telescope, and after 
the detection of the 21 cm hydrogen line by Ewen and Purcell, Menzel sup-
ported Bart Bok’s efforts to start the first radio astronomy program at an 
American university.
Menzel traveled to Washington to meet with Berkner and Emberson to plan 
a May organizing meeting. In preparation for the May meeting, Menzel drafted 
a report for Berkner titled, “Survey of the Potentialities of Cooperative 
Research in Radio Astronomy.” He ended his covering letter to Berkner with, 
“I hope this is the beginning of a new and important era in radio astronomy.”50
Fig. 3.10 Harvard 
College Observatory 
Director Donald Menzel, 
who authored the 1954 
report that initiated 
Berkner’s plans to develop 
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In his introduction to the report, Menzel stated that the field of 
radio astronomy
encompasses most of astronomy, stars, cosmic evolution, geophysics of the atmo-
sphere, aerodynamics, astroballistics, electronics, radio communication, electro-
magnetic and hydrodynamic properties of gases, statistical mechanics, 
thermodynamics, interaction of atoms and radiation, cosmic rays, properties of 
the atomic nucleus, and the speed of chemical reactions.
Menzel went on to discuss options for solar, planetary, and galactic studies, 
including prescient remarks on the prospects for radio astronomy investiga-
tions of the hydroxyl (OH) molecule and deuterium as well the opportunities 
for further research based on the neutral hydrogen 21 cm line. Interestingly, 
OH would not be detected in the interstellar medium for nearly another decade 
(Weinreb et al. 1963) while deuterium remained elusive for more than half a 
century (Rogers et al. 2005). He also discussed the possibilities for research in 
the related areas of ionospheric physics, active lunar and planetary radar, as well 
as “allied laboratory and theoretical studies.”
In his report, Menzel noted that “although several individual scientists in 
the United States were preeminent in the early development of radio astron-
omy, there has been no broad, coordinated attack in this country on the basic 
problems of this field,” and he argued that “other nations (in particular Britain, 
Holland, and Australia) now lead in this important area.” He speculated that 
part of the reason for “the lag” was the “enormous expense of the tools,” and 
commented that the objective of his survey was to bring together “the various 
scientific groups who have an interest in the field, in order to pave the way for 
a coordinated attack on the problems, perhaps through the medium of a formal 
organization, similar to that of Associated Universities Incorporated.”
As he had already discussed with Berkner and Emberson, Menzel’s report 
suggested that “a small committee of interested scientists should be formed 
initially to discuss the details of the program, to formulate a working polity, and 
to make recommendations for future extension of the work.” He added that 
the initial participants might include, “in addition to representatives from 
Harvard, MIT and other members of Associated Universities Incorporated, … 
scientists from the Franklin Institute, Penn State, NRL, the Carnegie Institute 
[DTM] and possibly others.” Caltech was noticeably absent from Menzel’s list.
In a carefully laid out plan, Menzel thoughtfully emphasized the need to 
find a suitable site for the new radio facility. Although he commented on the 
need for “freedom from local radio interference,” he considered that the “pri-
mary consideration be given to accessibility.” Perhaps somewhat gratuitously, 
he added that “the council of the Harvard College Observatory wishes to 
express the opinion that its facilities at the Agassiz Station might be expanded 
to meet the needs of the proposal.” He also suggested that the radio facility 
include several optical telescopes, and stated that Harvard might have some 
spare mirrors to donate. He laid out the requirements for recruiting staff and a 
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director as well as the need to train students in this new field, pointing out that 
“only at Harvard is there at present an academic program in radio astronomy.”
Menzel concluded his report to Berkner by noting that with the establish-
ment and operation of Brookhaven, AUI had “effectively solved a similar prob-
lem” and “the suggestion that the Associated Universities Inc. should itself 
support the proposal merits most serious consideration.” Menzel proposed 
that AUI set up a Steering Committee to develop plans to set up a radio obser-
vatory and suggested some 20 possible members of the Steering Committee—
all from the Northeast. But as an apparent afterthought, he added DuBridge, 
Greenstein, and Otto Struve from UC Berkeley.
Contentious AUI and NSF Committees Berkner lost no time in reacting to 
Menzel’s report. Two weeks later he and Menzel met with the NSF Director, 
Alan Waterman, and other NSF staff as well as Jerrold Zacharias from MIT and 
Emanuel (Manny) Piore from ONR. They convinced Waterman to sponsor a 
small meeting to “discuss the possibility of building a large dish in the near 
future,” and to entertain a proposal from AUI to set up a group to further 
develop the planning.51 While the NSF anticipated that they or the Department 
of Defense might pay to construct such a facility, they expected that private 
funds would be sought “for the maintenance for the upkeep of the facility.”
Following the 26 April 1954 meeting at the NSF, Berkner appointed an “Ad 
Hoc Group for Cooperative Research in Radio Astronomy” which he promptly 
convened on 20 May 1954 in AUI’s New York Offices on the 69th floor of the 
Empire State Building. Berkner’s meeting was attended by 37 scientists repre-
senting 28 different institutions, including Minkowski and DuBridge from 
Caltech, John Hagen from NRL, and Merle Tuve from DTM.52 Alan Waterman 
and Ray Seeger representing the NSF and Manny Piori from ONR came as 
observers. Jesse Greenstein chose not to give up his 200 inch observing time to 
participate in the meeting, but he later confided to John Hagan53 that while he 
supported anything that would bring new resources to radio astronomy, he was 
concerned about the role of AUI and particularly Harvard, and worried more 
about the lack of experienced people than the shortage of expensive telescopes.
Berkner conveyed AUI’s interest in building a 250–300 foot dish, which he 
estimated might cost between $2,000,000 and $5,000,000, that AUI would 
make available for use by all universities, not just members of AUI. Although it 
was understood that construction funds would need to come from the federal 
government, probably the NSF, Berkner suggested that AUI might seek a 
$5,000,000 endowment whose income of about $200,000 per year could be 
used for operation of the observatory. Technical discussions were concentrated 
on the size of the dish and whether or not it should be on an equatorial or alt-
 az mount. Princeton physicist Robert (Bob) Dicke made some insightful 
 comments and suggestions.54 First he pointed out that to avoid unacceptably 
high sidelobes, it was necessary to taper the illumination and thus reduce the 
effective area that one had worked so hard to build. Second, he suggested that 
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instead of trying to keep the feed support structure sufficiently rigid to avoid 
flexure, one might consider a servo system to stabilize the support structure. 
Finally, with great prescience, Dicke pointed out the advantages of using an 
interferometer system composed of a number of small dishes instead of a single 
large dish. Dicke specifically suggested an interferometer composed of three 87 
foot dishes moving on a circular track which would have the equivalent collect-
ing area as a single 150 foot antenna, but which, he argued, would only cost 
about 1/5 as much, although he conceded that savings would be at least par-
tially offset by the cost of the instrumentation. This seems to be the first ever 
suggestion to build a radio interferometer composed of multiple steerable par-
abolic antennas, and predates by several years the Caltech two-element inter-
ferometer or the Cambridge One-Mile Radio Telescope. However, Dicke’s 
memo was ahead of its time, and appears to have had little serious impact to the 
subsequent discussions, which continued to focus on large fully steerable dishes.
Lee DuBridge surprised the participants by announcing that Caltech planned 
to create their own radio astronomy observatory with probable funding from 
the Office of Naval Research (ONR) (Sect. 6.6). The proclamation by DuBridge 
perhaps further motivated the Northeast science establishment and the NSF to 
try to establish their own facility, now needed to compete not only with 
Australia and the UK, but also with Caltech and ONR. It also obviated any 
argument to locate the proposed radio astronomy facility in the western part of 
the US. The group, which included the members of the NSF Advisory Panel 
for Radio Astronomy, supported the concept of establishing a national facility 
for radio astronomy and agreed that AUI should propose to the NSF to do a 
feasibility study for establishing a cooperative radio observatory. Emberson 
(1959) later wrote that the 20 May conference concluded that a three step 
process was needed, “(i) a feasibility study on objectives and organization, 
sites, and facilities, (ii) final design of facilities and equipment, and (iii) con-
struction of the observatory.”
The following day, the AUI Executive Committee authorized Berkner to 
apply to the NSF for a grant to study the selection of a site and to prepare a 
preliminary design for a radio astronomy facility,55 and at their next meeting on 
18 June 1954, the Executive Committee approved Berkner’s request to appoint 
Dick Emberson, as “Acting Director of a radio astronomy project,” along with 
a supporting salaried staff. With his strong background in radiophysics, 
Emberson was a natural choice to guide the AUI radio astronomy program. 
The Executive Committee also approved the appointment of an ad hoc com-
mittee recommended by Menzel to “work in close liaison with the project 
staff” and with a committee of the AUI Board. Recognizing that their lack of 
expertise in radio astronomy might open them to criticism from Tuve and oth-
ers, AUI considered the need to extend the composition of the Board of 
Trustees, but Berkner argued that the committee could keep the Board 
informed through a small committee of the Board.56
Berkner’s choice of John Hagen to chair the AUI Committee was a logical 
move. Starting in 1935, Hagen had worked at the Naval Research Laboratory 
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where, as described in Sect. 2.6, he had begun a program of research in radio 
astronomy. As the Chair of the US Radio Astronomy Commission V of URSI, 
Hagen was a natural choice to chair Berkner’s study committee. The other 10 
members of the AUI committee came primarily from the major East Coast uni-
versities and laboratories.57 At the suggestion of Bart Bok, David (Dave) 
Heeschen, who was soon to become one of the first Americans to receive a PhD 
degree in radio astronomy, was appointed as a consultant to the committee. Both 
Emberson and Heeschen worked with the Steering Committee and Berkner to 
plan the proposed feasibility study. Notably missing were Lee DuBridge and 
Jesse Greenstein, who had initiated the January 1954 meeting which had started 
the sequence of events leading to AUI’s involvement in radio astronomy.
The Boston and Washington meetings had discussed “small science” pro-
grams typically carried out by small close-knit teams, but in just a few short 
months the discussion had grown to anticipate big science with a national facil-
ity, government funding, and management by committee. After years of neglect 
and following a series of high level meetings held over a period of four months, 
the United States suddenly had two national advisory committees for radio 
astronomy—one reporting to AUI and one reporting to the NSF.58 Sometime 
they worked together, but at other times they were in conflict. These were in 
addition to the two NSF committees for optical astronomy, the Advisory Panel 
for Astronomy and the Advisory Panel for a National Astronomical Observatory. 
Conflicts also arose between the East and West Coast establishments, between 
radio and traditional (optical) astronomers, between advocates for and oppo-
nents to big government spending for science, and even between long standing 
personal rivals. Four individuals, Bok, Hagen, Kraus, and Tuve, served on both 
the AUI and NSF radio astronomy committees, which led to further tensions 
and mistrusts. Leo Goldberg, a member of the NSF radio astronomy panel 
who also served on the Advisory Panel for a National Astronomical Observatory 
as well as the NSF Division Committee for Mathematical, Physical, and 
Engineering, expressed concern about radio astronomers taking funds from 
“real” astronomers.59 Much of the deliberations of the two committees and 
interaction between them were by written letters, sometimes private between 
only two committee members, other times with multiple carbon copies sent to 
all members of one or both committees. Little formal documentation remains 
from these committee/panel deliberations, although the sense of the delibera-
tion can be reconstructed from the private papers of the participants, particu-
larly those of Greenstein and Tuve. The situation was confused by the loose 
and changing definition of the committee names. At various times each com-
mittee was referred to as a “panel” or “committee” and as “advisory  committee/
panel” or “steering committee/panel,” often leading to confusion over who 
was speaking for which committee or panel and what hat they were wearing.
The NSF and AUI committees each addressed similar questions: what 
instruments to build at the national radio facility, where to build the facility, 
who would manage the facility, and how to recruit staff, particularly a director. 
But over the next two years the discussion invariably returned to the size and 
cost of the proposed radio telescope, how it would be managed, and by whom.
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To discuss the draft proposal that had been prepared by Berkner and 
Emberson, the AUI Steering Committee met together with the members of 
the NSF Advisory Panel on 26 July 1954 at the AUI offices in New York. 
Merle Tuve, Chair of the NSF Panel was unable, or perhaps, unwilling to 
attend. After reviewing the broad range of potential scientific research pro-
grams, the participants dismissed the need for co-locating the proposed radio 
facility with optical facilities, but in order to meet all of the scientific objectives, 
they suggested that a range of equipment, including a high gain antenna as well 
as a number of smaller antennas, a standing fan-beam antenna for surveying, 
and an interferometer, would be needed. They also discussed the criteria for 
siting the facility, recognizing the need to balance observing conditions 
(weather and freedom from RFI) with practical accessibility.60
The next day, Berkner hand-carried 15 copies of an AUI proposal, along 
with minutes of the January and 20 May meetings, to Waterman at the 
NSF. The proposal requested $105,000 for a one-year study to investigate the 
feasibility of establishing and operating a national radio astronomy facility. AUI 
intended that the Phase I proposal would produce (a) a consensus of research 
objectives, (b) a list of the instrumentation needed, (c) an examination of pos-
sible sites, (d) an examination of other costs that might be required, e.g., roads, 
power, buildings, etc., (e) a determination of the cost of a Phase II study for 
the detailed design and construction, and (f) consideration of operating costs.61 
Dick Emberson was specified as the Principal Investigator. Berkner and 
Emberson referred to the January and 20 May 1954 meetings as justification 
for the study, but interestingly, they did not mention the December 1953 
meeting in Boston.
Waterman apparently quickly recognized the opportunities for the NSF and 
called Berkner back the next day to explain that if funds for Phase II, which 
Berkner estimated to be between $1 and $1.5 million, would be needed start-
ing in 1956, Waterman would need that information now, with “as much jus-
tification as feasible,” and that he needed to know by the spring of 1955 what 
funds Berkner would need for fiscal 1957. Over the following week, after dis-
cussions within the Foundation, it was agreed that “plans for radio astronomy 
should be worked out as a specific NSF program,” and that the NSB and 
Bureau of the Budget be kept informed. Waterman was keen that “this sched-
ule can move forward rapidly,” and hoped that the NSB would give him the 
“authority to carry on with the Bureau of the Budget.”62 But first Waterman 
had to deal with Tuve and his NSF Advisory Panel for Radio Astronomy.
Berkner’s proposal was sent to more than 12 referees, including members of 
Tuve’s committee, as well as to the Chairs of other related NSF advisory com-
mittees. Although many of the reviewers noted that they had no experience in 
radio astronomy, there was a general consensus that the United States had 
fallen behind in this important new field of astronomy and that to compete 
with the new and planned international facilities such as the Jodrell Bank 250 
foot antenna, there was an urgent a need for a cooperative large facility for 
radio astronomy. But some members questioned the need for the proposed 
study, asking whether it was an appropriate use of NSF research funds, or say-
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ing that it was too expensive. Several respondents asked whether AUI, which 
had no experience in radio astronomy, was the appropriate organization to 
carry out the study, while others noted AUI’s success in managing Brookhaven. 
A few reviewers recognized the likelihood that AUI’s study would lead to 
requests for millions of dollars, much more than the NSF could likely afford.63 
As Rudolph Minkowski later commented, “The most severe criticism came 
from those referees who are least familiar with radio astronomy.”64
Before consulting with his Panel, Tuve paid a quiet visit to the NSF to 
express his concerns to Waterman, Seeger, and Peter van de Kamp, the new 
program manager for astronomy, that the AUI proposal was overly ambitious, 
claiming that, with the exception of Harvard, there was little interest even 
among the AUI universities. He also noted that AUI’s first responsibility was 
to Brookhaven, and he did not see how the proposal for radio astronomy was 
related to Brookhaven. Finally, Tuve claimed that since his Panel “had informed 
itself rather thoroughly as to the potentials of radio astronomy and the plans 
that might be undertaken,” that “much of the feasibility study proposed by 
AUI was unnecessary.”65 Waterman explained to Tuve that he “was looking 
entirely to the Tuve Committee [i.e. Panel] on Radio Astronomy” for guid-
ance on “how the general program of the country in radio astronomy might be 
developed.” Seeger added that they urgently needed some guidance about the 
1956 radio astronomy program if funds were to be needed in the next fiscal 
year. Somewhat contradictorily, Tuve responded that his committee could not 
“make such a recommendation without having had a meeting on the subject,” 
but that “they would probably not recommend as a major a program as 
indicated.”66
In summarizing the reports of the reviewers to his Panel, Tuve argued that 
no one at AUI was active in radio astronomy, that the “proposal is being made 
by administrators not researchers,” and that “there is no visible basis for conti-
nuity of any activity on radio astronomy in the AUI.” Tuve also called attention 
to the construction problems with the Manchester 250 foot project, saying it 
would be prudent to await the outcome of that effort “before another project 
of the same kind is initiated.”67 Once again, having been alerted by Tuve, Taffy 
Bowen stepped forward with an offer to volunteer his services to lead a jointly 
financed feasibility study for a large steerable radio telescope, and Tuve sug-
gested that Bowen, rather than AUI could be “in full charge of the design 
project.”68 Tuve, who opposed big government support of science, and was 
reacting to his long standing suspicion of Berkner’s motives, argued that since 
the reviews were negative they should give AUI only $15,000. But Greenstein 
came to AUI’s rescue, pointing out that the average rating of the proposal was 
between good and excellent and that Tuve’s report reflected only his own views.69
Following his meetings with Waterman, Berkner spent the next 2½ months 
in Europe, primarily to attend scientific meetings in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and in the UK. Although he was able to take advantage of the opportunity to 
talk with Ryle, Lovell, and Oort and to learn about their progress and plans, his 
lengthy absence delayed meeting with the NSF to respond to questions from 
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the reviewers and the NSF Advisory Panel. However, during Berkner’s absence, 
Emberson did meet with the NSF and provided an estimate of the funds that 
would be needed for construction, for land acquisition and the rate at which 
funds would need to be made available. This information was subsequently 
forwarded by the NSF to the Bureau of the Budget to aid in their planning for 
the FY56 and FY57 budget cycles. But Emberson noted that Tuve’s Panel was 
a “real block to early action on the AUI proposal.”70 Emberson also shared 
these details with the members of the ad hoc AUI committee, who interest-
ingly pointed out the additional costs that would be needed to acquire a suit-
ably large parcel of land to minimize any local sources of interference as well as 
the cost of providing advanced electronic instrumentation.
Aside from Berkner’s absence from the US, although the NSF had estab-
lished a Radio Astronomy Panel, no funds had been allocated for the Panel to 
meet until Tuve proposed that the Carnegie Foundation should administer a 
grant to provide for it to hold three meetings over the next year.71 It was not 
until mid-November 1954 that the NSF Panel was able to meet to discuss the 
AUI proposal. In preparation for their 18 November 1954 meeting, a subset 
of the group, together with Berkner and Emberson, met on the evening of 4 
November at the Cosmos Club in Washington to discuss revisions to the AUI 
proposal. As described by Bok, “it was a long and difficult evening.”72 In 
response to the issues raised by the reviewers and the Advisory Committee, 
Berkner addressed the criticism that AUI had no active radio astronomers by 
pointing out that the AUI proposal was based on a “a number of meetings, 
conferences, and discussions in which every U.S. leader in radio astronomy has 
participated to some extent,” and that as a collaborative effort he anticipated 
extensive participation from the university community as well as from Ryle, 
Lovell, Bowen, and Oort, all of whom, he said, had offered to supply their 
construction plans.73
Prior to the 18–19 November meeting of the NSF Advisory Panel, Tuve 
informed its members that he felt that the AUI proposal should be for “a” 
facility and “not necessary for ‘the’ national facility of the USA” and went on 
to emphasize the importance of the existing facilities and that the subject is 
“astronomy and astrophysics,” and not “automatic gadget engineering.”74 
Tuve’s Panel was hardly unbiased or disinterested. Greenstein, who was 
involved in planning Caltech’s own major radio astronomy project, responded 
in favor of the cooperative facility but expressed reservations about starting 
with a large antenna.75 Six members of the Panel were also members of the AUI 
ad hoc committee that had met at AUI to help to develop the AUI proposal, 
while Bok and Kraus themselves had large grant proposals before the 
Foundation. At their 18–19 November meeting, which was held at the 
Carnegie Institution, the Advisory Committee (a) reviewed the previous rele-
vant meetings including the evening “rump meeting” on 4 November, (b) 
reviewed the AUI proposal as modified on 8 November in response to the 4 
November meeting, (c) considered proposals from Harvard for their 60 foot 
radio telescope along with informal proposals from Kraus at Ohio State, and 
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possible needs for other radio astronomy projects at Cornell, NRL, DTM, 
Caltech, the National Bureau of Standards, Michigan, Princeton, Stanford, 
Penn State and the University of Alaska.76 Rather surprisingly, just before the 
meeting, Greenstein stated that he was resigning from the NSF Panel citing 
both internal and external responsibilities, but Tuve asked him to reconsider.77
The Panel struggled with the realization that the AUI proposal could not be 
treated in the same way as a typical research grant, so there was considerable 
debate about to what extent the proposed AUI study should be “supervised” 
by the Panel, by the NSF itself, or whether AUI should be free to act indepen-
dently.78 While Tuve wanted AUI to concentrate on antenna design, Berkner 
responded that “If all the panel wants is a cost estimate, …. I could get Hughes 
Aircraft to submit one.” But Tuve argued that “We can’t turn this whole job 
over to AUI,” to which Berkner replied, “You must have confidence in what 
we are trying to do,” and appealed to the success of Brookhaven, and that 
“nothing should be done by the Panel to question AUI’s judgment.” It was 
becoming clear at this meeting that radio astronomy might be in a very privi-
leged position for rapid growth. Although the NSF 1954 total budget for 
astronomy was less than $200,000, Peter van de Kamp pointed out that “radio 
astronomy was considered at present to be in a special class of subjects, and that 
it might not be impossible for the Foundation to give a hearing to recommen-
dations which total more than $200,000 during the present fiscal year.”79
Apparently encouraged by van de Kamp’s remarks and not wanting to miss 
an opportunity, the NSF Panel agreed that the AUI study should concentrate 
on a steerable antenna and not a Mills Cross type of radio telescope, and that 
the cost of the antenna might be in the vicinity of $3 million, but that they 
should also consider antennas that might be built for $1 and $6 million, as well 
as consider the “the largest steerable antenna that might be built without spe-
cial regard to cost, its limits being based on the strength of materials and similar 
considerations.”80 They also specified that the antenna should work to at least 
21 cm over the whole surface and down to 3 or 10 cm over a limited area and 
be able to see the entire northern sky “at least as far south as 10 degrees below 
the Galactic Center.” Moreover, the committee suggested that the “search area 
for the site be confined to an area within 300 miles of Washington, D.C.” The 
reason given for the geographical restriction was to minimize travel time by 
scientists and students from northeast universities, although by this time jet 
travel was already making single day transcontinental travel feasible. But the 
panel members were also likely seeking balance between the national radio 
facility and big west coast optical astronomy facilities as well as the planned new 
radio astronomy program beginning at Caltech which they felt would give west 
coast radio astronomers adequate access. Also, with a possible location near 
Washington, the NSF could watch with a closer eye and exert some control 
over the radio facility.
The Panel then quibbled over the size of the grant. Following Tuve’s sug-
gestion that the AUI member organizations should demonstrate their interest 
by contributing to the study, they recommended that AUI be given only 
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$85,000 and not the requested $105,000, but only as an initial grant which 
could be supplemented by another $15,000 “if AUI found it difficult to obtain 
this portion from their participating members.” However, this recommenda-
tion was subject to AUI more specifically defining the scope of their study to 
evaluating only the feasibility of a national radio facility and the criteria by 
which the site should be chosen. The Panel then went on to recommend that 
the NSF award grants to Bok for a total of $128,000 for the operation of the 
Harvard 24 foot radio telescope and toward the construction of a 60 foot radio 
telescope, to Kraus at Ohio State for $23,000 for further studies of standing 
parabolic antennas, and to Tuve to administer a grant to host visiting radio 
astronomers to the United States and to send US students to other countries. 
Following a request from van de Kamp, the committee assigned the following 
ranking to the proposals “in order of their estimated importance: 1) Harvard, 
2) Ohio State, 3) AUI, 4) grants for visitors.”
That same day, Berkner sent to the NSF a three page letter essentially identi-
cal to the draft that that he shared with the Tuve’s group at the Cosmos Club 
meeting, repeating the justification for the feasibility study, the endorsement of 
the radio astronomy community, and saying that, if successful, he expected this 
Phase I study to “generate the basic plans for the construction, management, 
and operation of the required facility,” to be followed by a more detailed Phase 
2 for the actual antenna design and choice of a contractor.81 While he was care-
ful to reassure Tuve and the NSF that funding of this Phase 1 proposal was not 
a foot-in-the door toward AUI operation of the radio astronomy facility, 
Berkner went on to add, “I would be less than frank in saying that in undertak-
ing Phase 1 under the present proposal, AUI would expect to make a further 
proposal under Phase 2 if Phase 1 proves that such a further proposal is feasi-
ble.” Of course, as had already been discussed earlier in the day at the Advisory 
Panel meeting, the fact that Lovell was currently building a 250 foot radio 
telescope, that a slightly smaller one was being planned by Bowen in Australia, 
and that Caltech was developing plans, already demonstrated clearly that it 
would be feasible to construct a national radio facility in the United States with 
a “large” antenna as the centerpiece. And Lloyd Berkner was determined that 
AUI would have a major role in building and operating the national facility. 
Without waiting to receive formal notification of the NSF grant, Berkner lost 
no time in planning for a national radio astronomy facility and organized a small 
meeting at AUI on 10 December 1954 with Charles Husband, who had 
designed the Jodrell Bank 250 foot antenna and was supervising its construc-
tion, and Michael Karelitz from Brookhaven as a consultant to AUI.  The 
assumption was that the basic instrument would be a “big dish” as the most 
versatile way “to solve certain problems,” but that “the need for interferome-
ters … must not be ignored.”82 Berkner pointed out that the AUI task would 
be to determine “what should be built and at what cost.” Husband optimisti-
cally advised “not to be scared by engineering problems in the structural steel 
phase,” and that the “big engineering difficulties are in the control gears and 
the instrumentation.” Based on his design and experience with the Jodrell Bank 
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alt-az antenna, Husband outlined design concepts and cost estimates for steer-
able antennas up to 500 feet in diameter. Karelitz argued that “Serious consid-
eration, has to be given to advantages of an equatorial mount,” but at the time, 
an equatorial option seems not to have been seriously discussed. At this stage 
both the NSF and AUI were thinking of only a “collaborative” observatory, 
where the construction funds would somehow be provided by the government 
(NSF or ONR), but ongoing operations would be the responsibility of the uni-
versities interested in radio astronomy who would provide people and resources.
3.3  creaTing The naTional oBservaTory
Sensitive to the accusations that AUI had no expertise in radio astronomy or, 
for that matter in antenna design, Berkner sought advice from Bell Laboratories, 
and in particular from Janksy’s old boss at Bell Labs, Harald Friis, who advised 
that “425 to 450 feet is about the limit for a reflector or dish of conventional 
design which would probably cost close to ten million dollars.”83
In January 1955, Berkner learned from Waterman that the NSF would grant 
$85,000 to AUI for their proposed feasibility study.84 Assuming that this plan-
ning and feasibility study did not require National Science Board approval, the 
NSF had not consulted the NSB, apparently ruffling some feathers of those 
NSB members from southern universities who looked at AUI as an elite private 
institution (England 1982, p. 282). Upon learning of the grant award, Berkner 
relieved Emberson of his other tasks as Assistant to the President so that he 
could assume full time responsibility as the Project Director for radio astron-
omy. In February 1955, following approval of the NSF funding, the AUI ad 
hoc committee was formally reconstituted as the AUI Steering Committee for 
Radio Astronomy. With the support of the Steering Committee, following a 
meeting with the NSF staff on 9 April 1955, AUI put the project on a fast track 
with the intention of presenting to the Foundation, “a proposal looking to the 
immediate establishment of a radio astronomy facility to be operated by AUI,” 
and with a goal of presenting it to the 20 May 1955 meeting of the National 
Science Board.85 But the NSB presented hurdles that would first need to be 
overcome: “whether the Foundation, as a matter of policy, should embark on 
a program involving continuing support of a large scale project, and if this 
question is answered in the affirmative, the Board will need to … chose from a 
selection of several proposals which will then be before it for consideration.”86
From the beginning, AUI’s goal was to construct a facility that “should 
provide research opportunities not available elsewhere.”87 This may be con-
trasted with AURA, which was organized to create a national optical observa-
tory to provide observing opportunities for astronomers who did not otherwise 
have access to their own facilities. AUI also recognized that some research 
groups might be interested in bringing their own instruments to the new 
observatory at their own expense, providing that the site was sufficiently radio 
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quiet. However, the emphasis was on building a large antenna whose cost was 
beyond the means of an individual university and would be at least competitive 
with the large dishes being built in Manchester and Sydney. One of the first 
questions asked was “Are there any real technical limitations to the maximum 
size of steerable radio telescopes?” Following consultation with structural 
experts, AUI optimistically, even if not realistically, concluded that diameters 
up to several thousand feet would be feasible.
Knowing that Lovell was already building a 250 foot telescope at Jodrell 
Bank set an unspoken lower limit on Berkner’s ambition. When the AUI 
Steering Committee met on 26 March 1955, they agreed that size needed to 
be balanced against cost. But, perhaps seduced by the prospects of generous 
federal funding, the Steering Committee initially focused on a 500 or 600 foot 
diameter radio telescope which they felt was justified, especially by the oppor-
tunities for both galactic and extragalactic 21 cm hydrogen line research. The 
Committee also noted the need for high resolution and sensitivity for contin-
uum studies at 21 cm and shorter wavelengths that would be afforded by a very 
large steerable paraboloid.
Jacob Feld, an independent contractor, outlined the factors to be consid-
ered in the design of large radio telescopes and proposed to undertake a design 
study for a 600 foot antenna with full sky coverage, a surface tolerance of 1 
inch,88 and a pointing accuracy of 7 arcsec (5% of the 10 cm half power beam 
width). Some concession was made by limiting the sky coverage to 8 hours 
about the polar axis if an equatorial mount was adopted, although the declina-
tion range was rather unrealistically and unnecessarily specified to reach from 5 
degrees below the North Pole to 5 degrees below the horizon.
But the Steering Committee also recognized that that it would be challeng-
ing to construct a 600 foot antenna and that to establish its viability, the new 
national radio astronomy facility needed to have observing facilities sooner 
than a 600 foot instrument could be erected. It is not clear to what extent the 
discussions about a 600 foot diameter radio telescope were based on knowl-
edge of the NRL 600 foot antenna planned for Sugar Grove (Sect. 9.3). At 
least some members of the AUI Steering Committee, in particular John Hagen 
from NRL, were surely aware of this then-classified project, as apparently were 
Emberson and senior NSF staff (McClain 1960, 2007; Needell 2000, p. 284).
Since modest size antennas in the range of 50 to 85 feet in diameter were 
being built at Harvard, DTM, and NRL as well as for the military, both Merle 
Tuve89 and AUI confidently assumed that their “design might be extrapolated 
to 100 to 150 feet and be essentially off-the-shelf.”90 They agreed to take 
immediate steps to procure a radio telescope with an aperture of about 150 feet 
and to simultaneously conduct feasibility studies for apertures in the range of 
300 to 500 feet and greater.91 The Steering Committee reviewed a detailed 
design submitted by Grote Reber for a 220 foot dish, as well as Reber’s 
thoughts about 500 feet and larger dishes.
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For both the 600 foot and 150 foot designs, the Steering Committee con-
sidered the pros and cons of placing the antenna in a radome to protect a much 
simpler and less expensive antenna structure from the weather. Two novel 
radome designs were discussed, one an air supported fiber-glass or nylon fabric, 
another based on a geodesic dome proposed by Buckminster Fuller. But they 
soon concluded that the cost of a radome would more than offset the decreased 
cost of the antenna structure. Moreover, they recognized that it would be dif-
ficult to build a radome that would not attenuate incoming signals over the 
broad frequency range of interest to radio astronomy.92
Both Berkner and Emberson were nervous about confining design consid-
erations to extrapolations of antennas that had already been built and agreed 
that they needed to receive independent outside advice. Nevertheless, 
Emberson proposed an ambitious schedule which called for requesting an 
additional grant of $300,000 to continue the feasibility study in 1956, with a 
goal of starting a five-year construction and operating plan on 1 July 1957 
“involving an expenditure of about twenty million dollars,” although it was 
recognized by the AUI Board of Trustees that “20 million dollars is consider-
ably in excess of the entire annual budget of the National Science Foundation,” 
and that “the Corporation has never formally decided that it should undertake 
the management of an enterprise of this character.” The Board also noted that 
the AUI charter would prevent its operating outside the state of New York, so 
they voted to amend the charter to allow AUI to operate in a state other than 
New York. At the same time they authorized Berkner to “enter into contractual 
arrangement for the construction and operation of a facility for research in 
radio astronomy,” for which they anticipated AUI would receive a manage-
ment fee “of between $35,000 and $50,000 a year.”93
To support their ambitious plans, the Steering Committee asked Bart Bok 
to convene a sub-committee to “promptly” prepare “a report on a scientific 
justification for a variety of large steerable parabolic reflectors, with aperture of 
150 feet, 300 feet, and 500 feet.”94 Bok’s Panel noted that high gain might be 
more important than narrow beam width, but stressed the need to maintain 
sufficient precision to operate at least to 21 cm if not shorter wavelength. Not 
surprisingly, they emphasized the impact that 21 cm observations with a large 
radio telescope could make to the understanding of galactic structure, and 
commented on “the potentialities for research into the structure and dynamics 
of neighbor galaxies and the fainter galaxies,” as well as speculating on the pos-
sibility of other spectral lines such as deuterium at 327  MHz and OH at 
1668 MHz. They also pointed out the importance of measuring precise posi-
tions, flux density, and spectra of the discrete radio sources, but there was no 
consensus about the relative merits of interferometers and Mills Cross instru-
ments for this type of work. Although they considered that “the primary justi-
fication for a paraboloid antenna with an aperture of 150 feet or more rests on 
the research potential of the instrument for galactic and extra-galactic studies,” 
they also called attention to the “great possibilities for solar work,” and espe-
cially the importance of a large paraboloid for planetary radar. The panel report 
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concluded that “there are few problems to be expected in the construction of 
[a 150 foot paraboloid]” and that “the acquisition of new and superior equip-
ment, designed to round out or fill in the picture obtained with present equip-
ment, has led to new discoveries.”
Emberson and Berkner met again on 8 April 1955 with Waterman and other 
NSF staff to discuss their planned proposal, but Berkner rejected the NSF sug-
gestion that Tuve participate in the meeting.95 Emberson explained that their 
proposed mode of operation would closely parallel the academic, corporate, 
and government partnership that had been so successful at Brookhaven, and 
that “all qualified scientists without regard to institutional affiliation would 
have access to the facility,” thus “insuring maximum scientific progress.” To 
review the effectiveness of both staff and visitor research, Emberson and 
Berkner proposed to institute a Visiting Committee patterned after the suc-
cessful Brookhaven Visiting Committees.96 Following their 8 April meeting, 
based on a preliminary draft of the Planning Document, Emberson submitted 
a seven page detailed statement of AUI’s thoughts on “The Establishment and 
Operation of a National Radio Astronomy Facility.”97
Tuve’s skepticism became apparent to Bok at Tuve’s 24 April 1955 presen-
tation at the NSF, which was also attended by Bok and Hagen. Bok became 
concerned about how Merle Tuve and his NSF Advisory Panel would treat the 
AUI proposal. Without strong support from Tuve’s Panel, it was not going to 
get very far with the NSB at their 19–20 May 1955 meeting. Bok wrote to 
Tuve urging that the NSF Panel report should, (a) urge continuing support for 
the existing university facilities (Ohio State, Harvard, and Cornell) as well as 
extending support to others such as Michigan, Illinois, Caltech, and Berkeley 
in order to “insure a steady research productivity,” and a “steady flow of 
PhD’s;” (b) support “the prompt establishment in the Eastern United States of 
a National Radio Observatory,” to be operated by AUI, (c) that “a 120 to 150 
foot paraboloid reflector be promptly built for the Observatory, … and at a 
later date …. a very large at least partially steerable paraboloid.” More specifi-
cally, Bok urged that AUI be given a grant in 1956 to design and construct “a 
120 to 150 foot instrument” … operating to 10 cm, “to purchase the land for 
a National Radio Observatory,” and to “continue the inquiry into the con-
struction of a large dish.”98 But aside from completing the design of the 
120–150 foot antenna, Tuve wrote a bold “No!!!” beside most of Bok’s ambi-
tious proposals.99
In anticipation of the 19–20 May NSB meeting, Tuve summarized his 
understanding that the NSF Panel100
 a) was enthusiastic about the prospects for radio astronomy including the 
need for “special budget support,”
 b) agreed that “very high priority, probably ahead of anything else, must be 
given to the support of existing activities in radio astronomy at universi-
ties and research institutions, along with the encouragement of one or 
two new additional groups,”
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 c) agreed to endorse “the construction of a reflector of intermediate dimen-
sions, in the range 120 to 150 feet in diameter (probably 140 feet [43 
meters]),” and said that
 d) “the proposal for a very large dish (250 to 600 ft. in diameter) is a proj-
ect of uncertain value.”
As an afterthought, Tuve added, “We regard radio astronomy as part of 
astronomy, and do not believe that it should compete with the proposed 
National [optical] Observatory. … Radio astronomy is a study of the heavens, 
not just glorified electronics.” Tuve acknowledged that there was no firm 
agreement on whether AUI was the appropriate organization to develop and 
operate the intermediate size dish, and suggested that operation by two state 
universities “might be a better arrangement.” He went on to suggest that 
funds be made available to purchase at least options on a suitable site “prefer-
ably within reasonable distance of Charlottesville, Virginia,” and that planning 
for the very large dish should not impact the construction of the intermediate 
size antenna. But he added, “I refuse to be pressured into any detailed approval 
or disapproval of AUI proposals on such a schedule,” to which Greenstein 
noted on his copy of Tuve’s letter, “I absolutely agree.”
Tuve’s letter triggered responses from Hagen, Greenstein, and Minkowski. 
Hagen took strong issue with Tuve’s opposition to a large antenna.101 
Elaborating on Bok’s scientific justification, Hagen listed 11 research areas, 
ranging from the Sun and other solar system objects to galactic and extragalac-
tic problems, that required a large dish. As he acknowledged, Hagen had ini-
tially opposed the intermediate size dish on the grounds that it “might prejudice 
our chances of arriving at our real goal, which is to obtain an antenna of at least 
300 ft. aperture.” But he did not oppose the majority decision to start with the 
150 foot antenna, provided that it had sufficient precision. Minkowski’s 
response102 primarily addressed the Kraus antenna which he felt unjustified, 
since he argued there were enough surveys, and that the need was to identify 
optical counterparts and have frequency flexibility to enable measurements of 
radio spectra. Minkowski also contended that the AUI budget proposal was 
unrealistic and included too large a staff, particularly for administrative person-
nel. In a separate letter, Greenstein and Minkowski pointed out the “prime 
purpose” for the AUI initiative was to consider the feasibility and cost of large 
antennas, and urged that “AUI concentrate cost studies on the 300 and 600 
foot dishes,” but they recognized that “experience with the Manchester 250 
foot and the proposed U.S. National 140 foot” might be needed before the 
costs were known. Acknowledging the equal demands of optical and radio 
astronomy, they claimed that the AUI plan to spend “$25 million for several 
large reflectors,” was “inspiring in scope but is not realistically justified by the 
capabilities in the United States.”103 Moreover, they argued, because of the 
small number of radio astronomers in the United States, there was no justifica-
tion for a Brookhaven-type facility. Rather, they claimed, the “intermediate size 
dish” could be “administered by one or two state universities, for example 
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Virginia and Michigan, with the site probably near Virginia.” Like Tuve, they 
felt “it dangerous to leave the direction of the activities of a new cooperative 
institution to a group familiar with the problems of large physics laboratories.” 
Of particular concern was the staffing needs of a large national facility, which 
they speculated would “destroy all going institutions in the field,” and that it 
was “improbable that student training could be carried on away from the uni-
versities with the very large equipments proposed.” Many of their concerns 
would be echoed over the following decades as NRAO indeed grew to domi-
nate US radio astronomy.
Tuve’s Panel finally suggested a total of $3.93 million for what they referred 
to as the “Eastern Radio Astronomy Facility.”104 Of this nearly four million 
dollars, they suggested that $1.7 million would be needed for the 140 foot 
“intermediate” sized reflector and its auxiliary equipment and $300,000 for 
continued engineering studies of a “super” reflector. Another $1.25 million 
was suggested for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the univer-
sity facilities. Peter van de Kamp, then head of NSF Astronomy, was charged 
with preparing a written report for the NSB. Van de Kamp’s report105 closely 
followed Tuve’s recommendations, but gave a somewhat more positive twist to 
the idea of a very large dish by saying that “the feasibility of a large dish (250 
to 600 ft. in diameter) deserves careful study,” rather than Tuve’s “is a project 
of uncertain value.” Based on Tuve’s recommendations, van de Kamp went on 
to suggest a budget of $3.5 million over four years starting in FY 1957 for the 
construction and operation of an intermediate sized radio telescope, $200,000 
for a 70 × 700 foot standing parabolic reflector at Ohio State, $700,000 for 
construction, maintenance and operation of a number of smaller facilities, and 
$300,000 for engineering studies for a large dish type radio telescope. However, 
van de Kamp added that the ultimate cost of the proposed AUI Radio 
Astronomy Observatory, including the construction and operation for 5 years 
of a large steerable dish, was estimated to be $24 million, and that Kraus envi-
sioned building a 4,000 × 400 foot standing paraboloid at an estimated cost of 
$8 million.
Following the recommendations of the AUI Steering Committee, on 6 May 
1955, on behalf of AUI, Emberson submitted to the NSF a detailed five-year 
plan centered about “at least one very large and very precise radio reflector,” 
but which also included, “a precision surface 20–50 foot” dish, a “100–150 
foot reflector,” a “250-foot reflector that would be a scale model of the fourth 
reflector, which would be perhaps 600 feet.”106 Emberson included Bok’s sum-
mary of the “research objectives,” arguments supporting the “need for a radio 
astronomy program in the United States,” and a detailed discussion of the 
proposed “organization of a national facility for radio astronomy research.” He 
reiterated the importance of radio astronomy to understanding the Universe, 
as well as to electronic communication and military security, and that the 
United States was being challenged by new radio astronomy facilities under 
construction in Australia, England, and the Netherlands. He did not miss the 
opportunity to point out that “the British 250-foot antenna, built by a nation 
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with a fraction of our resources is scheduled for operation in 1955.” With great 
prescience, Emberson noted that because “among the radio sources already 
discovered there appear some that appear not to follow the classical laws of 
radiation by hot bodies, and further that radio frequencies have been identified 
through molecular beam experiments in the physics laboratory, one can sense 
that these two branches of science may join in solving some of the riddles of 
nature.” Perhaps more important, and prophetic, he went on to state, “It 
would be a serious error to suppose that all possible discoveries have been made 
in this new and expanding field of science.”
Although Emberson presented eloquent arguments for establishing a large 
radio facility patterned after the successful Brookhaven operation, he also rec-
ognized the need to maintain the smaller university facilities to train students, 
to conduct research appropriate to the smaller facilities, and to provide “a 
breeding ground” for “great researchers” to use the “great facilities.” The AUI 
plan projected an “ultimate” staff of 106 individuals with an annual operating 
budget of about $700,000. Emberson suggested that they would need another 
$300,000 in 1956 for Phase 2 of the feasibility study, followed by $6,899,000 in 
1957 which included site acquisition, buildings, roads, etc. as well as $800,000 
for construction of a 150 foot reflector. Perhaps to mitigate “sticker shock,” he 
offered, “It is our hope that non-government sources of support may be found, 
both for part of the initial construction of the facility and for its operation, 
[and] that the NSF be asked to underwrite the operations for a five-year period, 
with the implicit understanding that if and as other sources of support material-
ize during that period the Foundation’s obligation would be proportionatly 
[sic] reduced.” The AUI plan called for a scientific staff “a nucleus of perma-
nent employees whose efforts would be supplemented by qualified visiting sci-
entists.” Finally, as a major policy directive, the plan proposed that, “All 
qualified scientists without regard to institutional affiliation would have access 
to the facility, thus permitting its efficient use and insuring maximum scientific 
progress.” This “Open Skies” policy, as it became known, would characterize 
NRAO for the next half century, and to an extent would be adopted by other 
radio and later optical observatories, although often only after “encourage-
ment” by the NSF in return for funding. To counter criticism about the lack of 
radio astronomy experience, the proposed AUI plan called for a periodic review 
by a Visiting Committee appointed by the AUI Board.
The 19 May 1955 meeting of the NSB Committee for MPE Sciences began 
with a closed session where the NSF MPE Acting Assistant Director Raymond 
Seeger summarized the recommendations for the proposed large scale radio 
and optical facilities. He was followed in an open session by separate presenta-
tions from R.R. McMath, Chairman of the NSF Advisory Panel for the National 
Optical Astronomy Observatory, and by Tuve, supported by Bok, Greenstein, 
Hagen, and Minkowski, for the radio astronomy Panel. Tuve’s Panel recom-
mended that the AUI concentrate on the 140 foot telescope and only do fea-
sibility studies for the larger instrument. One issue faced by the NSB was not 
only the large dollar amounts involved in these proposed national facilities, but 
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that, unlike research grants which may typically provide support for limited 
periods, the national facilities appeared to require a continuing commitment by 
the NSF for a large operating budget. This tension between national facilities 
and research grants would continue in the astronomical community over the 
next half century. The university scientists wanted access to the unique facilities 
provided by the national observatories, but not if it came at the expense of their 
research grants. However, the research grants were of limited value if there 
were no telescopes to use.
The AUI Steering Committee met on Saturday, 28 May 1955 to review the 
specifications for the intermediate size telescope, whose size seemed to oscillate 
from 140 feet to 150 feet depending on the committee, the audience, and the 
day. The AUI Committee also discussed a plan for the operation of the facility, 
the choice of a site, and how to reconcile the planned budgets with those rec-
ommended by the NSF Committee. Bok noted that the NSF Advisory Panel 
was concerned that AUI was putting too much emphasis on the very large 
radio telescope, apparently at the expense of the 140 foot dish, but he was reas-
sured by Berkner and Hagen that they were serious about an early construction 
of the 140 foot radio telescope.
In reviewing the draft specifications for what was now considered the “small” 
140 foot telescope, Bok reported that the NSF Panel did not consider the 
specifications for construction to be sufficiently precise. But the AUI Committee 
was concerned that if “detailed materials and construction specifications were 
prepared, a manufacturer would strive to give only what might conform to the 
specifications without regard as to whether the completed instrument would 
perform as desired.” Wisely, the AUI Committee agreed that they would con-
tinue with the use of performance specifications,107 but questions of this nature 
would continue to plague NRAO when faced with contracting for future radio 
telescopes. Charles Husband, who designed and was building the Jodrell Bank 
250 foot radio telescope, had been contracted to advise AUI, and wrote,108 
“We have tended to carry out improvements to the design as actual construc-
tion work proceeded. For many reasons this is not a good thing to do.” Perhaps, 
less obviously, he also commented, “I think you would save a great deal of 
money by preparing a design in considerable detail before inviting bids,” and 
went on, “The client being responsible for producing the design is practically 
always the more economical in the long run.” This latter philosophy was 
 fundamental to all of NRAO’s future antenna Requests for Proposals, except in 
the case of the Green Bank Telescope. The extenuating circumstances sur-
rounding the GBT funding and the perceived need to begin construction 
before the design was finalized led to a huge cost increase (Chap. 9). The AUI 
Committee also struggled with the question of equatorial vs. alt-azimuth 
design. Based on his experience with the NRL 50 foot dish, Hagen expressed 
concerns that109 “the alt-azimuth mounts require more complex computers 
and servo-mechanisms and that maintenance would therefore be more costly 
and time consuming.” But Goldberg and Haddock argued that110 “low alti-
tudes would be highly desirable for some solar work, lunar occultations, and 
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eclipses,” that would be more difficult with an equatorial mount, and Bill 
Gordon111 “stressed that atmospheric and ionospheric problems required 
access to very low altitudes, particularly to the north.” Unable to decide 
between the two options, the Committee agreed to seek two bids, one for each 
type of mount.
Although the budget recommended by the NSF Advisory Panel did not dif-
fer significantly from the AUI plan, Emberson defended the slightly larger AUI 
figures by pointing out that AUI had included essentially112 “everything that 
might be considered for the Facility.” Nevertheless, there was concern that the 
AUI was planning for a much larger staff and more extensive operation than 
recommended by the NSF Panel. Following discussions among Seeger, van de 
Kamp, and Tuve, and in recognition of an expected increase in the FY1957 
NSF budget, Seeger agreed to an increase in the budget for salaries and main-
tenance, but Tuve expressed concern that the proposed budgets for radio 
astronomy would113 “equal or exceed the figure currently planned for astron-
omy,” and that the proposed budget for radio astronomy “should not be 
allowed to reduce the sum being apportioned to optical astronomy, but should 
be added to it, thus serving to greatly increase the grand total for astronomy. 
Our panel still considers radio astronomy as a branch of astronomy and not a 
substitute or competitor.”
By the time of the 17 June 1955 meeting of the AUI Executive Committee, 
AUI had not received any formal notification of the results of the 19–20 May 
meeting of the NSB, but, through the joint membership of the AUI and NSF 
committees, Emberson reported that he had learned that the NSB114 “had a 
lively interest in radio astronomy and that the Foundation’s radio astronomy 
panel had proposed that $3,300,000 be allocated for a national radio astron-
omy facility.” Emberson also informed the Executive Committee that he had 
initiated a contract with Jacob Feld for design studies of a 600 foot reflector 
and had engaged two consultants from the University of Pennsylvania to evalu-
ate Reber’s design.
To continue the feasibility studies started under the first NSF grant, AUI 
applied for another grant for $234,500, which included funds for two indepen-
dent designs for the 140 foot telescope along with a preliminary design for the 
600 foot telescope, and for site evaluations including options to purchase land. 
In discussions with Waterman and other NSF staff, Emberson stressed that 
since the feasibility study for the 600 foot antenna had been successfully com-
pleted under Phase 1, omission from the Phase 2 grant would “constitute a 
time delay somewhat greater than six months.”115 The NSF was already begin-
ning to appreciate that the cost of the new radio astronomy facility would be 
significantly more than Tuve’s panel had indicated.116 At the same time, the 
NSF was considering comparable levels of funding for the proposed American 
Astronomical Observatory to be located somewhere in the Southwest to pro-
vide clear skies and suitable facilities for photoelectric observing, and this would 
surely add to the NSF budget burden.117 Nevertheless, at its August 1955 
meeting, the NSB approved the AUI budget proposal for $3.5 million to be 
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spent over a four year period starting 1 July 1956 and asked the Bureau of the 
Budget that this be included in the NSF’s FY1957 budget.
Bart Bok, with his usual enthusiasm, wrote in support of full funding for the 
AUI Phase 2 proposal, citing the successful progress of the Phase 1 study and 
the urgency of moving ahead so that the United States did not lose momentum 
at what he called “this critical stage.”118 Jesse Greenstein indicated that since 
funds were limited he could not “go along with the wholehearted endorse-
ment of a $234,000 grant,”119 and that it was premature to invest too much 
money in the design of the 140 Foot Telescope until it was clear that construc-
tion funds would be approved by Congress. John Kraus’s strongest statement 
in support of the AUI proposal was that “continued support for studies and 
planning on a multi-million dollar national facility is unavoidable,” but he 
spent most of his two-page report arguing for the smaller university facilities, 
especially his standing parabolic reflector at Ohio State.120 Minkowski pointed 
out that there was serious concern that “300 feet is the maximum possible size 
of a sufficiently rigid dish,” and that no “further funds be diverted from the 
core of the study.”121 Merle Tuve, reporting on a series of telephone conversa-
tions with his Panel, expressed concern about the impact of the AUI grant on 
astronomy research grants and suggested that funds be specifically earmarked 
for Kraus’s antenna at Ohio State. He reported that the Panel recommended 
that the NSF grant to AUI be cut to only $140,500 since some of proposed 
activities could be deferred, but that AUI should add “one or two high level 
members to their professional staff, preferably appointing the director who is 
to take charge of the evolution of this project.” The challenge to find a director 
turned out to be more difficult than anticipated, and would end up taking 
another five years. However, Tuve’s panel went on record “to use AUI as the 
vehicle for bringing the Eastern National Radio Astronomy Facility into being, 
but that the actual title to the property and decisions as to the future ownership 
and control be held in abeyance, probably for several years.” Unwilling to give 
AUI a free hand, Tuve added, “It is understood, however, that this ownership 
and control would be in the hands of universities, whether through the AUI 
mechanism or directly with one or two selected institutions.”122,123
At a meeting with Waterman on 6 December 1955, Berkner outlined the 
proposed scientific and administrative structure of the facility, the nature of the 
expected contract between the NSF and AUI, and said he hoped to have a 
director appointed by 1 July 1956.124 They also began a discussion on how the 
land for new facility would be acquired, whether it should be public or private 
land, and who would hold title to the property. Although no decision had been 
reached, or even formally discussed about who would manage the radio astron-
omy facility, both Berkner and Waterman tacitly assumed that it would be AUI.
Meanwhile, Waterman was juggling inquires and pressures from both 
Berkner and Tuve, each promoting their own agendas. Even the name of the 
new facility was contentious. Tuve had started to use the name “Eastern Radio 
Astronomy Facility” to make it clear that it wasn’t a government operated 
“national” facility, but Waterman didn’t want it to appear as a facility only for 
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the East Coast. “Green Bank Observatory” was suggested, but Tuve argued 
that would be inappropriate if the facilities were dispersed. They both agreed 
that it was “difficult to pick a proper name until the site was selected, property 
purchased etc.” Waterman agreed not to call it a “National Observatory,” and 
suggested to just call it the “Radio Astronomy Facility.”125 In his phone con-
versation with Waterman, Tuve also complained about “Berkner’s attitude 
toward the whole thing,” arguing that “Berkner is trying to run everything his 
way and that Hagen and Bok are going along for political reasons.” Waterman 
cautioned Seeger, “that we should watch AUI carefully as they have a tech-
nique for pushing things through and it is hard to do anything about it. Berkner 
lines up a few members of Tuve’s committee beforehand and then calls com-
mittee meeting and everyone usually agrees with him, but major points should 
be considered by the Foundation before giving him a ‘yes.’” He advised Seeger, 
“In any conversation with Berkner in which he wants a quick OK, to tell him 
that he must check with me first.” Waterman explained that he saw a need “to 
encourage something else than AUI,” as “this will keep AUI in bounds.” Tuve 
and Seeger also did not miss an opportunity to exchange a few criticisms, with 
Tuve expressing concern about “Seeger’s willingness to agree to all of Berkner’s 
suggestions,” and Seeger’s criticism of the way Tuve was running his Panel.126
The AUI Steering Committee met again on 11–13 December 1955, 
together with NSF and AUI staff as well as invited consultants from the US 
Geological Survey and elsewhere. Much of the meeting was devoted to review-
ing the site studies and a planned 12 December trip to a candidate site at 
Massanutten, Virginia (see following section “Choosing the Site”).127 But the 
Committee also discussed the design of the 140 foot telescope and the difficult 
problem of guidance and control. Tuve argued for an equatorial mount since 
he contended “that precision positioning could be more easily achieved … on 
an equatorial mount than on an alt-az mount.” Unfortunately, neither Tuve 
nor the rest of the participants appreciated that while the drive system might be 
simpler and more accurate, structural distortions on an equatorially mounted 
telescope could lead to much larger positioning errors than those introduced 
by the control system on an alt-az mount. The Committee did recognize, how-
ever, that an equatorial mount would lead to “something less than full hemi-
spheric coverage,” a reasonable constraint that somehow was to be forgotten 
when it came to defining the final design.
Emberson described the progress on the three ongoing commercial 140 
foot design projects, all of which were for an alt-az mount. Numerous argu-
ments were presented against an equatorial design, including the limited sky 
coverage, the need for counterweights, and most importantly that “problems 
of stiffness and rigidity would be more difficult.” It was also “pointed out that 
since there was little prospect for a 600 foot equatorial mounted dish, … an 
equatorial 140 foot would teach little of the problems that would be met with 
larger instruments.” Although it would “delay the 140 foot project by at least 
two months, … the Committee unanimously recommended the above equato-
rial program be initiated,” although this would mean diverting funds from the 
large telescope design. Unable to agree on the size of the planned “smaller” 
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telescope to be mounted on the Laboratory building, the “the Committee 
concluded that two small instruments were desirable, one in the 25 foot range, 
and the other 60 foot.” The announced schedule optimistically called for com-
pletion of the 140 foot design and call for bids in March 1956 followed by the 
award of a construction contract in May or June. Emberson reported that he 
expected construction to start in September 1956 after review of the detailed 
design, and had set a target date of December 1957 for the completion of the 
140 foot radio telescope. Sadly, it would be almost ten years before the 140 
foot radio telescope would be completed and available for research. Perhaps 
recognizing that the Steering Committee had outlived its purpose of consoli-
dating community support for Berkner’s ambitions, a few days later, at their 14 
December 1955 meeting, the AUI Executive Committee approved Berkner 
and Emberson’s request to disband the informal Steering Committee and 
replace it with an “Advisory Committee to the Board of Trustees.”128 This 
step, perhaps, was facilitated by John Hagen’s announcement that he would be 
resigning from the Committee, as he was about to assume charge of the ill- 
fated Project Vanguard.129 Nevertheless, Tuve was “dumbfounded” when he 
learned from Seeger that the AUI Steering Committee would be dissolved.130
In reporting to his NSF Panel about the Steering Committee meeting, Tuve 
expressed his frustration about the decision to “build an extensive community 
in the deep woods,” rather than have “at least an auxiliary laboratory and 
administration building adjacent to some nearby university, probably in 
Charlottesville, or in Northwest Washington.” Tuve complained, “I was con-
sistently and vigorously opposed in this by a variety of arguments,” and went 
on to quote verbatim the two resolutions passed by the Steering Committee, 
but he neglected to mention that he had proposed the motions.131
The NSF Advisory Committee met again on 16–17 January 1956 to address 
the delicate question of the management and location of the radio astronomy 
facility. They asked if the facility should be managed by a single university, a 
group of universities, or other non-profit institutions, with or without experi-
ence in radio astronomy; to what extent was it necessary to choose a site that 
required building an extensive and expensive nonscientific infrastructure; and 
to what extent should the country’s radio astronomy facilities be concentrated 
at one site.132 The Panel and Waterman expressed concern that AUI, with its 
membership confined to the Northeast, did not properly represent all of the 
major institutions in the country with interests in radio astronomy,133 and the 
Panel concluded that “there are serious problems with AUI as the corporate 
organization.”134 Waterman considered the possibility of letting AUI construct 
the facility and some other group or university handle the “detailed administra-
tion,” but Berkner again argued that an appropriately chosen Visiting 
Committee would satisfy the need for national representation.135 Following 
assurances of cooperation in securing the land from the Governor of West 
Virginia, Berkner was anxious “to proceed with plans for a contract for con-
struction, operation, and maintenance of the observatory.” But he was informed 
by the NSF that although they would consider the AUI plans, the NSF could 
not proceed with contracts until they received the House report on the 
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Foundation’s budget request.136 Meanwhile, Tuve’s concerns about AUI were 
supported by the NSB, which unanimously recommended that “to the extent 
possible and practicable, the governing body for any major facility receiving 
substantial assistance from the Foundation should be as representative as pos-
sible of interested universities and institutions throughout the country with 
experience in the field.”137 Waterman also explained the Board’s policy.
In supporting large-scale facilities, the Federal Government should aim to limit 
its support to established construction costs, but might recognize that in indi-
vidual instances continuing support may be required, preferably on a diminishing 
scale. Once a sound venture is started, the Government should stand behind it, 
but not necessarily be its sole support.138
Although AUI and the NSF agreed that while the discussions about a 
national radio astronomy facility were not secret or classified, “there should be 
no public announcement covering the construction of facilities”139 until 
Congress appropriated the funds. However, someone leaked the news, and a 
long story appeared in the 26 January 1956 issue of The New York Times under 
the headline, “President Recommends Radio Telescope Funds for New 
Astronomy Research.”140 The Times article reported that, if approved, the 140 
foot telescope would cost about $7 million, but that the total cost of the facility 
might cost up to $30 million. The article turned out to be somewhat of an 
embarrassment, as the House Appropriations Committee had approved only 
$4.5 million for the total cost of the radio astronomy facility.141
Meanwhile, no steps were taken toward disbanding or renaming the AUI 
Steering Committee, although Bart Bok replaced Hagen as the Committee 
Chair. The Steering Committee unanimously agreed with Berkner’s suggestion 
that that the new facility be called “The Karl G.  Jansky Radio Astronomy 
Observatory.”142 A week later, the NSF agreed to Berkner’s suggestion to name 
the observatory after Jansky, but there is no evidence that name was ever con-
sidered further.143
On 10 January 1956, at the request of Waterman, AUI submitted their draft 
Planning Document for the National Radio Astronomy Facility.144 With 
 unsuppressed optimism and enthusiasm, Berkner suggested a five-year budget 
for the construction and operation of four radio telescopes with diameters of 
25–50 feet, 140 feet, 250 feet, and 600 feet. Berkner’s plan was reviewed by an 
equally enthusiastic small subcommittee of the Advisory Committee composed 
of Bok, Leo Goldberg, and Ed McClain. The final Plan for a Radio Astronomy 
Observatory submitted to the NSF in August 1956 included:145
 1. A “standard size” 28-ft dish to develop and test electronic equipment as 
well as making “worthwhile observations.”
 2. A 60 foot dish which had now also reached the status of “standard size” 
by virtue of the 60 foot Kennedy dish recently completed at Harvard.
 3. A 140 foot dish.
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 4. A 250 to 300 foot diameter antenna, possibly a scale model of the 600- 
ft antenna.
 5. A 600-ft radio telescope following the specifications given for the 
Feld study.
AUI’s “Plan” was apparently the first use of the word “Observatory” in any 
AUI or NSF document. While the NSF was openly discussing the establish-
ment of a National [Optical] Astronomy Observatory, all reference to the par-
allel radio program had previously referred only to a “facility.” In addition to 
specifying the planned radio telescopes, the AUI “Plan” carefully laid out a 
management plan which was received with some alarm by the NSF. Basically, 
the AUI plan called for government (e.g., NSF) funding and ownership of the 
facility, but all aspects of the operation would be controlled by AUI. Under the 
AUI plan the NSF would have no control over the selection of the director or 
advisory committees, operating policies, expenditure of funds or auditing. 
While the NSF recognized that “good administration requires a single line of 
authority,” and that the AUI plan “does this with remarkable thoroughness. It 
also succeeds in divorcing the National Science Foundation from any practical 
measure of control over responsibility for use of the funds provided.”146 Also, 
of continuing concern to the Foundation, was AUI’s repeated reference to 
itself as “scientists and institutions in the eastern part of the United States” and 
their repeated insistence against expanding the AUI Board which appeared to 
stand in contrast to the NSF goal of a “national” radio astronomy facility. 
Berkner reacted “very strongly” to these NSF criticisms, alluding to “interfer-
ence of government with research in general and with the proposed facility in 
particular.”147
At their 27–28 March 1956 meeting, the NSF Advisory Committee, led by 
Merle Tuve, was not enthusiastic about AUI’s ambitious plan, and rejected the 
two larger radio telescopes proposed. They suggested instead that the initial 
construction include only four more modest sized instruments: one 28 foot 
antenna, two 60 foot antennas, and one 140 foot antenna. The two 60 foot 
antennas were included because the committee projected a heavy demand for 
observing time from university staff and students, and also anticipated their 
possible use as an interferometer. The NSF Advisory Committee also had their 
own ideas about how to build a radio telescope. Specifically, some members of 
the Committee had concerns that the coordinate conversion for an alt-azimuth 
mounted antenna would not meet the stringent pointing requirements, so 
AUI was instructed to develop at least one design based on an equatorial 
mount.148 Berkner anticipated that AUI would first issue an RFP for an alt- 
azimuth mounted 140 foot dish, but defer a construction contract until an 
equatorial design was available. Following a later review of the Feld, Husband, 
and Kennedy designs, as well as the separate designs for the drive and control 
systems by a team of consultants, it was realized that none of the designs could 
meet all the requirements, so the proposal to the NSF acknowledged that the 
design “is still open for study.”149
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In addition to debating the number and size of the major instruments, the 
AUI proposal gave careful consideration to how the observatory would be run, 
what staff was needed, and of course how big an annual budget would be 
required. The AUI proposal delegated considerable authority to a Director 
who “must bear the overall responsibility for the Observatory,” and went on to 
specify that “he must be not only be a research scientist of recognized ability; 
he must also have proved his ability to administer scientific projects; and that 
he possess special aptitude in selecting and supervising scientific personnel.” 
Characteristic of the time, only the pronoun “he” was used; there was no rec-
ognition of the possibility that the Director, or any of the scientists, might be a 
woman, and indeed, none were considered in the subsequent lengthy 
Director search.
The proposal included a Chief Scientist who would also act as the Deputy 
Director, a Chief Engineer, and a Business Manager to round out the senior 
staff. AUI anticipated that the scientific staff would be approximately equally 
divided between resident and visiting scientists. Responding to repeated 
reminders from the NSF as well as from Merle Tuve and his Panel that neither 
the AUI staff nor any of the Trustees had any expertise in radio astronomy, 
AUI finally agreed to add two at-large Trustees with experience in radio astron-
omy, but Berkner refused to consider any changes in the Board’s basic organi-
zation. Tuve expressed concern about AUI appointing the Visiting Committee, 
since, as he argued, “this mechanism can be self-biasing.” Tuve also expressed 
concern about AUI’s offer to “contribute recreational facilities costing hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars,” since he correctly appreciated that this “would 
be quite a hurdle if a new contractor had to buy out the facilities which belonged 
to AUI.” Somewhat surprisingly, Tuve also suggested that some two to three 
million dollars be invested in placing a 24 inch Schmidt along with a larger 72 
inch reflector in Green Bank to facilitate related optical studies.150 While such a 
scheme had obvious scientific merit, the very different environmental require-
ments of radio and optical observatories rendered this impractical.
Not dissuaded by the concerns of their Advisory Committee, the NSF 
Deputy Director, Charles Sunderlin, leaked to Berkner and Emberson that 
Waterman intended to recommend to the Foundation’s Committee on Physical 
Science and to the National Science Board that AUI be selected “as the 
 operating agency for the National Radio Astronomy Facility,”151 although this 
was not fully supported by all of the NSF staff, some of who preferred a “rather 
loose type of organization that would permit a greater degree of control by the 
Foundation.”152 In response to a question from Sunderlin, Berkner empha-
sized “the great importance of having the operating institution in full control 
during the construction phase,” and that, “AUI would not be prepared to act 
simply as a construction contractor,” although he was prepared to accept a 
contract for “three to five years with provision for extension.”153 Sunderlin also 
informed Berkner that because the House of Representatives had voted to 
reduce the NSF budget by a factor of two from $7 million to $3.5 million, and 
because it was uncertain whether or not the Senate would try to restore some 
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or of all of the deleted funds, it was unclear how much money would be avail-
able for the radio facility in 1957. Berkner was therefore told to consider three 
1957 budgets levels of $2.095 million, $3.895 million, and $5.170 million, 
respectively, as an absolute minimum cost for a facility that would compare 
with others, the minimum cost for a facility including the 140 foot telescope, 
and the cost of fully carrying out AUI’s plans for the development of the facil-
ity.154 Emberson encouragingly commented that in his opinion “the Foundation 
does not wish to omit the140 foot radio telescope.”155
Recognizing the magnitude of the effort on which they were about to 
embark and noting that AUI was constituted to manage the Brookhaven 
National Laboratory, not to do radio astronomy, Berkner asked the AUI Board 
if it was necessary to consult the founding universities, although he speculated 
that “in his opinion, the language of the agreement is sufficiently broad to 
cover almost any contractual obligation.” The Board agreed, and told him only 
that “the universities should be kept advised.”156 Signals from the NSF were 
encouraging. In his address at the 28 April 1956 dedication of the new Harvard 
60 foot radio telescope, (Sect. 2.5) the NSF Director, Alan Waterman, publi-
cally acknowledged the NSF plans to build a 140 foot diameter radio telescope 
to be operated by a “group of universities,” and said that “substantial funds for 
this purpose have been included in our 1957 budget.”157 Waterman went on to 
refer to radio astronomy as “A new window on the universe,” and acknowl-
edged the responsibility of the Federal Government to support basic research 
“when such support is necessary and in the interest of science.”158
Very shortly after the dedication of the Harvard radio telescope, Berkner 
gave a talk at the 94th meeting of the American Astronomical Society describ-
ing the need and plans for a national radio astronomy facility. In his short two- 
page published paper, Berkner (1956) referred to the 600 foot reflector as an 
“ultimate compromise between cost and operating characteristics,” and 
expressed his believe that “it would be entirely feasible to construct a radio 
telescope of this size with adequate precision.”
3.4  choosing The siTe
Discussions on the important question of site selection for the national radio 
astronomy facility began very early. Already, in November 1954, the NSF 
Advisory Panel on Radio Astronomy dictated that the site should be within 
300 miles of Washington. Following discussions with Harold Alden, Director 
of the University of Virginia’s McCormick Observatory, Carl Seyfert from 
Vanderbilt, John Hagen from NRL, and Peter van de Kamp from the NSF, 
Emberson and the AUI Steering Committee defined an additional set of crite-
ria deemed important for the successful operation of a radio observatory. These 
included159:
 (a) Radio Noise: To minimize the impact of radio frequency interference 
(RFI), AUI specified that the telescopes should be located in an area 
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with a small local population, should not be in view of any high voltage 
lines, should be in a valley surrounded by mountains, be at least 50 
miles distant from any city, and not be near any commercial air route. 
Furthermore, AUI noted that “the quietness of the site must be assured 
for the future; for example, by appropriate zoning regulations.”
 (b) Weather: Low humidity to minimize erosion of steel structures and 
impact to electrical insulation, low winds, and low occurrence of hurri-
canes and tornadoes along with little ice and snowfall to minimize loads 
on the telescopes were specified. “Reasonably mild” weather was desir-
able to facilitate maintenance. At the time, little was understood about 
the impact of tropospheric water vapor160 on centimeter wavelength 
radio astronomy measurement, and so was not considered in evaluating 
the quality of each of the sites considered.
 (c) Latitude: Lower latitudes were preferred to maximize the amount of 
available sky and in particular facilitate access to the important region 
near the center of the Milky Way Galaxy. However, AUI noted that 
northern latitudes would facilitate research on “aurorae, ionospheric 
scintillation, and polar blackouts.”
 (d) Social and Professional Amenities: To the extent possible, AUI sought 
“as many as possible of the attributes of a university campus, including 
laboratories, shops, libraries, conference rooms,” and proximity to sci-
entists working in broadly defined related areas. Easy access to “housing 
… stores, theaters, and recreational facilities” was also considered to be 
“desirable.”
 (e) Access: The chosen site should be “easy to reach by plane, rail, or auto-
mobile” and as previously specified by the NSF, the site was to be within 
300 miles of Washington.
 (f) Availability and Size: A total area of five to ten thousand acres was 
desired to allow for adequate separation of future telescopes and arrays. 
Such a parcel of land would need to be available either as existing gov-
ernment property or by purchase from private owners.
AUI recognized that it would not be possible to meet all of these criteria, 
and that indeed, some were “mutually contradictory and incompatible,”161 so 
some compromises would be necessary. Consideration of known weather pat-
terns, and population distributions along with the other geographical con-
straints suggested a valley somewhere in the Appalachian Mountains located 
within an area approximately 300 miles by 100–150 miles in extent oriented in 
roughly a northeast-southwest direction and west of Washington, DC 
(Fig. 3.11).
After receiving his second NSF grant in the spring of 1955, Berkner 
appointed an ad-hoc panel to evaluate potential sites for how well they met the 
criteria set out by the Steering Committee. Panel members included the state 
geologists from Virginia, West Virginia, and Tennessee, representatives of the 
University of Virginia and the NSF as well as radio astronomers from NRL and 
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Harvard, along with two optical astronomers with experience in astronomical 
site testing. Richard Emberson represented AUI.162 The panel evaluated 20 
different potential sites in Georgia, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
Much of the groundwork was done by Hagen and Emberson who spent a 
couple of weeks in what Hagen later referred to as the “wilds of West Virginia, 
Tennessee and Virginia looking at the potential sites, many of which were easily 
rejected due to their proximity to urban or industrial centers, power lines, radio 
or radar transmitters.”163 One site was considered unacceptable due to a high 
southern horizon which would have restricted observations of the southern 
sky. The US Forest Service, the Park Service, the Geological Survey, the General 
Services Administration, and the Tennessee Valley Authority all provided valu-
able support, but the Army Map Service was less helpful.164
For the most part, the study proceeded objectively, with little political inter-
ference, except from a few Congressmen who gratuitously offered what they 
each claimed were ideal choices for the planned radio facility. West Virginia 
Congressman C. M. Bailey requested consideration of the marshy area known 
as Cranberry Glades which had previously been rejected due to inadequate 
shielding from mountains and inadequate terrain to support large radio tele-
scopes, but Bailey insisted on meeting with the NSF along with “a small com-
mittee of business men,” to present the advantages of their proposed site.165 
One of the attendees at their NSF meeting on 14 March 1956 was the warden 
of the local prison, who noted the availability of prisoner labor.166 Following a 
site visit urged by the NSF to keep the Congressman happy, Emberson reported 
that “if one jumps up and down … with water oozing up ankle deep, persons 
standing twenty feet away can feel the waves passing by.”167 Long time 
Congressman Harley Staggers, also from West Virginia, called Waterman to 
point out the desirable features of Spruce Knob, the highest point in West 
Virginia which looks out over three counties. Rather than try to explain to 
Staggers that the technical requirements for a radio telescope were not the 
same as for an optical telescope, Waterman merely told him that “the determi-
nation of the site was in the hands of a committee which is highly qualified 
scientifically,” and that he “would be glad to bring his invitation to their 
 attention.”168 Once Green Bank was chosen as the future site for the radio facil-
ity, Staggers helped to dispel the local fears about the impact of a big federally 
supported program in their quiet valley, and emphasized the new opportunities 
for employment (Kenwolf 2010).
Based on their initial review, the panel narrowed their consideration first to 
five sites, four in Virginia and one in West Virginia, some of which were also 
being considered by the Naval Research Laboratory as potential locations for 
their planned facility which ultimately went to Sugar Grove, WV.169 The con-
sulting firm of Jansky & Bailey170 was hired to evaluate the levels of RFI at each 
site, using equipment borrowed from NRL. During the latter half of 1955, 
Jansky & Bailey made measurements between 50 MHz and 10 GHz, but due 
to changing propagation effects, they found significant differences in RFI 
between measurements made in daytime or nighttime and between measure-
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ments made in the summer or winter months. Differing amounts of commer-
cial activity in the areas surrounding each site also contributed to the day-night 
differences. Only one site, at Massanutten, VA was studied in both the summer 
and winter, and this was used to try to normalize the other studies to deter-
mine the differences in RFI among the five sites. The Green Bank, WV site was 
judged to be superior “to all others in regard to radio noise” and also had by 
far the smallest surrounding population, and compared with Deerfield, VA, less 
likely to have population or industrial growth.171 As described by Bart Bok, 
“the rather remote valley near Greenbank [sic] and Arbovale in West Virginia 
(at an altitude of 2600 and 2700  feet) seems to be the answer to the radio 
astronomers’ prayers.”172 As it turned out, the region chosen has one of the 
highest percentages of cloud cover in the United States, and this has greatly 
limited the effectiveness of the Green Bank radio astronomy program at centi-
meter wavelengths.
The isolation of Green Bank from population centers was recognized as 
both an advantage and disadvantage. The isolated site offered better observing 
conditions in terms of lower radio noise, but clearly more difficult access and 
less attractive living conditions. Tuve, claiming that “Berkner would like a large 
community in the woods,”173 perhaps more than others appreciated the practi-
cal difficulties that would be faced by an isolated staff and urged that at least 
some of the facilities be placed in Charlottesville, Virginia. In fact, the NSF had 
some informal discussions with Professor Jesse Beams from the University of 
Virginia who conveyed the interest of both the physics and astronomy com-
munities in seeing UVA as a possible manager of the proposed facility. To 
strengthen their position Beams offered that within a few years the University 
was likely to appoint a radio astronomer to the faculty.174 Berkner, on the other 
hand, noted that placing some of the administrative facilities in Charlottesville 
would keep the Green Bank staff even more isolated, and instead envisioned 
what Tuve called a Los Alamos type of operation. But the Bureau of the Budget 
reportedly did not like the idea of providing housing at government expense,175 
so Berkner began to discuss seeking private funding for housing and other 
non-operational infrastructure. Concerns about the social impact of living in 
rural Appalachia would continue to plague the Observatory for the next 
decade, finally leading to migration of most of the scientific staff to 
Charlottesville, and effectively creating Tuve’s model (Sect. 4.7).
In preparation for the planned AUI Steering Committee meeting scheduled 
for 13 December 1955, on 2 December six groups set out in different cars to 
personally inspect the five most promising sites. Due to recent rain and snow 
they were unable to reach the Massanutten site, which probably should have 
been a message about the suitability of the site for building a radio telescope. 
A lengthy debriefing session was held in Washington on Sunday evening 11 
December, which included some other AUI Steering Committee members, 
some AUI Trustees, along with C. E. Curtis and Helen Sawyer Hogg from the 
NSF. The following morning a group of 15 people left by bus for one final 
inspection of the Green Bank site. During the trip they again reviewed all 
3 A NEW ERA IN RADIO ASTRONOMY 
128
aspects of the site question, including radio quietness, geographic require-
ments, and the nature of the operation of the facility. In view of the problems 
encountered in reaching the Massanutten site, the representatives from the US 
Geological Survey surprisingly reported that the five sites appeared to be about 
the same regarding geology and the effect of inclement weather on access.
The Steering Committee met the next day at the NSF for further discussion, 
after which Merle Tuve moved and Bart Bok seconded a motion which read176:
 (1) It is the recommendation of the Committee that the site near Green Bank, 
West Virginia, subject to verification down to very low field intensities of the 
expected low radio interference level, be selected specifically for the proposed 
140-foot parabolic reflector, and possibly for two or three antennae rays [sic] 
or other equipment of modest cost; and
 (2) This recommendation is made without prejudice to the possible location or 
locations which may in the future be recommended if this National Radio 
Astronomy Facility grows to include other specialized equipment or labora-
tory facilities.
The resolution was unanimously passed by the Committee, although it was 
later realized that the existing noise measurements were the best that could be 
made with existing equipment, so the requirement for additional noise mea-
surements was rescinded. The second part of the resolution showed great pre-
science in recognizing the need for the future extension of NRAO to Arizona 
for the 36 foot millimeter wave antenna (Chap. 10) and later to New Mexico 
for the VLA (Chap. 7). To ensure against protection from locally generated 
interference, the Steering Committee also unanimously agreed to another 
motion, again proposed and seconded by Tuve and Bok respectively, which read
It is the recommendation of the Committee that all or nearly all of the land in the 
Green Bank, West Virginia valley shown in the attached map be acquired by 
direct purchase or as an alternative, suitable controls e.g., by some agency of the 
State of West Virginia, be arranged to insure [sic] the future continued suitability 
of this valley for the National Radio Astronomy Facility; and the Committee is 
confident that the U.S. Forest Service will assist in maintaining radio quietness in 
the surrounding forest and overlooking mountain heights.177
Recognizing that it would be useful to consider contingency sites in case the 
Green Bank proved unsuitable, and, as Berkner pointed out, consideration of 
alternate sites would strengthen the bargaining position in acquiring the land, 
the Committee unanimously agreed to include Deerfield and Massanutten, in 
that order, as alternates. In parallel with the site search, AUI commissioned the 
New York City-based architectural firm of Eggers and Higgins to prepare a site 
development plan based on four radio telescopes of 25–50 feet, 140 foot, 250 
foot, and 600 foot diameter, a staff of about 100, a central laboratory and 
administrative building, site maintenance and telescope maintenance buildings, 
telescope control buildings, along with a dormitory and apartment building in 
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combination with a cafeteria, as well as several on site residences for key staff 
and visiting scientists. Based on a generic site taken from a selection of 14 
potential sites being considered by AUI, Eggers and Higgins determined that 
the total cost of site development for the antenna foundations, roads, build-
ings, power, and water would be close to $10 million.178
A more intensive site inspection took place in January 1956 with a two-day 
visit by Emberson, Heeschen, Bok, and A. Doolittle from the consulting firm 
of Eggers & Higgins.179 As a measure of the “human activity in the area” and 
potential sources of interference, they counted somewhat over one hundred 
houses in the valley, and laid out potential locations for the planned 25 foot, 60 
foot, 140 foot, 200–300 foot, and 600 foot radio telescopes, along with labo-
ratory, maintenance, housing, and cafeteria buildings. Characteristic of the 
area, the nearest hotel the group could find was in Elkins, WV, 50 miles distant 
over Cheat Mountain.
Earlier, Emberson had reported that the “Foundation fully recognizes the 
desirability of moving rapidly, and would not object to the acquisition of a site 
with private funds.”180 Still facing competition over who the NSF would chose 
as the managing organization, in March 1956 AUI acquired options to pur-
chase 6,200 acres of land at a cost of $502,000, thus apparently squeezing out 
any potential competitors including those representing gas and oil interests. 
Three months later, Congress appropriated $3.5 million to acquire the land, 
erect buildings, and design and construct a 140 foot radio telescope. However, 
not willing to accept Berkner’s preemptive strike in obtaining the land options, 
the NSF invoked the right of eminent domain, and authorized the Army Corps 
of Engineers to seize the land, and the AUI options became irrelevant. This 
not only had the effect of neutralizing Berkner’s tactical maneuver, but also 
removed the prospects of having to deal with landowner holdouts for higher 
prices. But the seemingly government land grab also had negative conse-
quences. The Corps of Engineers was instructed to start their acquisition at the 
center and work outward until the authorized sum of $550,000 was commit-
ted (Emberson 1959). Most of the privately owned land was bought at market 
value, but there were a few holdouts who only relinquished their land under 
pressure or perceived pressure. Although the affected land owners were all 
compensated, the non-negotiable seizure of private farms and homes that had 
been owned by generations of the same families would impact relations between 
NRAO and the local population for decades to come. Some years later, a small 
portion of land was returned to the local cemetery, accepting the local argu-
ment that the occupants of the cemetery “won’t bother you none” (Lomask 
1976, p. 142).
Even before being formally selected to manage NRAO, Berkner was lobby-
ing with his long-time friend, William Marland, then the Governor of West 
Virginia, for the protection of the Green Bank site from RFI. Following the 
urging of a number of influential Harvard alumni in the state government, on 
9 August 1956 Governor Marland convened a special session of the West 
Virginia state legislature to enact the “West Virginia Radio Astronomy Zoning 
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Act (WVRAZA)” which prohibited the use of any electrical equipment within 
two miles of a radio observatory “if such operation causes interference with 
reception by said radio astronomy facility, of radio waves emanating from any 
non-terrestrial source.”181 In addition, the Zoning Act set limits on the field 
strength of any electrical equipment operated with ten miles of the radio obser-
vatory. Although a fine of $50 a day was specified for any knowing violation, 
there is no evidence that anyone was ever prosecuted for violating the West 
Virginia Zoning Act. Nor is it clear that the Zoning Act was legal, since the 
1934 Federal Communications Act placed the regulation of radio transmis-
sions only in the hands of the federal government and the Federal 
Communications Commission. Nevertheless, the WVRAZA has remained 
valuable in restricting the use near NRAO of a growing list of potentially harm-
ful devices, such as TV antenna mounted preamps, microwave ovens, and most 
recently cell phones. The initiative of the West Virginia legislature was the first 
legislation in the world specifically intended to protect basic research, and it set 
a precedent for the National Radio Quiet Zone (NRQZ) established in 1958 
by the Federal Communications Commission to protect both NRAO and the 
Sugar Grove Naval Information Operations Center (Fig.  3.12). Within the 
NRQZ, all applications for licensed radio transmitters are referred to NRAO 
for comment. NRAO does not have veto power over radio transmissions within 
the NRQZ, but can provide comments to the FCC on applications for radio 
licenses, and often successfully negotiates with the applicant to modify their 
frequency or antenna beams to reduce the impact of their transmissions.
3.5  confronTaTion and decision
Continued friction between the AUI and NSF Radio Astronomy Committees, 
between Berkner and Tuve, and between the NSF radio and optical astronomy 
committees, led the NSF to call for another meeting to iron out the differences 
among the various individuals and the different advisory bodies. As later 
described by Heeschen (1996), “It really boiled down to a disagreement 
between Berkner and Tuve over just what the observatory should be. Berkner 
was the archetypal ‘big science’ scientist,” and “wanted the observatory to be 
an institution like Brookhaven, which would provide extensive facilities and 
services for visiting scientists, and have its own scientific and technical staffs 
engaged in research and development.” By contrast, “Tuve was the classical 
‘string and sealing wax’ scientist, and had established a very successful and 
productive research group at DTM along these lines. Tuve wanted the obser-
vatory to consist of just a telescope, with minimal staff, facilities and services.” 
According to Heeschen, Berkner and Tuve had “developed a mutual dislike 
and distrust” dating back to the time they had worked together before and 
during WWII.182 But Tuve also resented the way that Berkner grabbed the 
momentum which he, DuBridge, and Greenstein had started when they orga-
nized the January 1954 Washington meeting, and the possible impact that this 
might have to the major radio astronomy initiative now being pursued by 
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DuBridge and Greenstein at Caltech together with DTM’s sister institution, 
the MWPO. Ed McClain (2007) later speculated that Berkner put Tuve on the 
AUI Steering Committee fully expecting that he would get criticism from 
Tuve, but that the criticism would come from a member of an AUI committee, 
and not from an outsider.
Although the AUI “Plan for a Radio Astronomy Observatory” was not for-
mally submitted to the NSF until August 1956, early drafts were circulated to 
the NSF and others, so the 11 July 1956 meeting participants, especially mem-
bers of Tuve’s Panel, all had access to the ambitious AUI plan. On the table 
Fig. 3.12 Map showing the boundaries of the 13,000  sq. mile (34,000  sq. km) 
National Radio Quiet Zone. The NRAO Green Bank, West Virginia and the Sugar 
Grove, Virginia Naval Station are shown as stars. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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were AUI vs. an alternative contractor; equatorial vs. alt-az mount for the 140 
foot antenna; the viability of a 600 foot class antenna; national facilities vs. sup-
port for small university facilities; radio vs. optical astronomy; Green Bank vs. 
co-location with the national optical observatory; and not least of all the pres-
tige of Merle Tuve and Lloyd Berkner.
In the weeks leading up to the 11 July meeting, the confrontations further 
expanded through vigorous lobbying.183 Tuve, apparently unaware that 
Waterman was already committed to AUI, started a letter campaign to under-
cut the AUI initiative. Again, Tuve told his Panel that AUI was a northeastern, 
not a national organization, and as “a large-scale atomic energy activity … their 
Trustees cannot be expected to give major attention to the needs of astronomy 
and radio astronomy.”184 Tuve also wrote to Irvin Stewart, President of West 
Virginia University185 and to Jesse Beams at the University of Virginia186 claim-
ing that “our Advisory Panel for Radio Astronomy has taken the position that 
the trustees of AUI are too fully occupied with the large-scale operations at 
Brookhaven for us to feel confident that the radio astronomy activities will have 
full and unbiased attention,” and that the NSF was looking for an alternative 
to AUI. In his letter to Stewart, Tuve remarked that the “Oak Ridge Institute 
for Nuclear Studies [ORINS] has expressed some interest in becoming a pos-
sible sponsor for this activity.” To Beams, he ended with, “I trust that you will 
take appropriate initiative in this matter.” Beams, Stewart and Tuve had all 
worked together in wartime Washington and knew each other well.
On 28 June 1956 Tuve also wrote Leo Goldberg and Ira Bowen, “as the 
principal able bodied members of the Optical Observatories Panel,” expressing 
his concern with the growing separation of radio and optical astronomers, and 
suggesting that they consider a “single trusteeship for the optical and radio 
astronomy ventures.”187 Bowen was sympathetic to the idea of a jointly admin-
istered radio and optical facility, but noted that in view of the different observ-
ing requirements (RFI vs. sky transparency) any common headquarters might 
be far removed from at least one of the actual observatories themselves, 
although he noted that with the expected introduction of commercial jet trans-
port that “it will require little if any more time than the ground transportation 
from a nearby city to the point of operation regardless of whether the installa-
tion is in the East or West.”188 Bowen, however, underestimated the need not 
to separate the engineers and technicians who, of necessity must be located 
close to the facility, from the observers who may prefer a more academic envi-
ronment. It was this issue which a decade later restricted the relocation of the 
NRAO headquarters to a location “close” to Green Bank (Sect. 4.7).
Bok responded to Tuve on 20 June 1956, with copies to the Panel and to 
the NSF staff stating that “I do not share these misgivings” and that “At least 
half dozen of AUI’s Trustees … have in the past year shown a profound per-
sonal interest in the problems of the National Radio Observatory, and I have 
nowhere found any indication that anyone at AUI is inclined to favor the 
northeastern part of the United States over other sections.”189 The next day, 
Bok wrote again, this time in response to Tuve’s and Stewart’s letters, and 
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somewhat more forcefully he stated, “I must say frankly that I do not remem-
ber our Panel actually taking this stand, and I for one feel that this is not a fair 
statement.”190 Bok was careful not to appear to offend Tuve, since he was also 
lobbying Tuve’s committee for increased support for his Agassiz project.191 On 
25 June 1956 John Hagen responded more forcefully to Tuve’s assertion 
about the Panel’s position on AUI, by saying that he was “greatly disturbed by 
your two recent letters,” and that “This is just not a fact, the Advisory Panel 
has never taken such a position. It is my feeling that the majority of the mem-
bers of the Advisory Panel feel that AUI has done an excellent job to date in 
planning this activity and would look with favor upon continuation of the NSF 
relations with AUI.” “Moreover,” wrote Hagen, “I feel that when as radical a 
move as an attempt to generate a combination of two universities and the Oak 
Ridge Institute for Nuclear Studies with the implied support of the National 
Science Foundation is taken by the Chairman of the NSF Panel, he should first 
call a meeting of the Panel, discuss the matter and have agreements within the 
Panel.”192
Jesse Greenstein was not able to attend the July meeting, but wrote 
 expressing great concern over the performance and reliability of a computer- 
controlled telescope and strongly favoring an equatorial mount for the 140 
foot telescope, even if it cost more. Greenstein did not express any great con-
cerns about AUI management of the radio astronomy facility, but more broadly 
he worried about the impact to the funding of the university facilities, both 
radio and optical. Moreover, he remarked “I am absolutely aghast at the enor-
mous expenditure for buildings,” which he noted had more sleeping rooms 
(32) than the number of radio astronomers working in the United States.”193 
Both Greenstein and Bok challenged Tuve’s suggestion to build optical tele-
scopes or to locate optical astronomers in Green Bank, pointing out the very 
poor sky condition in that part of the country. But, they both concurred with 
Tuve in the need to bring optical and radio astronomers together. Ed Purcell194 
and Bill Houston195 had more tempered responses. Purcell conveyed confi-
dence in having AUI act as the manager of the radio facility, but expressed 
concern about what he felt were the inappropriately tight AUI specifications 
for the 140 foot pointing accuracy and the need for a very large fully steerable 
antenna, suggesting that a very large antenna with limited sky coverage would 
be cheaper and more useful than a somewhat smaller fully steerable instrument, 
and that, if needed, a separate instrument could be built for solar astronomy. 
Houston expressed confidence in AUI, but recognized the possible advantages 
in having a broader group of 30–40 universities involved, and perhaps combin-
ing the management of both the national radio and optical facilities.
In a second letter on 29 June 1956, addressed to Bok but apparently as an 
afterthought also sent to his Radio Astronomy Panel and NSF staff, Tuve indi-
cated that when two years earlier, the Panel “removed the onus from Berkner 
and the AUI of a political decision as to regional location by stating that the 
search for sites should be within 300 miles of Washington, D.C.,” they had not 
realized that they were “going to set up something comparable to Palomar in 
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cost and complexity.” Now, he argued, “since we have moved into the range of 
4.5 to 5.0 millions of dollars,” he wanted to explore the possibility of a “joint 
installation with the national optical observatory, evidently in Arizona.”196 
Tuve went on to point out the “relatively sad state of the 140 foot dish,” and 
that neither Berkner nor Emberson had made the necessary “crucial engineer-
ing decisions,” and accused Berkner of knowingly setting the specifications too 
high. He accused AUI of “using clerical procedures and a checkbook,” to 
purchase “some exceedingly expensive studies … so warped by the aim for a 
600 foot dish that they have produced only a series of contradictory sugges-
tions instead of a design.” Moreover, Tuve again argued that there was no one 
at AUI who would use the new facility, and that the other radio qualified 
astronomers at Harvard, DTM, Ohio State, Caltech, and Stanford were all 
building their own facilities with funds from ONR, NSF, and the Air Force. 
“Where,” he asked, “are the sound research men who will need this new five 
million dollar facility? … Shall we now decide we must import them from 
Manchester or Sydney.… Can we name even one first-rate man who is prepared 
to accept personal responsibility to make this added ‘National Facility’ a wise 
and fruitful venture for the NSF.” Tuve, of course, did not miss the opportu-
nity to remind Bok that the two strongest advocates for the national radio 
facility and the two most qualified people to assume the position of director 
were Bok and Hagen, and that Bok was leaving the US to go to Australia and 
Hagen was about to leave radio astronomy for a “satellite adventure.”
Three days later, claiming that “radio astronomy activities have largely been 
‘captured’ during the past two years by Berkner, Hagen, and Bok” and their 
plans for a $25 to $30 million facility, Tuve laid out a more detailed plan for 
how the “NSF and its advisors in astronomy should firmly and flatly dissociate 
themselves from this kind of thinking,” arguing that “the AUI proposal can 
wreck the entire NSF if it is adopted.”197 Instead, Tuve proposed forming a 
“University Corporation for Astronomy,” and suggested the possible names of 
a number of “men with some immediate active connection with Radio 
Astronomy.” But he specifically added, “Do not include, Bok, Hagen, 
or Berkner.”
Meanwhile, Bok, feeling offended, did not delay, and responded on 3 July 
1956 to Tuve’s letter of 29 June 1956.198 Reacting to the perceived allegation 
that he “was running away from the project,” Bok felt obliged to point out that 
in January he had informed everyone of “his decision to leave Harvard” and 
that he had “in mind either going to Australia or joining the staff of the 
National Radio Observatory.” When Bok received a formal offer for the 
Directorship of the Mt. Stromlo Observatory in Canberra, he let it be known 
that he would accept the Australian position after two weeks, “unless good 
reason could be given why I should not do so.” John Hagan apparently wrote 
to Waterman that it was important to keep Bok in the United States, but as 
Bok described, “nothing developed, … [and] I decided that I was free to accept 
the [Australian] Directorship.”199 More to the point, Bok laid out a seven- 
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point plan of action that he wished might come out of the scheduled 
July meeting.
 1. NSF should purchase the land in Green Bank,
 2. Settle the administrative issues with preference given to AUI as the 
contractor,
 3. Decide on the needed precision for the 140 foot telescope,
 4. Obtain an engineering study for an equatorial mount making use of the 
experience with the Harvard 60 foot and Caltech 90 foot antennas,
 5. Appoint a Director,
 6. Build up a staff and instrumentation,
 7. Increase NSF support for university facilities.
Bok also challenged Tuve’s accusation that the radio astronomers were iso-
lated from optical astronomers by pointing out that the projects at Harvard, 
Caltech, Ohio State, and Michigan were led or co-led by an optical astrono-
mer, but that “the contact [between radio and optical astronomers] may not be 
a close one for the radio astronomers working in and near Washington, D.C.” 
Bok also expressed that, in view of the heavy concentration of optical facilities 
in the west, he was “strongly opposed” to Tuve’s suggestion of co-locating the 
national radio observatory together with the optical observatory near Phoenix, 
Arizona, and with a final dig, he pointed out that “some of you people in 
Washington, fairly remote from university contacts, do not apparently realize 
the terrific boon to the development of student interest in the Eastern United 
States in radio astronomy as a result of the [planned] Greenbank [sic] 
operation.”
Greenstein took a more intermediate approach.200 While not opposed to 
having AUI as the contractor for the construction and operation of the radio 
observatory, he agreed with Tuve that the NSF should establish a single Board 
for both observatories to apportion resources between the two fields, and that 
consideration be given to locating the 140 foot dish in the same area as the 
optical facility although travel from the East would be more expensive, “but 
hardly more time-consuming than road travel to Greenbank [sic].” Like Bok, 
Greenstein felt that there were a sufficient number of young men in the United 
States who would use the radio observatory, and that “if we lack the ideal 
leader for the group, I would, personally, not be embarrassed at importing one.”
The “shootout” to decide on the management for the national facility was 
held on 11 July 1956 in Washington and was organized by the NSF Acting 
MPE Director, Raymond Seeger along with Frank Edmondson, at that time 
the NSF Program Director for Astronomy.201 Prior to the meeting, AUI 
decided to take a “passive role,” and not do any advance lobbying in response 
to Tuve’s letters.202 More than 40 people attended, including not only mem-
bers of Tuve’s Advisory Panel and the AUI Steering Committee, but also John 
Bolton from Caltech and many of the major players in optical astronomy, 
including Seyfert, Lyman Spitzer, and Albert Whitford. Institutional leaders 
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attended as well, perhaps looking to grab a piece of the action: the Presidents 
of Rice and Ohio State Universities, and the Universities of Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, and West Virginia, along with the Directors of DTM (Tuve) and the 
Oak Ridge Institute for Nuclear Studies (Pollard), and a number of University 
Vice Presidents. AUI was represented by President Lloyd Berkner, Frank 
Emberson, and Charles Dunbar, the AUI Corporate Secretary. Jerry Wiesner 
and Julius Stratton, two future MIT presidents, represented MIT, while 
Harvard was represented by Menzel and Ed Reynolds, the Harvard Vice 
President for Administration and member of the AUI Board of Trustees. Alan 
Waterman and eight other staff attended from the National Science Foundation. 
NRL and ONR sent representatives. Detlev Bronk, President of the National 
Academy of Sciences and Chairman of the National Science Board, presided. 
Greenstein and Purcell were unable to attend.
The morning session opened with a brief review from Waterman explaining 
that with the approval of the Administration, the Foundation now accepted 
responsibility for the construction of new scientific facilities, although that was 
not part of its original charter to support research. He then added that, based 
on the recommendation of Tuve’s Advisory Panel for Radio Astronomy, the 
NSF had financed a feasibility study for a radio astronomy facility, but since the 
Foundation was not allowed by law to operate research laboratories itself,203 
the NSB would consider the AUI study, and would make a final decision about 
how to operate the new facility at its August meeting.
Tuve, perhaps not to anyone’s surprise, claimed that there already was good 
support for new radio astronomy facilities at universities around the country, 
that the need was to integrate radio and optical astronomy, and to keep control 
within the universities and away from “the hands of a professional management 
group.” Tuve contrasted management by “a true university operation … in the 
hands of university research men” and a “special laboratory operation, nomi-
nally in university hands, but actually controlled and guided by small self- 
approving groups of experts.” He went on to argue that “very high priority, 
probably ahead of anything else, must be given to the support of existing activi-
ties in radio astronomy at universities,” and that NSF money should go to 
active research astronomers, not to physicists, engineers, or administrators. 
Departing from his prepared remarks, Tuve contended that “the AUI plan is a 
poisonous whitewash,” adding that, “a very large dish (250-600-ft) is a project 
of uncertain value,” and that “the AUI plan for a 600-ft radio telescope is a 
power bid by people who love to manage things.” (England p. 284). Tuve 
concluded his speech by stating, “My frank advice against accepting AUI as the 
contracting agency for radio astronomy is not based on their list of trustees, 
but on their very large plans and on the pattern of self-generated approval and 
on their automatic initiative for larger and larger projects of the same tech-
nical type.”
Bart Bok followed with brief history of the development of radio astronomy, 
both in the US and abroad, including a detailed description of the status of 
solar, planetary, 21  cm, continuum research, and various radio astronomy 
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activities underway at each of ten different US facilities. Contrary to Tuve, Bok 
claimed that, “the majority of radio-astronomical centers in the Eastern and 
Central United States are not contemplating the construction in the near 
future of new large scale equipment, because they expect to make use of the 
Greenbank [sic] facilities.”
Berkner again reviewed the history leading to the current meeting, remind-
ing everyone that AUI was approached by Harvard, MIT, and NRL to under-
take a study on how a radio observatory might be organized to provide large 
scale facilities that seemed beyond the capacity of any one university to under-
take. Naturally, he described the success of AUI in operating Brookhaven, and 
noted the addition of Dave Heeschen204 to the full time staff at AUI to supple-
ment the radio astronomy expertise of the Steering Committee. But he added 
that the AUI Planning Document was a general report with respect to the 
character of the management, and it did not recommend that AUI operate 
the facility.
Emberson summarized the content of the Planning Document, including 
the process which led to the choice of the Green Bank site and the status of the 
140 foot design. Following Rudolph Minkowski’s brief outline of the interde-
pendence of radio and optical astronomy, Leo Goldberg spoke of the need for 
balance between national and university facilities, for both radio as well as for 
optical astronomy.
Although the morning session went off without much acrimony, the seeds 
of discontent had clearly been sown. Detlev Bronk led off the afternoon delib-
erations with the premonition, “I have the unsatisfactory feeling that after the 
end of the afternoon conference you may have an unsatisfactory feeling of 
nothing have been accomplished or decided.” More to the point, while 
acknowledging that neither he nor the NSB had expertise in radio astronomy, 
Bronk reminded those present that it would be the NSB that made the final 
decision on the development of radio astronomy through the national facility, 
so the NSB would of necessity depend on the advice received. Moreover, he 
pointed out that as the first large NSF research facility, the decisions made on 
how to operate the radio astronomy facility would have broader impact “than 
merely for radio astronomy itself.” Noting that because the NSF is funded on 
a year to year basis, the construction of a research facility can provide no legal 
responsibility for its future operation, but Bronk nevertheless warned that “I 
can conceive a time when the National Science Foundation would be using all 
the money it could get from the National Treasury in the support of the activi-
ties which it had created in the past.” Waterman added that “astronomy being 
pure research is in the position of requiring probably more support on the part 
of the Government than most facilities would have.” Berkner spoke at great 
length about his interpretation of a national facility as one that responds to 
broad interests and pressures from individual scientists and not from universi-
ties, but is not an independent laboratory with its own agenda or programs. 
M.V. Houston, President of Rice University and NSB member, cynically com-
mented that “Washington is a long way off from most of the country,” and 
3 A NEW ERA IN RADIO ASTRONOMY 
138
since you can’t have more than one national facility for radio astronomy, “one 
has to make it clear that the facilities are available to all who wish to use them, 
… not as a favor, but available … as a matter or right.”
Menzel and Wiesner reminded the group that AUI involvement came about 
only because the instrumental needs were too great even for the combined 
resources of MIT and Harvard, and that Edward Reynolds, Harvard’s Financial 
Vice President, had suggested that they approach AUI, not the other way 
around as Tuve had contended. Wiesner recalled that their small MIT-Harvard 
group had discussed forming a new corporation, but realized that the manage-
ment cost would be much less working with AUI, and that it would take much 
longer to set up a new organization. Menzel acknowledged that the 600 foot 
dish was a long range vision, but that the immediate need was for a 150 foot 
class antenna, and argued that the design of the intermediate size antenna 
should not be affected by any consideration that it be a prototype for the 600 
foot telescope.
William Pollard, Director of the ORINS, suggested instead that they form 
“a new corporation of national scope” to manage the new radio astronomy 
facility. Pollard acknowledged that he was “not a radio astronomer or for that 
matter an astronomer of any kind,” nor was he even aware of the proposed 
radio astronomy initiative until learning about it from Merle Tuve just a month 
earlier. Pollard and Tuve had worked together at Los Alamos during the war, 
and Tuve, who expressed concern about his “Christian responsibility” had con-
tacted Pollard, a recently ordained Episcopal priest, as Tuve later reported, “to 
help me orient my thoughts constructively” (Wang 2012). Apparently the pre-
vious NSB Vice Chair, Paul Gross, had lobbied with Seeger in support of 
Pollard’s initiative (Needell 1987, p. 279) and he received further support at 
the 11 July meeting from Houston and Morris, the other southern members 
of the NSB present at the meeting. At the meeting, Pollard passed around a 
descriptive brochure of his proposed new organization that included an 
“Agreement for Incorporation,” along with draft by-laws, and suggested a pro-
cedure for the organization to be chartered under West Virginia law. Pollard 
argued that his new organization would be more open to new membership 
than AUI and suggested that since the new organization could be established 
in “three to five weeks,” it would not introduce any significant delay in estab-
lishing the national radio astronomy facility. Irvin Stewart, President of West 
Virginia University, added that “if you are going to locate in our backyard,” 
the University has “an interest in this,” and spoke in support of the Pollard 
proposal. Tuve claimed that since the technical specifications for the 140 foot 
antenna were not yet decided and that “if it is built according to the present 
internal contradictions … it will be a white elephant. … Therefore, you need 
not think you are holding things up if it takes a while to get a sponsor-
ing agency.”
Tuve returned to his concerns that creating a national radio facility separate 
from the planned national optical facility would further split astronomy, but 
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was challenged by Bok, who claimed that “many of us do not agree that there 
is even a limited divorce between optical and radio astronomy at the present 
time,” and suggested a joint meeting of the two panels to discuss this question. 
Bok was supported by Hagen, who argued that “the connection between radio 
astronomy and astronomy is much, much better today than it has ever been 
and it is steadily improving.” Tuve read from Greenstein’s letter expressing 
concern about the competition between the universities and the national facil-
ity for funds, but under pressure from Wiesner, he also read from the very 
strong letter from Purcell, who wrote, “I don’t know of any organization in the 
country that has had experience and success comparable to that of AUI in this 
special sort of enterprise.” Bok added that the real issue was the concern about 
management by committee, and the solution was to find a good director, give 
him the power and responsibility to make the decisions and “fire him if you 
don’t like him.”
Asked about the position of the optical community, Leo Goldberg agreed 
that because of the obvious different technical requirements, it would be inap-
propriate to co-locate the two national facilities, but he could conceive of a 
single management structure possibly including a national solar facility as well.
Finally, following up on their agreed strategy, Theodore Wright, Vice 
President for Research at Cornell and long-time AUI Trustee, spoke passion-
ately saying,
The Trustees of AUI would not want to undertake the management of this new 
facility if they were not to be enthusiastically supported by the NSF, by its 
Advisory Committee and by the scientists and universities in the country who will 
do the research work in the laboratory itself. AUI is not out to get the job. It feels 
however, it can make a real contribution and if it is backed, it will go ahead 
enthusiastically.
“Furthermore,” added Wright,
I do not think that AUI would wish to undertake the construction phase and 
then bow out. So, in the interest of time saving and after all I have heard here, I 
am convinced that the National Science Foundation will not go astray if it looks 
favorably upon contracting with AUI to manage the contemplated National 
Radio Astronomy Facility.
Wright was supported by Harvard’s Ed Reynolds, who, pointing his arm at 
Tuve, added (England 1982, p. 285)
The atmosphere here has disturbed me very, very much indeed. … My distur-
bance goes so far that I am going to enlarge on what Dr. Wright has just said. … 
We don’t want this contract under this atmosphere. You are going to have to 
want us enthusiastically if we are to take it on. Then we can do a good job for you.
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In reflecting over the afternoon’s tumultuous session, MIT’s Julius Stratton 
was said to have remarked, “Never have so many thought so differently on so 
few matters” (England 1982, p. 284). Bronk summarized the meeting with the 
important conclusion that there was agreement that the managing organiza-
tion would be responsible to both the NSF and to the astronomical commu-
nity. But considering the lack of agreement about if or how the NSF-sponsored 
radio and optical astronomy initiatives should be coordinated, Bronk con-
cluded the meeting with a call for the NSF Panel for Radio Astronomy and for 
the two Optical Astronomy panels to meet jointly and consider what they 
would like to recommend to the National Science Board as to the relationship 
between the three panels “and the desirability or undesirability of having some 
sort of more formal common association in this general undertaking.”
Returning from the 11 July meeting, Menzel wrote a scathing letter to Tuve 
pointing out the many contradictions between his testimony and his prior writ-
ten statements.205 Menzel complained that “many of us are greatly disturbed 
that you chose to inject regional competition into the situation by writing Dr. 
Stewart and Dr. Beams in your letters of June 19 inviting opposition to the 
AUI plan.” Menzel specifically chastised Tuve for his claim, “Our Advisory 
Panel for Radio Astronomy has taken the position that the trustees of AUI are 
too fully occupied with the large-scale operations at Brookhaven for us to feel 
confident that the radio astronomy activities will have the full and unbiased 
attention,” whereas in fact wrote Menzel, “You did not even consult your 
panel, before taking this unilateral action.” Later, Berkner shared his frustra-
tions with Menzel, expressing his concerns about Tuve’s attempts to undercut 
AUI’s plans to construct and manage the national radio astronomy facility.206
Meanwhile, Pollard and Stewart, apparently undiscouraged by the lack of 
reaction to their bold suggestion, circulated a formal proposal to form a new 
corporation to be known as the Association of Universities for Radio Astronomy, 
or AURA, with its headquarters to be located in Green Bank. Pollard’s invita-
tion went to 12 prominent scientists and science administrators, including 
Menzel, Goldberg, Hagen, Struve, and Greenstein, as well as Colgate Darden, 
President of the University of Virginia, and Howard Bevis, President of Ohio 
State University, inviting them to become an “incorporator” of AURA. Pollard 
and Stewart included a proposed “Agreement for Incorporation” along with 
seven pages of proposed “By-Laws.” But aside from his co-conspirators Irvin 
Stewart and Merle Tuve, there was no support from within the astronomy 
community for this initiative. Donald Menzel was particularly incensed, and 
accused the conspirators of “southern pork barrel interest” and “selfish motives 
on the part of the Carnegie-Cal Tech [sic] axis” for the attempt to discredit 
AUI (England 1982, p. 286).
Interestingly, the acronym AURA was to be soon reconstituted as the 
Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, which would manage 
the Kitt Peak National [optical] Observatory, the sister organization of 
NRAO. However, Pollard’s initiative was supported by the influential National 
Science Board Vice Chair, Paul Gross, who also happened to be a member of 
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the ORINS Board. Earlier, encouraged by Tuve, Gross had told Waterman that 
he supported what he (incorrectly) claimed was the view of the NSF Radio 
Astronomy Advisory Committee that the national radio astronomy facility 
should be managed by a group with broader representation than AUI (Needell 
1987, p. 227).
Sensitive to the anti-AUI sentiment, Waterman spoke with both West 
Virginia University President Stewart and University of Virginia President 
Darden to explore their interest in having a role in managing the radio facility. 
Both expressed possible interest in some joint management scheme, but nei-
ther Stewart nor Darden seemed interested in assuming responsibility for sole 
management of the facility (England 1982, p. 287).
Following the 11 July meeting, Berkner wrote to Waterman stating AUI 
“will make a proposal to construct and manage a National Radio Astronomy 
Facility,” but only “if desired and requested to do so by the National Science 
Foundation.”207 However, Berkner emphasized, “it would not be appropriate 
to undertake the management of the Facility through an initial phase only, … 
after which some other agency would manage the operation itself.” In response 
to the criticism raised by Tuve and others that AUI did not have sufficient 
expertise in radio astronomy, Berkner repeated that AUI “would appoint an 
Advisory or Visiting Committee for the Radio Astronomy Facility, similar in 
composition and function to the visiting committees for the various depart-
ments at Brookhaven,” and that “appropriate representation will be given to 
astronomy” on the AUI Board of Trustees.
Meanwhile, Leo Goldberg and others were still concerned about the devel-
oping divide between the radio and optical factions of the astronomy commu-
nity, as well as the deepening rift emerging over who would manage the new 
national radio observatory. Goldberg, perhaps more than anyone else, appreci-
ated that unless the two communities could come together, chances of funding 
for either the national radio or optical facilities would be dubious. Following 
the 11 July closing directive from Detlev Bronk, the NSF Radio Astronomy 
Panel, the NSF Advisory Panel for Astronomy, and the NSF Astronomical 
Observatory Panel agreed to meet in a joint session. The combined meeting of 
the three NSF astronomy panels was held on 23 July at the University of 
Michigan in Ann Arbor and was attended by Waterman along with other 
 members of the NSF staff. Waterman opened with the announcement that 
unless there were objections, “the NSF was ready to proceed with acquisition 
of the Green Bank site,” and made it clear to the assembled panel members 
that the advisory panels were purely advisory to the NSF.208 Ever the optimistic 
statesman, Goldberg argued, “I think our positions should be that we need 
them all, and that the country is rich enough to afford them. I have been rather 
impressed by the timid attitude on the part of astronomers which seems to take 
it for granted that funds must always be limited.” According to Greenstein,209 
the Ann Arbor meeting “went off very well in a mood of friendliness and com-
promise. There was no debate of any kind about the details of management, 
and this is now definitely in the hands of the National Science Foundation and 
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its board for final decisions.” Greenstein reported a consensus agreement on 
the choice of Green Bank for the radio astronomy facility, but that “beginning 
with the next fiscal year, applications for operating funds for university installa-
tions in radio astronomy will be handled by the regular advisory panel for 
astronomy.” Two days later the NSF issued a press release announcing that 
Green Bank had been selected as the site for a new radio astronomy facility.210
After the 11 July meeting, and again after the joint meeting in Ann Arbor, 
Tuve’s Panel met to recommend operating funds for various university radio 
astronomy programs as well as funds to help support international radio astron-
omers planning to attend the 1957 URSI General Assembly, to be held in 
Boulder Colorado, and for Greenstein to visit Australia. In accord with the 
discussions toward integrating all of the astronomy advisory functions, the 
Radio Panel agreed that future yearly research grants in radio astronomy should 
be handled by the reconstituted NSF Advisory Panel for Astronomy. However, 
Tuve made it clear that the Radio Panel would retain the responsibility for facil-
ity grants. The Panel also made special mention of “the great importance” that 
they attached to “the fact that Dr. David Heeschen has now joined this activ-
ity,” and urged that he “retain his connection with the NSF activity whether or 
not the management sponsor is AUI or some other agency.”211
However, the issue of the relationship between radio and optical facilities, 
the level of NSF control over these facilities, and the constitution of AUI con-
tinued to fester. With a combined management of the radio and optical facili-
ties, the NSF might maintain a higher level of influence and control, which 
Berkner opposed. Greenstein, concerned that since Berkner would never give 
up control over the radio facility, worried that this would lead to AUI manage-
ment of both the radio and optical facilities, and also opposed any joint opera-
tion of the two national facilities.212
After making revisions resulting from the 11 July meeting and the subse-
quent informal exchanges between AUI and NSF staff, AUI delivered 50 cop-
ies of the Planning Document to the NSF in time for consideration by the NSB 
at its August meeting. Among the modifications to the earlier version, AUI, 
realizing that the restricted nature of AUI could be a deal killer, finally broke 
down and agreed to add three “at-large members” to the AUI Board. Initially, 
these would be Otto Struve from the University of California, Leo Goldberg 
from the University of Michigan, and Carl Seyfert from Vanderbilt University.
On 24 August 1956 the NSF National Science Board met to discuss three 
options for the new radio astronomy facility213:
 (a) Management by a university. (The NSF Director, Alan Waterman had 
already held discussions with both West Virginia University President 
Stewart and the University of Virginia President Colgate Darden and 
Physics Department Chair, Jesse Beams.)
 (b) Management by a new organization such as the Oak Ridge Institute for 
Nuclear Studies [ORINS].
 (c) Management by AUI.
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Also on the table were the long debated issues of the nature and perfor-
mance specifications for the first radio telescopes, and to what extent the man-
agement of the national radio and national optical facilities should be combined. 
Waterman presented the AUI plan, reported that AUI had obtained options on 
the land, and that the West Virginia Zoning Act had been passed (England 
1982, p. 288). Merle Tuve testified on behalf of the NSF Advisory Panel claim-
ing that there is “no value in a telescope capable of operation at less than 
10 cm,” that AUI was “too busy and has no experience,” and went on to ask, 
“where will the staff come from? UK? Australia?” There is “no need to rush,” 
he argued, but Hagen responded that Tuve “had misrepresented the commit-
tee and was speaking only for himself.”214 The NSB realized that there was no 
really viable option to AUI. This was the first big NSF project. Both Waterman 
and the NSB needed a success, but they weren’t going to give AUI a blank check.
On 4 September 1956 Waterman notified Berkner that the NSB had decided 
that it would take too long to form a new organization and authorized the NSF 
Director to enter into negotiations with AUI for the establishment and opera-
tion of the Radio Astronomy Observatory.215 But there were strings attached. 
Concerned about the lack of any AUI experience or involvement in astronomy, 
and that AUI only represented a limited number of universities, all in the 
Northeast, the NSB stipulated that AUI would need to agree to appoint three 
at-large members to the Board of Trustees and that AUI would operate the 
facility for the “use of the nation’s scientists,” independent of their institutional 
affiliation. Waterman also conveyed that the NSB decision to contract with 
AUI for the construction and initial management of the radio facility was
subject to a clear understanding with AUI that the Foundation will give serious 
consideration to the possibility of establishing at the end of that time a common 
management for the Radio Astronomy Observatory and for the Optical 
Astronomy Observatory; it is to be further understood that the selection of the 
Director and of the AUI Advisory Committee for the Observatory will be made 
in consultation with the Director of the National Science Foundation.216
Berkner responded firmly, informing Waterman that “the detailed planning, 
construction, and management of the Observatory will be handled … by 
AUI,” although he added that “AUI will, of course welcome basic policy rec-
ommendations by the NSF concerning the general direction of the pro-
gram.”217 Berkner went on to remind Waterman that while the proposed $4 
million initial budget “will cover the creation of an effective radio astronomy 
facility,” $6.7 million “represents a realistic estimate of what is needed to pro-
vide the facilities that radio astronomers in the United States really need.” Not 
to be intimidated, Waterman stated that “authority for major decisions with 
respect to the radio astronomy observatory are lodged at the National Science 
Board and the Director,” and that “the Foundation is not in any position at 
this time to comment on the magnitude of future commitments.”218
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At its meeting on 21 September 1956, the AUI Executive Committee 
authorized Berkner to “negotiate and execute … a contract for the construc-
tion and operation of a Radio Astronomy Observatory.”219 On 17 November 
1956, AUI and the NSF signed a contract for the “Construction and Operation 
of the Radio Astronomy Observatory (Fig. 3.13).”220 The five-year contract 
initially committed the amount of $5.13 million, but noted that “The 
Foundation may increase or decrease this obligation at its discretion from time 
to time.” Indeed, the signed contract obligated only $4 million, although a 
month before signing, the NSF Director had authorized an additional amount 
of $1.13 million. No indication was made in the contract that this was to be a 
“national observatory,” although it was specified that the observatory would 
be made available to qualified personnel to the extent possible. The contract 
was written in very general terms and did not include any details of the instru-
mentation to be built other than, “The observatory shall contain facilities and 
equipment appropriate for the conduct of research in radio astronomy (includ-
ing one or more radio telescopes, at least one of which shall have a diameter of 
at least 140 feet) and appropriate ancillary buildings and facilities as mutually 
agreed upon from time to time.” There was no mention in the contract of any 
possible larger instrument such as a 600 foot telescope. The NSF also specified 
that AUI “consult with the Director of the Foundation” before appointing the 
Fig. 3.13 17 November 1956 signing of the first AUI 5-year contract to operate 
NRAO. Seated on the left is AUI President Lloyd Berkner and on the right is the NSF 
Director, Alan Waterman. Watching are members of the NSF staff. Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
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Director of the Observatory. After this initial five-year period, the NSF stipu-
lated that the choice of the management would be reconsidered, possibly for a 
joint operation with a national optical observatory.
For more than half a century, until 2015, the NSF would renew the AUI 
contract or Cooperative Agreement every five years based on a non- competitive 
proposal from AUI. There was never any further serious discussion of combin-
ing the management of the national radio and optical astronomy observatories, 
although for a period of years in the mid-1960s, the NRAO and KPNO staffs 
met annually for exchange visits. However, due to budget pressures and 
increased emphasis on visitor use at both observatories, and less attention given 
to in-house research programs, these exchange visits ended after a few years. 
The national radio and optical observatories continued as they had begun, with 
independent management by AUI and AURA respectively, reflecting the dif-
fering technology and different scientific emphasis at the two national 
observatories.
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The search for the director of NRAO turned out to be unexpectedly difficult, 
as various astronomers turned down offers, citing the remoteness of the Green 
Bank site and the need to give up their own research programs. Finally, in 
1959, Otto Struve, a distinguished optical astronomer and member of AUI’s 
Search Committee, agreed to take on the job. But in 1961 both he and AUI 
President Lloyd Berkner resigned. I.I. Rabi, the new AUI President, appointed 
Australian Joe Pawsey as NRAO director, but due to a fatal illness he never 
served, and in 1962, Dave Heeschen became the new NRAO Director.
The initial intent of the founders was that NRAO would build a very large 
antenna of the order of 600 feet in diameter. But in order to gain operating 
experience while the large antenna was being designed and constructed, AUI 
decided to first build an intermediate size dish, about 150  feet in diameter, 
which they thought could be easily and quickly constructed. Contentious argu-
ments about the mounting and operating wavelength finally led to a contract 
to build a 140 foot equatorially mounted telescope with what turned out to be 
unrealistically optimistic cost estimates and time schedules. An uncertain fund-
ing schedule, poor design, use of faulty materials, contractor strikes, and man-
agement by committee, led to numerous delays and cost overruns which 
threatened the continued existence of the new radio observatory. To maintain 
its viability, NRAO first purchased a commercial 85 foot radio telescope, then 
built a 300 foot transit antenna which was limited to observations at relatively 
long wavelengths. Under Heeschen’s leadership, problems were painstakingly 
solved and the 140 Foot Telescope was finally completed in 1965 at a cost of 
$14 million, three times the initially budgeted cost. With both the 300 and 
140 Foot Telescopes operational, NRAO was finally able to fulfill its role as a 
national radio astronomy center for visiting scientists.
However, living and working in rural Green Bank proved a challenge for the 
NRAO staff and their families. In 1965, much of the scientific and engineering 
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staff moved to the new NRAO headquarters in Charlottesville, Virginia, which 
greatly changed the sociology of the Observatory.
4.1  Finding a director
As early as 1955, Merle Tuve urged Lloyd Berkner to appoint a director for the 
new radio astronomy facility, but Berkner correctly pointed out that it would 
be difficult to recruit someone until AUI and NSF agreed on a contract and 
operating procedures. In early 1956, the AUI Steering Committee informally 
discussed the choice of director. Bart Bok was the overwhelming favorite, with 
John Hagen second. Berkner wanted someone with more radio astronomy 
experience, and approached Hagen to be Director of the radio astronomy facil-
ity and Bart Bok to be the Principal Scientist.1 Hagen, however, had just 
accepted the Vanguard job (Sect. 3.3). Bok was considering an opportunity to 
go to Australia to head the Mt. Stromlo Observatory and did not consider 
Berkner’s inquiry as a formal offer. In July 1956, hoping to defuse the issue of 
choosing a director for the radio astronomy facility, Waterman again approached 
Bok, asking if he might not change his mind about going to Australia and 
instead become the director. According to Bok, his reply was, “NUTS,” and 
that he was very happy with his decision to go to Australia.2
After he learned that the National Science Board would select AUI as the 
manager of the new Radio Astronomy Observatory, Berkner realized the need 
to name a director who would “partake in the formation of policies and plans 
for the Observatory and play a major role in the technical decisions,” and he 
wrote to Donald Menzel for his assistance. Berkner asked Menzel to form “an 
ad hoc nominating committee” to “nominate a panel of not less than three and 
preferably five individuals,” and “take into account the ages and known com-
mitments of possible Directors.”3 Berkner did not hesitate to express his own 
views on the qualities of the NRAO Director, stating that “in my personal 
opinion, the Director should be a US citizen.” Somewhat optimistically, 
Berkner speculated that by the start of 1957, AUI “will already have bids for 
the construction of the 140-foot telescope and it is probable that a compro-
mise between costs, altazimuth /equatorial mounts, surface and control toler-
ances, and similar factors may be necessary,” so he saw the need to act quickly. 
He asked Menzel to provide nominations in time for the AUI Trustees 
Executive Committee meeting scheduled for 15 November 1956. Berkner 
appreciated that “in the temporary absence of a public announcement of AUI’s 
future involvement, it is not proper that AUI openly take steps toward the 
selection of the Director” and cautioned Menzel that “it seems necessary that 
the matter be held closely.”
Menzel wrote to Ira Bowen, C.D. Shane, W.W. Morgan, Otto Struve, and 
Jerry Wiesner to solicit their participation in a search committee to choose a 
director.4 In his initial letter, Menzel stated, “It is for us to determine … 
whether this director should be primarily an astronomer or primarily a radio 
engineer.” He then went on to express his view that, “Certainly, direction of 
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the scientific program, in the long run, is more important than the ability to 
design electronics.” The Committee debated the relative merits of previous 
research accomplishments, understanding of electronics, experience in radio 
astronomy, executive experience, good judgement, personality, and age. They 
noted that the most qualified individuals, such as Taffy Bowen, Joe Pawsey, and 
R. Hanbury Brown were not American citizens, but Menzel cautioned that, 
“the justification for support by the National Science Foundation was the need 
of American astronomers for the radio facility. It would look mighty queer, if 
among American astronomers, we could not find someone with proper 
qualifications.”5
Bart Bok again clearly emerged as the top candidate and was formally 
approached by Menzel, who reported “His answer was definite and direct” 
that his commitment to Australia was firm.6 Having a traditional background 
in astronomy, while initiating and leading what was then the pre-eminent US 
university radio astronomy program and training a new generation of radio 
astronomers, Bok was clearly uniquely qualified for the job. Had a formal offer 
from AUI been made earlier, most likely Bok would have accepted. As evi-
denced by his July 1956 letter to Tuve,7 he was clearly interested, but again, 
Bok reiterated that he had made a commitment to go to Australia which he 
intended to honor.8
Just a week before the signing of the AUI-NSF contract, after several mail 
ballots and exchanges of letters commenting on the various candidates, the 
Search Committee met at AUI’s New York offices on 12 November 1956 to 
consider 26 names. The Committee recognized that the top leadership should 
include both an astronomer and someone skilled in radio astronomy instru-
mentation. Their report stated that if the choice of director was an astronomer, 
then the second position should go to “someone in the electronics field” and 
“if the top post went to a physicist … or engineer … the appointment of an 
astronomer to the second position was imperative.”9 Leo Goldberg, director of 
the University of Michigan Observatory, emerged as the unanimous choice for 
NRAO Director.
In order to induce Goldberg to accept the appointment, AUI offered him a 
generous salary, a liberal allowance to spend at least one month every year at 
some other institution, and a semester leave every fourth year. But Goldberg 
declined, citing the loss of research opportunities and the freedom which he 
enjoyed in a university position.10 Ironically, 15 years later, Goldberg would 
become Director of the National Optical Astronomy Observatory, which had 
its own broad range of administrative and operational problems. Albert 
Whitford from the University of Wisconsin was the Committee’s second 
choice, but he delayed responding to Berkner’s offer. Finally, after several 
months, following pressure to reply from Leeland Haworth, Brookhaven 
Director and an AUI Trustee, Whitford also declined. Jesse Greenstein and 
Fred Whipple were close alternates, and were followed by Charles Townes, 
Horace Babcock, and John Hagen in another close group. Greenstein declined 
the offer citing the remoteness of Green Bank and the loss of opportunities for 
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personal research.11 Charlie Townes received strong support from Greenstein 
himself as well as the East Coast scientists on the committee, but he was not 
well known by the West Coast astronomers, Bowen, Struve, and Shane. Berkner 
apparently gave serious consideration to offering Townes the directorship but 
there is no record that he ever actually discussed the possibility with Townes.
At the time the AUI contract was signed with the NSF in November 1956, 
AUI had not yet identified a director. Under pressure from the NSF, Berkner 
declared himself “Acting Director,” although he probably assumed that this 
would be for only a short term. The AUI Advisory Committee and the Trustees 
repeatedly declared that “the appointment of a Director is the most important 
problem to be solved by the corporation.”12 By early 1959, with no solution in 
sight, the several Trustees conferred among themselves and suggested to 
Berkner that Otto Struve might consider an appointment as NRAO Director. 
Struve had been brought in as an at-large Trustee in response to the agreement 
to broaden the AUI Board to include expertise in astronomy and astrophysics. 
Following consultation with the NSF and NRAO senior staff, at their 17 April 
1959 meeting, the AUI Board appointed Otto Struve (Fig.  4.1) as NRAO 
Director and Vice President of AUI, effective 1 July 1959.
Otto Struve came from a long line of famous astronomers and observatory 
directors, and was then a Professor of Astronomy and Director of the Leuschner 
Observatory at the University of California. Before that he had been the long- 
time Director of the Yerkes Observatory and editor of The Astrophysical Journal. 
He had an outstanding reputation as a scientist for his contributions to 
Fig. 4.1 Otto Struve, 
NRAO Director from 1 
July 1959 to 1 December 
1961. Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
161
 astrophysics, particularly in stellar spectroscopy and stellar variability. He served 
as President of the American Astronomical Society from 1947 to 1950 and as 
President of the International Astronomical Union from 1952 to 1955. He 
was a strong supporter of the effort to establish a national optical astronomy 
observatory, and in 1954, he became a member of the NSF Advisory Panel for 
Astronomy.
Struve was also an experienced and accomplished science administrator. As 
Director of the Yerkes Observatory, he recruited an outstanding staff including 
Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar, Jesse Greenstein, Gerard Kuiper, and Bengt 
Stromgren, and also attracted such distinguished visitors as Jan Oort, Pol 
Swings, and Henk van de Hulst. While still Yerkes Director, Struve established 
the McDonald Observatory in Texas, and served simultaneously as the Director 
of both Observatories. As a member of the AUI Board of Trustees he had 
taken an active interest in the affairs of the Observatory. Struve was not a radio 
astronomer, but he had a history of association with radio astronomy and radio 
astronomers. He had tried to help Grote Reber transfer his Wheaton dish to a 
more suitable site in Texas in the 1940s, and sought an appointment for Reber 
at the University of Chicago. As early as 1953 he had written to Greenstein 
about the need for better instrumentation for radio astronomy (DeVorkin 
2000, p.  82). While at Berkeley, he helped Harold Weaver initiate a radio 
astronomy program and hired Ron Bracewell to teach a course in radio astron-
omy in the 1954–1955 academic year.
Even earlier, Struve (1940) wrote, “that the small astronomical observatory 
is compelled to search for something that it is able to do, instead of doing what 
is scientifically important and interesting.” And he went on to advocate a coop-
erative approach to observational astronomy to provide telescope access to 
astronomers, especially young astronomers and students, who were at institu-
tions without good instruments and with poor skies. Struve was known as a 
strong supporter of what later became to be known as “big science,” and had 
the right background and philosophy to lead NRAO. Most importantly, he 
brought a lot of prestige to NRAO at a time when it was badly needed.
As had happened earlier at Brookhaven (Sect. 3.1), AUI management was 
unwilling to delegate authority to their new NRAO Director. Responsibility 
for the 140 Foot construction remained with AUI, which expected Struve to 
concentrate on operation of the NRAO radio telescopes, overseeing the scien-
tific program at Green Bank, and recruiting the scientific and engineering staff 
needed to carry out the NRAO mission as a radio observatory for visiting sci-
entists. Struve agreed to this split of responsibility between AUI and NRAO, 
feeling it would give him more opportunity to concentrate on scientific mat-
ters, but according to Heeschen,13 he later regretted this decision.
Shortly after he became NRAO Director in the summer of 1959, Struve 
(1960) had already noted that NRAO was a national observatory in name only, 
and that there were more powerful facilities available elsewhere. Especially con-
cerned about the isolation of Green Bank, he explained to the AUI Board that 
unless NRAO were to expand substantially, “Green Bank will become simply 
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one of about a dozen observatories working in the field of radio astronomy,” 
and added that both Caltech and Cornell looked more attractive to a scientist 
wishing to work in radio astronomy. He was supported by Board member Carl 
Seyfert who added that NRAO “should not be just one of a number of gener-
ally similar institutions.”14 Struve also cautioned Heeschen and other senior 
NRAO staff that, “NRAO is rapidly becoming one of many radio- observatories, 
some of which are better equipped than our own. I sense that even now the 
NRAO does not provide enough of an incentive for many visiting astronomers. 
If I were a young astronomer, I should be equally attracted by research oppor-
tunities at Stanford, Cal Tech [sic], Cornell, Illinois, and several others. Perhaps 
this is what the U.S.A. really needs; but if so, the original purpose of NRAO is 
not being met. My feeling is that an enormous amount of very clever thinking 
by many able physicists and astronomers has resulted in the invention and con-
struction of a wide variety of excellent, but very expensive instruments.”15
Unfortunately, Struve’s short tenure as NRAO Director was marred by his 
conflict with AUI, and especially AUI President I.I. Rabi, over issues surround-
ing the 140 Foot Telescope construction, his continued attention to his 
research and publication on matters unrelated to NRAO, and by his declining 
health, due in part to wounds and multiple diseases acquired during WWI and 
then during the Russian Civil War when he served as an artillery and cavalry 
officer, first in the Russian then in the White Army.
4.2  getting Started
Following the signing of the contract with the NSF in November 1956, the 
AUI Board established the new Advisory Committee for Radio Astronomy, 
which replaced the old Steering Committee.16 To oversee the effort of building 
the Observatory in Green Bank, AUI established an office in Marlinton, a 
45-minute drive and some 25 miles to the south of Green Bank. The Marlinton 
office was shared with the Army Corps of Engineers, who were charged with 
obtaining the land rights in Green Bank. The first office in Green Bank was 
opened on 14 May 1957. Initially, the NRAO staff included four people: Dick 
Emberson and his secretary Mary Beth Fennelly, John Carrol, an engineer 
working on the design of the 140 Foot Telescope, and Dave Heeschen (2008) 
(Fig. 4.2). Heeschen and Edward Lilley were the senior radio astronomy stu-
dents in Bart Bok’s radio astronomy group at Harvard, and the first to receive 
a PhD in radio astronomy at a US university. Following a year spent as an 
instructor at Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut, Heeschen 
returned to Harvard as a Lecturer and Research Associate. While still at 
Harvard, encouraged by Bart Bok, he became a consultant to Dick Emberson 
at AUI, attended meetings of the AUI Steering Committee, and participated 
in the December 1955 NRAO site search. On 1 July 1956, four months before 
the NSF awarded the contract to AUI, Dave Heeschen accepted a full-time 
appointment with AUI in the office of the President, and then became the first 
member of the NRAO scientific staff.
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John Findlay was the next person to join the NRAO staff. During WWII, 
Findlay had served in the Royal Air Force, where he supervised the installation 
of radar stations throughout North Africa, the Middle East, and South East 
Asia. Following his undergraduate education at Cambridge, Findlay started his 
academic career as a PhD student working for Lord Rutherford, who unfortu-
nately died a few months after Findlay arrived in Cambridge in 1937, although 
according to Findlay there was no connection between these two events.17 
After two years of research in ionospheric physics under Jack Ratcliffe, Findlay 
became involved in the development of radar, during which time he met and 
got to know Martin Ryle. Following the War, Findlay led a radar development 
group in Britain and did research in ionospheric physics at Cambridge 
University. In 1952, he spent time at the Carnegie Institution Department of 
Terrestrial Magnetism, where he first met Merle Tuve and Lloyd Berkner, who 
were at the forefront of American ionosphere research. While working at the 
Ministry of Supply in Great Britain, under pressure from his American wife to 
return to the United States, Findlay wrote to Berkner and others asking about 
employment possibilities in the United States. Having just obtained the NSF 
contract to study the feasibility of establishing a new radio astronomy facility in 
the United States, Berkner offered Findlay a job to help establish the observa-
tory, and at the end of 1956 he joined Berkner, Dick Emberson, and Dave 
Heeschen at the AUI offices on the 72nd floor of the Empire State Building in 
New York City.
Heeschen and Findlay were soon followed by other Harvard graduates, first 
by Frank Drake, later by Jack Campbell,18 William E. Howard III, May Kaftan- 
Kassim from Iraq, T. K. Menon from India, and Campbell Wade, and they 
Fig. 4.2 David 
S. Heeschen, NRAO 
Acting Director from 1 
December 1961 to 19 
October 1962; NRAO 
Director from 19 October 
1962 to 1 October 1978. 
Credit: NRAO/AUI/
NSF
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formed the core of the early NRAO scientific staff (Fig. 4.3). When asked why 
the early staff was all from Harvard, Heeschen explained that he was unable to 
recruit anyone else, but acknowledged that he had not tried to attract any of 
the then-recent Caltech graduates such as Alan Moffet or Robert Wilson.19
One of AUI’s first tasks was to activate some sort of instrument, as the West 
Virginia Zoning Act grandfathered any source of interference existing before 
the Observatory went into operation. Working out of a small house in Green 
Bank that had been taken over by the US Army Corps of Engineers, and using 
equipment on loan from NRL, Heeschen, together with NRL’s Ed McClain 
and Ben Yaplee, built a simple 30 MHz interferometer. It consisted of two half 
wave dipoles and a Hallicrafter’s communications receiver, and they used it to 
observe the Sun on 25 and 26 October 1956. Although these observations 
occurred a few weeks before the signing of the actual contract between 
NRAO and the NSF and a year before the official 17 October 1957 NRAO 
dedication, this became the first radio astronomy observation made from the 
Fig. 4.3 Early NRAO staff. Left to right from the top: John Findlay, Frank Drake, 
Cam Wade, Hein Hvatum, Sebastian von Hoerner, Frank Low, Dave Hogg, Sandy 
Weinreb, Ken Kellermann, Barry Clark, Mort Roberts, Bill Howard. Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
165
Green Bank site.20 A year later, John Findlay resurrected this simple interfer-
ometer to record the radio transmissions from the Russian Sputnik spacecraft.
In July 1957, three months before the official dedication of NRAO, Findlay 
and Heeschen moved to West Virginia to begin the task of building the 
Observatory. Six months later they were joined by Frank Drake. By this time, 
the Observatory had moved its offices from Marlinton to Green Bank. The 
formal groundbreaking and dedication of the Observatory, which took place 
on 17 October 1957, appears to be the first use of the name “National Radio 
Astronomy Observatory”21 (Fig. 4.4). Prior to that time, AUI and NSF referred 
to the “radio astronomy project,” “radio astronomy facility,” or “radio astron-
omy observatory.” Indeed, the concept of a truly “national” observatory 
remained somewhat contentious, at least until the actual dedication, when it 
became known as the “National Radio Astronomy Observatory.” Although 17 
October was billed as the “groundbreaking,” actual construction work on the 
site had begun earlier with the building of roads, sewers, wells, and the prepa-
ration of the sites for the 85 foot and 140 Foot Radio Telescopes.
The day before the dedication, the AUI Advisory Committee met with a 
number of the visiting radio astronomers to discuss their observing plans for 
Fig. 4.4 Dedication of NRAO in Green Bank, 17 October 1957. Left to right: 
Richard Emberson, Lloyd Berkner, G. Nay, John Findlay, Ned Ashton, Dave Heeschen, 
and H. Hockenberry, with a model of the planned 140 Foot Telescope. Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
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the soon to be completed 85 foot and 140 Foot Radio Telescopes. Emphasis 
was on solar and 21 cm work, but several participants also mentioned studies 
of H II regions, planets, and accurate source positions. Two participants indi-
cated they were setting up new radio astronomy groups at the University of 
Virginia and the University of Pennsylvania that would be based on use of the 
Green Bank instruments, and they expected to hire radio astronomers to 
exploit these opportunities. Anticipating the future use of maser amplifiers, 
Charles Townes pointed out the need for accommodating receivers cooled by 
liquid helium or nitrogen at the antenna focus.
In November 1957, Heeschen laid out a detailed plan for the Observatory. 
Based on planned starting dates for scientific observing of 1 September 1958 
for the 85 foot telescope and 1 January 1960 for the 140 Foot, Heeschen out-
lined the expected growth of the scientific, technical, business, and supporting 
staffs, which he projected would reach 55 to 62 persons by mid-1960.22 In a 
separate document, he described his views on how the NRAO should be orga-
nized, pointing out NRAO’s multiple responsibilities: to provide equipment 
and aid for visiting scientists, to anticipate the need for future developments in 
radio astronomy, to play a leading role in developing new instrumentation, to 
provide absolute flux density measurements, and to be a source of national 
standards for radio astronomy. He outlined a comprehensive research philoso-
phy that guided the growth of NRAO for the next half century. There would 
be no “Observatory Program,” but each staff member should expect to carry 
out their own independent research in their particular field of interest, and the 
staff would share the obligations of the Observatory in equipment develop-
ment, long range planning, calibration, and assisting visitors.23 At the same 
time, NRAO laid out a site development program that would accommodate 
the 85 foot and 140 foot antennas as well as the “very large antenna” that was 
expected “in the next four or five years.” Buildings were planned to accom-
modate “an outstanding scientific staff, both permanent and visiting, … an 
equally competent … engineering and technical staff,” along with “the mini-
mum auxiliary and supporting staff and equipment necessary to manage and 
maintain the site.” With enviable optimism as to the staff requirements, as well 
as construction schedules, the site plan including the need for three radio 
astronomers to support the 85 foot telescope by 1 July 1958, three more by 1 
July 1960 to support the 140 Foot, and a total of nine by the time “the very 
large antenna is constructed in late 1961.”24
4.3  the 85 Foot tatel radio teleScope (aka 85-1)
Recognizing that the 140 Foot Telescope would take some time to construct, 
and needing to get established with an observational capability, the initial plan 
for NRAO called for the quick construction of a more modest sized instrument 
of 60 foot diameter, presumably to be modeled after the Harvard 60 foot radio 
telescope. However, Heeschen became aware of a commercially designed, 
equatorial mounted 85 foot diameter antenna that the Blaw-Knox Corporation 
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was building for the University of Michigan. NRAO determined that a copy 
could be built in Green Bank for $255,730, or well within the budgeted 
$310,000. On 1 October 1957, two weeks before the Observatory ground-
breaking, AUI signed a contract with Blaw-Knox to construct an 85 foot radio 
telescope.
The conceptual design of the Blaw-Knox 85 foot antennas was initially 
developed by DTM scientist Howard Tatel for the DTM 60 foot radio tele-
scope. Unfortunately, Tatel died before the antenna could be constructed, and 
the detailed engineering design was completed by Blaw-Knox engineer Robert 
(Bob) Hall, who would later play major roles in the design and construction of 
future NRAO antennas, including the 300 Foot Green Bank transit telescope, 
the Tucson 36 foot mm telescope, and, finally, the 100 meter Green Bank 
Telescope. There was no specified delivery date in the AUI contract, although 
Blaw-Knox had initially claimed that 15 July 1958 “was easily in reach.” As 
Bob Hall preferred to work by himself, the design took longer than planned, 
but he anticipated that the lost time could be made up during fabrication. 
However, in an effort to reduce their expenses, Blaw-Knox laid off half their 
factory workers and went from two daily shifts to one. Worried that they also 
might be laid off when the jobs were complete, the remaining crew slowed 
their work, while the unions forbad any overtime when the plant had just laid 
off a shift.25 The delivery date slipped to 1 October 1958. Apparently confident 
of the October date, AUI scheduled a dedication timed to coincide with previ-
ously scheduled Green Bank meetings of the AUI Board and the NRAO 
Advisory Committee.
The dedication of the 85-1 antenna, as it later became known at NRAO, 
took place as planned on 16 October 1958, just a year after the dedication and 
groundbreaking of the Observatory, and it was formally named “The Howard 
E. Tatel Radio Telescope” (Fig. 4.5). Although Michigan had ordered their 85 
foot antenna before NRAO, for reasons the authors have been unable to deter-
mine, Blaw-Knox delivered the first dish to Green Bank. Since the wiring and 
instrument installation by Blaw-Knox contractors and NRAO staff was not yet 
complete, the Green Bank antenna was not available for use until four months 
later, seven months behind the original schedule. This was “a source of consid-
erable embarrassment” to NRAO and AUI, which had planned observing pro-
grams by visitors and staff to begin in the summer, with the intention of 
announcing results at the forthcoming Paris Symposium on Radio Astronomy 
(30 July–6 August 1958) and at the triennial International Astronomical 
Union meeting in Moscow (12–20 August 1958).26
The initial observations with the Tatel Telescope, which marked the begin-
ning of the first real research capability at NRAO, took place on 13 February 
1959. Even then, the antenna failed to meet many of the performance specifi-
cations, and there were still serious deficiencies in the structure which needed 
fixing, including loose bolts, leaking lubricant, gear misalignment, excessive 
backlash, and the need to replace the feed support structure. Nevertheless, in 
view of the already scheduled observing programs, it was agreed that the 
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 scheduled observations could take place before AUI accepted the antenna. It 
was not until the end of 1959 that NRAO would agree to accept the antenna, 
although even by then, Blaw-Knox had not met all of the contract performance 
specifications. In hindsight, the schedule delay in the construction of the Tatel 
Telescope was a forerunner of the much longer and more serious delays later 
encountered by the 140 Foot, 36 Foot, and 100 meter GBT projects.
Since NRAO did not yet have an engineering staff, the 85 foot antenna was 
initially equipped with commercial receivers and a feed system consisting of a 
1.4 GHz (21 cm) receiver built by Airborne Instruments Laboratory, an 8 GHz 
(3.75 cm) receiver built by Ewen-Knight, and a dual band 3/21 cm feed devel-
oped by Jasik Laboratories. According to Heeschen27 this was the only time in 
its history that NRAO used completely commercially built receivers, although 
for many years following, NRAO would purchase low noise maser and para-
metric amplifiers.
Blaw-Knox had earned their reputation by building road-paving equipment 
and had no previous experience in radio astronomy. Indeed, the design was 
well underway when they realized that, due to the latitude difference, the 
Green Bank and Michigan equatorial mounted antennas could not be  identical. 
Fig. 4.5 Dedication of the 85 Foot Howard E. Tatel Telescope, 16 October 1968. 
The telescope, still lacking surface panels at dedication, was completed in February 
1959, with first observations on 13 February 1959. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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However, they did go on to produce a number of 85 foot antennas of the same 
design as the NRAO and Michigan antennas. The next one was for the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Goldstone tracking station. One was for the 
Harvard College Observatory near Fort Davis, Texas, to support a program in 
solar radio astronomy by Alan Maxwell, a New Zealander, who had arrived at 
Harvard from Jodrell Bank. More than 10 other nearly identical antennas were 
located at the NASA Deep Space Network (DSN) tracking stations around the 
world. Comparably-sized radio telescopes were constructed by other manufac-
turers for the University of California at Hat Creek, California, and the Naval 
Research Laboratory at Maryland Point, Maryland. Some of these antennas 
remain in operation after more than 50 years. Years later the DSN antennas in 
South Africa and in Australia were decommissioned from their role in space-
craft tracking, and ownership was transferred to the host countries, where some 
were used for radio astronomy.
Initially, scientists wanting to use the 85 foot Tatel Telescope were unen-
cumbered by the need for detailed scientific proposals, referees, time assign-
ment committees, etc., so planning the Observatory’s first scientific programs 
was a simple affair. Over a meal at the local diner, the NRAO scientific staff 
discussed the initial observing program that included the planets, the Galactic 
Center, H II regions, planetary nebulae, and the spectra of extragalactic 
sources. The observations were scheduled by Heeschen, based on handwritten 
requests from NRAO and visiting staff members for specific days and times, but 
unaccompanied by any scientific justification. The first controversial proposal 
came from Doc Ewen, who requested a large block of observing time for a 
Venus radar experiment. As Chair of the NRAO Astronomy Department, 
Heeschen had been assigning telescope time, but was reluctant to assign such 
a large block of time to one observer, and sought Berkner’s advice. Due to the 
time-dependent nature of his planned radar experiments, Ewen ultimately 
withdrew his proposal, but, by the middle of 1960, the anticipated demands 
for nighttime observing on the Tatel Telescope caused Heeschen to inform the 
staff, “I think it would be well if each person with an observing program (or 
contemplated program) would write a short description of it—including pres-
ent status, why it’s being done, and with what receiver, and an estimate of the 
telescope time required to complete it.”28
The spring of 1959 saw NRAO’s first visiting observers, including George 
Field from Princeton, Hein Hvatum from Chalmers Technical Institute in 
Sweden, T. K. Menon from the University of Pennsylvania, Morton Roberts 
from the University of California, and Gart Westerhout from Leiden University. 
Although the Tatel telescope had only modest capabilities compared with 
NRAO/AUI’s ambitions, as Heeschen (1996) pointed out, it served a variety 
of purposes. NRAO learned how to develop and manage a visiting observer 
program, and instrumentation being developed for the 300 Foot and 140 Foot 
Telescopes was tested on the 85 foot antenna. In particular, in fall 1961 Sandy 
Weinreb, then an MIT graduate student, brought his original 21 channel digi-
tal autocorrelation spectrometer to use on the 85 foot Tatel antenna in an 
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attempt to detect the Zeeman splitting of the 21 cm hydrogen line29 (Weinreb 
1962a) and interstellar deuterium (Weinreb 1962b). Frank Drake’s 1960 
Project Ozma on the Tatel Telescope brought national recognition to NRAO 
and Green Bank, although it was not all favorable (Chap. 5). Later the Tatel 
Telescope became the first antenna of the three element Green Bank 
Interferometer (Chap. 8).
Characteristic of common practice at the time, NRAO started its own 
Observatory publication series, called “Publications of the National Radio 
Astronomy Observatory,” which was privately distributed. Volume 1, covering 
the period from April 1961 to August 1963, included 17 publications. 
Reflecting what was then a general isolation of radio astronomy from main-
stream astronomy, the absence of external peer review, and their limited distri-
bution, the NRAO Publications were not widely recognized or cited, and from 
1963 onwards NRAO staff and visitor publications appeared only in recog-
nized peer-reviewed astronomy and technical journals.
4.4  the 140 Foot Saga30
Planning for the New Radio Telescope During the years leading up to the for-
mation of NRAO, a range of antenna sizes up to the ambitious dimension of 
600 feet were discussed. Both the NSF and AUI committees provided advice 
on the flagship telescope for the new national observatory, but they were not 
always in agreement. Although the value and feasibility of the 600 foot tele-
scope were hotly contested, there was a consensus to start with a so-called 
“intermediate” size reflector in the 150 foot range. However, the tradeoffs 
between size and precision and between an equatorial and alt-az mounting 
were debated for years. For smaller antennas, it was agreed that a traditional 
equatorial mount was optimum, while for larger antennas, it was clear that only 
an alt-az mount could work. The planned antenna was in the awkward class 
that Grote Reber said was neither big enough to be interesting nor small 
enough to easily build. With some foresight, he commented that being of 
intermediate size, much time and effort would be wasted fighting over whether 
it should be on an equatorial or alt-az mount.31 The initial specification for a 
150 foot diameter dish was redefined to be 40 meters, then rounded up to 
140 feet (42.7 m) because, according to Struve et al. (1960), someone felt that 
the size of the national instrument should be expressed in feet, not in meters.
At this point, essentially everyone concerned was convinced, unrealistically 
as it turned out, that the construction of an intermediate-size dish would be 
a straightforward extrapolation of existing 60 to 82 foot designs. Initially, the 
main scientific driver for building the 140 Foot antenna was to do both galac-
tic and extragalactic 21  cm research. As project planning developed, there 
was increasing interest in going to shorter wavelengths to investigate radio 
galaxy spectra, to study the thermal emission from the planets and H II 
regions, and to study polarization. Interestingly, in a 1957 letter to the NSF, 
with foresight Heeschen noted that the 140 Foot would be uniquely capable 
of detecting spectral lines at centimeter wavelengths.32 At the same time, the 
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exciting work being done on radio galaxies in the UK and Australia (Sect. 2.1) 
led to increased interest in the identification of discrete radio sources and 
greater emphasis on precise pointing of the antenna to measure accurate source 
positions. This gradual specification creep led to a telescope that would not be 
available off-the-shelf, but would be at the cutting edge of technology and 
both more difficult and more expensive to build than anyone at AUI anticipated.
At their 28 May 1955 meeting, the AUI Steering Committee prepared a 
Request for Proposals for a 140 foot diameter radio telescope which specified 
that the pointing should be better than 30 arcsec and the surface accuracy 1/4 
inch over the inner half and 3/8 inch over the remaining part.33 After consider-
able debate, the decision between an equatorial and altazimuth mount was left 
open, but full sky coverage remained a stated requirement. In June, Emberson 
reported that he had requested proposals from 21 commercial companies for 
the design and construction of an intermediate-sized dish.34 However, the 
resultant cost estimates for the intermediate-sized dish varied widely, and none 
of the companies seemed prepared to produce an antenna meeting all of the 
challenging AUI specifications. Most of the manufacturers contacted indicated 
they would work on only a specific portion of the project, and could not deliver 
the full antenna. Significantly, several companies stated that AUI would need 
to supply a complete design before they could make a firm bid.35 At this point, 
the Steering Committee agreed to defer the issue of construction and to con-
centrate just on the design. AUI anticipated that a 140 Foot Telescope would 
cost $2.2 million to design and construct, although the bids ranged from $1.3 
million (D.S. Kennedy & Company) to $3.3 million (American Machine and 
Foundry). The full costs of developing the observatory, including other 
research equipment, roads, power, water, and buildings, was estimated to be 
about $4.6 million. Annual operating costs, which included salaries for the 
Director, two radio astronomers, one electrical engineer, and two technicians, 
as well as one mechanical engineer, were projected to reach $259,000 by 1959.36
Designing the Telescope After receiving the second NSF grant of $140,000 in 
July 1955, AUI decided to proceed in two phases: first, develop the design for 
a 140 Foot Radio Telescope, and second, contract to build the antenna. AUI 
issued three contracts for the design. At this time, everyone agreed that an 
equatorial mount would be too complex for a telescope as large as 140 feet, so 
the requested designs were all for an altazimuth mount using an appropriate 
coordinate converter. Jacob Feld from New York agreed to scale his 600 foot 
design to 140 feet. Charles Husband was asked to develop a design for a 140 
foot telescope based on his experience with the Jodrell Bank telescope, which 
was soon to become the largest, fully steerable radio telescope in the world. 
D.S.  Kennedy & Co. of Cohasset, Massachusetts, had already built several 
modest sized antennas for radio astronomy, including the Harvard 60 foot 
telescope, as well as other antennas for commercial and military applications, 
and agreed to develop a third design for a 140 foot radio telescope. In the Feld 
design, the dish was supported by two towers that rotate on a track, while the 
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Husband design followed the concept outlined nearly a decade earlier by Grote 
Reber (Chap. 9) for his proposed 220 foot antenna, in which the dish is sup-
ported at the two ends of a single supporting ring. In the Kennedy design, the 
dish was supported by two rings on a rotating structure mounted on a concrete 
pedestal (Fig. 4.6).
In order to operate at wavelengths shorter than 10  cm, even as short as 
3 cm, the surface accuracy was now specified as ±1/4 inch, without defining 
whether that referred to peak-to-peak or rms deviations. The pointing accuracy 
was initially specified to be 10 arcsec, corresponding to 5% of the HPBW at 
3 cm. The designers indicated that they could easily meet a 30 arcsec specifica-
tion, could probably obtain 20  arcsec pointing accuracy, but that 10  arcsec 
pointing “may have to wait on the development of improved technology and 
components.”37
By this time the NRL 50 foot alt-az dish had been in operation for four 
years, and it was known that the Dwingeloo, Jodrell Bank, and Parkes dishes 
were to be alt-az mounted. Moreover, as was certainly known by at least some 
members of the AUI Steering Committee, digital computer-controlled alt-az 
mounted antennas were already in common use in military radar systems.38 
Nevertheless, the AUI Committee, led by John Hagan and Dick Emberson, 
expressed concern that the required pointing precision of the Green Bank tele-
scope could not be met with an alt-az design and mechanical coordinate con-
verter.39 Hagan’s concern was no doubt based on the recognized pointing 
issues with the NRL 50 foot dish, so he argued, probably correctly, that an 
analogue computer of the type used at NRL and Dwingeloo could not meet 
the desired 140 foot pointing specifications. Although digital computers were 
already available, there was a widely held view that the operation of a precision 
scientific instrument should not be trusted to a computer.
The concerns about an alt-az design were shared by Merle Tuve and his NSF 
Panel, who questioned the potential precision of any servo system that would 
be needed in the alt-az design. According to Heeschen (1996), Tuve’s lack of 
faith in servo drives was at least in part the result of his wartime experiences 
Fig. 4.6 Left to right: Feld, Husband, and Kennedy telescope designs for the Green 
Bank antenna. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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with servo-driven gun mounts. Further, the optical astronomers on both the 
AUI and NSF committees, and the Harvard astronomers in particular, who 
had experience with their 24 and 60 foot equatorial dishes, viewed the equato-
rial mount more favorably. So Tuve and his NSF Advisory Panel told the NSF 
to specify that at least one design should be for an equatorial mount, although 
they acknowledged that the cost would be greater than for an alt-az mount. 
Moreover, Tuve claimed that the specified pointing precision was unrealistic 
and that AUI was “accepting from all advisers their desired performance char-
acteristics and then asking the designers to meet these high specifications.” He 
also made the valid point that the same specifications must be used in evaluat-
ing the two designs.40 In view of the engineering challenges for both designs, 
Tuve proposed to relax the 140 foot pointing specifications and to eliminate 
the requirement that the dish be able to track the Sun, Moon, and planets. But 
Berkner was firmly opposed to relaxing the tolerances laid down in the design 
specifications, since he argued “this would diminish the range of experiments 
for which the instrument could be used.”41 Tuve was supported by Greenstein, 
who claimed that the “equatorial design might not be feasible,” but that “the 
problems on the altazimuth mount are far from solved,” and he informed Tuve 
that the Caltech 90 foot dishes would be on equatorial mounts.42 Following 
pressure from Tuve’s Panel, the NSF instructed Berkner to divert $10,000 
originally planned for studies of the large reflector to “an immediate study of a 
polar type mount for the 140 foot reflector.”43
At their March 1956 meeting,44 the AUI Advisory Committee reviewed the 
Feld, Husband, and Kennedy designs. The Husband design adopted the same 
welded steel surface that later turned out to be so unsuccessful on his Jodrell 
Bank 250 foot antenna.45 Tuve, claiming to speak for the NSF Advisory Panel, 
noting the difficulty in achieving the design specifications, urged that the 
design be relaxed to allow the telescope to work at 7 or 8 cm rather than 3 cm 
and stated that he saw “no particular value in having a telescope capable of 
operating at less than 10 cm wavelength.” Haddock, who was using the NRL 
dish for 3 cm wavelength observations of planetary nebulae and H II regions,46 
was “greatly disturbed at the suggestion of relaxing the tolerances,” and wanted 
to go to even shorter wavelengths where the thermal radiation would be stron-
ger. Bok argued that “as accurate a reflector as possible is what is wanted.” 
Tuve retaliated, advocating the need to determine what observations were 
desired, and then build with that objective in mind. Similar arguments and 
counterarguments relating to the relative importance of solving old problems 
and discovering new questions would be expressed about almost every pro-
posed new radio telescope over the next half century.
All three designers agreed that the additional cost of an equatorial mount 
would outweigh the cost savings from the simpler drive and control mecha-
nism on an alt-az antenna, and that further funds would be needed to explore 
the equatorial designs in more detail. Aside from the cost differences, Berkner 
reminded everyone that an alt-az design for the planned 140 Foot Telescope 
would give valuable experience in the design of bigger antennas. Pointing out 
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that AUI had one or more workable alt-az designs, Berkner asked for authori-
zation to proceed on the basis of one of those designs rather than delay further 
the establishment of the National Radio Astronomy Facility which was still in 
the proposal stage. Although it was agreed that if AUI followed the urging of 
the NSF Advisory Committee to obtain an equatorial design, it would take 
another four to six months. Bok pointed out that since construction funds 
were not available anyway, it would be “desirable to undertake a study of an 
equatorial mount.” Berkner relented, and as instructed by the NSF, he agreed 
to “use funds in the amount of $10,000, previously allocated for studies of 
large dishes, to obtain a preliminary design of an equatorial mount.” However, 
already at this time it was clear that at best, the FY57 NSF budget request of 
$3.5 million for the radio facility was more than a million dollars below the 
amount Emberson felt was needed for land acquisition, site development, 
equipment, and antenna construction.47
Berkner, Emberson, and much of the AUI Steering Committee favored the 
structurally simpler alt-az mounting, in part because it would also serve to 
evaluate the design of the planned and much larger 600 foot telescope. Tuve, 
on the other hand was concerned about the more complex variable speed drive 
and computer systems needed for the alt-az mount, and argued that “no com-
parison between equatorial and altazimuth suitability can be made unless at 
least one of them is a complete design.” He was particularly concerned about 
the cost of a computer to do the coordinate conversion and the requirements 
for the servo system, which he claimed was “outside the contract,” for the 
three designs provided by Feld, Kennedy, and Husband. “Unless a second 
independent computer is added,” he argued, “there is no way of knowing at all 
times where the dish is actually pointing.”48 As Frank Drake49 later pointed out, 
Tuve apparently did not appreciate that the direction of the forces on the dec-
lination bearings, and on the fork supporting the dish of a polar mounted 
telescope, changes as the telescope moves in hour angle, so that an equatorial 
mount is much more difficult to design than an alt-azimuth mount. The prob-
lem is compounded because adding more weight to give stiffness increases 
issues of the load on the bearing.
The AUI and NSF committees debated the minimum operating wavelength 
and the tradeoff with antenna diameter and cost. Fred Haddock argued that 
1 cm would be ideal to study the thermal emission from planetary nebulae and 
H II regions, but 2 or 3 cm would be a reasonable compromise with cost. John 
Bolton claimed that even a factor of two improvement in surface accuracy 
would double the cost of the reflector, but Dave Heeschen and Bart Bok coun-
tered that in practice, previously built radio telescopes, such as the one at 
Harvard, had exceeded their design specifications, so that it should be possible 
to reach wavelengths as short as a few centimeters at no increase in cost.
As early as July 1956, Merle Tuve discussed the 140 Foot challenges with 
Blaw-Knox. Using the “Tatel-Carnegie design” for the DTM 60 foot antenna, 
he asked if Blaw-Knox would be able to give a “quotation or estimate” on the 
cost of a 140 foot equatorially mounted parabolic dish. Tuve reiterated his 
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often stated view that the AUI specifications were too tight, and asked how the 
cost might be reduced by relaxing the specifications, or if a larger dish could be 
built with reduced specifications “without extreme increase in costs.” Tuve also 
asked that the telescope be able to point down to the horizon over a range of 
210 to 240 degrees of azimuth, a specification which would later turn out to 
be very expensive.50 Around this time, Emberson was becoming concerned 
about the apparent difficulties inherent in the equatorial design, and predicted 
that “the alt-azimuth design will be the one chosen in the end.”51 But only a 
month later, based on optimistic input from Feld, Emberson expressed more 
confidence in an equatorial approach and proposed setting up a small group to 
further investigate an equatorial design for the 140 Foot Telescope.52 As later 
described by Emberson and Ashton (1958), the choice between an alt-az and 
equatorial mount depended on whether one had more confidence in a complex 
mechanical structure or a complex drive and control system, and since the tele-
scope would be used by astronomers who may have had “unhappy experiences 
with electronic and electrical equipment,” AUI decided in favor of an equato-
rial mount.
Initially, some of the Advisory Committee members wanted to retain true 
full sky coverage, even for an equatorially mounted dish, in order that observa-
tions of transient celestial phenomena or geophysical activity could be studied 
at lower culmination. This would have meant tipping the dish structure over 
the zenith, but fortunately, at the October 1956 AUI Advisory Committee,53 
it was agreed to restrict the sky coverage appropriate to the equatorial mount. 
Measuring the surface accuracy was recognized as a possible problem, and a 
number of approaches were considered. By this time, there were sufficient 
uncertainties surrounding the 140 Foot project, which was about to become a 
contractual responsibility, that it did not seem feasible to simultaneously push 
the studies of the much larger (600 foot) telescope. Nevertheless, Berkner was 
confident that the construction of the 140 Foot Telescope would not take 
more than two years, and perhaps could be completed in as little as 18 months. 
However, some members of the AUI Board were already expressing concern 
over the lack of a firm cost estimate, so Berkner agreed that “commitments be 
limited to land acquisition, construction of essential roads, and installation of 
electric power.”54
Under the guidance of the newly constituted AUI Advisory Committee on 
Radio Astronomy, in October 1956 AUI contracted with Ned Ashton for a 
“definitive” design of an equatorial mounted 140 foot radio telescope. Ashton 
was a structural engineer from the University of Iowa who had also designed 
the NRL 50 foot radio telescope, which was, when built, the largest in the 
world. A special ad hoc committee, including Howard Tatel and Merle Tuve 
from DTM, along with John Bolton and Bruce Rule from Caltech, was consti-
tuted in October 1956 to give “advice” to Ashton.55 Bruce Rule was a Caltech 
structural engineer who had been involved in the construction of the Palomar 
200 inch, and he was in charge of the design and construction of the new twin 
90 foot equatorially mounted radio telescopes for Caltech’s Owens Valley 
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interferometer. Rule and Bolton offered to make the design of the Caltech 90 
foot antennas available to Ashton and the Committee. The committee gave 
careful consideration to how both the polar and declination axes would be 
aligned and the methods by which the reflector surface would be fabricated, 
measured, and adjusted. But it was acknowledged that it would strain known 
optical or microwave procedures to adjust the surface to the needed accuracy.56
With an equatorial mount, there could be considerable cost savings by 
restricting the sky coverage, but “full sky coverage” was argued to be a funda-
mental requirement for a general purpose radio telescope. As a compromise 
between sky coverage and cost, the Advisory Committee initially agreed that 
the hour range would be restricted to six hours from the meridian. However, 
Donald Menzel, who carried a lot of weight with both AUI and the NSF, 
insisted that the telescope must be able to follow the Sun when it was above the 
horizon at any time of the year,57 thus increasing the hour angle limit to seven 
hours. Tuve pointed out that this would seriously impact the performance and 
cost. Ashton denied that this was true (Heeschen 1996), although the increased 
range of hour-angle required longer yoke arms, which greatly increased the 
weight of the movable structure and the load on the polar bearing. Deciding 
to include the capability to observe the Sun at any time probably more than 
doubled the cost of the antenna and compromised both the surface and point-
ing accuracy, as well as being responsible for the long delay in its completion. 
According to Dave Heeschen, it was arguably the worst decision made in 
NRAO’s long history.58 Ironically, by time the 140 Foot Telescope was com-
pleted in 1965, solar studies with the limited resolution of filled aperture tele-
scopes were no longer of great interest. As noted by Heeschen (1996), the 140 
Foot Telescope had gradually “evolved from a quick-off-the-shelf instrument 
to one that pushed the state of the art of telescope construction and would 
become extremely costly and time consuming to build.”
Without an NRAO director, management of the 140 Foot program 
remained in the hands of AUI.  As discussed previously, when Otto Struve 
became NRAO director in July 1959, it was agreed that the “director’s primary 
task will be to assemble a staff to operate the Observatory when it is com-
pleted,”59 and the responsibility for the construction of the 140 Foot Telescope 
remained with Emberson and AUI.  This unfortunate agreement, which 
removed the day-to-day management of the construction from Green Bank, 
was perhaps the most significant contribution to the series of miscalculations 
and mismanagements that resulted in multiple cost increases and schedule 
delays, and nearly led to the closing of NRAO before it even began any effec-
tive operation. According to Heeschen (2008), Struve apparently regretted the 
agreement and later unsuccessfully tried to transfer management of the tele-
scope construction back to Green Bank. Only after both Struve and Berkner 
had resigned in 1961 did the project management shift from AUI in New York 
to NRAO in Green Bank. But by then millions of dollars had been wasted and 
five years had been lost.
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Ashton’s design called for a large yoke supporting the dish structure attached 
to the polar axis, which was supported by a large spherical bearing sitting on 
nine (later reduced to four) oil supported pads (Fig. 4.7). This was much like 
the iconic 200 inch Palomar telescope, but, of course, the 140 Foot was much 
larger and heavier, and also had more precise pointing specifications. The yoke, 
polar axis, and spherical bearing were to be made of steel, and the dish backup 
Fig. 4.7 Ned Ashton design for the 140 Foot Telescope. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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structure of aluminum. The surface was composed of 72 aluminum panels set 
in three concentric rings.
Planning for the development of the Observatory was based on an antici-
pated budget of $4 million for FY1957 and $1.13 million for 1958. At the 
time, AUI estimated the cost of building the 140 Foot Radio Telescope would 
be about $2.2 million.60 But due to the uncertainty about the price of the 140 
Foot Telescope, it was difficult with the limited budget to also commit funds 
for a control building, instrumentation, and operations. In January 1958, AUI 
issued “Estimated Costs of Construction” for NRAO that included detailed 
requirements for roads, water, electric power, buildings, housing, cafeteria, and 
staffing. By this time, due to the more ambitious requirements to work at short 
centimeter wavelengths, the increased appreciation of the impact of the remote 
location, and better understanding of the engineering problems, AUI’s esti-
mated cost for the 140 Foot Telescope had ominously increased to $6.8 
million.61
Contracting for Construction An NSF suggestion for an independent review of 
Aston’s design was dismissed by Emberson on the grounds that the AUI ad–
hoc committee “had already accomplished this review.”62 While it was agreed 
that there should be a written record of the AUI review, there is no evidence 
that this ever happened. On 1 August 1957, AUI issued a Request for Proposals 
to construct the 140 Foot antenna following Ashton’s design. At the 12 
September 1957 Pre- Proposal Conference, AUI stated “AUI does not con-
template a re-design phase to precede construction; the objective is to build 
the present design.”63
Ashton’s design turned out to be incomplete and devoid of details. AUI 
received nine bids ranging from $3.96 million to $12.02 million to construct 
the antenna.64 After negotiations with the four lowest bidders, the lowest 
acceptable bid of $4.75 million came from the E.W. Bliss Company of Canton, 
Ohio, an amount nearly twice the available funds, but the bid offered an attrac-
tive, if unrealistic, delivery time of only 14 months. However, the bid did not 
include another $1.2 million that AUI estimated would be needed for engi-
neering, power, taxes, and cost escalation. In an emotional letter to the NSF on 
12 February 1958, Berkner pleaded for the additional funds needed to accept 
the Bliss proposal.65 At the subsequent NSF review on 13 March 1958, 
Emberson admitted that the original $2.2 million figure “was first used in 
almost casual conversation,” and was for a “smaller less precise instrument.” 
Struve kept up the pressure by pointing out to the NSF the ultimate need for 
“a very large antenna with a diameter well in excess of 1000 feet,” and said that 
the “140 foot telescope should be regarded as merely a stopgap.”66 AUI was 
initially authorized to contract with Bliss for $145,000 for engineering (Phase 
I), with an option for fabrication (Phase II) which was contingent on upon an 
additional Congressional appropriation, and gave Bliss a letter of intent autho-
rizing Phase I in December 1957. After Congress had passed a supplemental 
appropriations bill, AUI was able to let a fixed price contract to E.W. Bliss for 
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$4.75 million for fabrication of the 140 Foot Radio Telescope. Although not 
included in the contract, completion was promised in 24 months. On 9 June 
1958, representatives from Bliss, AUI, and NSF gathered in Green Bank to 
sign the contract for the construction of the 140 Foot Telescope. 
Groundbreaking was two months later, on 14 August 1958 (Fig. 4.8).
The contract with Bliss was poorly formulated. There were no penalties for 
delay or incentives for early completion. AUI maintained that Bliss was respon-
sible for completing the design, and would be free to depart from the Ashton 
design, provided that the stringent performance specifications were met. 
Nevertheless, Bliss repeatedly claimed that they were unwilling and unable to 
provide designs not covered by Ashton. As described by Heeschen (1996),
The exact relation between Ashton’s design and that of the contractor was never 
adequately spelled out, neither in the RP nor in the subsequent contract with the 
successful bidder, but it was clear that Ashton’s concept was to be used. Ashton’s 
detailed designs could be changed by the contractor, but only with the approval 
of AUI.  The degree of responsibility for performance was also worded 
ambiguously.
Fig. 4.8 Groundbreaking for the 140 Foot Telescope, 14 August 1958. From left to 
right, Eugene Hallik (AUI), unidentified (Bliss Co.), Frank Callender (NRAO), Richard 
Emberson (AUI), and John Findlay (NRAO). Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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Signs of Trouble Apparently neither Ashton nor Bliss nor AUI had considered 
how the antenna was to be fabricated or erected, or how the large components 
would be shipped to Green Bank. From the beginning, Bliss had problems in 
completing the design and in fabricating the spherical bearing. As early as mid-
1959, John Findlay reported that the completion date of the 140 Foot had 
slipped from early 1960 to the “fall of 1960,” but that “construction on the 
site and in the contractor’s shops is proceeding satisfactorily.”67 By the time the 
promised two year construction period had passed in mid-1960, fabrication of 
the spherical bearing, yoke, and polar shaft were proceeding in the Bliss plant, 
but already the project was nearly two years behind schedule (Heeschen 
2007a). Due to design problems, work on the drive and control system, which 
had been subcontracted to the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics, 
had not yet started, and Bliss also reported difficulty in developing a procedure 
for fabricating the surface panels.
On 5 May 1960, Bliss wrote to AUI that small cracks had developed in the 
spherical bearing, and that in cold temperatures, the type A-373 steel being 
used to fabricate the bearing and the polar shaft might be subject to what was 
called “brittle fracture.” It was known that in North Atlantic winters during 
WWII, brittle fracture caused merchant ships constructed from A-373 steel to 
fracture and sink. Green Bank winters can be very cold, with temperatures 
reaching −30F (−34C). Since Bliss apparently had a supply of A-373 steel and 
experience in using it on other projects, they used it to fabricate the spherical 
bearing and the polar shaft. AUI was concerned that although the cracks in the 
bearing were minute, there was a slight danger that under cold weather the 
cracks might propagate, leading to failure of the bearing which supported the 
whole movable structure. An additional complication arose when neither 
Ashton nor Bliss were able to develop a procedure for welding the polar shaft 
to the yoke and sphere. Bliss wanted to bolt the pieces together, but this 
required modification of the components that already had been fabricated. 
Ashton argued that a bolted structure would not be sufficiently strong. Bliss 
maintained that the problem was due to the unsatisfactory Ashton design, and 
that AUI would be responsible for any additional costs and delay. AUI promptly 
responded that the problems were not due to design faults, but to unsatisfac-
tory shop and welding procedures, and since, according to the contract, Bliss 
was responsible for the final design, they should be responsible for finding a 
solution and for any additional expenses involved.
Both AUI and Bliss hired consultants, but they disagreed on the optimum 
technical solution and on legal responsibility. On 24–25 May 1960, Lewis 
Burchill, the AUI Controller, and Emberson met with Bliss to discuss renego-
tiating the contract to provide a firm completion date, but they agreed that this 
would not be possible until the technical issues were resolved.68
Over the next months, AUI, the NSF, and Bliss discussed a number of pos-
sible solutions:
 1) heating the enclosure surrounding the sphere, which could be risky if power 
were lost to the heating system during cold weather;
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 2) drilling small “mouse holes,” or coating the sphere with epoxy to 
reduce stresses;
 3) using a process known as “normalizing” to heat at least the spherical bear-
ing, and perhaps all of the steel components, to a temperature of 1600 
degrees F, which would change the structure of the steel and greatly 
decrease the possibility of brittle fracture;
 4) scrap the sphere and start over with a new type of steel; or
 5) do nothing and take a chance that brittle fracture would not occur. 
Meanwhile, the polar shaft, which had been fabricated with the same defec-
tive steel, had already been delivered to Green Bank.
On 30 August 1960, AUI and NRAO staff, along with consultants, met 
with the NSF to address the problems and discuss whether to terminate the 
contract with Bliss. Although Ned Ashton claimed that the chances of brittle 
fracture were negligible, and that the safety factor included in the design of the 
sphere excluded the possibility of catastrophic failure, Emberson maintained 
that this was potentially a very serious problem and he did not want AUI to 
take any chances, however small. The antenna was already way behind schedule 
and over budget. NRAO, and especially Struve, expressed concern that by time 
the 140 Foot Telescope was finished, it would no longer be cutting edge. They 
were well aware of the growing number of 85 foot radio telescopes around the 
world, as well as the Jodrell Bank 250 foot dish, and the Parkes 210 foot tele-
scope then under construction. Struve contended that NRAO was not able to 
attract new staff members because the existing equipment was not sufficiently 
attractive or unique, and that there was a danger current staff would leave. 
Moreover, he argued that radio astronomy was progressing so fast that, after 
1962, the 140 Foot would be “outdated.” Perhaps somewhat irresponsibly, 
but no doubt with good intentions, he maintained that “the urgency of need” 
outweighed the “ideal technical or engineering solutions.”69
Encouraged by Ashton’s reassurance, recognizing that refabricating the 
major structural elements would be costly and introduce yet further delays, and 
concerned about minimizing the delay, Struve insisted that Bliss be allowed to 
continue with the erection of the antenna using the existing yoke, bearing, and 
polar shaft without normalizing. Although Emberson expressed dissatisfaction 
with the decision, the NSF agreed to proceed, and Emberson ordered that the 
spherical bearing and other fabricated components be shipped to Green Bank 
for integration and assembly. But the shipment was delayed by a railroad strike 
and by the continuing contention over who was responsible for the design 
faults and subsequent delays.70 Lloyd Berkner, meanwhile, was on a two-month 
trip to Europe and the Middle East attending to some of his other national and 
international responsibilities. When NRAO and AUI met with the NSF on 30 
August 1960, Berkner was in London as head of the US URSI delegation, and 
did not participate in this important discussion. After being updated by 
Emberson, three days later, Berkner telegrammed his agreement with Ashton 
and Struve to use the existing structures, and thus avoid further delay and cost 
4 GROWING PAINS 
182
increases which would “damage the health and effectiveness of the Observatory.” 
But he encouraged Emberson to “investigate heating of the bearing house to 
prevent low temperatures that may induce brittle fracture.”71 By this time, 
although probably unknown to most of the principals, Berkner had already 
decided to resign as AUI President.72
After his return to the United States in late September 1960, Berkner, along 
with Emberson and Burchill, met with Struve and the Observatory staff in 
Green Bank to develop plans to either renegotiate the contract with Bliss or 
decide instead to give notice to terminate the contract.73 Following a 22 
September 1960 meeting between AUI and Bliss, with both sides backed by 
their respective legal teams, AUI asked Bliss to propose a contract revision that 
included a firm fixed price for completion and a firm date for final delivery, 
“preferably not substantially later than November 1, 1961.”74 As a prerequisite 
to any negotiation, AUI required that all finished parts be shipped to Green 
Bank, that work on the sub-contracted drive and control system be completed, 
and that assembly in Green Bank be resumed.75 AUI was ready to assume 
responsibility for Ashton’s design, provided that they had the opportunity to 
inspect progress and that Bliss agree to a price adjustment if they were not able 
to complete the telescope by the agreed date.76 AUI appreciated that any rene-
gotiation would require additional funds, which would need NSF approval, 
and that this would likely mean further delay, especially if the negotiations 
involved normalizing any of the steel components. By this time, Bliss was 
claiming over $1 million in excess costs they argued that they had already 
incurred, due, they claimed, to defects in Ashton’s design. Burchill was confi-
dent that that they would settle for less, but the NSF agreed to “make addi-
tional funds available to you in such amount as may be necessary for a full 
settlement,” and to provide up to an additional $100,000 for assembly of the 
telescope in Green Bank.77 Meanwhile, at their 23 September 1960 meeting, 
the AUI Board authorized Berkner, at his “discretion,” to terminate the con-
tract with Bliss, although they recognized that this would be “fraught with 
difficulty.”78
Finding a Solution Berkner’s and Struve’s apparent confidence was not shared 
by Emberson or the NSF. On 25 September 1960, Berkner and Emberson, 
along with Lewis Burchill and NRAO Business Manager Frank Callender, met 
with NSF Director, Alan Waterman, and other NSF staff, to review the deterio-
rating situation in Green Bank. After further review at the NSF, and probably 
influenced by Emberson’s concerns, on 5 October, Waterman wrote to Berkner 
that while79
we fully understand and sympathize with your desire, and that of the NRAO staff, 
to place the telescope in operation at the earliest possible date, … the interests of 
the Federal Government must be protected by assuring that sound procedures 
are followed in fabricating any part of the telescope whose failure might result in 
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death or injury of personnel, severe financial loss and long delay in putting the 
telescope into operation.
After reviewing the options, Waterman went on to state
Because of the complexity, the serious consequences of major mistakes, and the 
possibility that our judgements may be overly influenced by the pressures we are 
all under to complete the job rapidly, the Foundation feels it is desirable at this 
time to have the technical problems reviewed by a highly qualified committee of 
experts in order that AUI may have the best possible basis for a decision on 
this problem.
Waterman added that he had appointed Dr. Augustus B. Kinzel, an engineer 
and Vice President of Union Carbide, to chair a committee charged with 
addressing the apparent problems with the spherical bearing and polar shaft.80
 Discouraged by the deepening problems surrounding the 140 Foot project, 
on 23 September 1960 Berkner quietly informed AUI that he was resigning as 
AUI President.81 Berkner’s resignation was officially accepted at the 20–21 
October 1960 Annual Meeting of the AUI Board of Trustees.82 Struve was also 
upset by the delays in the project. Citing ill health, frustration over the NSF 
reversal of the 30 August 1960 decision to continue construction with the 
existing bearing, which, he noted, “is a severe disappointment to me person-
ally,” and feeling that important decisions were being made without consulting 
him, Struve stated that he was unwilling to assume the responsibility for the 
success or failure of the 140 Foot Telescope unless he could be sure of control. 
Noting that he had previously taken the position that he would not continue 
as Director unless the telescope could be finished by 1 July 1962, and that 
“nothing had happened which gives him any confidence that this condition will 
be met,” Struve told AUI that he “cannot continue to serve as director of the 
Observatory.”83 Although Struve’s effectiveness as NRAO Director was ques-
tioned, in view of the worsening 140 Foot situation, AUI apparently did not 
want to deal with the potentially embarrassing, nearly simultaneous resignation 
of both the AUI President and the NRAO Director.
At their 18 November 1960 meeting, the AUI Executive Committee reas-
sured Struve that the “Director should be in complete charge at the Observatory 
and that Dr. Struve could count on the unwavering support of the Trustees in 
his administration of the Observatory.”84 The Trustees noted that in the earlier 
absence of a full time director, “practices had grown up at Green Bank and had 
simply been continued without any thought of acting contrary to the wishes of 
the director.” The minutes of the 18 November AUI Executive Committee 
reported that, following the unanimous vote of their “complete confidence in 
Otto Struve, their satisfaction at the progress of the Observatory under his 
direction, their hope that he will find it possible to continue as Director,” 
Struve “expressed his pleasure at the action taken and emphasized that he had 
never felt any lack of confidence on the part of the Trustees, but on the part of 
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the contracting agency, the NSF.” Later Struve (1961) would write, “the 
Observatory does not yet fulfill its intended function of serving as a ‘national 
laboratory.’ This is due to several causes, the most important of which is the 
delay in completing the 140 foot telescope.” Heeschen recalled that Struve 
“remained very upset,” over the reversal, without consulting him, of the 30 
August decision, and that “his growing dissatisfaction with his role in the proj-
ect would lead to his departure just a year later.”85
These were certainly the darkest days in the history of NRAO. There was no 
clear route to completing the 140 Foot Telescope without major redesign and 
refabricating most of the structure, which would be both costly and lengthy. 
The AUI President who had been the driving force behind the creation of 
NRAO had resigned, and the NRAO Director was threatening to resign. The 
AUI contract with the NSF to operate NRAO was coming up for renewal. The 
cost overruns and delays already incurred by the Green Bank 140 Foot antenna, 
as well as those surrounding the Navy’s 600 foot antenna at Sugar Grove, West 
Virginia (Sect. 9.3), came to the attention of the White House.86 The NSF and 
the American radio astronomy community were becoming increasingly disil-
lusioned with the lack of progress in Green Bank, and NRAO was becoming 
the subject of scorn and ridicule. At Caltech, the two-element interferometer 
was already in operation and was making a wide range of exciting solar system, 
galactic, and extragalactic discoveries (Sect. 6.6), while NRAO and the 140 
Foot were being dismissed by the Caltech staff and students. The situation was 
so serious that the Observatory was threatened with closure.87 Annoyed at the 
likely delays that would be introduced by the NSF decision to appoint an exter-
nal committee to review the 140 Foot situation, Berkner took matters into his 
own hands, and did not hesitate to make Kinzel aware of his concerns about 
introducing further delays in the completion of the telescope. Seemingly ignor-
ing the fact that he had just announced his wish to resign as AUI President, or 
maybe recognizing that he had nothing to lose, Berkner boldly wrote to Kinzel 
that, “you will learn of the technical aspects of the problem in your forthcom-
ing meetings with members of the AUI staff, representatives of the E. W. Bliss 
Company, and consultants.”88 Suggesting that there were more important 
issues at stake than just the metallurgy, Berkner, hinting that the urgent need 
to use the telescope was more important than dealing with the metallurgical 
issues, wrote, probably inappropriately, to Kinzel,
It is important, however, that you and members of your committee understand 
the unique position the 140-foot telescope has taken in the life of the Observatory 
and why we believe completion at the earliest possible date is necessary even if 
some measure of perfection may have to be sacrificed.
Continuing, he added,
Therefore, a 140-foot telescope has become a symbol for the staff of the observa-
tory in generating the opportunity at a national institution which would keep the 
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U.S. in the forefront of radio astronomy development. It is moreover, a symbol 
in the eyes of the scientific community generally including members of the NSF 
Board and to Congress and the public which is of course the ultimate source of 
support for such an institution as the NRAO.
But on 31 October 1960, in a letter to Leeland Haworth, who was to suc-
ceed him as AUI President, Berkner made it clear that he was relinquishing 
immediately all responsibility for the 140 Foot to Haworth and Struve, and 
informed Haworth that “AUI has employed long-time Trustee, Ted Reynolds, 
as an independent business consultant to study the AUI-Bliss relations.”89 
In November 1960, Bliss wrote to Emberson and Waterman requesting that 
the contract be revised to “to incorporate the changes which have incurred to 
date and to restate the consideration to be paid Bliss for the contract, as 
amended, on a cost plus fixed fee basis.”90 Following a meeting between AUI 
and Bliss on 23 November, Bliss estimated that their cost to complete the tele-
scope, including the “additional cost to alter the present sphere and to accom-
plish a bolted field joint between the sphere and the shaft,” would be just over 
$7 million, and proposed a total price, including their 7% fee, of $7.558 mil-
lion.91 Aware that “the expedient completion of this project is of great impor-
tance,” Bliss claimed that “erection could be completed by at least by November 
1962,” but only with the additional “judicious expenditure of $600,000 for 
overtime premium, shift differentials, multiple work areas, additional facilities, 
and extra supervision.” Another half a million was needed to complete the 
design work. Haworth noted that allowance for contingency further increased 
the likely contract price to at least $9 million, but that this was still less than 
some of the original bids.92 This meant that AUI would need to get another 
$3.7 million from the NSF, but apparently, as Haworth explained, because 
West Virginia was considered a “distressed area,” it was “desirable to speed up 
shipments from Canton so that work can go forward in the field using local 
labor.”93 AUI had no confidence in the engineering capabilities at Bliss, and 
began to explore alternate arrangements to provide satisfactory engineering 
supervision for the remainder of the work.94
Not surprisingly, the appointment of the Kinzel Committee had delayed any 
further work on the telescope. At one of the Committee meetings, Ashton 
“strongly urged that the original plan for welding the sphere to the shaft be 
followed, and, indeed, insisted that no other plan was feasible.”95 The 
Committee refused to accept Ashton’s position, and their January 1961 report 
concluded that the spherical bearing should indeed be normalized and that it 
should be bolted rather than welded to the polar axis.96 Due to the ensuing 
contract renegotiations, redesign efforts would not get underway until April 
1961, and construction did not begin again until autumn 1961. At least 
another year had been lost.
Although the NSF had appointed the members of the Kinzel Committee, by 
agreement, their report was advisory to AUI. But the AUI consulting engi-
neers were concerned about bolting the polar axis to the spherical bearing, 
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which had been designed to be welded, not bolted. Not only was there a dan-
ger that the bolts might become loose, but it would be necessary to heat both 
the sphere and polar shaft. Instead, AUI concluded that it would be better to 
redesign the polar axis and the yoke, along with the spherical bearing, and fab-
ricate all of the components using steel not subject to brittle fracture. After a 
meeting at the Bliss plant in Canton, still unable to reach a consensus, AUI, the 
NSF, Bliss, and Kinzel agreed to pursue both concepts. Following several 
meetings in early 1961 between AUI and Bliss, the contract with Bliss was 
terminated with a lump sum settlement, and it was agreed that “all future work 
performed by the E. W. Bliss Company in connection with the construction of 
the 140-foot telescope will be covered by a cost-plus-fixed fee contract.”97 But 
according to the 20 April 1961 minutes of the AUI Executive Committee, 
“serious disagreement developed over the degree of control which AUI will 
have to exercise over procedures followed by Bliss in fabrication and erection, 
as well as over procurement, subcontracting, and other matters.” Bliss main-
tained that AUI’s position “violated the understanding arrived at … on March 
1, 1961, … [and] threatened to bring suit for breach of contract.”98
New Management and a New Contractor In April 1961, AUI hired the Stone 
& Webster Engineering Company (S&W) to manage the whole project, and in 
particular to act on behalf of AUI in dealing with Bliss on all technical, finan-
cial, and management issues.99 AUI finally acknowledged that it did not have 
the expertise to manage the project with its limited in-house staff. In particu-
lar, AUI was seeking engineering advice on the “problems raised by the polar 
shaft and main bearing,” and noted that “no power of decision was vested in 
the Kinzel Committee.”100 After reviewing the work to date, S&W concluded 
that Ashton had prepared only a conceptual design. Since Bliss had refused to 
accept any design responsibility, Ashton’s drawings became the de facto 
design.101 Consequently, in yet another decision reversal, S&W decided that it 
would be necessary to fabricate a new polar shaft, yoke, and spherical bearing, 
which would all be bolted rather than welded together, and would use steel not 
subject to brittle fracture. The S&W design maintained only the broad charac-
ter of Ashton’s design. Meanwhile all construction work had again ceased. 
With the assistance of S&W, AUI negotiated a new agreement, withdrawing 
work from Bliss, as well as transferring the Electric Boat sub-contract for the 
drive and control system from Bliss to AUI.102 AUI finally assumed responsibil-
ity for the design, and S&W became the agent for AUI in all future dealings 
with Bliss.
NRAO’s Frank Drake was particularly frustrated with the delays, and did 
not see any solution to the problems connected with the polar axis and spheri-
cal bearing. He also noted that the 140 Foot was already becoming obsolete at 
wavelengths longer than about 10 cm, and that Green Bank was not a very 
good site for short wavelength work. In a memo to Struve and the entire Green 
Bank scientific and senior technical staff, Drake made two radical suggestions: 
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convert the design to an alt-azimuth mount, and move the telescope to a better 
site near Tucson, Arizona.103
Following AUI’s acceptance of Berkner’s resignation in October 1960, AUI 
Trustee Edward (Ted) Reynolds was put in direct charge of the project. 
Nevertheless, relations between the NRAO Green Bank staff and AUI remained 
troublesome. Basically AUI didn’t trust Struve, but was unwilling and proba-
bly unable to replace him. At the same time AUI leadership was evolving. BNL 
Director Leeland Haworth succeeded Berkner as AUI President, and was fol-
lowed first by Ted Reynolds and then I.I. Rabi. Decisions based on recommen-
dations from consultants and committees were being made in New York by 
AUI without involving or even informing Struve, Heeschen, and Findlay in 
Green Bank. Heeschen finally led a revolt of the entire NRAO Scientific Staff, 
spearheading a 9 May 1961 letter to Struve.104
The situation with regard to the 140-foot telescope is of great concern to us. 
There has been essentially no progress whatsoever for at least a year, and there 
appears to be no basis for expecting progress in the near future. There is, we feel, 
valid reason for questioning whether the AUI-Bliss contribution will succeed in 
completing the telescope before it is obsolete.
We feel very strongly that the principle [sic] source of the 140-foot troubles lies 
in the way it is being managed by AUI. The lack of action in the past year and the 
apparent inability to make decisions is appalling and inexplicable to us. The deci-
sions that are needed to get the telescope completed cannot be based solely on 
technical considerations. The scientific needs of the Observatory are not being 
given sufficient consideration largely because there is virtually no contact between 
the Observatory and the management of the telescope project.
We do not understand why the 140-foot telescope has not been placed under 
your direction, and we have been questioned repeatedly by other scientists as to 
why the Observatory and the Director are not more immediately involved. 
Everyone seems to agree that in principle the job should be run from Green 
Bank. We reject the argument that the job cannot be managed by NRAO because 
NRAO has an inadequate engineering staff. Engineering advice is available from 
many sources. Stone and Webster for example can report as easily to you as to 
anyone else. The real problem is in deciding which of the conflicting engineering 
opinions should be acted on.
The next day, Struve forwarded to Rabi the letters from both Heeschen and 
Drake, along with a strong note criticizing AUI management of the 140 Foot 
Telescope project. Struve wrote105:
AUI has ruled that the project should not be directed from Green Bank, and I 
have accepted this decision, despite the fact that I am not personally in favor of it.
During the past few months I have not been fully informed concerning the nego-
tiations with the Bliss Company, the Stone and Webster Engineering Management 
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firm and the NSF.  This creates an intolerable situation that cannot continue 
much longer.
It is perhaps appropriate to mention that the NRAO suffers from having had 
virtually no AUI president during the past six months or so. Mr. Berkner, though 
absent for considerable intervals of time, had a good grasp of the whole project 
and managed to accomplish a great deal and provide a stabilizing influence on the 
whole organization. Matters of vital importance to the Observatory have from 
time to time centered around persons who lack understanding of the scientific 
competence to make major decisions but whose advice and influence have been 
obviously accepted by those who have the authority to act.
Struve had clearly crossed the line with his censure of AUI and, by inference, 
criticism of Rabi, which may have led to Struve effectively being summarily 
fired by Rabi six months later (Sect. 4.6). Frustrated with AUI, Struve sent 
Heeschen to represent NRAO at the 19 May 1961 meeting of the AUI 
Executive Committee, where Heeschen continued his criticism of AUI’s man-
agement of the 140 Foot project. Apparently of particular concern was the 
relative authority and responsibility of Struve and Emberson. Responding to 
Heeschen’s criticism, Reynolds acknowledged the need to “improve commu-
nication with the Observatory.” Although the Board reaffirmed that Reynolds 
was in overall charge of the 140 Foot project, “Reynolds explained that Dr. 
Emberson will continue to serve as Project Manager, but that, as in the past, he 
is responsible to the Director of the Observatory.”[italics added]106 At Struve’s 
suggestion,107 Dave Heeschen was appointed as the “scientific project direc-
tor,” which Heeschen later described as “meaningless.”108 Apparently, at least 
three individuals, Struve, Emberson, and Heeschen, now had some authority 
and responsibility for the 140 Foot antenna construction, but there was no 
clear division of responsibility.
Meanwhile, the NSF was becoming increasingly concerned with the repeated 
reversals of decisions on how to deal with engineering problems surrounding 
the 140 Foot project, as well as the growing cost and apparent management 
issues. Faced with the emerging S&W report recommending that all of the 
components already fabricated by Bliss be scrapped, the AUI Trustees circled 
the wagons, and agreed “that the only sensible choice is to follow the conserva-
tive Stone & Webster recommendations in all proposals to the NSF. The 
responsibility for taking risks should be placed on the Foundation and not be 
assumed by AUI.”109 Heeschen suggested that a “radical alternative” was to 
instead scrap the whole project, and build a copy of the Haystack 120 foot 
antenna, which he initially estimated might be done for $2 million. However, 
following a visit to Haystack, Heeschen and Findlay concluded in their 17 July 
1961 report that it would be better not to make an entirely new start, but to 
salvage what little they could from the Ashton-Bliss enterprise. According to 
the minutes of the meeting, “Mr. Reynolds emphasized the importance of 
avoiding any discussion of scrapping the 140’ Telescope. This possibility should 
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not even be mentioned unless there is an alternative which is clearly more 
desirable.”110
At the 20–21 July 1961 AUI Executive Board meeting, Reynolds reported 
that “Ashton still insists that his design is entirely feasible and can be completed 
in less time and for less money than the one now being prepared by Stone and 
Webster,” and that Ashton had gone to the NSF “objecting to what he claimed 
to be waste of time and money involved in the present plans.”111 At the same 
time, AUI was concerned that the S&W recommendations involved rejecting 
the recommendations of the Kinzel Committee, and that following a meeting 
with Kinzel on 17 July 1961, Reynolds reported that “Kinzel insisted that the 
solution his committee recommended is still satisfactory,” although he agreed 
that the S&W design “was in some respects superior.”112 Closing his report, 
Reynolds wrote that he had informed the NSF that the total cost of the 140 
Foot Telescope would be close to $11 million.
By September 1961, AUI had taken over from Bliss the contract with 
Electric Boat for the drive and control system, but it was becoming clear that 
Bliss was also having difficulty fabricating the surface panels, while Aston con-
tinued to be critical of S&W. To complicate matters, the AUI contract to oper-
ate NRAO was due to expire on 16 November 1961. AUI was concerned, as 
they probably should have been, that the NSF was likely to impose stricter 
controls on the operation of the Observatory, and was unwilling to agree to a 
long term extension of the contract until the NSF agreed to AUI’s plan for 
completing the 140 Foot Telescope.113
At Bliss, the President and other senior management all resigned. AUI 
decided to terminate the contract with Bliss since “there is no work in connec-
tion with the newly designed components which Bliss is capable of doing satis-
factorily.”114 Ending the contract with Bliss was no easy matter, and had to be 
justified to the NSF, the Bureau of the Budget, and to Congress. S&W was 
unwilling to help document the case, as it did not want “to place itself in the 
position of apparently profiting by taking work away from E.W. Bliss.”115 S&W 
was now estimating the cost to finish would be over $12 million, or about $2.5 
million more than allocated by the NSF based on estimates made only six 
months earlier. Even this price was predicated on a November 1963 comple-
tion, and Reynolds emphasized that “if AUI and NSF want this instrument at 
the estimated price, unusual efforts will have to be made to prevent the con-
struction schedule from going into an additional year.”116 At this point, the 
Trustees seriously debated “whether completing the telescope … was the best 
use of funds available for the support of the Observatory.” They concluded, 
however, that, “the adverse effect, from the public relations point of view, of 
abandoning the project,” and the instrument’s promise “to be a very valuable 
research tool for many years to come,” were sufficient motivation to complete 
the construction of the 140 Foot Telescope.
Following the resignation of Otto Struve as NRAO Director, and pending 
the arrival of the new Director, Joe Pawsey, Dave Heeschen became NRAO 
Acting Director on 1 December 1961 (Sect. 4.6). Maxwell Small, the BNL 
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Business Manager and former Construction Manager for Brookhaven’s 
Alternating Gradient Synchrotron and High Flux Beam Reactor, was recruited 
as the 140 Foot Telescope Construction Manager. Small set up an office in his 
home in Boston near S&W, with an agreed goal of being the single point of 
contact between AUI and S&W.  Ensuing discussions among AUI, NRAO, 
Bliss, S&W, and the NSF, led the new Bliss management to agree to terminate 
the contract with AUI.117
The NSF agreed to the AUI/S&W approach and on the level of financial 
support required to complete the telescope, in “an amount not to exceed 
$12,095,000.”118 However, the bids from Bethlehem Steel to re-fabricate and 
erect the polar axis and spherical bearing were significantly higher than the 
S&W estimates, as were the estimates from Electric Boat for the drive and con-
trol system. Meanwhile, the NSF was becoming increasingly concerned that 
they were not being fully informed about the negotiations with Bethlehem 
Steel, nor about the schedule and cost for completing the telescope, but AUI 
could only respond that these remained uncertain.119 Unfavorable media cov-
erage and confrontational correspondence with Ashton led to further anxieties 
at AUI and the NSF.120 By time of the April 1962 meeting of the AUI Executive 
Committee, the cost estimated by S&W had risen to $13.3 million.
Completing the Job After S&W had completely redesigned the spherical bear-
ing, the yoke, and the polar shaft, fabrication was subcontracted to various 
firms.121 Ashton’s 22 foot diameter spherical bearing design, which had been so 
controversial, had been reduced to 17.5  feet, the largest that could fit with 
three inch clearance through a rail tunnel near Droop Mountain, WV, on the 
way to Green Bank (Fig. 4.9). It was the largest nickel steel casting ever poured. 
A specially built railway car was used to transport the 167 ton bearing from 
Eddystone, Pennsylvania, where it was cast, to the Westinghouse foundry near 
Pittsburgh where it was machined to a precision of less than 0.003 inches 
(Heeschen 2007a, b). The spherical bearing, the polar axis, and the yoke were 
all shipped to Green Bank, first by rail to the nearby town of Durbin, and then 
by road over the last 13 miles to the telescope site. A small bridge over a creek 
near Green Bank needed to be rebuilt in order to bear the 55 foot long 90 ton 
load of the massive polar axis. Following the advice of Small, a contract for 
aluminum surface panels was let to the D.S. Kennedy Company, while Electric 
Boat continued as the subcontractor for the drive and control system. All that 
remained of the Ashton-designed, Bliss-fabricated telescope was the aluminum 
backup structure and the already completed 5800 ton concrete and steel foun-
dation, which extended 30 feet below the ground level. The original Bliss polar 
shaft and yoke were discarded. Some pieces were sent to Brookhaven as shield-
ing for BNL accelerators; the rest was buried in Green Bank where it remains 
as a memorial to the troubled 140 Foot Radio Telescope.
In planning for the assembly and erection in Green Bank, Heeschen and 
Small felt that since the ultimate responsibility for the project was with AUI, 
that AUI rather than S&W should assume more control. Furthermore, they 
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argued, “much would be gained by having members of the Observatory staff 
actively working on the Telescope at the earliest possible date.” Although the 
“Trustees doubted the desirability of diminishing in any way the responsibility 
of Stone & Webster,”122 at the 15 February 1963 meeting, AUI decided to 
modify the contract with S&W to give AUI responsibility for all field operations.
Max Small moved to Green Bank in May 1963 to take charge of completing 
the fabrication of the backup structure on site, the assembly of the declination 
and polar shafts, and of the yoke and spherical bearing, all scheduled to arrive 
by rail from the various plants where they were being manufactured. An 
 anticipated railway strike, which would further delay the construction sched-
ule, threatened to interrupt shipments before the winter, but as it turned out, 
Fig. 4.9 Testing a model of the 17.5 foot spherical bearing for clearance in the rail 
tunnel through Droop Mountain, 1961. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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new problems in fabricating the major components ended up in delaying their 
shipment and erection in Green Bank.
In September 1963, authority for the 140 Foot project was transferred from 
the AUI President in New York to the NRAO Director in Green Bank, where 
the project was handled in the same way as other Observatory projects. Max 
Small hired two engineers and two clerks to facilitate interaction with S&W, as 
well as with the various manufacturers. At the 17 October 1963 meeting of the 
AUI Executive Committee, Small reported that the design was 95% complete, 
fabrication 70%, and construction 20%.123 The polar shaft was finally delivered 
and on site, but due to delays in the receipt of the other major telescope pieces, 
Small was forced to renegotiate a new erection schedule with Pacific Crane and 
Rigging. The new contract, which assigned increased responsibility to Pacific 
Crane for “all work necessary to bring the telescope to completion after the 
components have been completed and delivered,” included additional com-
pensation of $1 million. But D.S. Kennedy reported “a wide variety of prob-
lems” in fabricating the surface panels, and stated that they were going out of 
business after delivering the panels.124
The spherical bearing was finally received in late April 1964. It was bolted to 
the polar axis and then lifted into place without incident. This was followed by 
separate lifts to hoist the two parts of the yoke into place. On 4 November 
1964, a large crowd gathered to witness the final lifting of the telescope backup 
structure to fasten onto the yoke arms. Pacific Crane and Rigging company was 
in charge of the lift. However, the 266 ton structure proved too heavy, and 
when lifted just off the ground a cable snapped. There was no damage except 
to the cable. Five days later, after repairs and the revision of the lifting proce-
dure (including cutting off a portion of one of the lifting cranes!), the backup 
structure was successfully lifted into place, and was bolted to the yoke the fol-
lowing day.125 The 140 Foot major structural work was finally complete. All 
that remained was the installation of the 72 surface panels. Preliminary tests 
indicated that the panels distorted due to solar heating, but this was largely 
mitigated by the use of a special paint designed to scatter the incoming solar 
radiation and radiate strongly in the infrared, thus keeping the dish surface 
below ambient air temperature. By the end of 1964, all the surface panels were 
in place on the backup structure, and the two 167 foot tall cranes were dis-
mantled. On 23 December 1964, the telescope was moved for the first time, 
and pointed to the zenith, with the entire 2700 ton weight of the rotating 
structure sitting on four oil pads, floating on a thin film of oil only 0.005 inches 
thick and under 3000 pounds per square inch pressure.
The 140 Foot Telescope (Fig. 4.10) construction was finally completed in 
the spring of 1965. The many delays and huge cost overrun of the project, 
which required unexpected additional funding for NRAO had challenged the 
credibility of the Observatory, and even the concept of a national federally 
funded facility. But this quickly changed with the introduction of a vigorous 
visitor program and the resultant flow of scientific results, particularly in the 
area of centimeter wavelength spectroscopy.
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
193
The first astronomical observations with the 140 Foot Telescope were made 
on 22 May 1965 at 234 MHz (1.3 meters) and 405 MHz (74 cm) to study the 
Crab Nebula during a lunar eclipse. In July 1965, Bertil Hoglund, a visiting 
scientist from Sweden, and NRAO staff member Peter Mezger, detected a long 
sought hydrogen recombination line at 5 GHz (6 cm) (Sect. 6.2). Painting the 
telescope took place throughout the summer of 1965, while observations con-
tinued at 11, 6 and 2 cm. The aluminum panels were set during the summer 
nights to minimize the effect of solar heating and distortion.
The final cost of the 140 Foot Telescope was about $14 million. The dedica-
tion was held on 13 October 1965. Unlike the dedication of Green Bank eight 
years earlier, it was a beautiful sunny day. More than 150 visitors joined the 
NRAO staff by a podium erected under the telescope, surrounded by the 
splendid West Virginia fall foliage. One of the authors, (KIK) clearly recalls that 
in his speech at the dedication, Dave Heeschen remarked, “This isn’t the larg-
est radio telescope in the world, but it is largest equatorial mounted radio 
telescope in Pocahontas County, West Virginia.” Indeed, no radio telescope 
larger than 85 feet was ever again built with a polar mount, and since the late 
1990s, starting with the Keck 10 meter telescope on Mauna Kea, all large 
 optical telescopes now use the much simpler alt-az mountings which had been 
rejected by AUI for the 140 Foot Telescope.
Fig. 4.10 Completed 140 Foot Radio Telescope. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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By the end of 1965, the telescope had been used at wavelengths as short as 
9 mm. However, due to large scale deformations when the telescope was tilted 
from the zenith, the aperture efficiency decreased substantially at wavelengths 
shorter than about 3 cm. Due to the nature of the equatorial mount, the effi-
ciency changed differently with hour angle or declination. In 1976, as a test 
bed for the VLA antennas, the 140 Foot Telescope was modified so it could be 
used at the Cassegrain focus. Two years later, the fixed subreflector was replaced 
with a deformable subreflector whose surface was adjusted to partially compen-
sate for the loss of gain at low elevations. The 140 Foot Telescope was origi-
nally designed to have a pointing accuracy better than 10 arcsec so that it could 
be used to determine accurate radio source positions (Struve 1960; Drake 
1960), although by the time it was completed in 1965, it had become clear 
that radio source positions are best determined by interferometric means. In 
fact, 140 Foot pointing errors up to 30 arcsec, especially in the daytime, con-
tinued to plague observers, especially when observing at short centimeter 
wavelengths where the beamwidth was only a few arcminutes across.126
Until AUI relinquished control of the project to NRAO in September 1963, 
the 140 Foot Telescope was the first and only construction project managed 
directly by AUI, rather than by Brookhaven or NRAO. Throughout the proj-
ect, maintaining that operation at short centimeter wavelength with a 140 foot 
diameter dish would provide unique opportunities, the NRAO staff had always 
argued against relaxing the performance specifications in order to limit the 
ever-increasing cost. The 140 Foot was smaller than the Jodrell Bank 250 foot, 
the Australian 210 foot, and Canadian 150 foot antennas, and had only a small 
fraction of the collecting area of the Arecibo 1000 foot dish (Sect. 6.6). Neither 
the pointing precision nor the surface accuracy were as good as either the 
Haystack 120 foot or the Canadian 150 foot telescopes, both of which were 
completed earlier and in routine operation well before the completion of the 
140 Foot Telescope. By time the 140 Foot was completed in 1965, the Parkes 
210 foot radio telescope was already in operation at wavelengths as short as 
6 cm, and by 1972 at 1.3 cm. But as described in Sect. 6.2, as a result of the 
outstanding instrumentation and a competitive “open skies” access policy, 
until the completion of the VLA in 1980, the 140 Foot Telescope was arguably 
the most productive radio telescope in the world, with a growing oversubscrip-
tion rate. Of particular interest was the use of the deformable subreflector and 
1.3 cm maser radiometer for a wide variety of programs to study interstellar 
water vapor and ammonia. From 1967 until the completion of the VLBA in 
1993, the 140 Foot Telescope was the backbone of the growing national and 
international VLBI effort.
In July 1999, for lack of operating funds, the 140 Foot Telescope was closed 
as an NSF-supported user facility for astronomical observations. For several 
years an independently funded MIT group used the antenna for ionospheric 
studies. Later, with financial support from the Russian Astro Space Center, it 
was resurrected in 2013 as a ground station for the Russian RadioAstron space 
VLBI mission (Sect. 8.9).
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John Findlay later remarked, “no one with hindsight will deny” that “the 
choice of an equatorial mount was idiotic,”127 and that the choice of a hydro-
static bearing which was copied from Palomar was foolish, while Bernard Burke 
described the 140 Foot Radio Telescope as having “served well, but its equato-
rial geometry is antique, its structural flexure is dreadful, its surface quality is 
inferior, its maintenance is expensive and man-power intensive, and its pointing 
is substandard.”128 Grote Reber was a bit more colorful in his appraisal of 
NRAO and the 140 Foot project. Writing to John Findlay, he remarked, “If 
such an affair had happened during the days of Elizabeth I, there would have 
been some public hangings.”129
In 1992 Dave Heeschen summarized the 140 Foot project, by saying130
The 140 foot is a classic example of how not to design and build a telescope. The 
design specs were set by a committee of outside consultants who had no respon-
sibility or accountability for the final result, and who gave liberally of poor advice. 
The 140 ft project leader [Dick Emberson], a very nice gentleman who was 
[assistant] to the president of AUI and responsible for the entire feasibility study 
that led to the establishment of NRAO, uncritically accepted all this advice. The 
telescope was originally going to have an az-el [sic] mount because the consulting 
engineers thought that was the most feasible…. But the steering committee 
membership changed from time to time and finally had on it a prominent and 
outspoken scientist [Tuve] who insisted the mount should be equatorial…. Then 
the solar astronomer [Menzel] on the steering committee decided that the tele-
scope should observe the sun from sunrise to sunset on Jun 22 each year.
The errors made in bidding, contracting, and construction were even worse…. 
AUI wound up with a fixed price contract, for $4 million, with a company—E W 
Bliss—that really didn’t want the job, except for one enthusiastic vice [president] 
who apparently bullied them first into accepting the final contract. He quit shortly 
afterward and AUI was left with a semi-hostile contractor.
Some important lessons were learned, or should have been learned, from 
the 140 Foot experience:
 1) beware of the lowest bidder;
 2) be sure the contract is clear about who is responsible for what;
 3) finish the design before starting construction;
 4) establish clear points of contact, authority, and responsibility on both sides;
 5) have a firm understanding of when the antennas will be delivered, with 
penalties for late delivery;
 6) don’t take committee advice too seriously; and
 7) have good in house expertise.
Regrettably, many of these same issues arose with the ill-fated 600 foot 
Sugar Grove antenna and resurfaced 25  years later with the Green Bank 
Telescope (Chap. 9).
4 GROWING PAINS 
196
4.5  the 300 Foot tranSit radio teleScope
By early 1958, the 140 Foot Telescope was no closer to completion, and it was 
not even clear if it would be completed (Heeschen 1996). While NRAO scien-
tists were able to do some interesting observations with the Tatel 85 foot tele-
scope, it was by no means a state of the art facility that would attract visiting 
observers in the way that had been expected for the US national observatory. 
Not only did the University of Michigan operate a similar, and indeed, a some-
what better 85 foot antenna, but competing facilities were coming on line 
throughout the world, even within the United States. Both Germany and the 
Netherlands were operating 25 meter class radio telescopes; Jodrell Bank had 
their 250 foot dish; and planning for the Parkes 210 foot radio telescope was 
well along. At Caltech, with financial support from the Office of Naval Research, 
John Bolton was building a novel two-element interferometer in the Owens 
Valley, capable of operating at centimeter wavelengths. With a modest budget 
that was dwarfed by the generous NRAO NSF budget, Caltech scientists would 
begin an ambitious radio astronomy program that would make the Owens 
Valley Radio Observatory the dominant radio astronomy facility in the US.
With only a modest radio telescope, essentially no visiting observers, and 
facing increasing concerns about when, or even if, the 140 Foot Telescope 
would be completed, John Findlay and Dave Heeschen thought a fixed 300 
foot miniature Arecibo type antenna could be built for about $300,000. But 
their 1958 proposal was not well received by the NRAO Visiting Committee 
or by the NSF.
A year later, Findlay and Heeschen developed a bold plan to build the best 
antenna that they could for not more than about $1 million, which they 
thought to be the largest amount of money the NSF would approve without 
long delays. Following his appointment as NRAO Director in July 1959, Otto 
Struve was able to sell the project to the Visiting Committee and then to the 
NSF (Heeschen 2007b, 2008). A 300 foot transit antenna, movable only in 
elevation, thus simplifying its design and limiting the construction cost, seemed 
to offer the best compromise between opportunity for scientific returns and 
price. Funding was approved in the 1961 NSF budget. John Findlay became 
the project manager, and recruited Bob Hall to design the telescope.
Hall had just left Blaw-Knox for a new position at the Rohr Corporation, 
which was anxious to get into the antenna business. Between his jobs at Blaw- 
Knox and Rohr, with the aid of five Blaw-Knox engineers, Hall spent six weeks 
at the end of 1960 working for NRAO from his home in Chula Vista, CA, to 
design the 300 Foot antenna. Later, Ed Faelten was retained to complete the 
engineering drawings necessary for construction bids. To meet the limited con-
struction budget, the design was kept simple. Specifically, the height of the 
supporting towers was limited, which constrained elevation motion to 60 
degrees from the zenith and the corresponding observable declination range 
from the north pole to minus 19 degrees. The antenna was driven in elevation 
by a 230 foot long quadruple chain which wrapped around the antenna 
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elevation wheel. The construction cost was further reduced by using standard 
steel members, simple joints and bearings, and constructing the reflecting sur-
face from chicken wire rather than solid panels. It was anticipated that the 
future would see a large, fully steerable, radio telescope at NRAO, so the useful 
scientific life of the 300 Foot was expected to be not more than about five 
years. Emphasis was on getting it completed and on the air quickly, rather than 
longevity. The 3/8 inch chicken-wire holes would restrict the operation to 
wavelengths longer than about 20 cm, but the 300 Foot antenna nevertheless 
became a powerful facility for both galactic and extragalactic 21  cm H I 
research, as well as for continuum source observations.
In April 1961, NRAO contracted with Bristol Steel and Iron Works to con-
struct and erect the antenna. Groundbreaking in Green Bank was on 27 April 
1961. Under Findlay’s leadership, construction took less than 18 months at a 
cost of about $850,000, a record construction time for any large radio tele-
scope project. On 21 October 1962, the 300 Foot Telescope was handed over 
to the Green Bank operations staff and began its first astronomical observa-
tions. The next day, President John F. Kennedy announced the US naval block-
ade of Cuba in response to the discovery of Soviet missile bases a week earlier. 
Two days later, the US military went on the highest military alert since 1945, 
and the start of observations with the world’s largest parabolic dish went rela-
tively unnoticed by the nation.
The 300 Foot Radio Telescope, now one of the most powerful radio tele-
scopes in the world, became an immediate success. For the first time, NRAO 
had a world class instrument that was attractive to both visitors and NRAO 
staff. The successful completion of the 300 Foot transit radio telescope prob-
ably saved Green Bank from a premature closing resulting from the continued 
debacle with the 140 Foot antenna project. From the start of 300 Foot obser-
vations, the Observatory operated as the first true visitor facility for radio 
astronomy. One of the earliest visiting observers was Bernard Burke who, with 
his colleagues from DTM, brought a 100 channel receiver for 21 cm spectros-
copy in November 1962. Gart Westerhout, who had recently arrived in the US 
from the Netherlands to start a radio astronomy program at the University of 
Maryland, became a regular user of the 300 Foot Telescope. At the start of 
each summer, Westerhout would arrive in Green Bank with his family and a 
cadre of students to help observe and reduce data, and to escape the heat and 
humidity of the eastern Maryland summers. According to Heeschen (2007b), 
the 300 Foot taught NRAO how to manage an oversubscribed telescope, train 
operators, provide calibration and documentation, and, in general, deal with 
visitors. Unlike the 85 foot and 140 Foot antennas, the 300 Foot was the first 
of a series of antennas and arrays that would be conceived by NRAO staff and 
built under the direction of NRAO.
Initially, the rim of the 300 Foot antenna would hit the ground at low eleva-
tions, so the antenna could not be moved over the full 60 degree range of 
zenith angle allowed by the drive system. In October 1962, at Frank Drake’s 
urging, the Observatory started to dig a pit at the south side of the structure in 
4 GROWING PAINS 
198
order to lower the antenna elevation limit. But the excavation reached bedrock 
after digging only six feet below the surface. The Green Bank site manager, 
Bob Elliot, suggested deepening the pit further by using dynamite, much to 
the chagrin of the conservative scientists who were concerned that the blast 
might destroy their new telescope. Indeed, the explosion sent rock and other 
debris more than 100 feet into the air, scattering the crowd that had assembled 
to watch the big event. Fortunately, no one was hurt, but one of the rocks put 
a one foot hole in the dish surface.131 However, the exercise was successful in 
extending the southern declination limit to minus 19 degrees.
By the summer of 1966 several structural deficiencies had become apparent, 
and the backup structure was strengthened with the addition of 20,000 pounds 
of steel, 120 sections of rib structure were replaced, and welding added another 
7000 pounds to the structure. The wire mesh surface, which was irregular to 
start with, further deteriorated as a result of staff walking on the antenna sur-
face, and in October 1966 the surface was removed and flattened by laying 
sections on the ground and running over them with a steam roller (Fig. 4.11).
Although the 140 Foot antenna later became the NRAO workhorse, it was 
primarily used for centimeter wavelength spectroscopy. For continuum obser-
vations at longer wavelengths, the 140 Foot was limited by confusion,132 while 
for 21  cm spectroscopy, observers preferred the greater collecting area and 
better resolution of the 300 Foot. The 300 Foot was designed to be used in a 
“drift-scan” mode, where the antenna would be driven in elevation to the dec-
lination of interest, shortly ahead of meridian transit, and the rotation of the 
Earth would allow the source or area of interest to drift through the antenna 
beam, typically in about one minute. To increase the available integration time, 
in 1969 a so-called “traveling feed” was constructed, which would allow the 
antenna beam to track equatorial sources for up to an hour depending on the 
wavelength of observation. The travelling feed was later replaced in 1980 with 
a unit that supported heavier cryogenically cooled receivers.
By 1970 it was becoming clear that the basic antenna structure and pointing 
were sufficiently precise to allow operation at a shorter wavelength than 21 cm, 
but the chicken wire surface was too porous and too irregular for this purpose. 
In 1970, NRAO replaced the original chicken-wire surface with perforated 
aluminum panels. The contract for the new surface was placed with a new, rela-
tively unknown company, Radiation Systems Inc. (RSI) from Sterling, 
VA. Richard (Dick) Thomas, the president and principal owner of RSI, was 
anxious for business, and apparently underbid for the contract. NRAO Associate 
Director Ted Riffe recalled that Thomas realized that he was about to lose a 
large amount of money, and appealed to the NRAO to renegotiate the con-
tract. Riffe, who had come to NRAO from the West Virginia coal mining 
industry, was a hard-nosed business man who sat quietly while Thomas 
explained where he had made an error, how his error would hurt his employees 
and the economy of Northern Virginia, how his family would be deprived, his 
children not able to go to college, and so on. Finally, Riffe looked Thomas in 
the eye and replied, “Bull shit!”133 NRAO did not adjust the price, but RSI 
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weathered the storm and went on to become a major player in the antenna 
industry, including constructing the surface panels for the VLA (Chap. 7), and 
contracting to build the ten VLBA antennas (Chap. 8). But 20  years later, 
again in his anxiety to win the contract, Thomas would underbid for the GBT 
(Chap. 9), leading to a huge cost overrun and eventually the end of RSI.
Over the next years there were many minor 300 Foot repairs, including 
additional weldings and more reinforcing structures, and the structure was 
repainted multiple times. An unanticipated use of the 300 Foot Telescope, one 
that would later prove fatal, was to take advantage of the great sensitivity by 
rapidly moving the antenna in elevation to cover a wider area of the sky than 
possible with only Earth rotation drift scans. When first proposed by the Green 
Bank scientists, Fred Crews, head of telescope operations, was reluctant to 
introduce the unplanned stresses on the telescope that would result from nearly 
continuously driving the antenna and from the rapid reversals of direction 
which would occur at the end of each scan.134 Naturally, the scientists wanted 
to limit the time wasted in turning the telescope around at the end of each 
Fig. 4.11 Working in vain effort to smooth the surface of the 300 Foot Telescope, 
October 1966. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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scan. Following review by the cautious telescope operations staff, operators 
began the practice of slowing the antenna to a gradual stop before reversing its 
direction, thus minimizing any sudden decelerations or accelerations.
The 300 Foot antenna was built to withstand snow or ice loads up to 10 
pounds per square inch (Lockman et al. 2007, pp. 103–105). While dry snow 
might fall through the chicken wire surface, wet snow or ice could become a 
serious problem. During the first few years, the dish was tipped during snow-
storms, and most of the snow would fall out. But on two occasions, a small 
army of site personnel had to use brooms to sweep up the snow, and it was 
difficult to avoid damaging the surface by walking only along the ribs. On one 
occasion small fires were built under the dish to melt the snow, but the melting 
snow dripped down and extinguished the fires. At Findlay’s semi-serious sug-
gestion, NRAO acquired a surplus jet engine, which was used to blow snow off 
the dish. Needless to say, for nearby households, the sound of a jet engine run-
ning all through a snowy winter night was like trying to sleep next to an airport 
where the same plane was continuously taking off. The use of the jet engine to 
de-ice the dish was abandoned after a few years, in deference to residents of 
Green Bank and Arbovale, and because of the considerable maintenance 
required to keep the engine operational. Following the installation of the new 
more robust aluminum panel surface in 1970, snow accumulation was less of 
a concern.
4.6  Jumping Ship
Lloyd Berkner Resigns as AUI President Even while juggling the two simulta-
neous jobs as President of AUI and Acting Director of NRAO, Berkner 
assumed many other national and international responsibilities. In 1955, he 
became president of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), 
then president of the International Union of Radio Science (URSI), and was 
the leader of the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year. From 1958 to 
1962, he was Chair of the newly created National Academy Space Studies 
Board, and from 1956 to 1959 a member of President Eisenhower’s Science 
Advisory Committee. In 1957 he became a member of the Board of Texas 
Instruments, and in 1958 he returned to Antarctica to prepare a report for 
Eisenhower that became the basis for continuing the US Antarctic program. 
Following his resignation from AUI in late 1960, in the midst of the 140 Foot 
construction problems and corresponding unrest among the Green Bank staff, 
(Sect. 4.4) Berkner went to Dallas, TX, to become the first president of the 
new Graduate Research Center of the Southwest. On 22 November 1963, 
Berkner was waiting to have lunch with President Kennedy, whom he had wel-
comed to Dallas earlier in the day before he began his fateful motorcade.
Although Berkner’s resignation as AUI President did not become effective 
until 30 November 1960, as discussed in Sect. 4.4, AUI records show that the 
Board of Trustees had already accepted his resignation at their annual meeting 
on 21 October 1960, following his announced resignation on 23 September 
1960 at a closed session of the Executive Committee.135 Presumably, Berkner 
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must have sometime earlier begun discussions with the group in Texas. At this 
same meeting on 21 October, the AUI Board appointed a selection committee 
chaired by Trustee Edward Reynolds, the Administrative Vice President at 
Harvard and a retired brigadier general, to “nominate one or more individu-
als” to succeed Berkner. At their 18 November meeting, probably recognizing 
the time required to recruit a new President, the Board appointed Brookhaven 
Director and AUI Vice President, Leeland Haworth as AUI President. Haworth 
served as President for only four months, until 30 March 1961 when he took 
a leave of absence from AUI to accept a position on the Atomic Energy 
Commission. During this entire period Haworth also continued in his demand-
ing role as Brookhaven Director. He was succeeded as President by Edward 
Reynolds. Since Berkner’s resignation, Reynolds had taken charge of the 140 
Foot project, but, by previous agreement, he only served as AUI President for 
three weeks. AUI stayed inside in choosing their next president, and, on 21 
April 1961, named I.I. Rabi, Trustee from Columbia, to be President.
Rabi was known as a no-nonsense individual who demanded and accepted 
nothing less than excellence from his students and colleagues. He was well 
known for his 1944 Nobel Prize-winning discovery of nuclear magnetic reso-
nance. In 1947, Rabi and his students were the first to make a laboratory mea-
surement of the 1420  MHz hyperfine line in hydrogen, which led to his 
development of the hydrogen maser atomic clock. During WWII, he worked 
on microwave radar at the MIT Radiation Laboratory where he became Deputy 
Director, and later worked as a consultant to the Manhattan Project, which 
brought him to the 1945 Trinity test at Alamogordo, NM. In 1946, along with 
MIT and Harvard scientists, Rabi founded the Brookhaven National 
Laboratory, and became a founding Trustee of Associated Universities, Inc. He 
was later influential in the formation of CERN, and as a statesman for national 
and international cooperation in science (Ramsey 1993). Rabi served as AUI 
President until 19 October 1962, at which time he became Chairman of the 
AUI Board, a position which he held for a year. Rabi was succeeded as AUI 
President by Gerald Tape, who had been the AUI Vice President and Deputy 
Director at Brookhaven where he had oversight of the large reactors and accel-
erators. Like Rabi, Tape had worked at the MIT Radiation Laboratory during 
the War where he was an important liaison between the Rad Lab scientists and 
Army and Navy officers responsible for implementing these new instruments of 
electronic navigation. Tape left AUI on 10 July 1963 to become the US 
Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Commission (IEAC), at 
which time Edward Reynolds again chaired a search committee for a new AUI 
President. AUI Trustees Curry Street, Frank Long, and Norman Ramsey all 
declined, so Reynolds assumed the position on an interim basis starting 10 July 
1963. Expressing frustration over the rapid turnover of Trustees and lack of 
active participation of the Trustees in the affairs of the corporation, Reynolds 
notified Rabi that he did not want to continue as President after the October 
1963 Board meeting,136 but he was convinced to remain until 1 December 
1964, when he was succeeded by Theodore Wright, who served from 1 
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December 1964 to 1 October 1965. Reynolds was succeeded by Theodore 
Wright (1 December 1964 to 1 October 1965), T. Keith Glennan (1 October 
1965 to 30 June 1968), and then Franklin Long as Acting President (1 July 
1968 to 1 May 1969), After completing his term as IEAC Ambassador, Jerry 
Tape returned to AUI as President from 1 May 1969 finally bringing much 
needed stability to AUI. Tape retired as AUI President on 10 October 1980 
and was succeeded by Robert Hughes, a chemist from Cornell, and former 
NSF Assistant Director for Mathematical and Physical Sciences.
Dick Emberson, who had been so instrumental in leading the feasibility 
studies leading up to the 1956 establishment of NRAO, and then became 
director of the 140 Foot construction project, remained as 140 Foot project 
director and as NRAO Acting Deputy Director, but according to Dave 
Heeschen (1996) his role was diminished after S&W became involved. After 
Heeschen became NRAO Director in October 1962, Emberson left AUI to 
become Director of Technical Services, and then Executive Director and 
General Manager, of the Institute of Radio Engineers (IRE) later to become 
the Institute of Electric and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
Otto Struve Resigns as NRAO Director In his Biographical Memoir for the 
National Academy of Science, Kevin Krisciunas (1992) described Struve as 
“both dedicated and demanding,” and said “his physical appearance and 
demeanor” were imposing and intimidating. Although he was greatly respected 
by Dave Heeschen and the NRAO scientific staff, Struve’s European back-
ground and somewhat conservative life style did not mesh well with the much 
younger and enthusiastic NRAO scientific staff or with life in rural Appalachia. 
He became frustrated by his inability to recruit scientists to the NRAO staff, a 
problem he recognized was due in large part to the lack of world class observ-
ing facilities, an absence which was exacerbated by the delays in the 140 Foot 
Telescope construction project and the isolated location of Green Bank. In 
addition to his demanding responsibilities as the NRAO Director, throughout 
his tenure Struve tried to maintain an active program of personal research and 
publication in areas unrelated to the NRAO mission, and became increasingly 
frustrated by the need to attend to administrative matters and by seemingly 
endless meetings.
Following Berkner’s resignation and Struve’s 1960 attempt to resign over 
the escalating issues surrounding the 140 Foot Telescope construction (Sect. 
4.4), the NRAO Scientific Staff recognized that the reputation of the 
Observatory, as well as their relations with Struve, were being questioned. Led 
by Heeschen, the staff sent a very carefully worded letter to Struve expressing 
their confidence and their wish that he “continue as director as long as 
 possible.”137 But recognizing both Struve’s declining health and endurance, 
and his limited understanding of radio astronomy instrumentation, they sug-
gested that AUI appoint a Deputy Director as soon as possible to assist Struve.
In January 1961, Haworth and the Trustees Committee on NRAO, went to 
Green Bank to personally assess the situation at the Observatory. The 
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Committee report recommended that “all engineering activities … be centered 
in Green Bank as rapidly as feasible,” that a mechanical engineer be recruited 
to “participate in the completion of the 140’ Telescope” and “become the 
leader of a permanent group which will have the responsibility for the design, 
construction, and maintenance of a continuing series of mechanical struc-
ture.”138 But they added that “for the present the negotiations with E.W. Bliss 
Company and the National Science Foundation regarding the 140′ telescope 
must of necessity be carried out by the officers of AUI.” Finally, fearful of the 
adverse publicity and reaction of the NSF if Struve were to resign, they stressed 
“that the steady guiding hand of Dr. Struve is essential to the success of the 
National Radio Astronomy Observatory.” Noting that “if certain conditions 
are met, Dr. Struve might reconsider his earlier announced wish to retire,” the 
Committee urged “the President to explore with Dr. Struve the measures that 
would make it possible for him to continue.” Struve responded to the Trustees 
that he would reconsider his request to be relieved of the Directorship in the 
summer of 1961, and, health permitting, to continue for at least one to two 
years more.139 Prompted by Heeschen’s letter and a proposal from Struve, AUI 
appointed John Findlay as Deputy Director of NRAO, and Dave Heeschen as 
Assistant to the Director replacing Findlay. At this point Findlay, who was ten 
years older, clearly outranked Heeschen, but the Board instructed Struve to 
explain to Findlay “that the appointment as Deputy Director should not be 
regarded as a stepping stone to the Directorship, because the Trustees believed 
that the director of the Observatory should be an astronomer.”140
Although there appear to be no further questions about Struve’s position as 
NRAO Director by either AUI or by Struve himself, Rabi had apparently con-
cluded that he didn’t want Struve to remain as Director of NRAO, and he 
began to work behind the scenes to find a replacement. In June 1961, during 
a visit to Green Bank, probably at Rabi’s suggestion, Bart Bok wrote to Joe 
Pawsey to informally ask if he might be interested in the NRAO directorship.141 
Pawsey responded unenthusiastically, claiming that Green Bank was too “com-
mitted to big paraboloids,” and that his “interest is in techniques,” but he left 
the door open for possible further discussion.142 Pawsey came to the United 
States during the summer and early autumn of 1961 to attend the August 
meeting of the International Astronomical Union that was held in Berkeley, 
CA, and also to visit various radio observatories and his brother-in-law, Ted 
Nicoll, who lived in Princeton, NJ. During a visit with Pawsey at the home of 
Pawsey’s brother-in-law, Rabi discussed the Green Bank situation with Pawsey 
and asked him for his impressions of the situation there.
Following a three-day visit to Green Bank, Pawsey wrote to Rabi on 5 
October 1961 that he “found the situation disappointing,” and that none of 
the staff are “really first rate.” But he was impressed by two visitors, T.K. Menon 
and Sander [Sandy] Weinreb, who was using the Tatel Telescope for his PhD 
research.143 Pawsey reported that “the director’s experience has not been in the 
field in which the staff is weak,—the technical radio and experimental physics 
side.” Interestingly, and perhaps with some envy, he went on to say that, “Both 
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Greenbank [sic] and U.S. radio astronomy suffer from the same basic difficulty: 
a dearth of good radio astronomers and the too ready availability of elaborate 
equipment.” Consistent with his earlier remarks to Bok, Pawsey only gave 
lukewarm support to the 140 Foot and 300 Foot antennas then under con-
struction. However, he noted that for prestige and staff morale, both the 140 
Foot and 300 Foot Telescopes “should be completed as soon as practicable.” 
But the best he would say about the 140 Foot was that it will be “a thoroughly 
useful instrument.” Pawsey stopped short of suggesting that the 140 Foot 
equatorial design should be abandoned in favor of the “master equatorial” idea 
used by Freeman Fox in designing the Parkes 210 foot or the Algonquin Park 
150 foot dishes, but he did suggest that the Green Bank “engineers should be 
informed of the existence of the Freeman Fox design,” as “there could be snags 
in the original Greenbank [sic] design and this could be a replacement.” Citing 
the report of the NSF Pierce Committee (Keller 1960) Pawsey declared that 
“future emphasis should be directed toward instruments having a resolution of 
1′ or less,” and went on to suggest that NRAO might try to hire W.C. [Bill] 
Erickson and Sander Weinreb.
It is not clear what transpired between Rabi and Pawsey during their 
Princeton conversation and to what extent Pawsey’s Green Bank visit was con-
sidered by either of them as being only in an advisory capacity, or whether 
either or both of them thought of it as a response to Pawsey’s consideration of 
the possibility of becoming NRAO Director. Pawsey’s use of phrases such as, 
“I should also like to encourage,” or “My view is,” and “I envisage” as well as 
“During my initial preparatory phrase,” certainly suggests that Pawsey was 
responding to Rabi’s overtures about the NRAO Directorship, and that he was 
seriously considering the possibility.
Three weeks later, the minutes of the 26 October 1961 meeting of the AUI 
Board of Trustees Executive Committee, reported that “the Committee held 
an executive session, at which it was directed that no report be made.”144 
During a discussion of the renewal of the AUI contract with the NSF, Rabi 
expressed concern that if the contract were extended for only two years, that 
this might “impede the selection of a new director to replace Dr. Struve.”145 
This was the first indication that changes might be forthcoming, although 
there was apparently no further indication from either Rabi or Struve that 
either might be aware of any imminent change. During his presentation to the 
Executive Committee, Struve commented that “the entire staff of the 
Observatory supported the continuation of AUI management of the observa-
tory. The consensus of the Trustees was “that every effort should be made to 
obtain an extension of at least three and preferably five years.” Struve reported 
on the good progress being made with construction of the 300 Foot dish 
(Sect. 4.5) and his concern about turnover in the scientific staff, while AUI 
Vice President Edward Reynolds gave a report on the status of the 140 Foot 
project (Sect. 4.4). After the formal adjournment, the minutes report that 
Trustees moved to another building to hear scientific presentations from Frank 
Drake on Venus observations, from Dave Heeschen on extragalactic radio 
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source spectra, from MIT graduate student Sandy Weinreb on his attempt to 
detect the 327 MHz deuterium line and from T.K. Menon on H II regions. 
Following the formal signature of the Corporate Secretary, Charles Dunbar, 
attesting that the meeting was adjourned a note was added that,
At the conclusion of the scientific presentation the Trustees met again in execu-
tive session. The Secretary was instructed to make the following report: The 
President informed the Trustees that Otto Struve had asked to be relieved of his 
responsibilities as Director of the National Radio Astronomy Observatory on 
December 1, 1961, or as soon thereafter as could be arranged. The choice of a 
successor to Dr. Struve was extensively discussed as well as interim arrangements 
to be made pending the appointment of a new Director. At the conclusion of the 
discussion, on motion duly made and seconded, all Trustees present voting, it was 
unanimously VOTED: That the President be and hereby is authorized to offer to 
Dr. Joseph Pawsey of Sydney, Australia, an appointment as Director of the 
National Radio Astronomy Observatory on such terms as the president deems 
appropriate. Dr. Rabi said that he would write without delay to Dr. Pawsey and 
report the result as soon as possible.
Unlike the frustrating three-year long search that preceded Struve’s appoint-
ment, there was no search committee, and there is no evidence that Rabi 
sought the advice of anyone else. At this point, there apparently was no longer 
any agonizing over whether or not the NRAO director need be an American 
citizen. Merle Tuve must have been gratified when he heard the news that his 
1956 question to the NSB, “Where will the staff come from? UK? Australia?” 
(Sect. 3.5) had been answered.
Interestingly, this important action was taken by only the AUI Board 
Executive Committee and not the full Board of Trustees. There is no indica-
tion from the agenda that was distributed to the Board on 4 October 1961 that 
there would be any discussion of Struve’s successor, although it seems likely 
that this was the purpose of the executive session called at the start of the day. 
There was no statement of who moved and who seconded the motion to 
appoint Pawsey as the Director of NRAO. The only evidence that Struve had 
again asked to be relieved of his responsibilities was the announcement by Rabi 
at the late afternoon unscheduled session.
The next day, 27 October 1961, the full Board of Trustees met for what 
appeared to be a routine meeting primarily addressing corporate matters and 
business related to the operation of Brookhaven. Again, there was no sched-
uled discussion of Struve’s successor, nor, according to the minutes, any 
announcement of the resolution passed on the previous afternoon by the 
Executive Committee to appoint Pawsey (Fig. 4.12). The only reference to 
Struve’s tenure as Director came up during Struve’s presentation of the NRAO 
Visiting Committee report, where the minutes recorded, “Dr. Struve said that 
since he is retiring as Director in less than a year, he would like to remind the 
Trustees of some of the problems he has encountered, in the hope that they 
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might be avoided in the case of his successor.”146 At the time Struve gave no 
indication that he expected to retire in only two months. 
Apparently, Rabi informed Struve of the outcome of Executive Committee 
action and suggested that Struve resign on 1 December 1961, as, four days 
later, on 31 October 1961, perhaps in a face-saving move, Struve wrote 
to Rabi147
to ask you whether my services at the National Radio Astronomy Observatory 
could be dispensed with about this December 1, either temporarily or perma-
nently, in order to give me an opportunity to engage more actively in research 
than I have found it possible to do during the past two and a quarter-years. I feel 
that I must try to catch up with recent developments in astrophysics and I am 
unable to do so while I am compelled to spend nearly all of my time in non- 
scientific meetings and investigations by single persons and groups. These leave 
me in a state of continuous fatigue which is the cause of other health problems. 
A leave of absence for several months would of course be the most desirable 
arrangement from my point of view, if you feel that I deserve it. If this would not 
be possible, then according to our records I believe that I shall have 45 days of 
vacation pay due me if I leave by December 1. In either case the Observatory 
would not have to fear that the scientific staff would be left without guidance and 
protection, since I gathered from your remarks last week that the problem of my 
successor has virtually been solved. If you should wish it, I could return to Green 
Bank for a short time either before Dr. Pawsey arrives or soon afterward.
Fig. 4.12 Joseph 
L. Pawsey at IAU 
Symposium 4, Jodrell 
Bank, 1955. Credit: 
NAA-WTS Working Files, 
Interviewees
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On 31 October 1961, the same day that Struve wrote to Rabi offering his 
resignation, Rabi wrote to Pawsey that the AUI Board had approved his nomi-
nation to be Director of the National Radio Astronomy Observatory, and that 
he had already obtained the approval of the NSF Director, Alan Waterman.”148 
From the content of Rabi’s letter, it is clear that he and Pawsey had previously 
discussed the matter in London, if not also in Princeton, although Rabi’s for-
mal offer letter was written the same day that Struve wrote his letter of resigna-
tion. Rabi did not disclose to Pawsey that he expected Struve to retire on 1 
December 1961, but rather mentioned that “Dr Struve has asked for retire-
ment as of October 1, 1962.”
Pawsey promptly responded that before making a decision, he first wanted 
to talk with E.G. Bowen and CSIRO Chairman Fred White.149 Two weeks 
later, on 17 November 1961, at an executive session of the meeting of the AUI 
Executive Committee, Rabi reported on the letter he had received from Struve, 
and the Committee voted unanimously, “pursuant to his own request,” to 
relieve Struve of his duties as NRAO Director.150 At the same time, David 
Heeschen was appointed as Acting Director of NRAO, effective 1 December 
1961, in anticipation of Pawsey’s arrival as the Director in October 1962. 
Immediately after the AUI Board meeting, Rabi wrote to Struve that the 
Trustees had accepted his resignation,151 and also informed the NRAO staff 
that “at his request,” Struve had “been relieved of executive responsibility” as 
Director of NRAO effective 1 December.152 Fred White reluctantly agreed to 
Pawsey accepting the NRAO position, but was concerned that it should appear 
that Pawsey was accepting an invitation to help the Americans, and not that he 
was leaving due to any discontent with CSIRO or Australia.153 Pawsey then 
accepted a three-year appointment at NRAO, “with the possibility of returning 
to my employment in Australia at the end of that time,” but he made it clear 
that he wanted to maintain close ties with Australia and would seek increased 
cooperation between the US and Australia.154 Since he was unable to take up 
the position until October 1962, he agreed that, as suggested by Rabi, he make 
a visit to Green Bank in the spring of 1962. Rabi responded that “your decision 
leaves us all rejoicing, Waterman, Scherer, myself, the whole board of AUI, the 
Staff of the Observatory, etc.”155 Heeschen was apparently losing patience with 
the situation and wrote to Rabi, “I do not intend to take care of all the admin-
istrative dirty work at the expense of my own radio astronomy interests and 
then be simply a rubber stamp to either the NSF or a distant director-to-be on 
the interesting things.”156
Expressing his frustration with the 140 Foot situation, Rabi had no patience 
for Struve’s complaining, and after receiving Pawsey’s acceptance, Rabi sent a 
handwritten letter to Taffy Bowen, congratulating him on the recent  dedication 
of the Parkes 210 foot antenna and commenting that “Pawsey is saving my life 
by coming as director of NRAO next year. The present incumbent although a 
great optical astronomer has no administrative talent and no knowledge of 
radio astronomy. We hope now we are off to a better start.”157 Rabi’s rather 
disparaging remarks were clearly unfounded and inappropriate. The problems 
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with Green Bank and the 140 Foot Telescope project preceded Struve’s 
appointment and, in any event, AUI had barred Struve from any role in the 
140 Foot project. Moreover, aside from his distinguished career in astronomi-
cal research, Struve had been the very effective director of the University of 
Chicago Yerkes Observatory. According to Osterbrock (1997, p. 159) “Otto 
Struve resurrected the Yerkes Observatory.” He founded the McDonald 
Observatory in Texas and served simultaneously as a strong Director of the 
McDonald and Yerkes Observatories (Evans and Mulholland 1986). As men-
tioned earlier, he was a strong advocate of large astronomical facilities. Dave 
Heeschen (2008) later described Struve as a “fine person and a great astrono-
mer,” who had an important impact on NRAO, but that “his final years were 
made so stressful by the problems with the 140 foot telescope that he had 
inherited.”
As discussed in Sect. 4.5, after Heeschen and Findlay’s proposal to build the 
300 Foot dish had been rebuffed in 1958 by the AUI Visiting Committee and 
the NSF, it was Otto Struve who was able to convince both AUI and the NSF 
to fund the construction during the depths of despair about the lack of prog-
ress with the 140 Foot Telescope. It was also Struve who obtained the money 
and solicited donations of privately held books and journals for the NRAO 
library, which today arguably holds the largest collection of any radio astron-
omy library in the world, including complete runs of many journals such as 
Nature. Before the days of the Internet, the presence of a comprehensive sci-
entific library had an immeasurable impact on scientific life in isolated Green 
Bank. In 1961, during a time of widespread global tensions, Struve also orga-
nized a US-USSR conference on radio astronomy that was held in Green Bank, 
opening a door which led a few years later to the decades-long NRAO-USSR 
collaboration in very long baseline interferometry (Sect. 8.2). After leaving 
NRAO, Struve held visiting positions at Princeton and Caltech, then returned 
to Berkeley, where he continued to work at the University of California until 
his death on 6 April 1963.
Joe Pawsey Appointed NRAO Director Although Joe Pawsey had been the 
founder and leader of the very productive radio astronomy group at the CSIRO 
Radiophysics Laboratory, he, Bernard Mills, and Wilbur (Chris) Christiansen 
were irritated with Bowen’s focus on the large expensive programs to build the 
Parkes 210 foot telescope and Wild’s solar heliograph at Culgoora (Robertson 
1992, p. 198) at the expense of the more traditional Radiophysics innovative 
programs that had been pursued by the small groups. Two years earlier, fearing 
that Mills might leave Radiophysics, Pawsey had written to Struve to suggest a 
joint program to build a Mills Cross at Green Bank, noting that Sydney had the 
expertise and NRAO had the money.158 However, in 1960, both Mills and 
Christiansen left Radiophysics to accept professorships, in physics and electrical 
engineering departments respectively, at the University of Sydney. Pawsey was 
particularly angered by the decision, which was made without consulting him, 
to appoint Bolton as head of the Parkes radio telescope. Pawsey had been made 
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irrelevant by Bowen (Robertson 1992, p. 200; 2017, p. 227) and was open to 
Rabi’s offer. Dave Heeschen (2008) and the NRAO staff were pleased with the 
selection of Pawsey and were looking forward to his coming to Green Bank as 
the NRAO Director.
As agreed, after stopping off in Pasadena to meet with Struve, Pawsey met 
with Rabi at the Princeton home of his brother-in-law, then attended the 16 
March 1962 meeting of the AUI Executive Committee, after which he traveled 
to Green Bank with AUI Vice President Gerald Tape. One morning, about a 
week after he had arrived in Green Bank, Campbell Wade observed that Pawsey 
was dragging his foot,159 and Frank Drake (Drake and Sobel 1992, p. 26) saw 
that Pawsey “was partially paralyzed on the left side of his body.” Following 
medical evaluation in Washington, Rabi reported that Pawsey appeared to 
improve, and “there was every reason to suppose that his recovery will be suf-
ficient to permit him to assume full-time duty at the Observatory on October 
1 as planned.”160 However, at the 18 May 1962 meeting of the AUI Executive 
Committee, Rabi reported that Pawsey’s illness “had taken a decided turn for 
the worse,” and, “he is now at the Massachusetts General Hospital under the 
care of [AUI Trustee] Dr. William Sweet, and that on May 16 he was operated 
on for a brain tumor. The result of the operation is still uncertain.”161 In an 
executive session, Rabi expressed the opinion that “The chance that Dr. 
Pawsey’s health will ever get to be sufficiently good to permit him to assume 
the duties of Director appears to be negligible,” and “it will be necessary to 
find a new Director for the National Radio Astronomy Observatory.” Rabi’s 
sober appraisal of Pawsey’s condition was confirmed the following month by 
Dr. Sweet.162
Pawsey remained optimistic. While still recovering from the surgery at 
Massachusetts General Hospital, he wrote a letter for Tape to read and deliver 
to Rabi following up on their earlier March discussion about his ideas on 
achieving high angular resolution.163 Although he had hoped to return to 
Green Bank to discuss his plans for the Observatory, after his discharge from 
the hospital on 12 July 1962 Pawsey went to Princeton to recuperate with his 
sister and brother-in-law. Pawsey and Tape met in Princeton on 18 July, 
together with Pawsey’s wife Lenore and his brother-in-law. Dave Heeschen 
was also present, and they all agreed that Pawsey should not undertake the 
NRAO Directorship, but while in Australia, Pawsey would “keep a hand in 
NRAO programs,” and in particular, “the possibility of a cooperative program 
with CSIRO.”164 Before leaving for Australia, Pawsey prepared a short report 
outlining his ‘general objectives in coming to Green Bank.165 In his report, 
Pawsey outlined the following priorities for NRAO:
 a) Develop a first-class scientific team
 b) Provide extremely powerful radio astronomy equipment
 c) The stimulation of US research in radio astronomy
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Pawsey discussed two major Green Bank projects: completion of the 140 
Foot Telescope, and a project which he said “is not well defined,” but which he 
described as “the high resolution project” with the specific objective of “fur-
thering the study of radio galaxies.”166 Interestingly, Pawsey gave higher prior-
ity to the high resolution project than to completing the 140 Foot antenna, 
but he also commented on a possible future solar program and, with great 
insight, he endorsed the plans by Frank Drake and Frank Low to develop a 
millimeter wavelength capability, as well as noting the opportunities for low- 
frequency radio astronomy.
Accompanied by his wife, Lenore, and Paul Wild from the Radiophysics 
staff, Pawsey returned to Australia on 27 July 1962.167 Wild had been in the US 
for the previous two weeks and had visited Green Bank. Before their departure 
Rabi tried to recruit Wild to come to Green Bank as the NRAO Director but 
Wild declined, citing his opportunities and obligations at CSIRO.168 AUI also 
considered Robert Hanbury Brown and Henk van de Hulst as possible NRAO 
directors. But it was recognized that Hanbury Brown was committed to build-
ing his intensity interferometer in Australia, and that van de Hulst would not 
be an effective director at an American national observatory.169 In November 
1962, both Heeschen and Tape made a long planned visit to Australia, where 
they reviewed the Australian radio astronomy and nuclear research programs, 
especially the work with the newly completed Parkes radio telescope, and they 
were able to visit with Pawsey before his death in Sydney on 30 November 1962.
Dave Heeschen Becomes NRAO Director There was little option left for Rabi 
but to appoint David Heeschen as the Director of NRAO, effective 19 October 
1962. Again, there was no search committee or consultation within the com-
munity, although Rabi’s selection was strongly supported by the AUI Board. 
Heeschen was only 36 years old, but had been involved with NRAO from the 
very beginning, first as a consultant, then as an employee of AUI, later as Head 
of the NRAO Astronomy Division, and finally, since 1 December 1961, as 
Acting Director of NRAO. In 1960, he received tenure from AUI, but was 
almost drawn away from NRAO by an attractive offer from the University of 
Virginia as a Full Professor, Chairman of the Astronomy Department, and 
Director of the University of Virginia Observatory.170
But Rabi had appointed Heeschen over the older and more senior John 
Findlay, who had originally been recruited by Berkner. Findlay was furious, and 
never forgave Rabi, who apparently disliked Findlay, and the relationship 
between Findlay and Heeschen became strained. Findlay developed a drinking 
problem, and although he continued to take a leadership position in the plan-
ning for the long-awaited, large fully steerable telescope (Sect. 9.4), and in the 
initial planning for the 36 foot millimeter telescope (Sect. 10.2), he was gradu-
ally relieved of his responsibilities as Deputy Director, although Heeschen later 
claimed that he never had the nerve to fire or replace him.171
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4.7  exoduS From green Bank
The site chosen for NRAO is actually situated between Green Bank and the 
even smaller village of Arbovale. From the earliest years, NRAO has used a 
Green Bank postal address, but the telephone exchange was in Arbovale. For 
reasons which remain lost to history, the Observatory came to be associated 
with Green Bank rather than Arbovale. Perhaps “Green Bank” sounded more 
colorful than “Arbovale,” or perhaps AUI was trying to draw an analogy with 
“Jodrell Bank.” Located in Pocahontas County, only about five miles from the 
Virginia border, local loyalties during the American Civil War were mixed, and 
the sympathies of the two villages leaned in opposite directions. The local 
churches were the center of political debate and, as a result of the allegiances 
founded in the Civil War, there remain today separate United Methodist 
Churches in Green Bank and Arbovale, located less than two miles apart and 
sharing the same pastor.
According to the Pocahontas County Historical Society, there is no evi-
dence that “Pocahontas ever set foot in present-day Pocahontas County,” but 
when the then-Virginia county was established in 1821, the Governor of 
Virginia was Thomas Randolph, who was a direct descendant of Pocahontas. 
In the early part of the twentieth century, during the heyday of the lumber 
industry, the small town of Cass, located about ten miles from the Observatory, 
was a thriving town with a population of more than 2000, which, by the late 
1950s had declined to less than 400. The local sawmill was once the largest 
double band sawmill in the world, producing 1.5 million board-feet of lumber 
per week. In 1911, West Virginia had more than 3000 miles of logging railroad 
line, more than any other state in the country. By 2010, only the 11 mile long 
Cass Scenic Railway line remained. Although remote by almost any measure, a 
local business proprietor once boasted that half of the people in the United 
States lived within a day’s drive of Cass. Nearby were the colorfully named 
communities of Clover Lick and Stony Bottom. At the time NRAO arrived in 
1956, there were no bars in West Virginia. Alcohol could not be served in 
public except in restaurants and private clubs. Each county was allowed a liquor 
store, but the hours were kept limited. Frank Drake later recalled asking a Cass 
local if he knew where the liquor store was and being told, “Yup, but I ain’t 
gonna tell ya.” (Drake and Sobel 1992). On another occasion, after a party at 
his home, an NRAO scientist had put the empty bottles out in the trash, only 
to find them removed the next morning. After some investigation, his local 
cleaning lady confessed that she was so embarrassed that his neighbors might 
find out that there had been drinking in his house that she hid the bottles. 
There were no secrets in Green Bank. All telephone calls had to go through an 
operator in Cass, who, if she wished, could, and probably did, listen in to 
phone calls going through her exchange; those who shared one’s multi-party 
telephone line undoubtedly listened as well.
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In 1996, Dave Heeschen (1996) gave the following colorful description of 
life in Green Bank when he arrived in 1956 with his wife, Eloise, and their 
young children.
In 1956, Green Bank and Arbovale were small villages relatively isolated from the 
outside world by the mountains and the poor roads. The local residents were 
almost all descended from a few original families, and spoke a form of English 
that had been frozen in time by the isolation of the area. That and their distinctive 
accent made them difficult to understand at times. Like all true Americans any-
where in the world, when they weren’t understood they simply spoke faster and 
louder. Farming and hunting were the only activities, the latter carried out with 
much more enthusiasm than the former, and with almost total disregard for for-
mal hunting seasons and the laws. In fact, about the only recognition of the 
existence of hunting laws was that the local schools closed on the opening day of 
deer season. Green Bank consisted of two small stores, a post office, an Oldsmobile 
dealership, and a few homes. Arbovale was smaller, having one store with a post 
office in the store. With a few exceptions the locals were very friendly and wel-
comed the coming of the Observatory. Many looked at it as a potential source of 
badly needed jobs.
As most of the NRAO scientific and technical staff came from more urban 
environments, they, and particularly their families, often did not easily fit into 
the Green Bank culture. Shopping, medical, and dental facilities were a 40- to 
60-minute drive from the Observatory, although a local Arbovale general store 
carried a wide, yet limited, range of supplies, from food to hardware to equip-
ment needed to castrate bulls. AUI provided funds to help subsidize a local 
doctor by contracting to provide annual physical exams for all of the resident 
staff. However, it was even more difficult to recruit physicians than scientists 
and engineers. At one point a married physician pair were recruited from 
Norway, but they only lasted a few years. There were long periods when the 
only local doctor was an osteopath (DO) rather than an MD. More than one 
child was born on the way to the nearest hospital in Elkins, 50 miles distant 
over a sometimes treacherous Cheat Mountain.
Winters in Green Bank were cold and the ground could be covered by snow 
for many months. The only guaranteed frost-free month was July. Opportunities 
for employment for observatory wives were limited, although some spouses 
found satisfying work teaching in the local schools.172 Some parents felt that 
the local school system was inadequate for their ambitious children, although 
in fact many of the discipline problems common in larger city school systems 
were not found in Green Bank. Particularly in the primary grades, there was 
strong emphasis on the fundamentals. However, owing to the relatively small 
fraction of the local children that went on to universities, the opportunity to 
take the advanced level courses thought to be needed for acceptance to elite 
universities was limited. Many of the local children, when legally allowed, left 
school to raise families and work. Most of the local children were on reduced- 
cost lunches, reflecting the generally low income levels in the community. 
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When she was the Green Bank site director from 1981 to 1983, Martha Haynes 
frequently told colleagues that the nearest McDonald’s was an hour away—
over a mountain. The nearest TV stations were also very distant, and the 
Observatory site had been specifically chosen because it was shielded by the 
surrounding mountains. Even when using the largest Radio Shack antennas, 
picture quality from Roanoke and Pittsburgh TV stations was at best marginal.
If incoming staff were required to build or buy homes, it could be a danger-
ous investment, particularly for scientific staff on term appointments. Unlike 
most areas of the country where the population was growing, the population 
of Pocahontas County was decreasing due to the lack of employment opportu-
nities. NRAO reluctantly built 24 houses on the site, mostly in an area that 
became known as “the rabbit patch”173 and provided them for staff at a very 
modest rent. Although intended in principle for young scientists on term 
appointments, in practice they were also occupied by tenured scientists, engi-
neers, and administrative staff on indefinite appointments. AUI also shared the 
financial risk with those who chose to build their own homes, and partly guar-
anteed the mortgages so that local banks could provide low interest loans. In 
an effort to compensate for the limited medical support in the area, AUI pur-
chased an ambulance and trained staff to serve as EMTs. But even with this 
additional support, it remained difficult to recruit or retain scientific, and par-
ticularly engineering, staff.
In some respects, Green Bank could be an attractive place to live and work, 
especially if one enjoyed outdoor recreation activities. Opportunities for hunt-
ing and fishing were excellent. NRAO families often got together for weekend 
hikes in the surrounding mountains. A small group of scientists and engineers 
became active spelunkers and enjoyed investigating the local limestone caves. 
As in many small towns, local school sports were very popular and often the 
focus of community activity. One could walk, bicycle (and in the winter, ski) to 
work if you lived in one of the nearby Observatory houses. Observatory rents 
were attractive, and maintenance was readily available from the Observatory 
maintenance staff. Children were free to play and ride bicycles on Observatory 
grounds without any concerns by them (or their parents) for traffic or other 
urban dangers. Starting in 1962, NRAO operated a kindergarten on the site. 
Costs were shared by the NSF, AUI, and the parents.
Nevertheless, the lack of social, medical, and educational opportunities soon 
became apparent. Staff members, and especially their families, were not happy. 
Some, like John Findlay, chose to live elsewhere and make the long commute 
home on weekends. Others, such as Frank Drake, left NRAO to pursue oppor-
tunities elsewhere. Interestingly, although there were a few hardy Americans 
(including one of the present authors—KIK), it was particularly hard to hire 
American scientists and engineers, who wanted the ambiance of universities 
and cities. In the mid-1960s, the resident scientific staff in Green Bank had 
come largely from Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland, Norway, 
France, India, and Iraq. By 1962, NRAO was beginning to plan for the design 
and construction of the VLA and the 36 foot millimeter telescope, and it did 
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not make sense to have either the engineering staff for these projects, or the 
growing administrative staff, isolated in remote Green Bank. Dave Heeschen 
made the difficult decision that if NRAO were to maintain its viability, it would 
be necessary to move the NRAO headquarters from Green Bank to a more 
desirable location. But who should move and where should they go?
One of the successes of the Green Bank operation was the close collabora-
tion between the scientists and engineers, facilitated, at least in part, by virtue 
of the fact that they and their families lived, worked, and played together. In 
particular, the NRAO scientists and engineers worked closely together design-
ing and commissioning new instrumentation. In principle, the scientists might 
be able to live away from the telescopes in Green Bank, but then they would 
lose contact with the engineers. There was no distinction at NRAO between 
design engineers and those who maintained the equipment. An engineer who 
designed and constructed a piece of equipment was responsible for its opera-
tion. If it failed in the middle of the night, the engineer was expected to show 
up at the telescope and fix it. So there was no obvious way to keep some engi-
neers in Green Bank and not others. Moreover, it was the engineers more than 
the scientists that motivated moving from Green Bank. The scientific opportu-
nities for research with the unique NRAO facilities in Green Bank might have 
been sufficient to attract members of the scientific staff, but the same was not 
true for engineers. Although there were attractive opportunities for engineer-
ing research and development at NRAO, salaries were not competitive with the 
rapidly expanding, attractive opportunities in the military-industrial complex 
characteristic of the Cold War period.
In May 1962, while still only the Acting Director, Heeschen raised with 
AUI the idea of moving the NRAO headquarters from Green Bank. Trying to 
minimize the impact of a split operation, he looked for nearby possibilities, and 
considered Charlottesville, VA, home of the University of Virginia (UVA) and 
Morgantown, WV, home of West Virginia University. Both cities were about a 
two and a half-hour drive from Green Bank. Charlottesville seemed to offer 
better living conditions and had the stronger university.174 Moreover, the West 
Virginia University did not have an astronomy program. Although UVA had 
one of the oldest Astronomy Departments in the country and operated a 26 
inch telescope that had been the gift of Leander McCormick, the department 
languished for many years while the university pursued excellence in the 
humanities and related areas. In 1960, Heeschen had seriously considered the 
offer from UVA to head the astronomy department, so he was familiar with 
UVA and with Charlottesville.
After a long search, UVA had finally hired Larry Fredrick in 1962 to rejuve-
nate the Astronomy Department and the McCormick Observatory. Shortly 
after Fredrick arrived at UVA, Heeschen called him on the phone to ask if 
“they could chat.”175 When he arrived in Fredrick’s office, Heeschen closed the 
door and hesitatingly asked if Fredrick would object if he brought the NRAO 
headquarters and the scientific staff to UVA. Fredrick was enthusiastic and set 
up a meeting with UVA President Edgar Shannon, who indicted that UVA 
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could provide the land and attractive financial conditions to construct a build-
ing for NRAO on the UVA Grounds. A local bank indicated they would finance 
mortgages for staff purchasing homes in Charlottesville. Everything was set, 
but Heeschen needed to first convince AUI, who five years earlier had gone 
out on a limb with the NSF and Merle Tuve to “build an extensive community 
in the deep woods.” (Sect. 3.3).
Heeschen’s recommendation to move the NRAO headquarters from Green 
Bank turned out to be very controversial. At its 17 May 1963 meeting, the 
AUI Executive Committee debated the augments pro and con for moving the 
NRAO headquarters to Charlottesville. The Trustees were split on whether or 
not to move, and those who did support a move were split on the relative mer-
its of remaining close to Green Bank or locating at a prestigious university. 
Some Trustees considered easy access to Green Bank as the strongest factor in 
determining the best location; others argued that “a congenial and stimulating 
environment for the scientific staff … should be the primary consideration.” 
AUI President Gerald Tape expressed concern that if the new headquarters 
became part of a university “there would be little reason for the AUI-NRAO 
mechanism,” and that the Observatory might “easily deteriorate into simply 
one more radio astronomy laboratory,” and lose its identity as a National 
Observatory. The Trustees concluded their meeting with a request to Heeschen 
“to prepare for consideration by the Trustees a detailed statement of operating 
plans under a split location arrangement,” saying that “considerations should 
be given to several possible headquarters locations.”176
Although his presentation to the AUI Executive Committee was scheduled 
for the afternoon of 18 July 1963, a small subgroup of Trustees asked Heeschen 
to be available in the morning for “a full discussion” and “following that dis-
tribute his memorandum with whatever revisions the morning discussion has 
produced.”177 The formal presentation and discussion stretched over two days. 
Instead of presenting several possible locations as instructed, Heeschen opened 
his four page report with, “I recommend that NRAO establish offices in 
Charlottesville, Virginia and that scientists and certain other members of the 
staff be transferred there.”178 After summarizing the need to move, his report 
weighed the advantages of a “stimulating and intellectual environment” against 
“closeness to Green Bank,” and argued that it was essential to be close to 
Green Bank. He also noted that the planned VLA and 36 foot millimeter tele-
scopes would mean that Green Bank would be less important as the adminis-
trative, technical, and scientific headquarters for a broadly geographically 
dispersed Observatory. After extensive discussion among the Executive 
Committee, Ed Reynolds, who had taken over the AUI Presidency from Tape, 
appointed a committee to guide a detailed study of the proposed move. The 
committee was chaired by Carl Chambers and included three members of the 
Board plus Emanuel R. (Manny) Piore from IBM.
The committee supported Heeschen’s suggested move to Charlottesville, 
and there was a general consensus among the committee members and the 
Trustees to accept Heeschen’s recommendation, although “some Trustees still 
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voiced objection to making any move from Green Bank.”179 Of those that 
agreed to the move, many favored a location where the staff would find the 
intellectual stimulation that they felt was lacking in Green Bank. Princeton and 
Cambridge were touted as providing “all the social amenities and also the intel-
lectual stimulation to be derived from close association with a major university 
maintaining a vigorous program in astronomy,” and it was suggested that, by 
comparison, Charlottesville lacked “a congenial intellectual environment, … 
and might seem a rather isolated site intellectually.”180 Rabi, who on his last day 
as AUI President, had appointed Heeschen as NRAO Director, was particu-
larly adamant about the merits of Princeton or Columbia as the best location 
for the NRAO headquarters. Heeschen, while fully cognizant of the advan-
tages of co-locating at a university, particularly one with vibrant physics and 
astronomy departments, was more concerned about how to keep the staff 
engaged in Green Bank activities, and looked for a home for the NRAO 
Headquarters closer to Green Bank. But some Trustees maintained that “mod-
ern transportation greatly diminishes the importance of geographical 
proximity.”
Fed up with the debate and procrastination, Heeschen characteristically 
pointed out the need for an “immediate decision,” but a motion and second to 
approve the move from Green Bank was withdrawn after further discussion. 
Instead the Executive Committee decided unanimously “that the question of 
establishment at Charlottesville, Virginia of a headquarters for the scientific 
staff of the Observatory and the approval of the Director’s proposal for carry-
ing out this plan be referred to the full AUI Board of Trustees at its annual 
meeting to be held on October 18, 1963.”181
The full AUI Board continued the debate when they met in Green Bank on 
18 October. Reynolds, Chambers and Manny Piore spoke in favor of the move, 
but others argued against the move, which they felt would be “a dissolution of 
the Observatory as an institution.” Finally, the Trustees voted to move the 
headquarters to Charlottesville, but the minutes recorded that the decision was 
made only by majority vote, and unlike most AUI Board actions, was not unan-
imous.182 According to Heeschen, Rabi was so upset with Heeschen’s insis-
tence on moving to Charlottesville rather than Princeton or Columbia that he 
walked out of the meeting before the critical vote to wander around the 
Observatory, and that Rabi did not speak to Heeschen or Piore again for two 
years. Heeschen also described his experience with AUI over the move, as the 
most disagreeable dealing he ever had with AUI during his 17  years as the 
NRAO Director.183
In trying to understand Rabi’s dogmatic opposition to locating the 
Observatory Headquarters at Charlottesville’s University of Virginia, it might 
be noted that at the time, the University of Virginia was essentially all white 
and all male. Moreover, only three years earlier, the city of Charlottesville, as 
part of Virginia’s broader “Massive Resistance,” had closed the city’s public 
schools to protest the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court deci-
sion against school segregation. As seen by Rabi, a Jewish immigrant from 
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Eastern Europe, Virginia was part of the still-segregated South. The records do 
not indicate which of the other Trustees also spoke in opposition to 
Charlottesville, but many of the AUI Trustees of that period shared a similar 
background with Rabi.
Having persuaded AUI, Heeschen still had to deal with the NSF, which in 
turn had to deal with the WV Congressional delegation. Fortuitously, the 
NRAO budget included a $600,000 item to build a new laboratory building, 
and the Foundation agreed to a proposal from UVA to divert this sum toward 
the new Charlottesville building. UVA then built a 25,000 square foot build-
ing, which was leased to AUI at a yearly rental rate so that the construction cost 
was amortized over a period of five years, and that after this period, the rent 
was reduced to a level covering only maintenance. The new headquarters 
building, which became known at UVA as Stone Hall, was finished in December 
of 1965, and most of the tenured and tenure track scientific staff, along with 
many engineers, technicians, and administrative staff, moved from Green Bank 
to Charlottesville (Fig. 4.13). With the large staff increase associated with the 
VLA, and growing technical, administrative and human resources staff, NRAO 
soon had outgrown the new UVA building and in November 1972, NRAO 
had to rent additional space in Charlottesville to house the technical staff. 
Although the engineers were located only a few miles away, the sociological 
impact of the separation of the scientific and technical staff became an increas-
ing concern. Historically, there had been close collaborations between the 
Fig. 4.13 In this cartoon from the December 1955 Observer, the Green Bank tele-
scopes are weeping and waving as the moving vans head east to the big city of 
Charlottesville. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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NRAO scientists and engineers in developing and testing new instrumentation, 
and in the design of new telescopes. In April 2005, with the intention of bring-
ing the engineers and scientists back together, the capacity of Stone Hall was 
doubled by adding a new wing. But soon after construction began in 2003, it 
was apparent that even the addition could not accommodate the growing 
number of new staff involved with Atacama Large Millimeter/submillimeter 
Array, and the technicians and engineers of the Central Development 
Laboratory, as it was then named, remained in a separate location.
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CHAPTER 5
Is Anyone Out There?
In the shadows of the struggles surrounding the construction of the 140 Foot 
Radio Telescope, Frank Drake, NRAO’s newest and youngest scientist, carried 
out a small observing project to detect radio signals from nearby stars that 
would indicate the present of extraterrestrial intelligent life. Naming his pro-
gram “Project Ozma,” after the mythical princess of the Land of Oz, Drake 
observed two nearby stars, Tau Ceti and Epsilon Eridani. This project, the first 
modern Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI), captured the imagina-
tion of the public and scientific communities alike. In the following decades, 
other investigators initiated a variety of SETI programs of ever-increasing capa-
bility at NRAO and elsewhere. NASA began a major SETI program, but it 
became mired in controversy over whether searching for intelligent life in the 
Universe is a proper scientific pursuit or should be relegated to the realm of 
science fiction. While no confirmable evidence for extraterrestrial intelligent 
life has yet been found, the discovery of the widespread existence of other plan-
etary systems combined with the vastly improved sensitivity of radio telescopes 
has reinvigorated SETI research, and the exciting promise of detection contin-
ues to attract the attention of new generations of astronomers and the public.
5.1  Project ozma
Frank Drake had long been fascinated by the possibility of life on other worlds 
and more generally by science and engineering. On a Navy ROTC1 scholar-
ship, he followed these interests by enrolling at Cornell University. Initially 
The title of this chapter is taken from the book by Frank Drake and Dava Sobel 1992, 
Is Anyone Out There? The Scientific Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (New York, 
NY: Delacorte Press).
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interested in designing airplanes, Drake ultimately settled on a degree in 
 engineering physics. Cornell also provided the opportunity for Drake’s first 
forays into astronomy. He enrolled in an elementary astronomy course and was 
captivated by the lectures of Otto Struve, and he even built a small optical tele-
scope. Although Drake wanted to pursue his interests in astronomy by enrolling 
in a graduate astronomy program, he first had to complete his required 
Naval service.
During his three years of active duty, Drake was a Naval electronics officer, 
learning skills that would soon greatly impact his future career. After his time 
in the Navy, he enrolled in 1955 in the graduate astronomy program at Harvard 
University. Bart Bok, chair of the Harvard astronomy program, quickly put 
Drake’s electronics training to work by offering him a position with the 
Harvard radio astronomy project, where he further developed his technical 
abilities and became a skilled radio astronomer. After receiving his PhD from 
Harvard based on studies of neutral hydrogen in galactic clusters, Drake joined 
the NRAO. He arrived in Green Bank in April 1958, joining Dave Heeschen 
and John Findlay as the only other members of the scientific staff2 (Fig. 5.1).
As described in Chap. 4, within a few months of Drake’s arrival in Green 
Bank, NRAO acquired an 85 foot radio telescope. The new 85 foot Tatel 
Radio Telescope was essentially off the shelf, and did not have the collecting 
area or precision of the planned 140 Foot Radio Telescope. However, Drake 
realized that an 85 foot antenna had the capability to detect radio signals equiv-
alent to Earth’s most powerful transmissions from a distance of up to 10 to 20 
light-years. Carefully choosing the right occasion, Drake softly suggested the 
first SETI project over lunch one day with Heeschen, Findlay, and Acting 
NRAO Director Lloyd Berkner. Drake proposed using the Tatel Telescope to 
search for signs of extraterrestrial life from nearby stars. To Drake’s surprise and 
Fig. 5.1 Frank Drake, 
1962. Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
231
delight, Berkner, whom Drake described as being an optimistic gambler in sci-
ence, immediately gave his enthusiastic approval and encouragement. Drake 
dubbed his investigation Project Ozma after the fictional princess Ozma of the 
Land of Oz in L. Frank Baum’s series of Oz books, suggesting a sense of “a 
land far away, difficult to reach, and populated by strange and exotic beings” 
(Drake and Sobel 1992). Project Ozma thus became the first modern Search 
for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI)3 and the standard by which future 
search programs have been measured.
Drake selected two nearby Sun-like stars, Tau Ceti and Epsilon Eridani, for 
his search. T. Kochu Menon, a fellow radio astronomy graduate from Harvard, 
had recently joined the NRAO scientific staff and was interested in studying 
magnetic fields in galactic hydrogen clouds using what is known as the Zeeman 
effect.4 The instrumental requirements to search for the Zeeman effect were 
similar to those Drake would need for Project Ozma, and Menon and Drake 
went to work together to build the equipment needed for their projects, with 
the Zeeman experiment serving as a convenient front for Ozma (Fig. 5.2).
On 11 April 1960 Drake made the first observations for Project Ozma 
(Fig. 5.3). After six hours of observing Tau Ceti with no results, he turned the 
antenna toward Epsilon Eridani, the third closest star to the Sun located only 
about 10 light-years away.5 Almost immediately Drake saw an off the scale 
Fig. 5.2 Tatel Telescope control room used during Drake’s 1960 Project Ozma. 
Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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pulsed signal—8 pulses per second. An apparent successful detection of signals 
from another planet stunned Drake and his colleagues. Drake later recalled his 
experience, “When it happened, we were all dumbfounded. Could it be this 
easy? All you need to do is point to a random star and within a minute you see 
a signal that puts a receiver into overload? We were so surprised and so unpre-
pared for it, we didn’t know what to do. Everybody just looked at each other.”6 
Fig. 5.3 Tatel Telescope log book for April 1960, with entries for Ozma observations 
on 11–16 April. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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But detecting signals from extraterrestrial intelligence was not to be that easy. 
The signal lasted for only a few minutes and Drake spent the next few days try-
ing to confirm the apparent detection. To determine whether the signal was of 
terrestrial or extraterrestrial origin, he placed a small horn antenna, which was 
sensitive to radiation coming from a wide area of sky, outside the control build-
ing window. About ten days later they again saw the same signal. But both the 
Tatel Telescope and the horn antenna detected the signal with equal intensity, 
and it was clear that it originated from a terrestrial source, but one of unknown 
origin. Twenty-five years later at a gathering of the group involved in the origi-
nal Ozma study, Drake commented, “We have never known what that was, but 
it had all the earmarks of being an electronics countermeasure system, probably 
airborne based on the timescale during which we heard it.” (Kellermann and 
Seielstad 1986, p. 25).
After a little over a week of observing, there was a catastrophic receiver fail-
ure. Drake took a short break to get the receiver fixed while the telescope was 
used at another frequency for more conventional radio astronomy observa-
tions. When Drake resumed his observations, he continued to observe both 
Tau Ceti and Epsilon Eridani. But after 150 hours of observing spread over a 
total period of about two months between April until late June, there were no 
suggestions of any signals from either Tau Ceti or Epsilon Eridani.
The amount of data collected for Project Ozma motivated NRAO to imple-
ment new, digital methods of recording data. Initially all data for Project Ozma 
was recorded with a moving pen on strip charts, the standard technique for 
recording radio astronomy data at the time. However, Drake and his colleagues 
soon found that analyzing these chart recording was extremely tedious, and 
over the course of the project they developed the first digital data-recording 
system used at NRAO. At first they used a newly available digital voltmeter 
with a nixie tube display. This setup required the observer to press a button to 
freeze the display and then write down the numerical output of the receiver. 
Later, they attached a printer to the digital output to avoid the tedious task of 
writing down the numbers. Drake recalled the next leap forward in the process:
The dramatic breakthrough that took place then was that [visiting] astronomer 
Gart Westerhout came and recognized that he could make life much more pleas-
ant for himself if he attached a string to the button so that he wouldn’t have to 
stand by the button. He rigged a string across the ceiling of the telescope control 
room and down from the ceiling right over an easy chair, in which he could sit. 
He attached a pull[ey] to this string and then he sat in the easy chair and when-
ever he wanted to take a reading he would pull the chain. (Kellermann and 
Seielstad 1986, p. 24)
Ultimately the system evolved to record the digital output of the receiver on 
punched paper tape to be analyzed later by NRAO’s first computer, an IBM 610.
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5.2  cocconi and morrison PaPer
Concerned that the scientific community would view Project Ozma as science 
fiction and a waste of resources, Drake and newly appointed NRAO Director 
Otto Struve initially agreed not to publicize it. The fledging Observatory was 
already facing extensive criticism resulting from what many felt were the heavy- 
handed methods used by AUI in securing the NSF contract to operate NRAO, 
the delays and cost overruns of the 140 Foot construction, and envy over the 
generous way the Observatory was being funded compared to the university 
astronomy facilities. However, their hand was forced when Cornell physicists 
Giuseppe Cocconi and Philip Morrison published their September 1959 
Nature paper, “Searching for Interstellar Communication” (Cocconi and 
Morrison 1959). Drake was pleased that his ideas had been independently dis-
cussed by two prominent scientists, in particular Morrison, who had earlier 
played a major role in the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos and who had per-
sonally assembled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. However, Struve 
was annoyed that Drake and NRAO were not receiving credit for their enter-
prising plans. It was Frank Drake who not only was the first to suggest search-
ing for 21 cm radio signals from extraterrestrial intelligence, but who also took 
the initiative to build the necessary instrumentation, and planned to carry out 
the first meaningful search.
Despite that, Cocconi and Morrison were receiving all the attention from 
both scientists and the public. Struve and Drake wanted to ensure that NRAO 
would get the proper credit for their pioneering work. So in November 1959, 
reacting to the Cocconi and Morrison paper, Struve announced the existence 
of Project Ozma in his Karl Taylor Compton Lectures in Astronomy at MIT 
where he said7:
Many of us have seen a report that thus far has come only in a mimeographed 
form from 2 American Scientists now in Europe. I believe their paper is soon to 
be in Nature. At Green Bank we are also thinking about this problem and there 
is underway a project which goes by the letters O-Z-M-A and I do not recall what 
these letters stand for, but those of us who forget what the name means, call it the 
project of the little green men.8
Curiously, in the published version of his lectures, written more than a year 
later, Struve (1962) made no mention of Project Ozma. Also, four months 
before his Project Ozma began, Drake discussed the problem of detecting 
transmissions from distant planetary systems in a January 1960 popular article 
in Sky and Telescope where he also described his plans for Project Ozma (Drake 
1960). Both Drake and Struve were treading a fine line. They did not want 
NRAO to be ridiculed for spending money on what might be perceived as a 
science fiction project; but neither did they want to be scooped by others. So 
Drake wrote to the NSF Press Officer with an “On Demand Information 
Regarding NRAO Project Ozma” press release describing Project Ozma and 
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saying, “We very much wish to withhold this information from the press until 
such time as the experiment is successful” and “if the press should become 
aware of the project … or if another group also embarks on research in this 
field.”9 Nevertheless, as a result of Drake’s article, Struve’s lectures, and the 
Cocconi and Morrison paper, the search for extraterrestrial civilizations drew 
increased interest from both the scientific community and the public.10
Cocconi and Morrison had considered what type of signal extraterrestrial 
civilizations might use in an attempt to contact each other or to announce their 
existence. They argued that since hydrogen was the most abundant element in 
the Universe, a fact which would be known to any intelligent being, the best 
place to start searching for signals from extraterrestrial life would be the 
1420.405  MHz (21  cm) radio line of neutral hydrogen. Curiously, Drake 
chose this same frequency for Project Ozma, but not for the same reasons as 
Cocconi and Morrison. By selecting the 21 cm line, Drake could then bury the 
$2000 development costs as part of Menon’s project to detect the Zeeman 
effect (Drake and Sobel 1992, p. 28). Recalling the planning process for Project 
Ozma, Drake later explained, “We would build it and do the search at the 21 
centimeter line…. It was a way to prevent criticism of the Observatory, and in 
a way, kill two birds with one stone.” (Kellermann and Seielstad 1986, p. 19). 
Drake’s plan for Project Ozma thus allowed him to meet his scientific goals for 
the project while limiting the criticism that could be leveled against NRAO.
As a result of the reluctantly released publicity, Microwave Associates gave 
Drake one of the first parametric amplifiers used in radio astronomy, which 
allowed a major improvement in sensitivity not only for Project Ozma, but for 
Menon’s Zeeman experiment, as well as other 21  cm projects on the Tatel 
Telescope. Interestingly, with time some SETI researchers pointed out that 
1420 MHz is the wrong place to search, since any intelligent civilization would 
want to keep that frequency quiet for radio astronomers.11 Later SETI research-
ers focused on the region between the 21 cm hydrogen line and the 18 cm 
hydroxyl (OH) line which has been characterized as the “water (H2O)12 hole,” 
an equally logical place for a water based civilization to transmit their presence 
(e.g., Oliver 1979).
5.3  reactions to searching for extraterrestrials
Cocconi, Morrison, and Drake all anticipated that their speculations would 
meet criticism from other scientists due to the widespread perception that 
extraterrestrial life was more of a plot device for science fiction novels than a 
serious topic of scientific discussion. Indeed, the Cocconi and Morrison paper 
created quite a stir in both the scientific and popular press. Their primarily 
theoretical paper resulted from follow-up discussions of a paper Morrison had 
published the previous year on gamma ray astronomy. In their discussions, 
Cocconi and Morrison realized that gamma rays were being artificially pro-
duced at Cornell, just a few floors below them as a by-product of the univer-
sity’s synchrotron experiments. They structured their paper in a way to limit 
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criticism they expected to receive. By assuming that intelligent, communicative 
life existed on other planets, they concentrated on the best methods for 
attempted contact and their article focused on this issue. “We shall assume that 
they (an extraterrestrial civilization) established a channel of communication 
that would one day become known to us…What sort of channel would it be?” 
Though their initial discussions addressed artificially produced gamma rays, 
based on energy considerations and relative transparency of the interstellar 
medium and planetary atmospheres, they concluded that radio frequencies 
between 1 MHz and 30 GHz provided the best opportunity for establishing 
interstellar communication. Furthermore, they noted that an advanced alien 
civilization would use the most obvious and simplest wavelength to communi-
cate with our relatively primitive civilization, and that would be the 21 cm 
(1420 MHz) line of neutral hydrogen, the most abundant element in the 
Universe. In their Nature paper, Cocconi and Morrison concluded, “We there-
fore feel that a discriminating search for signals deserves a considerable effort. 
The probability of success is difficult to estimate; but if we never search, the 
chance of success is zero.”
In common with all subsequent SETI programs to date, Project Ozma 
found no evidence for any intelligent extraterrestrial civilizations, although 
some skeptics questioned whether there was intelligent life on Earth, or at least 
in Green Bank.
But Project Ozma did not go unnoticed. During this period, Green Bank 
was visited by West Virginia Governor Cecil Underwood, by Theodore 
Hesburgh, the new president of the University of Notre Dame, and by Bernard 
Oliver, the vice president of Hewlett Packard, who would later play a major 
role in the American program to detect radio signals from an extraterrestrial 
civilization. Representatives of various news media also visited Green Bank, and 
Drake was interviewed for television, complete with cue cards.
All NRAO telescopes were actually controlled by a professional telescope 
operator based on instructions from the scientist in charge of the program. 
During Governor Underwood’s visit, the telescope operator noted the 
Governor’s visit in the logbook by writing in parenthesis, “Republican fool.” 
On another occasion, a newscaster quietly took the telescope operator aside to 
ask, “If you had really heard something, you would tell me; wouldn’t you?” 
(Crews 1986, p. 29). But after examining hundreds of yards of chart paper, 
Project Ozma disclosed nothing but noise (Drake 1979, p. 13). While Ozma 
was not successful in the narrow sense of detecting extraterrestrial civilizations, 
in a broader sense Ozma brought SETI to the public arena and defined all 
subsequent work in the quest for extraterrestrial civilizations. Drake never 
expanded Project Ozma to look at other stars, but over the next half century 
he became the recognized senior statesman and spokesman for SETI.  No 
doubt his growing stature was enhanced by his prematurely white hair, which 
conveyed an image of wisdom and authority even when he was a young Green 
Bank astronomer.
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
237
With no positive results to report, Drake never published the results of 
Ozma in the refereed scientific literature. However, in a 1961 paper in Physics 
Today, Drake discussed the arguments for searching for advanced extraterres-
trial civilizations and gave a technical description of the Ozma instrumentation. 
In a very brief statement, he simply said, “A search for intelligent transmissions 
has been conducted in Green Bank. We looked at two stars, Tau Ceti and 
Epsilon Eridani, which are the nearest solar system type stars. After some 
150 hours of observing, we obtained no evidence for strong signals from these 
stars.” (Drake 1961).
In their paper, Cocconi and Morrison discussed the broader issue of whether 
searching for extraterrestrial intelligence should be considered a legitimate sci-
entific activity and noted, “The reader may seek to consign these speculations 
wholly to the domain of science-fiction.” However, Cocconi and Morrison 
argued that the search for extraterrestrial intelligence lay on firm theoretical 
grounds and should be considered a valid scientific inquiry and went on to say, 
“We submit, rather, that the presence of interstellar signals is entirely consistent 
with all we now know, and that if the signals are present the means of detecting 
them is now at hand.”
Recalling the public reaction, Morrison (1990, p. 24) said in a later inter-
view, “It got huge newspaper and media coverage, which we didn’t antici-
pate…The media kept chasing me because I was going around the world. In 
every city I visited there would be messages from reporters wanting to talk to 
me….” The attention SETI received in the public media can be attributed to 
the booming interest in extraterrestrial life and the growing enthusiasm for 
space exploration. Project Ozma was no doubt connected in the public’s mind 
with the widespread fascination with “flying saucers” that had developed fol-
lowing the Roswell UFO13 incident a decade earlier and with the popular spec-
ulation that UFOs or flying saucers were spacecraft sent to Earth by aliens from 
another planet. But the nature of this attention was a double-edged sword. 
Increased general interest in SETI would be a key factor in receiving funding 
for future SETI projects; however, SETI scientists also wanted to ensure that 
their work was viewed as valid scientific research, not lumped together with 
UFO sightings.
Indeed, while the reaction of the public was generally positive, the scientific 
community had more mixed views. Drake recalled the attitude of his colleagues 
as, “…uniformly positive but not enthusiastic. Again I think that it was the fact 
that we weren’t investing a great deal of resources… People didn’t think it was 
worth a very careful analysis, but since it wasn’t crazy they said: These guys 
want to spend two thousand dollars, let them do it.” (Drake 1990, p. 69). 
Morrison’s recollection of his colleagues’ reactions echoed Drake’s experience, 
“Most felt it was not a good idea, probably foolish, certainly completely specu-
lative, and hardly worth discussing.” (Morrison 1990, p. 24). Though reac-
tions were mixed in the scientific community, the attention that Cocconi, 
Morrison, and Drake received helped to connect scientists who were interested 
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in extraterrestrial intelligence. Drake later commented that finally, “People 
knew who they could write to find out who was interested” (Drake 1990, p. 60).
5.4  develoPment of the seti community
After his earlier hesitation, Drake did not shy away from public exposure. 
Encouraged by the increasing interest, if not support for SETI, Drake thought 
about holding a conference to discuss Project Ozma and the broader aspects of 
extraterrestrial life, in particular intelligent civilizations. Following a talk Drake 
gave at the Philosophical Society of Washington on the “Detection of 
Extraterrestrial Intelligent Life,” he exchanged ideas with Peter Pearman, a 
staff officer of the National Academy of Science’s (NAS) Space Studies Board 
(SSB).14 After returning to Green Bank, and with the concurrence of Struve, 
Drake proposed a “quiet symposium on extraterrestrial life” to be held in 
Green Bank which the SSB agreed to sponsor with NRAO acting as the host.15 
Pearman defined the goals of the meeting as.16
 a) The considerations which may lead to the expectation that intelligent 
transmitters are likely to be observable;
 b) Whether or not it would be worthwhile to engage in further exploratory 
investigations with existing apparatus or whether the prospects of detect-
ing an interesting event are, in fact, too small to be of interest;
 c) If the consensus turns out to be largely negative, it may be that some 
suggestions can be derived for further investigations which could be 
made either to verify or to refute the null hypothesis or which might 
enable a re-assessment to be made.
According to Drake, Pearman was trying to build support in the govern-
ment for the possibility of discovering life on other worlds (Drake 2010). It did 
not hurt that Lloyd Berkner, President of AUI, was the Chair of the SSB, 
although curiously, Berkner did not attend the Green Bank conference. 
Participation in the Green Bank conference was by invitation only and Struve 
requested that the invitees cooperate in conducting the conference “privately, 
without publicity or press coverage.”17 This became only the second scientific 
conference held in Green Bank, following the joint US-USSR radio astronomy 
meeting held six months earlier.
Held on 1–2 November 1961, the Green Bank Conference on Extraterrestrial 
Intelligent Life brought together a diverse group of scientists and engineers to 
discuss issues pertinent to communicative extraterrestrial life. Participants 
included Morrison and Cocconi; Su-Shu Huang, author of papers on planet 
formation; John C. Lilly, author of the book Man and Dolphin on dolphin 
intelligence; and chemist Melvin Calvin, who was notified during the confer-
ence that he had received the 1961 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, giving a celebra-
tory atmosphere to the gathering. Carl Sagan and Bernard Oliver also attended, 
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both of whom would later play key roles in future SETI activities. NRAO 
Director Otto Struve acted as Chair.
The Green Bank conference provided the opportunity to examine the 
assumptions Drake, Cocconi, and Morrison had previously made about extra-
terrestrial intelligent life. As previously discussed, these first publications were 
limited to technical issues in order to limit the criticism their projects would 
encounter. However, at the Green Bank conference the attendees expanded 
their analysis to include debating the possibility of the existence of extraterres-
trial life based on current understanding of astronomy, planet formation, and 
evolution, the optimum frequencies for communication, the form of messages, 
and, even at this early stage, they speculated on when it would be appropriate 
to send our own messages.
In preparation for the conference Drake organized his thoughts into a for-
mat that would shape subsequent SETI investigations for the next half century. 
The Drake Equation estimated the number of communicative civilization in 
the Galaxy by accounting for factors necessary for intelligent life to develop. 
This included the number of stars with habitable planets in the Galaxy, the frac-
tion of those planets that develop life, and most important, but also most 
uncertain, the mean lifetime of a technical, communicative civilization.
The Drake Equation is given by:
 
N R f n f f f Lp e l i c= ∗  
where
R∗ = mean rate of star formation over galactic history
fp = fraction of stars with planetary systems
ne = number of planets per planetary system with conditions ecologically suit-
able for the origin and evolution of life
fl =  fraction of suitable planets on which life originates and evolves to more 
complex forms
fi = fraction of life-bearing planets with intelligence possessed of manipulative 
capabilities
fc =  fraction of planets with intelligence that develops a technological phase 
during which there is the capability for and interest in interstellar 
communication
L = mean lifetime of a technological civilization
Throughout history humanity has often speculated on the possibility of 
extraterrestrial civilizations. In the early part of the twentieth century, there 
were even primitive attempts to make contact with Martians or civilizations 
elsewhere in the Galaxy18 (See Dick 1993, 1998). But for the first time, the 
Drake equation put these speculations on a quantitative basis. Although none 
of the factors in the Drake equation could be reliably estimated at the time, the 
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conference participants could optimistically argue that each of the first six fac-
tors could be in the range of 0.1 to 1. The big uncertainty was the lifetime of 
technically advanced civilizations, which might be as short as a few hundred 
years or as long as hundreds of millions of years for those civilizations that did 
not destroy themselves by war or by exhausting their resources.19 Subsequent 
work leading to the recognition of the widespread existence of exoplanets and 
advances in evolutionary biology has mostly confirmed these early specula-
tions, leaving L as the big uncertainty.
The camaraderie of Green Bank conference attendees was evident at the 
meeting as they dubbed themselves the Order of the Dolphin, and Calvin had 
dolphin pins made in honor of Lilly. The formation of the Order of the Dolphin 
demonstrated the sense of group identity that developed during the confer-
ence. Although the Order never developed into an official organization in any 
sense, after the meeting Carl Sagan wrote to J.B.S. Haldane inviting him to 
join the Order. Haldane’s response to Sagan’s request illustrates the type of 
organization the Order of the Dolphin was. Sagan recalled his response, “…he 
(Haldane) wrote me that membership in an organization that had no dues, no 
meetings, no responsibilities was the sort of organization he appreciated; he 
promised to try hard to live up to the duties of membership.” (Sagan 1973, 
p.  168). For the next few decades, the Green Bank conference attendees 
formed the core group of scientists involved in the search for extraterrestrial 
intelligence.
Following the 1961 Green Bank meeting, many of the still surviving partici-
pants returned to Green Bank in 1985 to celebrate the 25th anniversary of 
Project Ozma (Kellermann and Seielstad 1986) (Fig. 5.4). But at the 2010 
50th anniversary workshop, only Frank Drake himself was able to participate.20 
By the time of the 1985 conference, the search for extraterrestrial civilizations 
had split between two strategies. One approach was to look for extraterrestrial 
beacons consisting of high-powered transmitters and highly directional anten-
nas that might be pointed toward the Earth. However, beacon research assumes 
that the extraterrestrial civilization has some knowledge of the Earth as being 
inhabited by a technical society. The other approach is to look for signals result-
ing from the analogue of Earth’s entertainment broadcasting or the powerful 
defense related radars—so-called “eavesdropping.” The 1985 conference par-
ticipants vigorously debated the relative merits of the two approaches, as well 
as the effectiveness of looking outside the radio band, in particular at optical or 
infrared wavelengths, where Harvard’s Paul Horowitz was beginning an inno-
vative search.
Unlike most previous SETI conferences, the 2010 Green Bank 50th work-
shop paid less attention to technical and implementation strategies, instead 
discussing such things as the social, moral, religious, and legal implications of a 
confirmed discovery of an extraterrestrial civilization, and the likely societal 
reactions. The participants also reflected on the accomplishments and impact 
of the previous half century of SETI and speculated on the possible  consequences 
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of realizing that we may be alone in the Universe. Among the participants of 
the 2010 workshop was Judge David Tatel, the son of Howard Tatel who had 
designed the 85 foot Green Bank telescope for the Blaw-Knox Company when 
he was working at the Carnegie Institution’s Department of Terrestrial 
Magnetism. His son, David, a distinguished jurist and member of the US 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, shared his thoughts on 
the legal and moral implications of a confirmed detection of a transmission 
from an extraterrestrial civilization.
For years after Drake’s short-lived observations, Project Ozma became one 
of the most highly discussed programs at NRAO and the focus of broader dis-
cussions about NRAO.  Ozma, along with Cocconi and Morrison’s famous 
paper and the 1961 SETI Conference, launched SETI into the popular ver-
nacular (Drake and Sobel 1992). Criticism of SETI often focused on the whim-
sical nature of searching for signals from extraterrestrials and was often discussed 
in the same way as the widely debunked UFO research. Scientists such as 
Drake, Morrison, and Sagan, argued against that characterization of their 
work, claiming that the advent of the modern radio telescope provided the 
Fig. 5.4 25th Project Ozma reunion, Green Bank, 1985. Front (left to right): Bob 
Viers, Dewey Ross, Bill Meredith, Troy Henderson, Bob Uphoff. Back: George Grove, 
Fred Crews, Omar Bowyer, Frank Drake, Kochu Menon. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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technology to conduct a sober, scientific search for interstellar signals of intel-
ligent origin.
5.5  seti after Project ozma
In 1963, Drake left NRAO for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in 
Pasadena, California. Frustrated by the bureaucracy and paperwork associated 
with a NASA laboratory, he left JPL to become Director of the Cornell Arecibo 
Observatory after only a year. There he initiated a number of SETI programs, 
often in collaboration with Carl Sagan.21 In the years following Project Ozma, 
NRAO accepted proposals to use the 300 Foot and 140 Foot Radio Telescopes 
in competition with other proposals for more conventional astronomical 
research, but only if the investigators agreed to publish in the normal literature 
and not solicit undue publicity. Gerrit Verschuur used the 140 Foot and 300 
Foot Telescopes to search for intelligent signals from possible planets orbiting 
ten nearby stars (Verschuur 1973), but buried his SETI observations as part of 
a more extensive program to study galactic neutral hydrogen clouds. Only 
about a decade after Ozma, Verschuur estimated that his search was already 
about 30 times more sensitive than Drake’s Ozma. Radio astronomers Pat 
Palmer and Ben Zuckerman convinced NRAO to spend 500 hours to observe 
674 stars with the 300 Foot antenna which they dubbed Project Ozma II or 
Ozpa. But perhaps concerned that if they tried to publish in a peer reviewed 
astronomy journal they might damage their reputation as rapidly rising young 
radio astronomy stars, they reported their work first in an internal NRAO 
newsletter (Palmer and Zuckerman 1972) and later in the proceedings of a 
1979 IAU conference (Zuckerman and Tarter 1980).
In 1974, Frank Drake again shook the scientific community with a dramatic 
and bold experiment. As part of the ceremonies marking the inauguration of 
the Arecibo radio telescope upgrade, Drake used Arecibo’s powerful million- 
watt transmitter to broadcast a message to the globular cluster M13 located 
about 21,000 light years away. Drake’s message consisted of a stream of 1679 
bits of 1’s and 0’s which, he argued, any intelligent species would recognize as 
the product of the prime numbers 73 and 23. When arranged in a pattern of 
73 lines by 23 rows, the 1’s and 0’s conveyed a simple picture of human life.
Until Drake’s Arecibo message, all previous SETI research was passive. That 
is, powerful radio telescopes were used to try to receive transmissions originat-
ing from extraterrestrial civilizations. Drake reasoned that if everyone only lis-
tened, there would be no signals to receive. At a distance of 21,000 light years, 
it would be at least 42,000 years before one might expect a reply from M13. 
Nevertheless, Drake’s message generated some controversy. In England, 
Martin Ryle argued that by sending a message, Drake was irresponsibly disclos-
ing our presence to any alien civilization that might live on a planet orbiting a 
star in M13, and that there was no guarantee that such a civilization would be 
friendly. Of course, since the 1920s humans had begun broadcasting radio 
signals into space. And starting in the 1950s with the rise of powerful TV trans-
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mitters and the Distant Early Warning system (the DEW Line) radar, man-
made radio signals from the Earth were already propagating through the 
Galaxy and could be detected by alien civilizations no more advanced than our 
own. In fact, due to these  artificial radio transmissions at VHF and UHF fre-
quencies, to a distant observer the Earth appears brighter than the natural 
radio emission from the Sun.
The increasing number of SETI programs, particularly in the United States, 
perhaps fueled by Drake’s transmission to M13, raised numerous ethical, moral, 
legal, and political questions about how to react to the reception of any signal 
thought to come from an advanced extraterrestrial civilization. Should a success-
ful detection be kept confidential or immediately made public, and if made public 
should national governments be consulted first? If consulted, would govern-
ments try to classify any relevant information about the detection? If made public 
how would countries (particularly rogue countries), religious or quasi-govern-
ment groups, or even individuals be constrained from responding and perhaps 
misrepresenting our society and culture? Behind much of the debate is the uncer-
tainty about whether alien civilizations would be benevolent or would be a threat, 
intentional or not, to emerging societies, and it was noted that the history of 
contact between terrestrial civilizations is not encouraging in this respect.22
It was becoming increasingly clear not only to scientists, but to the public 
and particularly politicians, that the detection of signals sent by extraterrestrials 
or aliens would have a profound impact on human life. At worst, it was feared 
that two-way contact with aggressive aliens with advanced weaponry might 
destroy our civilization, much as the colonial powers on Earth have destroyed 
the less technologically developed earthly societies with which they came into 
contact. At the other extreme was the possibility of obtaining advanced medical 
knowledge with the promise of curing famine and disease, and providing 
advanced technologies to support human activities as well as the immeasurable 
impact to human religious beliefs. SETI was becoming too important for the 
government to leave to scientists.
At the request of Don Fuqua, Chairman of the US House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications,23 the Library of Congress 
Science Policy Research Division24 issued a report on the “Possibility of 
Intelligent Life Elsewhere in the Universe.” The report, which was compiled 
by Science and Technology Analyst Marcia Smith (Smith 1975), gave a defini-
tive update on the status of SETI research in both the United States and the 
USSR. It served to legitimize SETI and served as a blueprint for future SETI 
programs. In 1982, the International Astronomical Union set up a new com-
mission on “Bioastronomy: Search for Extraterrestrial Life.” Further legitimi-
zation of SETI came from the 1980, 1991 and 2001 National Academy of 
Sciences Decade Reviews of astronomy which recognized the Search for 
Extraterrestrial Intelligence as an important and valid area of scientific research, 
and the special role played in SETI by radio astronomy (Field 1982, p. 150–151; 
Bahcall 1991a, p. 62; McKee and Taylor 2001, p. 131–132). Perhaps an even 
more influential endorsement came from Theodore Hesburgh, President of 
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Notre Dame, who wrote, “This proposed search for extraterrestrial intelligence 
(SETI) is also a search of knowing and understanding God.” (Morrison et al. 
1977, p. vii).
In view of the large uncertainty in the nature of the signals being sought, the 
National Academy reports stressed the need for a variety of approaches by 
independent researchers, and cautioned against too much reliance on highly 
organized and visible agency-directed expensive programs such as those being 
pursued by NASA. The NASA SETI observations began in the early 1970s 
when Jill Tarter, Jeff Cuzzi, and others used the Green Bank 300 Foot Radio 
Telescope to search for narrow band radio signals.25 But by this time, it had 
become apparent that no existing or planned radio telescope probably had suf-
ficient sensitivity to detect signals from any but the nearest stars. Under the 
leadership of Bernard Oliver, NASA convened a summer study to design a 
radio telescope with at least two orders of magnitude better sensitivity than any 
existing facility that would be capable of a meaningful SETI search (Oliver and 
Billingham 1973). Project Cyclops, as it was known, was to consist of an array 
of more than one thousand 100-meter antennas. The study team also identified 
a number of exciting radio astronomy applications, but the anticipated cost of 
approximately $10 billion far exceeded any conceivable funding.26 Nevertheless, 
Oliver’s bold vision served to ignite the scientific community, especially radio 
astronomers, to the prospects for SETI investigations, as well as to begin to 
smooth the way toward the construction in the US of a large multiple antenna 
array for more conventional radio astronomy programs. But the Cyclops study 
also had a negative impact. Although never intended to be a blueprint for an 
actual construction program, the high price tag left a long-lasting stigma that 
the search for extraterrestrial civilizations involved huge amounts of money 
that could be better spent, depending on one’s outlook, on conventional 
astronomy or on addressing the nation’s sociological problems.
SETI and NASA NASA’s involvement in Project Cyclops led to a series of 
workshops organized by John Billingham at the NASA Ames Research Center. 
Billingham, who was a British military medical doctor and head of a small 
group called the Committee on Interstellar Communications within the 
Exobiology Office at Ames, had previously recruited Bernard Oliver to lead the 
Cyclops study. He was probably the first person to be head of a US government 
office with official responsibility for extraterrestrial intelligence (Billingham 
1990). Billingham’s committee was part of the NASA Life Science Division 
which was the result of NASA’s interest in life beyond the Earth. The NASA 
SETI workshops, which were chaired by Morrison, were convened to system-
atically examine the fundamental basis of SETI, the preferred search approaches, 
and the social, environmental, and political impact of the success or failure of 
SETI.  They concluded that SETI was timely and feasible, that a significant 
program would not require substantial resources, and that the US could take 
the lead in this intrinsically international endeavor.
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The report of the NASA workshop on “The Search for Extraterrestrial 
Intelligence” (Morrison et al. 1977) laid out the blueprint for the American 
SETI program for the following decades, and by the close of the 1970s, SETI 
had developed a robust community of scientists and engineers, strong public 
support, and sets of detailed options for future work. Interestingly, although 
there has been no space based component of the US SETI program, starting 
with the Ames workshops, for several decades the US SETI effort was led by 
NASA rather than by the NSF which, at the time, had no interest in life beyond 
the Earth.
The end of the 1970s brought strong challenges to further SETI research in 
the United States. In February 1978, Senator William Proxmire (Wisconsin) 
awarded SETI his infamous “Golden Fleece Award,” a dubious monthly honor 
meant to single out projects that the Senator felt wasted federal funds. In mak-
ing his announcement of the “award,” Proxmire suggested that NASA was 
“riding the wave of popular enthusiasm for Star Wars and Close Encounters of 
the Third Kind,” and proposed that SETI should be “postponed a few million 
light-years.”27 While Proxmire was often criticized for being ill-informed about 
the recipients of his Golden Fleece Award, he regularly was able to terminate 
funding for the projects he honored. SETI continued to receive some NASA 
funding, but, not wanting to threaten the more important and much more 
expensive space programs, NASA kept SETI funding below the 
Congressional radar.
However, the Golden Fleece award sparked a decades-long battle over 
NASA and even NSF funding for SETI projects. While strong scientific and 
public support successfully rebutted Proxmire’s legislative attacks on proposed 
funding, the continuing struggles over NASA funding prompted Tom Pierson 
and Jill Tarter to create the private SETI Institute and Bruce Murray and Carl 
Sagan to form the Planetary Society, both of which could operate at lower cost 
than a government agency such as NASA. By the mid-1980s, following the 
urging of Carl Sagan, Proxmire relented, apparently leaving SETI with no 
strong opponents in Washington (Drake and Sobel 1992, pp. 195–196), and 
encouraging NASA to develop the SETI Microwave Observing Project (MOP). 
Subsequently, NASA established the MOP much in the same way as other 
NASA missions, issuing a “Research Announcement” soliciting proposals for 
several facility instrumentation teams as well as the usual Interdisciplinary 
Investigators. A project office was set up at Ames and began negotiations with 
NRAO for NASA to take over the operation of the 140 Foot full time for SETI 
beginning in 1995 when the new 100 meter GBT was expected to be com-
pleted (See Chap. 10).
The Microwave Observing Project, which was later renamed the High 
Resolution Microwave Survey (HRMS) consisted of two complementary strat-
egies: the NASA Ames based Targeted Search System (TSS) and the JPL based 
Sky Survey (Dick 1993). The TSS was planned to use primarily the Green Bank 
140 Foot, the Parkes 210 foot, the Nançay 94 meter, and the 1000 foot 
Arecibo radio telescopes to examine 800 nearby stars between 1 and 3 GHz, 
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while the Sky Survey planned to use the antennas of JPL’s Deep Space Tracking 
Network in California, Australia, and Spain to search the entire sky between 1 
and 10 GHz. Each project developed its own wide bandwidth spectrum ana-
lyzer with up to 30 million independent frequency channels having a resolution 
as narrow as about 1 Hz. The NASA HRMS was formally launched on 12 
October 1992 (500 years after Columbus landed in the Bahama Islands) with 
simultaneous celebrations at the JPL Goldstone Deep Space Communications 
Complex in California and at the Arecibo Observatory in Puerto Rico. 
Ironically, although the engineers at Goldstone and Arecibo were looking for 
signals originating from many light-years away, they were unable to get the 
planned communications link between the two US sites to work.
After only a year of full funding, the HRMS and all US SETI research suf-
fered a major setback. The HRMS project was projected to cost $108 million 
spread over about a decade, and was vigorously promoted in Washington by Jill 
Tarter and others. Congressional lobbying can sometimes be successful in rais-
ing funds for a pet project, and usually at worst is ignored. Typically, a ten 
million-dollar budget item in NASA’s then seven billion-dollar annual budget 
would go unnoticed by Congress, or perhaps would be buried somewhere and 
not even appear as a line item. But the broad public interest in SETI along with 
the intense lobbying effort brought the HRMS to the attention of Democratic 
Senator Richard Bryan from Nevada. Bryan, the former governor of Nevada 
and a long-standing opponent of SETI, had unsuccessfully tried to kill the 
NASA SETI program for FY1992 and FY1993, perhaps in an attempt to get 
visibility for himself and the state of Nevada. On 20 September 1993, Bryan 
introduced a late amendment to the 1994 Housing and Urban Development 
appropriations bill to “prohibit the use of funds for” NASA’s $12 million 
HRMS funding appropriation. Only the previous day, in a Parade Magazine 
article,28 Carl Sagan had inadvertently provided fuel for Bryan’s anti-SETI 
rhetoric. Sagan’s article started out by specifically drawing attention to the 
year-old NASA SETI program and tried to minimize the cost by comparing it 
to the price of a military attack helicopter. Sagan’s article was widely distributed 
as a supplement to the 19 September Sunday newspapers around the country, 
and almost certainly came to the attention of Bryan, who introduced his 
amendment the following day. Referring to SETI as “The Great Martian 
Chase,” Bryan went on to absurdly state, “As of today millions have been spent 
and we have yet to bag a single little green fellow. Not a single Martian has said 
take me to your leader, and not a single flying saucer has applied for FAA 
approval.”29
Bryan argued that he was not against science, but pointed out that the previ-
ous year both the House and Senate had eliminated NASA’s MOP. He was 
clearly annoyed that NASA had adopted the new HRMS name, which he felt 
was a weak attempt to hide SETI funding. He argued that even after decades, 
SETI had never detected any signs of intelligent life and that $12 million could 
send 9000 needy students to the University of Nevada.30 Despite a valiant 
effort from Senators Barbara Mikulski (D-MD), Phil Graham (R-TX) and Jay 
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Rockefeller (D-WV), two days later by a voice vote, the Senate passed Bryan’s 
amendment to save taxpayers money, and NASA’s HRMS program died on the 
Senate floor.
Having just rebounded from the Hubble Space Telescope spherical aberra-
tion mirror fiasco,31 NASA was not in a strong position to argue with Congress 
for SETI funding. Formally the funding bill applied only to NASA’s 1994 
budget, but NASA was not willing to incur Congressional wrath and fight over 
this relatively small budget item that was out of the mainstream of NASA pro-
grams. Much of the previous effort and expenditures of approximately $15 
million at Ames and at JPL had gone into designing and prototyping several 
generations of high resolution multichannel spectrometers and other instru-
mentation. So there were few actual observations to use as a basis for soliciting 
additional funding. For more than a decade following Senator Bryan’s inter-
vention, SETI was an unpopular subject at NASA and at other government 
agencies such as the NSF, where SETI research was explicitly excluded from 
NSF grants until 2000. Nevertheless, NRAO continued to support modest 
SETI programs on the 140 Foot and 300 Foot Telescopes, provided they were 
not given undue publicity and the results would be published in the normal 
astronomical journals rather than the popular literature.
It was perhaps unfortunate that the national SETI program had become so 
entwined with NASA, primarily because some of the key people interested in 
SETI research happened to already work for NASA. Unlike the NSF, NASA 
has historically concentrated on big missions in space with well-defined realistic 
goals, and has not looked favorably on ground-based research. SETI as an 
ongoing research activity with constantly changing procedures and goals was 
probably more appropriate for the NSF than NASA. Ironically, SETI’s associa-
tion with NASA created the image within the astronomy community that 
SETI, like other NASA programs, had generous funding, at least in compari-
son with NSF funded research programs.
SETI Goes Private Jill Tarter and other SETI researchers have repeatedly 
pointed out SETI’s awkward situation: SETI is one of those scientific endeav-
ors that must justify additional expense for increased capability on the basis of 
previous failures (e.g., Garber 1999). Fortunately, Tarter and others have been 
able to exploit the extensive instrumentation development begun by the 
HRMS and prior NASA SETI programs. Supported largely by private funding, 
the SETI Institute initiated Project Phoenix to search the ~800 nearby stars 
originally specified by the HRMS Targeted Search. Phoenix used nearly 30 mil-
lion simultaneous 1 Hz spectral channels and had the capability to detect sig-
nals in the range between 1 and 3 GHz which might have originated from 
transmitters comparable to the most powerful terrestrial radars such as those at 
Arecibo and Goldstone. Following an extensive negotiation with NRAO, the 
SETI Institute purchased time on the Green Bank 140 Foot Radio Telescope 
for Project Phoenix. But after nearly a decade of searching with the 140 Foot 
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Telescope, as well as the Parkes, Nançay, and Arecibo radio telescopes, no con-
vincing signals from any extraterrestrial civilizations were detected.
Three other long running SETI programs need to be mentioned.32 Using 
private funding, SERENDIP or the “Search for Extraterrestrial Radio Emissions 
from Nearby Developed Intelligent Populations,” used a secondary feed for 
so-called commensal or “piggy-back” research, primarily at Arecibo and Green 
Bank, to examine random directions in the sky determined by the regularly 
scheduled astronomical program being pursued at the telescope. SERENDIP, 
which went through a series of four hardware and software upgrades, used as 
many as 168 million channels to cover a 200 MHz wide band.
At Ohio State University, following the completion of their all sky radio 
source survey in 1973, Robert Dixon and John Kraus initiated a SETI survey 
using their standing parabolic reflector which Kraus referred to as “Big Ear.” 
Kraus also self-published a journal called Cosmic Search, which promoted a 
variety of SETI programs as well as provided a broad introduction to topics in 
radio astronomy.33 Aside from a widely publicized but never confirmed “WOW” 
signal recorded on 15 August 1977, Big Ear found no signs of any signals 
originating from any extraterrestrial civilizations.34 The program ran for many 
years using largely student and volunteer labor, until the telescope was finally 
shut down. In 1998, despite widespread popular protest, Big Ear was removed 
to build a golf course.
A particularly innovative SETI activity has been the SETI@home program 
developed by Dan Wertheimer and colleagues at the University of California, 
Berkeley. SETI@home uses data taken at a number of the world’s most power-
ful radio telescopes which is then is distributed over the internet to more than 
80 million personal computers in more than 200 countries around the world 
where the data is analyzed for evidence of signals not of natural origin and not 
due to terrestrial interference. The combined computing power of the distrib-
uted SETI@home network, which operates on the host computers as a screen- 
saver, rivals that of the world’s largest super computers and has resulted in tens 
of millions of amateurs involved in what must be the largest citizen science 
programs ever implemented. However, the amateur SETI effort has not been 
confined to data analysis, as a number of amateurs have built modest facilities 
which they have used to survey the sky for signals from extraterrestrial civiliza-
tions. Many of these amateur activities are coordinated by the SETI League 
which has more than one thousand members.
Naturally, there were many false alarms, perhaps the most dramatic being 
Jocelyn Bell’s 1967 discovery of pulsars. After eliminating the possibility that 
the pulsating signals had a terrestrial origin, but noting that the pulsars had all 
the characteristics of terrestrial radar systems, Cambridge radio astronomers 
wistfully speculated that they might be observing interstellar beacons used to 
guide interstellar travel, and whimsically named them Little Green Men or 
LGMs (Bell 1984). Even earlier, Gennady Sholomitsky (1965) used a classified 
Soviet military facility in Crimea (Fig. 5.5) to observe the radio sources CTA 
21 and CTA 102 which were known to have peculiar radio spectra (Kellermann 
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et al. 1962). Sholomitsky, who was a student of the Russian astrophysicist Iosef 
Shklovsky, made the surprising discovery that over a period of only a few 
months, the strength of the radio source CTA 102 changed by about 30 
 percent (Sholomitsky 1965) (Fig. 5.6). It was difficult to explain such rapid 
variability in terms of what was then understood about synchrotron radiation 
from radio galaxies and quasars.35 On 12 April 1965 Alexander Midler, a TASS 
(Soviet equivalent of the Associated Press) science reporter, overheard a discus-
sion between Shklovsky and Nikolai Kardashev speculating that perhaps the 
observed radio emission from CTA 102 might have been generated by an 
extraterrestrial civilization, and later that day, TASS issued a “telegram” on the 
discovery by Soviet scientists of an artificial cosmic signal. At a large press con-
ference widely attended by Soviet as well as foreign press, Shklovsky and 
Kardashev, playing with the assembled journalists, did not deny the possibility 
that the signals from CTA 102 were due to an extraterrestrial intelligence 
(Fig. 5.7). The press took it seriously, and the 14 April 1965 issue of Pravda 
reported that extraterrestrials were signaling the Earth. The startling news 
quickly spread to newspapers throughout the Soviet Union and around the 
Fig. 5.5 The ADU-1000 antenna at the Evpatoria Deep Space Communication and 
Control Center in Crimea used by Gennady Sholomitsky in 1964 and 1965 to observe 
CTA 102. The array of eight 16 meter diameter antennas was built from parts of a 
Soviet battleship, a military railway bridge, and the hull of a captured Italian submarine. 
Credit: State Space Agency of Ukraine
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world. The Byrds, a famous rock group, popularized a song about extraterres-
trials from CTA 102 that even entered the peer reviewed scientific literature.36
Approaching the close of the twentieth century, the SETI Institute inaugu-
rated a new study to review the status of SETI and plan for the future. Over an 
18-month period in 1998 and 1999, the SETI Science and Technology 
Fig. 5.7 From left to right, on the steps of Moscow State University, Gennady 
Sholomitsky, Josef Shklovsky, and Nikolai Kardashev having a good laugh following the 
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Fig. 5.6 Variability of CTA 102 from late 1963 to mid-1965 as it appeared in Pravda. 
Filled circles show the flux density of CTA 102 relative to 3C 48. The open circles are 
for CTA 21. Credit: Courtesy of the Sholomitsky family
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Working Group (SSTWG), led by Australian radio astronomer Ronald Ekers, 
met on four occasions to develop a strategy for both the near term as well as 
the long term opportunities for SETI. The Working Group report confirmed 
that searches in the electromagnetic spectrum should continue including opti-
cal as well as radio wavelengths; that both targeted and sky surveys are needed; 
that telescopes be developed with multiple beams; that searches include both 
narrow band signals as well as broad band pulsed emissions; that the focus 
should be on the detection of beacons, but although thought to be less likely, 
the eavesdropping scenario should not be excluded; and that multiple site 
detection systems be used to discriminate against terrestrial interference, thus 
greatly improving the credibility of the search (Ekers et al. 2002).
An important outcome of the SSTWG study, the impact of which went well 
beyond SETI, was the development of the Large-N-Small-D (LNSD) concept 
to build up a very large collecting area by using many small, possibly commer-
cially available dishes and receivers, instead of a single large aperture. The 
SSTWG recommended the construction of the One hectare Radio Telescope 
(1hT) which later became the basis of the proposal to build the Allen Telescope 
Array. The LNSD concept was further developed by the US Square Kilometre 
Array (SKA) Consortium as part of a proposal from the United States to build 
the International SKA, consisting of thousands of 12 meter class dishes spread 
throughout the western United States. The United States later withdrew from 
the SKA project, but the International SKA mid-frequency design, which plans 
to include first hundreds then thousands of 15 meter (49 foot) diameter anten-
nas to be erected at a remote site in South Africa, is also based on the LNSD 
concept developed by the SETI Institute’s SSTWG (Sect. 11.7).
With the less than enthusiastic interest in SETI at NASA and at the NSF, US 
SETI activities have depended more and more on growing private philan-
thropy. In addition to the modest donations from thousands of individuals, 
people such as Bernard Oliver from Hewlett Packard, Microsoft co-founder 
Paul Allen, and Nathan Myhrvold, who made his fortune as Chief Technology 
Officer at Microsoft, generously supported the search for extraterrestrial civili-
zations. A potentially major advance to SETI research came from Paul Allen’s 
gifts amounting to $30 million to construct the first radio telescope specifically 
dedicated to the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence. The Allen Telescope 
Array (ATA) was expected to include 350 six meter diameter dishes to obtain a 
total collecting area of about 10,000 square meters—roughly the equivalent of 
a 100 meter diameter steerable dish antenna. The monolithic parabolic reflect-
ing surface of each antenna was designed to be stamped out from a single mold 
instead of the conventional construction method using a large number of small 
panels. However, the design and construction of the antenna structure and the 
associated electronics proved to be more complicated and more expensive than 
anticipated, so the available funds only permitted the construction of 42 of the 
originally planned 351 antennas or 12% of the planned collecting area.
The ATA, which is located at the Hat Creek Radio Observatory in northern 
California, began operation in 2007. As has been the case for many modern 
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radio telescopes, especially in the United States, operating funds turned out to 
be even more difficult to raise than construction funds. Following a brief fund-
ing hiatus in 2011, the ATA has been operated by SRI International with 
 support largely from the US Air Force for a variety of programs, including 
SETI as well as conventional radio astronomy, to complement several Defense 
Department programs.
5.6  seti in the ussr
Interestingly, outside of the United States, it was primarily scientists in the 
Soviet Union, inspired by the imaginative astrophysicist Iosef Shklovsky, who 
have been seriously involved in SETI research.37 Unlike the American pro-
grams which concentrated on high spectral resolution to look for very narrow 
band radio signals, the Soviet effort, largely led by Vsevolod Troitsky, consid-
ered broad band very short time duration pulses as well as monochromatic 
radio emissions.38 (See Troitsky et al. 1971, 1974). On the theoretical side, 
Nikolai Kardashev’s famous paper on Type I, Type II, and Type III civiliza-
tions focused on the development of civilizations based on their ability to har-
ness the energy from their planet, their sun, and their galaxy respectively 
(Kardashev 1964). Kardashev also argued that the broad spectral region near 
the 1421 MHz hydrogen line had minimum noise and so was optimum for 
SETI research.
Characteristically, the Soviet SETI program was more structured than its 
American counterpart. Like much scientific research in the USSR, especially if 
related to electronics, computers, or other high tech instrumentation, there 
was a significant government component, generally through the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences. Drake even remarked,
I believe … it had little to do, in my opinion, with a wide regard for the search 
enterprise itself, but was more of a reflection of the state of Soviet science in gen-
eral, particularly the lack of peer review. There was also a political motive behind 
the government support for these activities: The authorities correctly perceived 
the search enterprise as an area where Soviets could compete with and possibly 
excel over American efforts (Drake and Sobel 1992, p. 96).
Following Project Ozma, in 1964 Soviet astronomers met at the Armenian 
Byurakan Astrophysical Observatory for the Soviet National Conference on 
Problems of Communication with Extraterrestrial Civilizations to set out a 
plan for future SETI research (Tovmasyan 1964). This early Soviet conference 
was a remarkable preview of SETI conferences that would be held over the 
course of the next half century and included speculations on the multiplicity of 
inhabited worlds, the existence of alien civilizations at various levels of develop-
ment, the best means for establishing communication, how to distinguish an 
extraterrestrial signal sent by an advanced alien civilization from terrestrial 
interference, as well as the problems of linguistics. The conference concluded 
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that it would be appropriate to begin a simultaneous program of transmission 
and reception of radio signals. Reacting to skepticism about transmitting, 
Shklovsky argued that starting to transmit was like burying a time capsule—
only more expensive.
In 1972 the Soviet Academy considered and approved a national research 
program on “Communication with Extraterrestrial Civilizations” (Scientific 
Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences 1975). The intended Soviet pro-
gram included targeted searches and all sky surveys at both radio and infrared 
wavelengths, searches for monochromatic signals as well as broad band pulses, 
and noted the need for special attention to develop the techniques that would 
be needed to decipher any received signals. Interestingly, however, there was 
no mention of transmitting in the 1972 plan.
In a noteworthy departure from the Cold War atmosphere of the time, in 
May 1971 scientists from the USSR and the US gathered at the Byurakan 
Observatory in Soviet Armenia for the first ever international conference about 
the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (Fig. 5.8). The Byurakan conference, 
Fig. 5.8 Participants in the 1971 US-USSR SETI Symposium at the Armenian 
Byurakan Observatory. One of the present authors (KIK) is standing in the back 5th 
from the right wearing dark glasses. Standing in the front are Frank Drake (6th from 
left), Vitaly Ginzburg (7th from left), Carl Sagan (9th from left). Credit: KIK/NRAO/
AUI/NSF
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which was co-sponsored by the Soviet and US Academies of Science, was 
remarkable in bringing together scientists from a wide range of disciplines, 
including anthropology, linguistics, biology, and world history as well as astro-
physics and SETI, to discuss the scientific basis for intelligent life elsewhere in 
the Universe; the technical and sociological challenges of SETI; and the moral, 
social, and legal implications of a successful detection. Critical to the meeting 
was Boris Belitsky, who served as the incredible bilingual nearly real-time trans-
lator. Belitsky was born in the United States and grew up in the Soviet Union 
with his parents who had emigrated in the 1930s. He was the English language 
science editor for Radio Moscow and had served as the translator at the 1960 
trial of Francis Gary Powers after his U-2 spy plane was shot down by a Soviet 
missile over Soviet territory.39
The Byurakan conference confirmed that the search for extraterrestrial intel-
ligence was technically feasible; that a successful detection would have a pro-
found influence on the future of civilization on Earth; that a successful search 
would likely require a large expenditure of funds and resources, but that a 
modest start was feasible and was recommended. The group also made some 
specific recommendations for future work to search for civilizations not only at 
our own level of technical development, but also at a “level greatly surpassing 
our own” and discussed building “a decimeter radio telescope with an effective 
area ≥1 km2.” The recommendations included searches for narrow band sig-
nals, but also for strong impulsive signals from both ground and in space, and 
set the agenda for SETI research for the next decades.40 Two later meetings of 
USSR and US SETI scientists were held in Tallinn, Estonia in 1981 (Sullivan 
1982) and in Santa Cruz, California in 1991, although by the time of the Santa 
Cruz meeting SETI research had all but ceased in the rapidly crumbling 
USSR41 (See Shostak 1993).
5.7  continuing seti Programs
The Soviet focus on the evolution of civilizations mirrored the development of 
SETI in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. With time and the progress 
of astronomical research, the rate of star formation in the Galaxy, the fraction 
of stars with planets, and the number of habitable planets were reliably esti-
mated, even measured, and is now known to be very large. Thus, the biggest 
uncertainty about the number of advanced communicative civilizations is still 
the formation and longevity of intelligent civilizations. But even as early as his 
1961 lecture at the Philosophical Society of Washington, Drake commented,42
The number of civilizations with which we might communicate today is strongly 
affected by the average length of time during which technology and motivation 
allow a civilization to be contacted. We have a very poor estimate of this time at 
present, with a resultant large uncertainty in the number of civilizations we 
might contact.
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Our increasing recognition of the ubiquity of planets around other stars in 
the Galaxy, combined with the improvement by many orders of magnitude of 
the sensitivity of SETI programs and the lack of any positive detections, has 
raised a concern for the future of humanity. As early as 1950, Enrico Fermi is 
said to have famously asked, “Where is Everybody?”43 leading to many specula-
tions ranging from the motivations of extraterrestrials to a worrisome short 
value of L due to the inevitable self-destruction of technological civilizations, 
whether from war or environmental negligence. The scientific debate over the 
lifetime of civilizations echoed the vociferous debates over nuclear weapons 
during the Cold War period. The threat of global annihilation particularly 
impacted US and Soviet SETI scientists, perhaps motivating them to better 
understand our place in the Universe and the lifetime of our own civilization. 
Indeed, at the Green Bank 25th anniversary Project Ozma celebration, 
Sebastian von Hoerner, who had served in the German army on the Russian 
front and later lived through the 1945 Allied destruction of Dresden, explained 
that the aftermath of Dresden was “much more gruesome” than any fictional 
apocalypse, and that it will be not the day after a nuclear war but “it is the year 
after, when all of the food has been eaten up and when the thin skin of our civi-
lization comes peeling off in large chunks.” (von Hoerner 1985, p. 3).
In 2016, Frank Drake and SETI returned to Green Bank. Yuri Milner, a 
Russian billionaire, has pledged $100 million over a ten-year period to support 
SETI investigations at the Green Bank Telescope, the Parkes 210 foot dish, the 
500 Meter FAST fixed radio telescope in central China, and elsewhere. Milner’s 
Breakthrough Listen project will search a million Galactic stars and 100 nearby 
galaxies. This project is led by former Air Force General Pete Worden, the for-
mer Director of the NASA Ames Research Center and one of the leaders of 
President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as Star 
Wars), with the support of Frank Drake, Sir Martin Rees, and the late Stephen 
Hawking. Milner started out studying physics at Moscow State University. 
Apparently his teacher, Andrei Sakharov, was not impressed with Milner’s 
promise in physics, and suggested that he might consider a different career. 
This inspired Milner to study business at the University of Pennsylvania and to 
go on to a very successful career in finance. More than half a century after 
Frank Drake’s Project Ozma, with Milner’s generosity, Green Bank is again 
probing the skies for signals from extraterrestrial intelligent civilizations, but 
with more than a million times better sensitivity than Project Ozma. Thus 
Breakthrough Listen can detect in one second a signal that would have taken 
Project Ozma 100,000 years. On the downside, the radio spectrum is vastly 
more polluted now than it was more than half a century ago for Project Ozma. 
Today, SETI has to deal with the proliferation of interfering signals from com-
mercial, military, and scientific satellites, as well as from a wide range of ter-
restrial transmissions, interference which will only get worse with time.
In the more than half-century since Project Ozma, a small group of dedi-
cated enthusiasts such as Kardashev, Oliver, Drake, Bracewell, Kraus, Morrison, 
and later Tarter have remained passionate about the need to search for alien 
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intelligence. Others such as University of Virginia’s Robert Rood, Shklovsky, 
and von Hoerner later became disillusioned about the prospects for a successful 
detection, while yet others saw SETI as a backdoor approach to fund new large 
radio telescope systems, or to protect the radio spectrum from interference. 
Further, the continued lack of any observational evidence for extraterrestrial 
civilizations has led to serious objections from some about the justification for 
SETI research. Others, such as the SETI Institute’s Jill Tarter (2010), point 
out that only a very small amount of the nine-dimensional “cosmic haystack” 
(3 directions, time, frequency, modulation, sensitivity, and 2 polarizations) has 
been searched for the illusive needle in the cosmic haystack. Sir Martin Rees 
famously pointed out, “The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence,” 
(Oliver and Billingham 1973, p. 3) a remark arguably made even more famous 
by Carl Sagan in defense of his continued support for SETI.  Starting with 
Drake’s Project Ozma, NRAO has treated proposals for SETI the same as 
more conventional astronomical research programs. While there was no secrecy, 
neither was there any undue publicity associated with the NRAO SETI propos-
als. Even during the period when the NSF would not entertain grant proposals 
for SETI, NRAO continued to support modest SETI proposals on the 140 and 
300 Foot Telescopes. Considering that the proposed NASA SETI program 
amounted to less than 0.1 percent of the NASA budget, one cannot help but 
wonder whether, if there had been less publicity and lobbying by the NASA 
SETI researchers, they might have escaped the scrutiny of Congress.
Probably no other subject in the history of science has had more confer-
ences held or books published based on the absence of any experimental results. 
Indeed, it is hard to think of any other area of human inquiry where we know 
less about what we are looking for, where to look, how to look, or even if there 
is anything to look for. Astronomers know much more about the planets, stars, 
and galaxies than about the technology and motivation of extraterrestrials, but 
as discussed in Sect. 6.2, astronomers did not do a very good job of predicting 
cosmic masers, pulsars, quasars, solar and Jupiter radio storms, gravitational 
lenses, the cosmic microwave background, the rotation of Mercury and Venus, 
or indeed cosmic radio emission itself, until they stumbled across them in the 
course of other investigations, some of which were motivated by commercial 
and military goals or as demonstrations of national strength and prestige. SETI 
search strategy is an interesting intellectual exercise, but may not lead to any-
thing. The first detection of an intelligent communicative extraterrestrial civili-
zation may well come from a similar serendipitous discovery, perhaps even by 
an amateur, rather than a directed SETI investigation. Nevertheless, there is 
universal agreement, as argued in the National Academy of Science 1991 
Decade Review of astronomy that, “A successful ‘contact’ would be one of the 
greatest events in the history of mankind.” (Bahcall 1991b, p. I–13).
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notes
1. ROTC is the Reserve Officers Training Corp, a university program to train mili-
tary officers. ROTC students received a stipend to cover their education 
expenses toward a four year degree in return for a commitment to serve in the 
active military.
2. Drake was recruited by Dave Heeschen and joined NRAO on 1 January 1958 
but spent the first few months finishing up his PhD thesis at Harvard and plan-
ning the 85 foot research program. For further information about Drake’s 
childhood and education see Chap. 1 in Drake and Sobel (1992).
3. We will use SETI throughout this chapter to refer to both individual projects 
and the general field of research dealing with the detection of radio signals from 
extraterrestrial civilizations. The term SETI came into common use in the 
1970s. Throughout the 1960s scientists referred to the various components of 
what became known as SETI by many names including interstellar signals, com-
munication with extraterrestrial life, communicative civilizations. The term 
SETI can originally be traced back to the 1971 Communication with 
Extraterrestrial Intelligence (CETI) Conference held at the Byurakan 
Astrophysical Observatory in Armenia. At the conference, Drake, Kardashev, 
and Shklovsky acknowledged that you first have to find extraterrestrials before 
you can communicate with them. The phrase “search for extraterrestrial intelli-
gence” first appears in Project Cyclops (Oliver and Billingham 1973), the 1972 
NASA study on detecting extraterrestrial intelligent life. Another NASA study 
led by Phil Morrison in 1977 on the same topic was the first to use SETI as an 
acronym. SETI quickly became the standard terminology of the field.
4. The Zeeman effect results from a magnetic field which splits the 21 cm line of 
neutral hydrogen into multiple lines. Since the separation of the lines is propor-
tional to the magnetic field strength, the Zeeman effect can be used to deter-
mine the magnetic field strength in hydrogen clouds.
5. Epsilon Eridani is now known to have at least one planet, known as Epsilon 
Eradani b, which orbits the star with a period of 6.85 years. However, Epsilon 
Eradani b has a mass about 1.5 times that of Jupiter and so may be unable to 
support any kind of life (Benedict et al. 2006).
6. Pulsars were unknown at the time, see Kellermann and Seielstad (1986), p. 25.
7. Otto Struve, Karl Taylor Compton Lecture Series, MIT Libraries, Institute 
Archives and Special Collections.
8. Actually, the Cocconi and Morrison paper was already published in the 19 
September issue of Nature, but a copy had not yet reached Green Bank.
9. Drake to Paine (NSF), 19 October 1959, NAA-NRAO, DO, Conferences, 
Symposia, and Colloquia.
10. New York Times, 22 November 1960, p. E 11.
11. Indeed, a small band centered on the 1420.4 MHz hydrogen line is the only 
globally protected frequency on Earth.
12. Between the 1.4 GHz hydrogen line and the 1.7 GHz OH hydroxyl line is the 
water (H + OH=H2O) hole.
13. Near Roswell, New Mexico, beginning on 7 July 1946, local ranchers found 
debris from a crash, and the US military quickly launched an effort to recover 
the debris. The official explanation of the event attributes this debris to the col-
lapse of a military surveillance balloon. However, the more popular explanation 
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 attributed the debris to a downed spaceship that contained alien life, which the 
US government covered up with their official version of the events. The Roswell 
UFO incident, as it was called, became the most famous supposed UFO encoun-
ter, though the 1950s and 1960s marked a high point in reports of such phe-
nomena. For information on the Roswell Incident and encounters with 
extraterrestrial life, see Clark (1993).
14. Pearman to Villard, 13 March 1961, NAS-NRC-A, Organized Collections, 
SSB, Conferences, Extraterrestrial Intelligent Life.
15. Drake to Pearman, 13 March 1961, NAS-NRC-A, Organized Collections, SSB, 
Conferences, Extraterrestrial Intelligent Life.
16. Pearman to File, 9 June 1961, NAS-NRC-A, Organized Collections, SSB, 
Conferences, Extraterrestrial Intelligent Life.
17. Letter of invitation to the Green Bank conference from Otto Struve to approxi-
mately 20 invitees, NAA-NRAO, DO Conferences, Symposia, Colloquia.
18. People like Heinrich Hertz, Guglielmo Marconi, Nicola Tesla, Donald Menzel, 
and even Albert Einstein considered methods to communicate with extrater-
restrials, particularly Martians.
19. See Pearman (1963) for a discussion of the 1961 Green Bank SETI Conference.
20. A webcast of the 2010 conference is available at https://vimeo.com/
album/3095975
21. Sullivan interview of Drake, 27 April 1979, NAA-WTS, Individuals. https://
science.nrao.edu/about/publications/open-skies#section-5
22. A non-binding protocol that recommends how the detection of extraterrestrial 
intelligence should be disseminated was authored by the International Academy 
of Astronautics and the International Institute of Space Law, and now has been 
adopted by a group of individuals and institutions participating in the search for 
extraterrestrial intelligence. http://www.seti.org/post-detection.html. 
However, like many other well-intentioned agreements, it was not signed by all 
potential signal recipients and, in any event, is not enforceable.
23. Part of the House Committee on Science and Technology.
24. The Library of Congress Science Policy Research Division, later known as the 
Congressional Research Service, provides bipartisan information to Congress.
25. Tarter et al. (1980) used the NRAO VLBI recording system (see Sect. 8.4) to 
digitally record a 360 kHz IF band which they subsequently analyzed in a CDC 
7600 computer. In this way they were able to create an early form of post- 
observation Digital Signal Processing to implement a multichannel spectrome-
ter with more channels and narrower bandwidths than then possible with 
conventional analogue hardware.
26. Probably the true cost of building Cyclops would have vastly exceeded the $10 
billion estimate given in the Cyclops report, which was only $10 million per 
100-m antenna exclusive of instrumentation. For the VLA, the cost of the 
instrumentation was about twice the cost of the antenna elements.
27. Press release from Senator William Proxmire, 16 February 1978.
28. “The Search for Signals from Space,” Parade Magazine, 19 September 1993.
29. Senator Richard Bryan Press Release, 22 September 1993.
30. Congressional Record, 20 September 1993.
31. When launched in 1990 after more than a decade of development and huge cost 
overruns, the Hubble Space Telescope mirror was found to have been incor-
rectly ground, resulting in badly defocused images.
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32. For a full list of SETI projects undertaken between 1959 and 1992 see Drake 
and Sobel (1992).
33. Between 1979 and 1982 John Kraus and his students published 4 volumes of 
Cosmic Search.
34. On 15 April 1977 Big Ear registered a short lived but strong signal, character-
istic of a cosmic rather than terrestrial origin. When looking later at the recorded 
telescope output chart, Jerry Ehman wrote, “Wow.” See Grey (2012).
35. The argument went that if a radio source varied on a time scale of 100 days it 
could not be more than 100 light days across, otherwise the signals from differ-
ent parts of the source would arrive at different times and the variability would 
be smeared out. In such a small source, the density of relativistic electrons 
responsible for the observed synchrotron radiation would be so great that the 
radiation would be self-absorbed and not able to escape the source.
36. In 1968, after receiving the referee’s report, Eugene Epstein of the Aerospace 
Corporation sneaked a note about the Byrds’ CTA 102 song into their 
Astrophysical Journal paper about radio source variability. See Schorn et  al. 
(1968). One of the present authors (KIK) was the referee of this otherwise seri-
ous publication.
37. In 1960, Shklovsky wrote a stimulating article in the Soviet journal Priroda, No. 
7, 21 which was reprinted in Interstellar Communication, ed. A. G. W. Cameron 
(New York: W. A. Benjamin), p. 1.
38. Other related programs involved the Moscow Power Institute, the All-Union 
Electrical Engineering Institute of Communications, the Russian Language 
Institute, and the USSR Academy of Sciences.
39. Powers was flying over the USSR as part of a CIA mission to monitor Soviet 
nuclear weapons development. Unexpectedly, his U2 aircraft was shot down by 
a Soviet missile on 1 May 1960; Powers survived and was taken prisoner by the 
KGB. President Eisenhower, not knowing that Powers had survived, initially 
claimed that it was a weather plane that had drifted off course. Powers was tried 
and found guilty of spying, but was returned to the US in exchange for Soviet 
spy Rudolf Abel. Powers later died in a helicopter crash while reporting on Los 
Angeles traffic for a local TV station.
40. Reports of the 1971 US-USSR CETI Conference, which was attended by one 
of the authors (KIK), are given in a short report by the Organizing Committee, 
chaired by V.A.  Ambartsumian (1972) and in a colorful article written by 
Freeman Dyson (1971).
41. The Third Decennial US-USSR Conference on SETI was held in August 1991, 
just a week prior to the ouster of the USSR leader Mikhail Gorbachev that led 
to the collapse of the USSR five months later.
42. Frank Drake, “Detection of Extraterrestrial Intelligent Life,” Washington 
Philosophical Society, Smithsonian Institution Archives, Washington, DC. We 
are grateful to Steven Dick for providing us with copies of the records of Drake’s 
talk.
43. This is known as “The Fermi Paradox.”
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CHAPTER 6
The Bar Is Open
With the successful completion of the 140 Foot Radio Telescope in 1965, and 
the increased use of the 300 Foot Telescope, NRAO finally began to serve its 
role as a national observatory. Any scientist with a good program had access to 
world class facilities without regard for institutional affiliation—a policy which 
later became known as “Open Skies.”
These were exciting years for radio astronomy. In addition to NRAO, new 
powerful radio telescopes at Caltech, MIT, and Cornell in the US, and in 
Australia, Canada, the UK, and later the Netherlands and Germany, were mak-
ing exciting new observations. During a period of only a few decades in the 
middle of the twentieth century, radio astronomers made a series of discoveries 
which fundamentally changed our understanding of our Universe and its con-
stituents. Radio astronomy was at last recognized as a legitimate part of astron-
omy. NRAO flourished in this exciting environment and became the poster 
child for the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) support for large expensive 
scientific facilities, an expansion of their traditional role of funding individual 
research grants.
6.1  NRAO ReAches MAtuRity
With the dedication of the 140 Foot Telescope in 1965, NRAO was finally a 
true national observatory with multiple state-of-the art facilities. The 300 Foot 
Telescope had been in operation for three years, the new 140 Foot Telescope 
offered unprecedented opportunities for centimeter wavelength research, and 
the Green Bank Interferometer was about to begin operation (Fig. 6.1).
Administration Partly as a result of the separation of activities between Green 
Bank and Charlottesville, but due also to the increasing size of the NRAO 
operation and the resignation of the NRAO Business Manager Frank Callender 
in 1965, NRAO Director Dave Heeschen reorganized the administrative struc-
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ture of the Observatory. Hein Hvatum and Ted Riffe (Fig. 6.2) were appointed 
as Assistant Directors of Technical Services and Administration, respectively, 
while Bill Howard became Assistant to the Director. Hvatum had responsibility 
for the electronics lab, the machine shops, and telescope operations. Riffe was 
in charge of business management and plant maintenance, and continued in his 
role as the NRAO Fiscal Officer. Hvatum moved to Charlottesville but the 
division heads who reported to him remained in Green Bank, creating an 
administrative challenge. Riffe remained in Green Bank, where he was respon-
sible for the Green Bank site operations, but was replaced in 1968 by John 
Findlay as Assistant Director for Green Bank Operations. Fred Crews was for-
mally in charge of only the Telescope Operations Division, but with time 
assumed more and more responsibilities for all operations in Green Bank. John 
Hungerbuhler, who had come to Green Bank to assist Max Small during the 
final years of the 140 Foot construction, was the Chief of the Engineering 
Division and Thomas Williams was in charge of Plant Maintenance. Heeschen 
ruled NRAO from Charlottesville with a firm (some would say iron) hand. 
Once, when describing the NRAO organizational structure, Heeschen drew 
two circles on a blackboard connected with a vertical line. In the upper circle 
he wrote “Me,” and in the lower circle, “Everyone Else.”
The commute between Green Bank and Charlottesville was not as easy one. 
In the first years after the move, before a series of road improvements, it would 
Fig. 6.1 Aerial view of the NRAO Green Bank site showing the three element inter-
ferometer, the 300 Foot transit dish, and the 140 Foot Telescope in the background. 
Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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take a careful driver nearly three hours to make the trip between the two sites—
more, if one were to get stuck behind a slow-moving logging truck. Several 
local speed traps along the way presented an additional challenge, but that did 
not inhibit the more ambitious drivers, including the NRAO Director, from an 
unofficial competition to see who could post the best time. Regular communi-
cation between Green Bank and Charlottesville was facilitated by a daily car 
shuttle and dedicated telephone lines. Each day cars departed from the two 
sites at precisely 9:00 a.m. carrying passengers, equipment, and data. The two 
cars met at a halfway point on a mountaintop which still shows the remains of 
a Confederate Civil War encampment (Fig. 6.3). The drivers exchanged cars so 
that each driver could return to his home, and the passengers and equipment 
continued to their destination, arriving at noon at the other site. Although 
visiting Green Bank observers could fly into more local airports in Elkins or 
Clarksburg, West Virginia, many chose to go through Charlottesville, where 
they could first meet with NRAO staff to discuss their observing programs. 
Green Bank staff returning from a trip would usually fly into one of the local 
airports where they would be met anytime of the day or night by an NRAO 
driver who would return them to Green Bank. The drivers were all long-time 
local residents who would help make the time pass by relating tales of local his-
tory, no doubt with some embellishment.
The split of operations between Green Bank and Charlottesville, and later 
Tucson and Socorro, was not without problems. Gone were the informal con-
tacts between the scientists in Charlottesville and the engineers, who were 
mostly based at the observing sites, and the culture was akin to that of colonies 
Fig. 6.2 Ted Riffe served as the NRAO Assistant then Associate Director for 
Administration. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
6 THE BAR IS OPEN 
266
with all major decisions made at the Charlottesville Headquarters. Interestingly, 
after the Charlottesville office was opened in late 1965, it was mostly the US 
staff members who took advantage of the opportunity to move from Green 
Bank, leaving behind scientists who had come to NRAO from such varied 
places as England, Germany, Netherlands, Iraq, India, Poland, and Sweden. 
Often the only US member of the NRAO Scientific Staff found in Green Bank 
was one of the present authors, Kellermann. On one occasion, Sebastian von 
Hoerner’s sons put up a sign on the road leading to the housing area reading, 
“You are now leaving the American Zone,” a spoof on the then divided German 
city of Berlin.
In 1969, John Findlay was replaced by Mort Roberts as Assistant Director 
for Green Bank Operations, and in 1970, Dave Hogg returned to Green Bank 
as the Assistant Director. Hogg was succeeded by Bill Howard in 1974, when 
Hogg returned to Charlottesville to become Associate Director for NRAO 
Operations with broad responsibility for both the Tucson and Green Bank site 
operations. Reflecting the increased size and complexity of the Observatory, 
the Assistant Directors for Tucson and Green Bank Operations now reported 
to Hogg rather than Heeschen, who was increasingly turning his attention to 
the Very Large Array (VLA) (Chap. 7). Recognizing the increased  responsibilities 
Fig. 6.3 Green Bank—Charlottesville daily shuttle cars meeting at the halfway point 
to exchange passengers, equipment, and data. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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resulting from the growing administrative staff needed to deal with the VLA, 
as well as the increasingly complex NRAO operations, in 1976 Ted Riffe 
became the Associate Director for Administration and served in this capacity 
until he retired in 1987 and was succeeded by James (Jim) Desmond. Bill 
Howard left NRAO in late 1976 to become Assistant Director of the Astronomy 
Division at the NSF and was replaced by Ken Kellermann as Acting Assistant 
Director in Green Bank before Kellermann went to Germany to become direc-
tor at the Max Planck Institut für Radio Astronomy in Bonn. Bob Brown 
became the Green Bank Assistant Director in June 1977, followed by Rick 
Fisher (1981), Martha Haynes (1982), and George Seielstad (1984). After 
Seielstad’s departure to the more urban environment of Grand Forks, North 
Dakota, a number of technical and scientific staff cycled through as Green Bank 
Assistant Directors until 2008, when Karen O’Neill assumed that role.
Phyllis Jackson, who was born and educated in Marlinton, West Virginia, 
joined NRAO in April 1959 to provide secretarial support to the new 
Observatory in Green Bank. In 1965 Phyllis moved to Charlottesville with the 
Scientific Staff. For 38 years, until she retired in 1997, she ran the Director’s 
office with great efficiency. Many believed that, in effect, Phyllis Jackson ran 
the organization. Among her numerous skills was her lightning fast typing 
speed, and she often typed scientific papers, correcting the spelling and English 
of young scientists lacking in those skills (Fig. 6.4).
The National Science Foundation Organizational changes also occurred at the 
NSF. Initially, NRAO reported to Randal (Randy) Robertson at the NSF, and 
was administered out of a separate division headed by Daniel Hunt, which 
Fig. 6.4 Phyllis Jackson, longtime secretary to NRAO Directors, ca. 1983. Credit: 
NRAO/AUI/NSF
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dealt with all of the National Facilities such as NRAO and the Kitt Peak 
National Observatory (KPNO). In this way, funding for grants to individual 
scientists, which was under the Division of Astronomy headed by Robert 
Fleisher, was kept separate from that of the National Centers. However, in 
1976 the NSF placed the National Astronomy Centers under the Astronomy 
Division. This pitted NRAO funding against proposals for individual research 
grants, setting up a competition for funding that continues to this day.
Mark Price, who had previously been the first NSF Spectrum Manager, 
became the Acting Director of the new Astronomy Division until Bill Howard 
was appointed as the permanent Director in November 1976. Under Howard, 
Price remained in charge of the individual investigator grants program, and 
Ronald LaCount administered the facilities. Price left the NSF in 1979 to 
accept an appointment as Chair of the Physics Department at the University of 
New Mexico in Albuquerque, and was replaced by Morris Aizenman as head of 
the grants program. Throughout his tenure as AST Director, Howard strove to 
keep the centers and grants funding in the constant ratio of 2 to 1, but resigned 
in 1982 over the contentious issues surrounding the abandonment of the con-
troversial NRAO 25 meter millimeter wave telescope (Sects. 8.7 and 10.3).
On 1 May 1986, the Astronomy Division was moved from the Directorate 
for Astronomy, Atmospheric, Earth, and Ocean Sciences (AAEO), sometimes 
referred to as the division for “Earth, Air, Fire, and Water,” to the Directorate 
for Mathematical and Physical Sciences, and AAEO became simply the 
Directorate for Geosciences.
Scientific Staff The NRAO scientific staff was structured following the AUI 
policy originally put in place for Brookhaven. This typically consisted of a series 
of two- or three-year term appointments as Assistant, then Associate Scientist, 
followed by an “up-or-out” tenure decision and promotion to the rank of 
Scientist. Members of the NRAO Scientific Staff generally divided their time 
between independent research and the development of new facilities and 
instrumentation as well as providing support for visiting users. Although he 
delegated most operational responsibilities to others, throughout his tenure as 
the NRAO Director Dave Heeschen remained in direct charge of the scientific 
staff.
In addition to the regular scientific staff, there was a steady flow of 
Research Associate or postdoctoral appointments meant to give new PhDs 
full time opportunities for research. Research Associates generally had no 
observatory responsibilities and were expected to move on after a two- or 
three-year temporary appointment. To give the Research Associate appoint-
ments more prestige and to compete with the NASA Hubble Fellowship and 
various university prize fellowships, the NRAO Research Associates were 
later called Karl Jansky Fellows, and the doctoral students became Grote 
Reber Predoctoral Fellows.
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Tenured appointments at NRAO were granted by AUI in recognition of 
outstanding research accomplishments or other intellectually creative activity 
appropriate to the mission of the Observatory, and could only be terminated 
by the AUI Board for financial exigency or what AUI called “moral turpitude,” 
a concept which no one really understood, but which was apparently never 
tested. The meaning of tenure at an organization such as AUI is unclear, but 
was intended to offer some degree of security of continued employment. 
Tenured staff were expected to provide leadership in the planning, design, 
construction, and operation of the NRAO facilities as well as carry out a vigor-
ous program of individual research. Tenured staff members had some freedom 
to direct their own efforts, but, starting in the 1970s, the design and operation 
of the VLA, and then the Very Long Baseline Array (VLBA), required more 
staff support than could be provided by the limited number of tenured staff, 
and NRAO adopted the practice of offering “continuing” or “indefinite” 
appointments that were neither tenured nor term appointments. Those scien-
tists with continuing appointments reported directly to the relevant site direc-
tor. However, with the increasing autonomy of the Green Bank, Tucson, and 
Socorro sites, the individual site directors complained that they had no man-
agement control over the tenured scientists at their site who reported only to 
the distant NRAO Director, and with time the tenured staff became more 
integrated into the site operational structure. This was especially true after 
1999, when the new AUI President, Riccardo Giacconi, insisted that each staff 
member be assigned well-defined “functional responsibilities,” a concept that 
he had introduced earlier as Director General of the European Southern 
Observatory (ESO).
During the 1960s and early 1970s many scientists rotated through NRAO, 
either after a Research Associate appointment, or following one or more term 
appointments on the scientific staff. They were generally able to find good 
academic positions in the post-Sputnik market, often with better professional 
opportunities than they might have had at NRAO. Many went on to distin-
guished careers as leaders in radio astronomy and started their own radio 
astronomy groups, and, in some cases, developed their own facilities or became 
Principal Investigators on NASA missions.
As discussed previously (Sect. 4.2), the early NRAO Scientific Staff was 
dominated by recent graduates from Harvard, but in 1959, Roger Lynds, who 
had received his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley, joined the 
NRAO staff after a one-year appointment in Canada. Following his Green 
Bank visit as a University Toronto graduate student, Dave Hogg joined the 
staff as an Assistant Scientist in 1961, followed by Frank Low from Texas 
Instruments in 1962 (Sect. 10.1), Peter Mezger from Germany in 1963, Mort 
Roberts in 1964, and by Barry Clark and Ken Kellermann from Caltech in 
1964 and 1965 respectively. Unlike the other Harvard recruits, Roberts had 
received his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley, after which he 
became a Research Associate at Harvard before coming to NRAO.
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In order to provide some theoretical support to the young scientific staff 
whose interests and expertise were mostly in technical and observational areas, 
in 1962 NRAO recruited the theoretical astrophysicist Sebastian von Hoerner 
from Germany. When the FBI called NRAO as a follow-up to von Hoerner’s 
visa application, Ted Riffe received the call as the Head of Administration. Riffe 
responded to the routine questions confirming that von Hoerner would have a 
salary so would not become a welfare recipient and that he was not a known 
criminal. But when asked what he would be doing at NRAO, Riffe, not know-
ing anything about radio astronomy replied, “I can’t tell you,” to which the 
caller, assuming that NRAO was involved in some highly secret activity that 
was above his clearance level, responded, “Oh, I understand!”
At NRAO, von Hoerner initially did research on some cosmological prob-
lems, but infected by the Green Bank culture, he soon turned his attention to 
observing with the 140 Foot Telescope and to the design of large radio tele-
scopes; he became a major player in the NRAO Largest Feasible Steerable 
Telescope program (Chap. 9). NRAO later recruited three young theoretical 
astrophysicists, Robert (Bob) Brown, Robert (Bob) Hjellming, and David 
DeYoung, but they too were seduced by the opportunities to make new discov-
eries by observing with the NRAO telescopes. Hjellming worked with Campbell 
Wade observing radio stars using the Green Bank Interferometer (Sect. 6.2) 
and later wrote the VLA Observing Guide (The Green Book) and was in charge 
of the VLA off-line software development (Sects. 7.6 and 7.7). Brown and 
DeYoung became dedicated observers, and both went on to assume responsi-
ble administrative positions. DeYoung left NRAO to join the Kitt Peak National 
Observatory, later the National Optical Astronomy Observatory (NOAO) 
where he rose to become the Associate Director. Bob Brown became a skilled 
observer, and after serving as Assistant Director for both Green Bank and 
Tucson Operations, became the Associate Director for Charlottesville 
Operations in 1985 and assumed responsibility for the Scientific Staff and 
NRAO Scientific Services. Starting in 1991, Brown oversaw the development 
of the NRAO Millimeter Array (MMA) and later ALMA, and became the 
NRAO Deputy Director in 2000. In 2003 Brown left NRAO to become 
Director of the Cornell National Astronomy and Ionospheric Center (NAIC) 
which oversaw operation of the Arecibo Observatory.
In order to get advice on Observatory priorities and policies, Heeschen 
instituted an Observatory Council, which met monthly and included all ten-
ured members of the Scientific Staff as well as the key Division Heads and other 
administrative staff. In the first years following the completion of the 140 Foot 
Telescope, NRAO had a generous budget for new equipment. At least once a 
year the Council would hear from the Electronics Division about proposed 
new receivers or other instrumentation. Heated discussions followed. Each sci-
entist vigorously defended personal priorities, but Weinreb generally decided 
what to do based more on technical considerations rather than astronomical 
whims. In those years only capital costs were considered, as it was assumed that 
the engineers and technicians were getting paid anyway. Invariably the 
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Electronics Division would take longer to deliver the promised instrumenta-
tion, as each engineer would be in charge of multiple projects. However, the 
engineering talent and motivation were exceptional, and soon the world looked 
to NRAO for expertise in radio astronomy instrumentation.
Publications In the early years of the Observatory, NRAO debated where to 
publish scientific and technical papers on radio astronomy. The IRE Transactions 
of the Professional Group on Antennas and Propagation was considered, but 
radio astronomy was more than just antennas. At the suggestion of AUI’s 
Richard Emberson, there was broad agreement to use the Astronomical 
Journal, but that never materialized. Apparently the NRAO radio astronomers 
still did not consider their work to be appropriate for the Astrophysical Journal, 
and in 1961 NRAO started its own publication series as had been common at 
many optical observatories. By the mid-1960s, however, the NRAO staff was 
finally publishing largely in the peer-reviewed journals, and the Publications of 
the National Radio Astronomy Observatory was terminated after two years and 
17 papers. In principle the Director was responsible for all Scientific Staff pub-
lications, but in order not to delay timely publications, Heeschen only asked 
that he be shown all papers; if he did not respond within 24 hours, that was to 
be considered approval to submit the paper. In order to allow publication of 
NRAO data by visiting scientists with no grant support, NRAO paid for publi-
cation costs, most of the cost of travel to Green Bank, and later to the other 
sites, as well as making the NRAO computing facilities available at no cost. 
MIT Professor Bernard Burke once explained that it was cheaper to pay his 
students to travel and to pay for Green Bank lodging than to pay the high costs 
of using the MIT computing facilities.
The Green Bank US-USSR Radio Astronomy Conference Radio astronomers, as 
a species, are prolific travelers. As we have noted (Sect. 2.4), both Frank Kerr 
from Australia and Henk van de Hulst from the Netherlands happened to be at 
Harvard when Ewen detected the 21 cm hydrogen line. Earlier van de Hulst 
had visited Grote Reber in Wheaton, Illinois. Due to their relative isolation, 
Australian radio astronomers, including Taffy Bowen,1 Joe Pawsey, and John 
Bolton, made frequent round-the-world trips to learn about radio astronomy 
progress in Europe and the US. Cambridge was more secretive about their 
work, but Peter Scheuer did spend two years in Australia working with Bernie 
Mills. It was not uncommon for this closely knit international community to 
stay in the homes of colleagues when visiting other observatories, and many 
lifelong international friendships were established among the radio astrono-
mers as well as among their spouses.
An exception during the Cold War period was the USSR. Travel to the USSR 
was difficult due to both visa restrictions and the language differences. It was 
even more difficult for Soviet scientists to travel to the West. Most Soviet papers 
were published in Russian, while the availability of Western journals was very 
limited within the USSR. To foster better contact between Soviet and American 
6 THE BAR IS OPEN 
272
radio astronomers, in 1961 Otto Struve organized a joint US-USSR Symposium 
on radio astronomy2 that was held under the exchange agreement between the 
US and Soviet Academies of Science (Fig. 6.5). After the opening session held 
in Washington on the afternoon of 15 May 1961, all the delegates proceeded 
by overnight train to White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, and then by bus to 
Green Bank to continue the following afternoon. Six Soviet and 28 American 
scientists participated in what was the first of many international scientific 
meetings held in Green Bank. Viktor Vitkevich led the Soviet delegation, while 
Otto Struve was the host in Green Bank. Frank Drake reviewed the history and 
status of US radio astronomy and Vitkevitch did the same for the Soviet Union. 
Most of the talks dealt with reports of recent observations or theoretical con-
siderations, but on the last day, both sides presented their ideas on the design 
and construction of new radio telescopes.
In addition to the official presentations, informal groups discussed source 
polarization, 21 cm line studies, discrete sources, and radio telescope design. 
NRAO staff hosted members of the Soviet delegation at dinner parties in their 
Green Bank homes. Following the conference, the Soviet delegation travelled 
to Washington to visit the White House and the Carnegie Institution 
Department of Terrestrial Magnetism, but their request to visit the Sugar 
Grove station was not approved.
Fig. 6.5 Attendees at the USA-USSR Radio Astronomy Symposium, Green Bank, 
May 1961, left to right: Row 1 (seated)—G.  Getmantsev, F.  Haddock, M.  Wade, 
S. Edmundsen (interpreter), R. Minkowski, V. Vitkevitch, O. Struve, R. Sorochenko, 
J. Firor, G. Keller, A. Kuzmin, R. Bracewell, F. Drake. Row 2—C. Wade, E. McClain, 
V. Sanamyan, P. Kalachev, G. Stanley, A. Barrett, H. Weaver, G. Swenson, C. Mayer, 
D. Heeschen, J. Kraus. Row 3—G. Field, T. Menon, C. Seeger, L. Woltjer, A. Sandage, 
A. Lilley, A. Blaauw, F. Kahn, B. Burke. Absent—G. Burbidge, J. Findley, C. Lynds. 
Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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6.2  FiRst scieNtiFic studies
While Berkner, Greenstein, Menzel, and the others involved in setting up 
NRAO certainly were looking forward to the expected contributions of radio 
astronomy, probably no one really appreciated the full potential of this new 
window on the Universe. As early as 1954, John Hagen had already reflected 
that “while we have perhaps ‘skimmed the cream’ of the top of radio astron-
omy, I feel it has a great future.”3
Indeed, following the earlier discoveries of the non-thermal galactic radio 
emission, the hot solar corona, solar radio bursts, radio storms on Jupiter, radio 
galaxies, and the radio supernovae remnants that we discussed in previous 
chapters, in less than a few decades, radio astronomers went on to make another 
series of remarkable discoveries. They reported the first evidence for cosmic 
evolution, discovered quasars, pulsars, the microwave background, interstellar 
molecules, radio recombination lines, cosmic masers, the greenhouse effect on 
Venus, Jupiter’s radiation belts, the first extra-solar planets, made the most 
precise tests of general relativity, and detected the first observational evidence 
for gravity waves (see e.g. Kellermann and Sheets 1984; Wilkinson et al. 2004). 
During the same period, active radar experiments disclosed the unexpected 
rotation of Mercury, were able to measure the rotation of cloud-covered Venus, 
determined the Astronomical Unit with new precision, and conceived of and 
confirmed a new fourth test of general relativity. Finally, starting with a simple 
experiment in Green Bank, the human race began the first credible research for 
intelligent counterparts elsewhere in the Universe. Subsequently, observations 
in other regions of the spectrum, obscured by the Earth’s atmosphere, were 
opened by space-based observatories. But the radio spectrum was the first to be 
explored outside the narrow optical window, and the discoveries rolled in. 
These were truly the golden years of radio astronomy, and astronomy, limited 
for millennia to optical observations, would never be the same (Fig. 6.6).
A discussion of all these discoveries is beyond the scope of this book, and so 
we confine our discussion below to the early research with the Green Bank 
facilities.4
Fig. 6.6 Electromagnetic spectrum showing the range covered by radio astronomy. 
Credit: J. Hellerman/NRAO/AUI/NSF
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The Tatel Telescope Observations with the new 85 foot Tatel Telescope were 
largely devoted to continuum studies of radio galaxies, supernovae remnants, 
and galactic ionized hydrogen (H II) regions and Solar System planets. Dave 
Heeschen (1961a) inaugurated a program of studying radio source spectra, 
with observations at four frequencies spanning the range from 440 MHz (68 
cm) to 8 GHz (3.75 cm), and was able to confirm the reported decrease in the 
flux density of the Cas A supernova remnant of 1 to 2% per year at 1.4 GHz 
(Heeschen 1961b). Campbell Wade, Roger Lynds, and Hugh Johnson used 
the Tatel Telescope to study individual radio galaxies and the weak radio emis-
sion from the nearby normal galaxy M31. Dave Hogg, then a visiting graduate 
student from Canada and the first international observer at NRAO, used the 
Tatel Telescope to observe supernovae remnants and H II regions, while 
University of Indiana student Yervant Terzian studied planetary nebula, and 
Kochu Menon and Roger Lynds observed the thermal emission from the 
Orion Nebula and other H II regions. Frank Drake used observations at 
3.75 cm to show the complex structure of the Galactic Center region.
Perhaps the most important observations made with the Tatel Telescope 
were Frank Drake’s studies of radio emission from the planets that established 
the high temperature and greenhouse effect on Venus, the internal heating of 
Jupiter and Saturn, and the non-thermal radiation from Jupiter’s Van Allen 
belt, all of which preceded confirmation by widely heralded NASA space-based 
observations.
The first spectroscopic observations at NRAO were by MIT student Sander 
(Sandy) Weinreb who brought his 21 channel digital autocorrelation receiver 
to the Tatel Telescope to search for the 327 MHz deuterium line and to try to 
detect the effect of Zeeman splitting of the 21 cm hydrogen line from interstel-
lar magnetic fields. Although Weinreb did not detect either deuterium or the 
Zeeman effect after hundreds of hours of integration, his digital spectrometer 
(Weinreb 1961, 1963) was the forerunner of the very successful series of future 
NRAO autocorrelation spectrometers, as well as the implementation of similar 
devices at essentially every radio observatory in the world.
The 300 Foot Transit Telescope One of the first projects on the 300 Foot 
Telescope was a survey by Dave Heeschen (1964) of normal galaxies, while 
Ivan Pauliny- Toth et al. (1966) studied all sources in the 3C catalogue at 750 
(40 cm) and 1400 MHz (21 cm) with the aim of determining accurate flux 
densities and positions free of interferometer lobe ambiguities. This work was 
later extended by Bridle et al. (1972), who used the 300 Foot Telescope to 
compile a complete sample of 234 sources above 2 Jy at 1.4 GHz. Dave Hogg 
(1966) observed a number of supernovae remnants, and Gart Westerhout 
showed up each summer with his family and his group of University of 
Maryland students to map the distribution of H I in the Galaxy (Fig. 6.7). At 
the same time, Mort Roberts used the 300 Foot Telescope to study H I in 
nearby galaxies. A particularly notable study was the investigation of the 
Andromeda galaxy (M31) by Roberts and Whitehurst (1975) which was able 
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to probe the kinematics of the Galaxy way beyond its optical boundary, con-
vincingly demonstrating the existence of dark matter, suggested decades earlier 
by Fritz Zwicky (1933).
The 140 Foot Telescope The first astronomical observations with the 140 Foot 
Telescope were made in March 1965, even before the formal acceptance and 
dedication of the telescope in October. Earlier, Sebastian von Hoerner (1964) 
developed a widely used technique for restoring radio source brightness distri-
butions from observations of lunar occultations, and, as soon as he could, von 
Hoerner begin using the 140 Foot to observe lunar occultations of radio 
sources to determine the positions and angular structure. He was assisted by 
Joe Taylor, then a graduate student at Harvard who was working with von 
Hoerner on his PhD thesis.
Fig. 6.7 Gart Westerhout (left) and Frank Drake examining 300 Foot telescope out-
put. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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When the 140 Foot Telescope was completed in 1965, there was only one 
known radio spectral line, the 1420 MHz (21 cm) line of neutral hydrogen. 
Van de Hulst’s classic 1945 paper only devoted a few paragraphs to the 21 cm 
hydrogen line (van de Hulst 1945). The rest of the paper was devoted to free-
free emission from ionized hydrogen and the possibility of detecting high order 
radio recombination lines (RRL) at radio wavelengths corresponding to 
changes in an electron energy level. However, van de Hulst erroneously con-
cluded that due to Stark broadening, RRLs would not be observable, and until 
Nikolai Kardashev (1959) showed that the effects of Stark broadening were 
previously overestimated, there were no serious attempts to observe RRLs. At 
the 1962 IAU General Assembly in Hamburg, two Soviet groups from Moscow 
and Leningrad reported the detection of RRLs at 8872.5 MHz (H90α)5 and 
5763 MHz (H104α) respectively. However, due in part to the limited informa-
tion about the instrumentation permitted by Soviet authorities and the poor 
quality of the visual presentation, compounded with language difficulties, their 
results were not generally accepted by radio astronomers in Europe or the US.
Peter Mezger had joined the NRAO scientific staff from Germany and first 
tried to detect RRLs using the Tatel Telescope in late 1964, but the results 
were inconclusive, and Mezger eagerly awaited completion of the 140 Foot to 
search for RRLs. Even before the formal acceptance of the telescope by NRAO, 
Mezger and Bertil Höglund, a visiting scientist from Sweden, shared time with 
the painters working during the day, and on 9 July 1965, they were able to 
detect the 5009 MHz (6 cm) H109α RRL in the galactic H II regions M17 
and Orion. Recognizing the importance of demonstrating that the 140 Foot 
was really working and had made a major discovery, Höglund and Mezger 
quickly sent off a letter to Nature. When they didn’t hear from Nature after a 
few weeks, Mezger sent a telegram to the editor, demanding prompt action, 
but was told in response that “Nature will not be dictated to with respect to 
publication. Your paper is rejected.” Dave Heeschen then pulled some strings 
and their paper was published in Science (Höglund and Mezger 1965) 
(Fig. 6.8).
Mezger, T. K. Menon, and others at NRAO, as well Ed Lilley at Harvard 
and Bernie Burke at MIT, were excited by the new research opportunities 
made possible by studying RLLs. Lilley sent two of his graduate students, Pat 
Palmer and Ben Zuckerman, to Green Bank to use the 140 Foot to study 
recombination lines from helium as well as hydrogen transitions with Δn = 2. 
Burke sent two of his students, Ted Rifenstein and Thomas Wilson, who 
worked with Mezger and Wilhelm Altenhoff on a variety of galactic continuum 
as well as recombination line studies.
Concurrently with the RRL studies, Kellermann and Pauliny-Toth (1968, 
1969) initiated a long running program to study extragalactic radio source 
spectra and variability. Their 140 Foot data were supplemented by 750 and 
1400  MHz data from the 300 Foot along with low frequency data from 
Cambridge (Kellermann et  al. 1969) and demonstrated the nature of very 
compact radio sources. Exploiting the high frequency capability of the newly 
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completed 140 Foot Telescope, Pauliny-Toth and Kellermann (1966) followed 
the dramatic changes in the centimeter wavelength emission of radio galaxies 
and quasars which challenged existing radio source theories. During this same 
period, Heeschen (1968) used first the 140 Foot and then the 300 Foot and 
the Green Bank Interferometer (GBI) to detect the first active galactic nucleus 
in an Elliptical galaxy.
The biggest scientific impact of the 140 Foot Telescope was no doubt in the 
discovery and investigation of interstellar molecules. At the 1955 Jodrell Bank 
Symposium on Radio Astronomy, Charles (Charlie) Townes presented a classic 
paper speculating on the potential to detect lines at radio frequencies due to 
various atomic and molecular rotation transitions. Townes was an accomplished 
physicist who would share the 1964 Nobel Prize for Physics for the invention 
of the maser. In the published version of his Jodrell Bank paper, Townes (1957) 
derived microwave transition frequencies for a number of molecules including 
carbon monoxide (CO), ammonia (NH3), water (H2O), hydroxyl (OH), and 
hydrogen cyanide (HCN).
The calculation of the transition frequencies of ammonia and water go back 
even earlier than Townes’ presentation at the Jodrell Bank Symposium. While 
working at Bell Labs following WWII, Townes (1946) and Townes and Merritt 
Fig. 6.8 Peter Mezger, Troy Henderson, Bertil Hoglund, and Neil Albaugh in the 
140 Foot control room, 27 July 1965, a few weeks after their discovery of radio recom-
bination lines. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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(1946) published two seminal papers on the 22  GHz (1.3 cm) spectra of 
ammonia and water respectively that would later lead to the important discov-
ery of these molecules at Hat Creek by Cheung et al. (1968, 1969) at 1.3 cm. 
The water lines turned out to be surprisingly strong due to maser action. But 
to the embarrassment of NRAO, an earlier proposal to detect the 1.3 cm water 
line by NRAO postdocs David Buhl and Lewis Snyder was turned down on the 
advice of a referee with distinguished theoretical credentials, but who had not 
considered the possibility of water masers.
Starting in 1967, the 140 Foot Telescope was used regularly for very long 
baseline interferometer high resolution studies of the continuum radiation 
from quasars and for OH, and H2O interstellar maser emission (Sects. 8.1–8.5). 
The need to simultaneously schedule the 140 Foot together with an increasing 
number of other radio telescopes, each with their own scheduled maintenance, 
became a challenge to NRAO management.
The Green Bank Interferometer (GBI) Although the Green Bank Interferometer 
was built primarily to give the young NRAO staff experience in interferometry, 
it was a powerful research instrument as well. The GBI complemented the 
Caltech interferometer that operated at longer wavelengths and over a shorter 
baseline and so had less angular resolution. Moreover, the GBI was probably 
unique in not being laid out in an east-west or north-south baseline. Even 
though the 243 degree azimuth of the GBI was determined by the Observatory 
site geometry, it turned out to have some unanticipated advantages in making 
absolute position measurements (Wade 1970). Dave Hogg et  al. (1969) 
mapped the brightness distribution of several bright radio galaxies and the Cas 
A supernova remnant. Heeschen (1968) used the GBI to show that the radio 
sources in NGC 1052 and NGC 4278 were small and confined to the galactic 
nucleus, in contrast to radio galaxies whose radio dimensions typically exceeded 
the optical boundaries of the galaxy. Later, using the GBI, Hjellming and Wade 
(1971) discovered the first true radio stars.
The addition of the remote antenna at Spencer’s Ridge and Huntersville 
(Sect. 7.3) improved the angular resolution of the GBI by more than a factor 
of ten, opening up new research opportunities. Probably the most exciting 
observation was the discovery by Bruce Balick and Bob Brown of the small 
radio source at the Galactic Center which they showed was less than 0.1 arcsec 
(1000 AU) (Balick and Brown 1974). Brown later named this compact source 
Sgr A∗. This was the first evidence for a massive black hole at the center of a 
normal galaxy. Later VLBI observations using the 140 Foot together with 
other radio telescopes showed that Sgr A∗ was less than 10 AU in extent 
(Kellermann et al. 1977). Perhaps the most important GBI program, however, 
was the series of elegant measurements of the gravitational bending of radio 
waves by the Sun which confirmed the general relativity prediction to within 1 
percent precision (e.g., Fomalont and Sramek 1975), far better than the then 
best contemporary optical observations made at the time of solar eclipses.
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Little Big Horn One of the outstanding problems facing radio astronomers in 
the 1960s was the need to establish an absolute flux density scale. It was straight-
forward, using any of the NRAO telescopes, to measure the relative intensity of 
radio sources. But putting the measurements on an absolute scale required 
knowledge of the effective area of the telescope, including the illumination effi-
ciency as well as losses due to diffraction and surface imperfections. It is difficult 
to calculate these quantities for parabolic antennas, but relatively straightfor-
ward for a simple horn. Conventional horn antennas, however, were historically 
too small to give sufficient sensitivity for meaningful measurements.
In 1958, John Findlay decided to address this problem by building a very 
large calibration horn in Green Bank, which became known as “Little Big 
Horn.” Little Big Horn was constructed on the side of a hill pointing toward 
a position where the strong radio source Cassiopeia A would pass once a day 
through the antenna beam. It was 120 feet (36.7 m) long and had an aperture 
17.6 by 13.1 feet (5.4 by 4 m), and was probably the largest horn antenna ever 
built anywhere (Fig. 6.9). Construction was completed in September 1959, 
and the first observations began the following month and lasted for several 
decades. After careful calibration and correction for the contribution from the 
galactic background, Findlay (1972) was able to measure an absolute flux den-
sity of Cas A with a precision of 1.8 percent, and he also determined the rate of 
Fig. 6.9 Little Big Horn calibration antenna designed and used by John Findlay to 
establish an absolute 1.4 GHz flux density scale. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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decrease of flux density as (1.38 ± 0.15) percent per year in good agreement 
with other measurements and the earlier prediction by Shklovsky (1960).
6.3  the ceNtRAl develOpMeNt lAbORAtORy
The 140 Foot Telescope was smaller than the Jodrell Bank, Australian, 
Canadian (Sect. 6.6), and the later German (Sect. 9.2) dishes, and did not have 
the pointing accuracy or surface precision of the Haystack, Canadian or 
Australian antennas. Nevertheless, the 140 Foot was arguably more productive 
than any of the competing facilities due to the excellent instrumentation made 
available by the NRAO Central Development Laboratory (CDL) located in 
Charlottesville. This was particularly true for spectroscopic observations, due 
to the series of low noise receivers and multi-channel spectrometers built for 
Green Bank that were unequaled anywhere in the world. The CDL pioneered 
the development of actively cooled Field Effect Transistor (FET) and High 
Electron Mobility Transistor (HEMT) amplifiers for centimeter wavelengths, 
as well as cooled Schottky diode mixers and Superconductor-Insulator- 
Superconductor (SIS) devices for millimeter wavelengths.
The first receivers at NRAO were mostly based on commercial products 
from Ewen-Knight, Microwave Associates, or Long Island-based Airborne 
Instruments Laboratory (AIL). They used simple mixer receivers or, in some 
cases, parametric amplifiers, but their performance was not as good as at some 
other observatories, such as Caltech. In 1962 Hein Hvatum led an effort to 
purchase a 6 cm maser amplifier from AIL. It cost $135,000, a lot of money at 
the time, but not too much for the then generously funded young observatory. 
Stability issues limited the sensitivity, and the maser was never used for any 
astronomical programs. NRAO clearly needed to improve its instrumental sup-
port to complement the growing collection of antennas, the Tatel Telescope, 
the 300 Foot Telescope, and the finally completed 140 Foot Telescope.
When Joe Pawsey visited Green Bank in 1961 (Sect. 4.6), he noted the 
weakness of the technical staff, but took note of the young MIT graduate stu-
dent, Sandy Weinreb (Fig. 6.10), who was using the 85 foot Tatel Telescope in 
an attempt to detect deuterium and the Zeeman effect with his novel digital 
spectrometer. After arriving in England, Pawsey wrote to AUI President I. I. Rabi 
suggesting that AUI might try to hire Weinreb.6 Four years later, Weinreb 
joined NRAO at the age of 28 to become head of the NRAO Electronics 
Division reporting to Hein Hvatum. Initially Weinreb lived in Green Bank, 
where he led the development of receivers for the 140 and 300 Foot Telescopes 
and the Green Bank three element interferometer, and was also responsible for 
the growing electronics research and development group in Charlottesville.
In 1968 Weinreb and his young family moved to Charlottesville, where he 
set up the NRAO Central Development Lab (CDL). Mike Balister, who had 
come to Green Bank in 1966 from Canadian Westinghouse where he worked 
on several classified military programs, became Associate Head of the NRAO 
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Electronics Division under Weinreb, as well as Head of the Green Bank 
Electronics Division, creating an awkward dual reporting line. Balister left 
Green Bank for Charlottesville to lead the low noise development group in 
1972, and was replaced by Craig Moore as Head of the Green Bank Electronics 
group. In 1986 this group was placed under George Seielstad, then the 
Assistant Director for Green Bank Operations, and Weinreb became the NRAO 
Assistant Director for Technical Development. After a leave of absence from 
NRAO when he taught at the University of Virginia, Weinreb left NRAO in 
1987 to join Martin Marietta. He later joined the faculty of the University of 
Massachusetts, then moved to California where he continued to develop low 
noise centimeter and millimeter wave amplifiers at the Caltech Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL). During his 23 years at NRAO, Weinreb pioneered the use 
of low-noise, cryogenically-cooled solid state amplifiers which greatly enhanced 
the sensitivity of the NRAO radio telescopes. He was also the architect for the 
electronic systems design for the VLA, and led the group which developed the 
VLA instrumentation. Weinreb was honored in 2008 with the Grote Reber 
Medal for his lifetime innovative contributions to radio astronomy and in 2011 
with NRAO’s Jansky Lecturership.
Following Weinreb’s departure, Ballister became Acting Assistant Director 
for Technical Development as well as Head of the CDL. NRAO was unable to 
recruit a replacement for Weinreb, and in 1989 Balister became the permanent 
Assistant Director for Technical Development. Due to the rapid growth of the 
Fig. 6.10 Sandy 
Weinreb led the NRAO 
Electronics Division, built 
the first radio astronomy 
digital spectrometer, and 
provided much of the 
architectural design of the 
VLA. Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
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NRAO staff resulting in part from the VLA program (Chap. 7), NRAO soon 
outgrew its new headquarters at the University of Virginia, and after 1972, the 
CDL was housed in rented space elsewhere in Charlottesville. Unlike the close 
collaboration between the scientists and engineers previously found in Green 
Bank, at CSIRO, and at many other radio observatories, the NRAO CDL and 
Basic Research staffs grew apart, primarily as a result of their physical separa-
tion, and there were few collaborative programs between NRAO scientists and 
engineers. Further, with the increasing independence of Green Bank, Tucson 
(Sect. 10.2), and Socorro (Sect. 7.7), new instrument construction and main-
tenance electronics work increasingly became the responsibility of the local 
electronics groups, which were more integrated into the local management 
structure, and there was less communication among the technical staffs at the 
different sites. The CDL increasingly concentrated on fundamental research 
and the production of low noise amplifiers for other observatories and for use 
in non-astronomical environments rather than in direct support of the instru-
mentation at NRAO facilities.
Low Noise Amplifiers and Mixers Probably the biggest success of the CDL was 
in the development of cryogenically-cooled centimeter wavelength low-noise 
HEMT and FET amplifiers under the leadership of Weinreb and Marian 
Pospieszalski (e.g., Pospieszalski et al. 1988). In addition to providing state of 
the art sensitivity for the NRAO telescopes, nearly every major radio observa-
tory in the world used amplifiers designed and built at the NRAO CDL either 
as low noise front ends, or as IF amplifiers in millimeter wave receivers. The 
income from the sale of these amplifiers provided a valuable supplement to the 
eroding NSF funding, and supported the further research by the CDL staff.
NRAO cooled amplifiers were also used in support of several space missions, 
including the NASA Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) that 
measured the anisotropy of the cosmic microwave background with unprece-
dented precision and gave precise new constraints to the cosmological param-
eters (Bennett et al. 2003). The WMAP satellite contained 20 NRAO HEMT 
amplifiers in a dual-beam dual-polarization configuration (Jarosik et al. 2003) 
designed and built at the CDL by Pospieszalski. The NRAO amplifiers, which 
were passively cooled to about 90 K and covered the frequency range from 20 
to 106 GHz in five bands, operated flawlessly for the nine year operational 
lifetime of the satellite. Later the CDL built 22 GHz (1.3 cm) amplifiers for use 
on the Russian RadioAstron space VLBI mission (Sect. 8.9). The RadioAstron 
amplifiers were similar in design to the lowest frequency WMAP amplifiers, and 
worked for the eight year duration of the mission, giving badly needed sensitiv-
ity at the shortest RadioAstron operating wavelength. The CDL also fabricated 
8 GHz (3.75 cm) amplifiers for the VLA to support the 1989 NASA Voyager 
flybys to Uranus and Neptune (Sect. 7.7). The new 3.75 cm receivers also gave 
a badly needed boost to the VLA sensitivity and were used for a wide range of 
continuum observations.
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Receivers for millimeter wavelengths were particularly challenging. When 
NRAO’s Kitt Peak 36 Foot Millimeter-Wave Telescope first went on the air in 
early 1968, typical system temperatures were over 1000 K using simple mixer 
receivers. Weinreb and Kerr (1973) were able to achieve significant improve-
ment by cooling Schottky diode mixers down to 15 K. By the 1980s, the intro-
duction of SIS devices by Anthony (Tony) Kerr had replaced Schottky diodes 
as mixer elements for millimeter wave receivers. More recently, the frequency 
multipliers and wide bandwidth sideband-separating SIS mixers developed at 
the CDL along with Kerr’s SIS mixers were critical to the technological success 
of ALMA (Sect. 10.7). Throughout this period, the millimeter-wave advance-
ments made at the CDL were enhanced by a close collaboration with the 
University of Virginia Semiconductor Devices Laboratory led by 
Robert Mattauch.
All of the NRAO receivers used cooled radiometers. But commercial refrig-
erators were not fully reliable and were a constant source of downtime at the 
telescopes. To deal with the repeated breakdowns, and in anticipation of the 
coming needs of the 27 element VLA, Howard Brown and David Williams in 
Green Bank developed an innovative modification to the commercial refrigera-
tors. Green Bank finally did obtain a successfully operating maser when Craig 
Moore spent time at JPL to fabricate a copy of the JPL 22 GHz (1.3 cm) trav-
eling wave maser, and that operated on the 140 Foot Telescope for many years. 
The new maser gave unprecedented sensitivity for observing the water vapor 
(H2O) and ammonia (NH3) lines but was disappointing for continuum work 
due to gain fluctuations induced by the mechanical pump used to cool the 
liquid helium.
Spectrometers and Digital Back Ends Weinreb’s MIT digital spectrometer was 
soon replaced by a series of more advanced systems designed and built at the 
CDL in Charlottesville. Even before Weinreb joined NRAO in 1965, NRAO 
had hired Art Shalloway from Cornell to develop digital spectrometers for 
Green Bank. Shalloway visited Weinreb, who was then working at MIT, to seek 
his guidance on building a digital spectrometer, and Weinreb continued to 
advise on the construction. The Model I autocorrelator, which had 100 spec-
tral channels, was installed at the 300 Foot Telescope in 1964, and the Models 
II and III, with 384 spectral channels, on the 140 Foot and 300 Foot respec-
tively in 1968 and 1972. The Model IV spectrometer, with 1024 channels, was 
based on the VLA custom chips (Sect. 7.7) and replaced the Model II spec-
trometer on the 140 Foot in 1980. In 1972, NRAO gave the original Model I 
correlator to Caltech to be used at Owens Valley Radio Observatory.
Digital spectrometers based on Weinreb’s design were restricted by the lim-
ited sampling rate of existing digital hardware. To study the much broader 
spectral lines observed at millimeter wavelengths, Weinreb devised a hybrid 
system whereby an analogue filter bank system was used to divide the band into 
eight smaller bands, each of which could be analyzed by a digital spectrometer 
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(Gordon 2005, p. 104). Future digital systems at NRAO exploited the rapid 
developments in the speed of digital devices, enabling up to 262,536 spectral 
channels over a 1.6 GHz bandwidth on the GBT as well as capabilities for 
sophisticated analysis of pulsar data. Later digital correlator systems were built 
by Ray Escoffier for the VLA, and by Escoffier and Richard Lacasse for ALMA, 
all designed and built at the CDL. However, the JVLA WIDAR7 correlator was 
designed and constructed by Brent Carlson and his group at the Dominion 
Astrophysical Observatory as part of the Canadian contribution to the JVLA.
Feed Systems Radio telescopes have historically used a single feed/receiver 
combination at the primary or secondary focus of the antenna, and so at any 
one time could observe only a single region in the sky. Soon after the 140 Foot 
antenna was completed, Jaap Baars (1966) introduced a dual beam system to 
reduce the effect of tropospheric emissions. Later multiple receiver/feed sys-
tems were built for use on the 300 Foot Telescope with up to seven dual polar-
ization independent beams at 5 GHz.
Starting in the mid-1990s several radio observatories, including the NRAO 
CDL, began to develop multiple element phased array feeds (PAFs) (Fisher 
and Bradley 2000). Unlike the focal plane arrays, the signals from each inter-
ferometer pair of feed elements were correlated and used to form multiple 
beams in the sky in the same way that ground-based arrays are used. By proper 
adjustment of the weighting and phasing of the individual elements, PAFs can 
also correct for reflector surface errors. However, the construction and opera-
tion of PAFs is technically challenging since the elements need to be small and 
closely spaced, so mutual coupling among the elements makes it difficult to 
configure the system for optimum efficiency. In practice, the advantage of the 
multiple beams has been at least partially offset by the degradation in system 
temperature.
In order to address this shortfall, NRAO, in collaboration with Brigham 
Young University, the Green Bank Observatory, and West Virginia University, 
developed a 1.4 GHz cryogenically cooled PAF system. Using a 19-element 
array to form seven dual polarized beams, the system temperature is under 20 
K, and the sensitivity of the seven synthesized beams is comparable to the best 
cooled single pixel systems, thus giving up to a factor of seven improvement in 
survey speed (Roshi et al. 2018). See Fig. 6.11.
6.4  OpeN skies
Traditionally, astronomical observatories existed for their staff or for the faculty 
and students of a parent observatory or university. Observing time was allo-
cated by the Director or by agreement among the staff members. Visitors were 
not uncommon, but generally they were either on long term sabbatical visits or 
were working with a host institution staff member. Often the larger and more 
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unique the telescope, the harder it was for outsiders to gain access.8 NRAO was 
established to facilitate competition by American radio astronomers, especially 
those from the influential northeast universities, with their European and 
Australian counterparts. However, in October 1959, Heeschen wrote to the 
editors of Astronomical Journal, Science, and Publications of the Astronomical 
Society of the Pacific that “the facilities of the Observatory are open to any com-
petent individual with a program in radio astronomy, regardless of institutional 
affiliation.”9 In practice, access to NRAO facilities was considered independent 
of not only institutional affiliation, but national affiliation as well. At the same 
time, NRAO declared that previous experience in the techniques of radio 
astronomy was not necessary to use the NRAO instruments.
This NRAO policy became known as “Open Skies” following the nomencla-
ture adopted by the international airlines governing reciprocal landing rights. 
The NRAO Open Skies policy had a profound and long-lasting impact on how 
global astronomical research evolved. For the first time, any qualified scientist 
with a good idea could gain access to a world class facility, independent of his 
or her national or institutional affiliation. Starting with the 1969 Mansfield 
Amendment to the Military Authorization Act, which shifted the burden of 
Fig. 6.11 NRAO 19 element dual polarized cryogenically cooled 1.4 GHz Phased 
Array Feed. Credit: J. Hellerman/NRAO/AUI/NSF
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federal support for the university radio observatories from the Defense 
Department to the NSF, the NSF required as a condition of receiving operat-
ing funds that a fraction, typically one-half, of the available observing time be 
made available to users from outside the university receiving the grant. With 
time, under pressure from the NSF and NASA, the Open Skies concept 
impacted all large American astronomy observatories, whether on the ground 
or in space. Ultimately, following the US model, other observatories, especially 
radio observatories worldwide, have adopted an Open Skies policy for at least 
a fraction of their observing time. Within the US, the Open Skies concept has 
become a matter of US policy applying to all federally operated research 
facilities.
Open Skies produces the best science because there is a broader pool of 
investigators, and the competition sharpens the US investigators. Interestingly, 
with the limited support available for individual investigator grants, Open Skies 
also means that other countries provide the labor to use and interpret the 
results from NRAO and other US facilities, but at no cost to the US taxpayer 
because salary and training are provided elsewhere. On the other hand, if the 
facility use becomes dominated by international users, it may be interpreted 
that US scientists are less capable and do not have the best ideas. Indeed, the 
NSF constantly draws attention to the high fraction of non-US scientists using 
NRAO facilities, and this may be reflected in the level of support received by 
NRAO from the NSF (Sect. 11.7).
By the mid-1970s, the NRAO instruments were becoming increasingly 
complex and a growing fraction of users did not have the experience needed to 
effectively use the NRAO radio telescopes. To provide added support for visit-
ing scientists, a staff scientist was appointed as a “friend” of each telescope. The 
telescope friends were responsible for the calibration of each instrument, and 
for instructing visiting observers on how best to use the telescope, informing 
them of any new equipment or computer software, and alerting them to any 
known problems with the telescope or instrumentation. The concept of “tele-
scope friend” has now spread to other radio observatories, both in the US and 
internationally.
Allocating Observing Time With the suite of world-class observing facilities 
provided by the 300 Foot and 140 Foot Telescopes, as well as the Green Bank 
Interferometer, and the corresponding increase in requests for observing time 
from visiting scientists, the informal allocation of observing time by consensus 
of the staff or by the Director was no longer tenable. Starting in the mid-
1960s, each proposal, whether from staff or from visitors, was reviewed by 
outside referees. The allocation of observing time on all NRAO facilities has 
remained the responsibility of the NRAO Director, but has been generally 
delegated: initially to Bill Howard, Assistant to the Director; by the mid-1970s 
to the local site directors; then to an in-house committee; evolving to commit-
tees of mixed NRAO and outside members; and finally to a Time Allocation 
Committee (TAC) composed entirely of non-NRAO staff. The referee reports 
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remain, in principle, only advisory, but with time have played a stronger and 
stronger role in the assignment of observing time. More recently, the TAC has 
been assisted by a series of discipline-related panels that provide priority rank-
ing of proposals within the discipline, which are then assembled by the TAC 
into a master list of priorities for each NRAO telescope. NRAO staff receive no 
special treatment and there is no time reserved for scientific observing by 
NRAO staff, although time needed for commissioning of new equipment, cali-
bration, or testing after a change of instrumentation between observers has 
been allocated as needed to NRAO support staff. See Hogg (2006) for more 
details on the NRAO telescope time allocation process.
Later, NRAO established new rules for so called “Large Proposals” in excess 
of 1000 hours that were subject to more extensive review, and required addi-
tional commitments from the observing team to make their results available in 
a timely manner. Also, in response to the increasing interest in multi- wavelength 
observations, NRAO implemented agreements with NASA-operated space- 
based facilities whereby small amounts of telescope time on these facilities or 
on NRAO facilities may be granted by the other TAC in response to a single 
joint proposals for the two facilities.
Data from all NRAO facilities are archived. Soon after the start of VLA 
operations, NRAO started to receive requests for data taken by other observ-
ers. Starting in August 1983, all observers were allowed an 18 month period 
where they had exclusive use of the data, after which time the data became 
available to the public. Approximately ten percent of the publications that use 
NRAO facilities are based on archival data rather than on new observations.
6.5  cOMMuNity iNteRActiONs
The strength of NRAO is derived from its user community. In order to receive 
scientific, technical, and management advice from the national as well as inter-
national community, both NRAO and AUI receive input from a variety of 
committees.
Advisory Committees Top level advice and support to NRAO has been derived 
from the AUI Board, which appoints the Observatory Director, approves all 
senior level appointments, grants tenure to qualified staff members, and is the 
legal entity entering into contracts and agreements with the NSF and other 
organizations. In 1958 the previous AUI Advisory Committee on Radio 
Astronomy morphed into the AUI Advisory Committee for the National Radio 
Astronomy Observatory. AUI had a long tradition of Visiting Committees to 
advise on their operation of the Brookhaven National Laboratory, and starting 
in 1961, the AUI Advisory Committee became the AUI Visiting Committee, 
with a mandate to report to AUI on the management of NRAO and how the 
Observatory was responding to national needs.
To complement the Visiting Committee, in 1965 Dave Heeschen convened 
a Users Committee reporting to the NRAO Director to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the telescopes and advise on priorities for new instrumentation. The 
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User Committee meetings were often heated, especially when something was 
not working or a promised new receiver was late. On one occasion, after a par-
ticularly critical comment, Heeschen told the committee that if they weren’t 
happy they could find a new Director, and he walked out. From time to time, 
in response to special needs such as the design or early construction of a new 
telescope, the Director would convene a special advisory committee. There was 
also a Computer Advisory Committee to advise the Director on the long- 
standing hardware and software issues that seemed to continually plague 
NRAO and frustrate observers. NRAO hosted many other meetings and con-
ferences, including scientific symposia and workshops that brought together 
visiting scientists and members of the Scientific Staff. All of these meetings, 
including the Visiting and User Committee meetings, were opportunities for 
staff and colleagues to meet informally, and were generally highlighted by a 
nice dinner at a nearby restaurant or country club. Heeschen detested after 
dinner talks. Invariably at the conclusion of the dinner, he, as the host, would 
stand up, ceremoniously bang an eating utensil on a glass to get attention, and 
announce, “The bar is open,” then sit down so the participants could continue 
their informal discussion.
The Jansky Lectures Starting in 1966, AUI initiated the Karl G.  Jansky 
Lectureship as an honor recognizing outstanding contributions to the advance-
ment of radio astronomy. Each recipient has presented an annual public lecture 
in Charlottesville and usually at one or more of the other NRAO sites in Green 
Bank, Socorro, or Tucson. In addition, the recipient often presents a profes-
sional colloquium on his or her research to the local staff and spends a few days 
interacting with staff members. Since the mid-1980s the Jansky Lecture has 
been attended by Karl’s son David Jansky and other members of the Jansky 
family. The recipient is chosen each year by the NRAO Scientific Staff based on 
nominations received from the broader community. The first Jansky Lecture 
was given by John Bolton from Australia in 1966, followed by Jan Oort in 
1967, Iosef Shklovsky in 1968, Fred Hoyle in 1969, and Robert Dicke in 
1970. More than 50 scientists have been recipients of the Jansky Lectureship, 
many of whom were not themselves radio astronomers, but who, through their 
theoretical contributions or observations in other wavelength bands, contrib-
uted to the enhancement of radio astronomy.
Student Programs As part of its mandate to educate the next generation of 
radio astronomers and to provide for a scientifically literate public, NRAO has 
since 1959 brought in undergraduate students during the summer to work 
with staff members. John Findlay was the first administrator of the program, 
which was later expanded to include graduate students. Many former NRAO 
summer students later joined the NRAO scientific or engineering staff or went 
on to distinguished careers in astronomy and astrophysics or other areas of sci-
ence and engineering or government service. Stephen Chu, a 1970 student, 
went on to win a Nobel Prize in Physics and later became Secretary of the 
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Interior in Barack Obama’s administration. Stephen Hawley, who spent the 
summers of 1973 and 1974 in Green Bank, became a NASA astronaut who 
deployed the Hubble Space Telescope and participated in several of the HST 
servicing missions. In addition to the summer student program, each year a few 
graduate students are typically in residence working on their dissertation 
research under the joint supervision of an NRAO scientist or engineer and a 
faculty member from their home institution.
The NRAO-KPNO Exchange Visits Perhaps in response to the concerns that 
had been raised earlier by Tuve and others about the segregation between radio 
and optical astronomers and the intellectual isolation of the Green Bank staff, 
NRAO and the Kitt Peak National Observatory Directors in 1959 initiated a 
series of alternating annual exchange visits which were used to exchange ideas 
about running a national astronomy observatory for visitors as well as for sci-
entific presentations on current research by the two staffs. These visits were 
greatly appreciated and enjoyed by both staffs, but died out in the late 1960s, 
ostensibly due to their expense and the concern that these visits did not directly 
help the Observatory’s user communities.
6.6  GROwiNG cOMpetitiON
NRAO was not alone in benefitting from the Sputnik-inspired wave of support 
for science, especially for astronomy and space science, which provided gener-
ous financial support to NRAO, but also led to other new American radio 
astronomy facilities and a certain amount of competition for recognition and 
continued funding. New university facilities were funded by the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) and the Air Force, as well as by the NSF. Other US radio 
astronomy facilities were expanded and new facilities initiated, also mostly with 
Department of Defense (DoD) funding. Meanwhile Australia, Britain, Canada, 
Germany, and the Netherlands were building on their earlier successes and 
embarking on new radio astronomy initiatives characteristic of the transition of 
radio astronomy to big science.
Under Ed Lilley’s leadership, the Harvard radio astronomy program gradu-
ally shifted emphasis from the 60 foot telescope to the more powerful new 120 
foot Haystack antenna. Additional competition to NRAO would come from 
the Caltech two-element interferometer and the Cornell 1000 foot spherical 
dish at Arecibo. In Australia, Taffy Bowen was building a 210 foot (64 m) 
steerable dish at Parkes, and in Canada, the National Research Council was 
building a 150 foot (46 m) radio telescope at Algonquin Park. In Cambridge, 
Martin Ryle was developing a series of innovative synthesis radio telescopes 
that were setting the benchmark for high resolution sensitive imaging of radio 
galaxies (Sect. 7.1).
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Ohio State and Big Ear John Kraus’ helical element array at Ohio State 
University (Sect. 2.5) had limited bandwidth, and it was not realistic to con-
sider a significant increase in collecting area using an array of helices. With 
support from the NSF, the Air Force, and the University, Kraus built a novel 
fixed paraboloid 360 feet long by 70 feet high (109 × 21 m) oriented in the 
east-west direction. Declination adjustment was made with a 260 foot long by 
100 foot (79 × 30 m) flat tiltable reflector that was illuminated by feeds cover-
ing the frequency range 20 MHz (15 m) to 2 GHz (15 cm). Although basically 
a transit instrument, the feed system was mounted on a movable carriage that 
allowed motion in hour angle up to 30 min from the meridian. The angular 
resolution ranged from 12.5 degrees by 50 degrees at 20 MHz to 7 by 28 
arcmin at 2 GHz.
Plans to increase the collecting area by a factor two never materialized, but 
the Ohio State Radio Telescope was used over a period of six years, primarily 
for a discrete source survey covering 8.66 steradians at 1.4 GHz (21 cm) down 
to a limiting flux density of 0.25 Jy. The Ohio State catalog of nearly 20,000 
radio sources was published in a series of papers in the Astronomical Journal 
between 1967 and 1975 and summarized by Rinsland et al. (1975). The Ohio 
State surveys uncovered a number of flat and peaked spectrum radio sources, 
many of which were optically identified with quasars and BL Lac Objects. 
However, the Ohio State survey was limited by confusion resulting from the 
large north-south fan-beam and side-lobe responses and was overshadowed by 
the emergence of more reliable source catalogues from Parkes and 
NRAO. Starting in late 1973, “Big Ear,” as Kraus (1995) called it, began a 
search for narrow band 21 cm radio signals from extra-terrestrial intelligent 
civilizations (SETI). In 1998, after years of opposition by Kraus and many Big 
Ear supporters, the Ohio State radio telescope was demolished and the land 
turned into an 18-hole golf course.
The University of Illinois Vermilion River Observatory (VRO) The University 
of Illinois Astronomy Department was headed by George McVittie, a well-
known theoretical cosmologist. Like John Kraus, McVittie was fascinated by 
the prospects of addressing cosmological problems by using radio sources, and 
in 1956 he recruited George Swenson from Michigan State University to begin 
a radio astronomy program. Swenson had a strong background in electronics, 
radio propagation, and acoustics, but no experience in astronomy. Following a 
global familiarization tour of radio observatories, and with support from ONR, 
Swenson built a radio telescope with sufficient sensitivity and resolution to 
detect radio sources an order of magnitude weaker than those that had been 
cataloged at Cambridge or Sydney.
To satisfy the requirements of collecting area, resolution, and low sidelobes, 
as well as the constraints of cost, Swenson (1986) constructed a fixed parabolic 
cylinder 600 by 400 feet (183 × 122 m), oriented in the north-south direction. 
The parabolic surface was lined with a one-inch steel wire mesh reflecting sur-
face. The antenna was steered in declination by appropriate phasing of the 276 
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receivers and feeds located 153 feet (47 m) above the parabolic surface ori-
ented along the north-south axis. No hour angle motion was provided, so the 
telescope operated in a transit mode in the unused 608–614 MHz (49 cm) 
Channel 37 TV band, which was later allocated world-wide as a protected band 
for radio astronomy. The initial receivers included electron beam parametric 
amplifiers, replaced later by Field-Effect-Transistor amplifiers.
Although Swenson had to deal with weather-induced degradation of the 
parabolic surface and parametric amplifier reliability, over a period of nearly a 
decade the VRO detected and catalogued over a thousand discrete radio 
sources, mostly radio galaxies and quasars. Notable among these was the radio 
source known as VRO 46.26.01 which was identified with what was presumed 
to be a long recognized star, BL Lacerte, or BL Lac (Schmitt 1968). However, 
BL Lac turned out to be a quasar-like object of the class of radio sources since 
referred to as BL Lac objects, which typically have weak or no optical emission 
lines and are highly polarized.
By 1969, ground erosion had altered the parabolic surface beyond repair 
and the telescope was abandoned for use. Its work was completed, but the 
49 cm protected radio astronomy band remains as a legacy of the Vermilion 
River Observatory.
The University of Michigan 85 Foot Telescope During WWII Fred Haddock 
worked at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), where he developed a sub-
marine mounted radar that was used locate Japanese ships. After the war he 
remained at NRL, working primarily at short centimeter and millimeter wave-
lengths to study the Sun and thermal radio sources, and he became a strong 
advocate for pushing the NRAO 140 Foot Telescope to the shortest possible 
wavelengths. In 1956, Haddock left NRL to begin a radio astronomy program 
at the University of Michigan that was funded by ONR. Under Haddock’s 
leadership, Michigan acquired a Blaw-Knox 85 foot antenna similar to the 
NRAO 85 Foot Tatel Telescope, but inexplicitly the surface accuracy and 
pointing were about a factor of two better than the Green Bank antenna. 
Haddock, who was a gregarious, outspoken scientist, later took pride in point-
ing out that his Michigan antenna was better than the one delivered to Green 
Bank. As a result, Michigan radio astronomers and students were able to push 
their observations to 4 cm and later 2 cm to study flat spectrum radio sources 
(Dent and Haddock 1965) and radio variability (Dent 1965) while operation 
of the Green Bank antennas was essentially limited to 4 cm minimum wave-
length. The University of Michigan 85 foot radio telescope remained in opera-
tion for more than half a century, during which Hugh and Margo Aller led a 
program to monitor the variability of extragalactic radio sources at 1.3, 2, and 
6 cm wavelengths.
The Naval Research Laboratory Following the construction of their first 25 
meter- class radio telescope at their Maryland Point Observatory, ten years later 
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NRL purchased a new high-precision 85 foot radio telescope from the Rohr 
Corporation (McClain 1966). The new dish was designed by Robert Hall and 
was based on his earlier design of the 85 foot antennas that were built by Blaw-
Knox for NRAO (Sect. 4.3) and the University of Michigan, but the NRL 
antenna was modified to allow good operation at wavelengths as short as 1 cm. 
It was used in 1967, together with the Green Bank Tatel Telescope, as part of 
the first successful NRAO independent-oscillator-tape recording interferome-
ter (Sect. 8.1).
The Haystack 120 Foot (37 m) Precision Antenna In parallel to NRAO’s con-
struction of the 140 Foot radio telescope, the US Air Force was building a 
radome-enclosed 120 foot antenna. Like the Jodrell Bank Mark I, or the 
Arecibo 1000 foot dish, the Haystack antenna was not originally conceived to 
do radio astronomy, but rather as multi-purpose facility to operate as a ground 
station for satellite communication, for radio propagation experiments, and as 
a satellite tracking radar facility.10 In fact, much of the motivation for building 
the Haystack facility was the military interest in evaluating the use of metal-
space frame supported radomes to protect large precision antennas against 
potential deleterious environmental effects of wind, snow, ice, and uneven solar 
heating. More conventional types of air-supported or self-supported plastic 
radomes were not considered practical for such large antennas due to the sig-
nificant loss that would occur from any dielectric surface strong enough to 
support its own weight. A 120 foot antenna was the largest that could fit inside 
a 150 foot radome that the US Air Force was considering for an Arctic environ-
ment, although a radome specifically designed for the more benign New 
England weather could probably have been built with less transmission loss.
Construction of the Haystack facility by North American Aviation, Inc. 
began in 1960 and was completed in 1964 as part of the Lincoln Laboratory, 
which was operated by MIT for a variety of defense related activities. Haystack 
construction was under the direction of Lincoln Laboratory scientist Herbert 
Weiss who had previously been in charge of the Defense Department’s Distant 
Early Warning (DEW) Line radar facility. At the time, Haystack was the largest 
radome ever built. As the Haystack facility was motivated primarily by defense 
needs, there was little or no input from the conservative astronomers who 
insisted on an equatorial mount for the NRAO 140 Foot. Rather, Haystack 
pioneered the use of digital computers to control the alt-az mounted antenna 
as well as to evaluate the data. The pointing accuracy of the radome enclosed 
Haystack 120 foot antenna was not affected by the wind and the effects of solar 
heating were minimized. The pointing accuracy was much better than that of 
the NRAO 140 Foot and the alt-az mounted dish did not suffer from the same 
astigmatic deformation when the telescope was tipped in elevation. Early use of 
the Haystack antenna was for a variety of experiments in space communication 
and space situation awareness, but gradually more time was devoted to astron-
omy, particularly for radar studies of the Moon and planets. A particularly 
important and innovative experiment was the verification by Irwin Shapiro and 
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colleagues (Shapiro et  al. 1971) of the so-called Fourth Test of General 
Relativity.11 Starting in 1967, with support from NASA, the Haystack antenna 
was also used in a series of Very Long Baseline Interferometry (VLBI) experi-
ments, particularly involving high resolution studies of interstellar hydroxyl 
(OH) and water (H2O) vapor masers, as well as innovative applications of 
VLBI to precise measurements of the rotation of the Earth with applications to 
global timekeeping and for studies of tectonic plate motions (continental drift). 
Much of the instrumentation and techniques used for VLBI, including several 
generations of the VLBA recording system, have been developed at the 
Haystack Observatory (Sect. 8.4).
Subsequent upgrades to both the 120 foot dish as well as the radome and 
radar capability have enabled effective operation to short millimeter wave-
lengths for both radio astronomy and for a variety of passive and active com-
munication and space surveillance activities. Although initially funded by the 
Air Force and later by the Defense Department Advanced Research Project 
Agency (ARPA),12 as a result of the 1969 Mansfield amendment to the 1970 
Military Authorization Act, the Haystack Observatory was turned over to MIT 
to operate primarily for radio astronomy programs sponsored by the North 
East Radio Observatory Corporation (NEROC) with financial support from 
the NSF.13 But starting in the late 1980s, with decreasing support from the 
NSF, the amount of time available for radio astronomy has been reduced.
The Arecibo 1000 Foot Dish14 Meanwhile, further competition to NRAO was 
appearing on the Caribbean island of Puerto Rico where Cornell University 
was constructing a 1000 foot (305 m) fixed spherical antenna 10 km south of 
the city of Arecibo. Like the Haystack and Jodrell Bank antennas, the Cornell 
antenna was not initially designed for radio astronomy, but for studies of the 
ionosphere. The Arecibo antenna was conceived in 1958 by Cornell Professor 
of Electrical Engineering William Gordon to study the density and tempera-
ture distribution in the ionosphere using incoherent radar backscatter (Gordon 
et al. 1961). Gordon calculated that even using the most powerful radar trans-
mitters then available, a dish diameter of 1000 feet would be required in order 
to obtain a decent return signal from the upper F-layer of the ionosphere. 
Marshall Cohen noted that with such a huge antenna, it would also be possible 
to detect radar reflections from the Sun and the planets. Further discussion at 
Cornell led to increasing interest in using the proposed dish for general radio 
astronomy.
After rejecting potential sites in the Philippines and Cuba, a suitable site 
centered on a sinkhole was located in the Puerto Rico karst district south of 
Arecibo, and funding was obtained from the new ARPA. There was consider-
able interest within the military establishment in better understanding the ion-
osphere, since it might contain traces of disturbances by Soviet ICBMs or 
satellites as well as by high altitude nuclear explosions. Moreover, the iono-
sphere plays an important role in the world-wide propagation of high frequency 
radio communications, and the International Geophysical Year (1957–1958) 
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and the 1957 launch of the Russian Sputnik were added incentives to study the 
ionosphere.
However, Gordon’s calculation of the required sensitivity was faulty. Gordon 
assumed that the returned signal would be Doppler broadened by the random 
motions of ionospheric electrons. But the radar scattering is mostly from elec-
trons moving with the singly ionized oxygen ions and so the width is given by 
the Doppler broadening of the ions, not the electrons, and is about a factor of 
a hundred more narrow than that calculated by Gordon. Gordon’s goals could 
have been attained with a substantially smaller dish than 1000 feet, but by time 
this was recognized both Cornell and ARPA had become enamored with the 
concept of a 1000 foot dish with its potential non-ionospheric applications, 
and there was apparently no consideration of reducing the size of the dish 
(Cohen 2009).
When completed in 1963, the 20-acre collecting area of the Arecibo antenna 
was by far the largest of any radio telescope in the world, and would not be 
exceeded for another half a century when the Chinese 500 meter dish was 
completed in 2017. The Arecibo dish had a spherical instead of parabolic sur-
face so that the beam could be steered up to 20 degrees from the zenith by 
moving the feed structure.15 However, with a spherical surface there is no sin-
gle focal point; rather the incoming radiation is focused along a line, so that 
simple horn or dipole feeds used on conventional parabolic antennas had to be 
replaced with elaborate line feeds. Unfortunately, due to a design error the 
original line feeds, including the high-powered 440 MHz radar feed, had poor 
sensitivity and unacceptably high sidelobes, and it would take years before they 
were replaced by properly designed line feeds.
For many applications, including 21  cm spectroscopy, SETI, and pulsar 
research, the Arecibo telescope was more sensitive than any radio telescope in 
the world. Active radar programs also allowed the exploration of solar system 
objects out to the orbits of Jupiter and Saturn. However, in common with 
other filled aperture radio telescopes, continuum observations were limited by 
confusion and gain stability. For the first few years, the Arecibo Ionospheric 
Observatory (AIO) was operated as part of the Cornell-Sydney University 
Astronomy Center with funding from ARPA.  In 1971, the AIO became a 
national observatory and part of the Cornell National Astronomy and 
Ionospheric Center (NAIC) with primary funding from the NSF, while plan-
etary and ionospheric radar programs were supported by NASA. In 1973 the 
antenna was upgraded by replacing the original wire mesh surface with 38,788 
perforated aluminum panels which permitted operation up to 3 GHz (10 cm), 
and a new 420 kW 2.3 GHz radar was installed. A second upgrade was com-
pleted in 1997 when the line feeds were replaced by a Gregorian subreflector, 
the surface was reset to increase the maximum observing frequency, and a more 
powerful 1 MW transmitter installed for planetary radar.
Soon after completion of the antenna, radar observations of Mercury 
showed that, contrary to all text book descriptions, Mercury was not in syn-
chronous rotation with its 88 day period of revolution, but instead rotated at 
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2/3 of the 88 day period or 59 days (Pettengill and Dyce 1965). Later obser-
vations included the discovery of the first millisecond pulsars (Backer et  al. 
1982), the first exoplanets (Wolszczan and Frail 1992), and the first detection 
of the effects of gravitational radiation (Taylor et  al. 1979). In 1966 Frank 
Drake became Director of the Arecibo Observatory and initiated a vigorous 
program of pulsar research. As discussed in Sect. 5.5, with its extraordinary 
collecting area and sensitivity, the Arecibo telescope became a home for SETI 
observations by Frank Drake, Carl Sagan, and others.
Caltech and the Owens Valley Radio Observatory As was discussed in Sect. 3.2, 
following the lengthy discussions among Caltech’s Jesse Greenstein, Robert 
Bacher, and Lee DuBridge, Taffy Bowen from Australia, Mt. Wilson and 
Palomar director Ira Bowen, and Carnegie’s Vannever Bush and Merle Tuve, 
Greenstein and Tuve organized the January 1954 Washington conference on 
radio astronomy which led to an unintended shift in US radio astronomy plan-
ning toward the East Coast establishment and ultimately in the formation of 
the NRAO. However, Bacher, DuBridge, and Greenstein had not lost interest 
in creating a radio astronomy program at Caltech, one that would have a 
unique relation with the Mt. Wilson and Palomar Observatories (MWPO). 
Shortly after the conclusion of the Washington conference, ONR Science 
Director Randal Robertson visited Caltech and began a discussion with 
DuBridge and Bacher about possible funding from ONR for a Caltech/
MWPO radio astronomy program. Although excited about the potential of 
radio astronomy, DuBridge hesitated, in part because of his uncertainty about 
how to proceed, his concern about whether the US should or could support 
two major facilities, and by the threat of competition from the planned Jodrell 
Bank 250 foot radio telescope or Taffy Bowen’s planned large Australian radio 
telescope.
By July 1954, Greenstein had succeeded in convincing DuBridge of the 
need for Caltech to establish its own radio astronomy program, and DuBridge 
asked ONR Chief Scientist Emanuel (Manny) Piore “to keep a few dollars ear-
marked off in a corner for such a program.”16 DuBridge added that he had 
selected Caltech Professor Bill Pickering, then temporarily at JPL, to lead the 
new Caltech radio astronomy program. Robertson quickly responded that 
since his visit to Caltech in February, “I have had some funds mentally set aside 
for your project.”17 Within a few days, Elliot Montroll, the ONR Director of 
Physical Sciences, followed up, saying he wanted to meet with DuBridge in 
early August to “discuss the projected ONR program on radio astronomy.”18 
Things were moving fast. Pickering accepted DuBridge’s offer to take charge 
of the radio astronomy program starting 1 January 1955 and had already 
“begun to develop ideas in this direction.”19 Then JPL Director Luis Dunn 
suddenly and unexpectedly resigned to accept an industrial position at Ramo 
Woolridge, leaving DuBridge with the problem of finding a new JPL Director. 
JPL was a $13 million a year program, providing needed overhead funds to 
Caltech, and was a key component of the then burgeoning US space program. 
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DuBridge needed to appoint the best man as JPL director and that was Bill 
Pickering, leaving his radio astronomy program without a leader.20
A few months earlier, Grote Reber, who apparently had gotten wind of the 
developing Caltech interest in radio astronomy, had written DuBridge to 
inquire if there might be place for him in the Caltech program.21 DuBridge 
wisely consulted Greenstein, who reported that while Reber was “extremely 
original and has done remarkable good work, … I’m not sure he would be a 
suitable person to build an organization around.”22 DuBridge responded to 
Reber that “our plans for radio astronomy at Caltech are at a very elementary 
and formative stage and we do not know if it will be possible to get any work 
underway in the near future or not,” and went on to say in the traditional way, 
“if we do find it possible to undertake a project in which you might be inter-
ested, I will get in touch with you.”23 There is no evidence, however, that 
Reber was ever considered for a position in the Caltech radio astronomy group, 
even when DuBridge was desperately in need of finding someone to replace 
Pickering.
The “Old Boy Network” then went into quick operation. While DuBridge 
was pondering how to find a new leader for his radio astronomy project, Taffy 
Bowen, who was in the US to raise money for his planned radio telescope, 
stopped at Caltech and met with DuBridge, Bacher, Greenstein, and Walter 
Baade from the Mt. Wilson and Palomar staff. Recognizing the lack of experi-
enced American radio astronomers, DuBridge suggested to Bowen that one of 
his men be invited to Caltech to help start a radio astronomy program. Several 
possibilities were discussed, but they agreed that John Bolton would be the 
best person. Following his remarkable discoveries described in Sect. 2.1, Bolton 
had run into conflict with his Radiophysics boss, Joe Pawsey. To ease tensions, 
Bowen had transferred Bolton from radio astronomy to his own rain-making 
program, but recognized the opportunity afforded by Caltech to get Bolton 
back into radio astronomy and perhaps to get him out the difficult situation at 
the Radiophysics Lab.24 Although Bowen claimed that he did not want to lose 
Bolton, he agreed to talk to Bolton and explore his interest in going to Caltech. 
Encouraged by his discussions with Bowen, DuBridge rather casually sug-
gested to Piore that “possibly you could add say $50,000 to the contract at 
ONR for radio astronomy purposes.”25
Only after Bowen had talked with Bolton and obtained in principle Bolton’s 
interest in going “to Cal. Tech. to help you start a Radio Astronomy pro-
gramme,”26 did DuBridge finally contact Bolton with an offer of an appoint-
ment “as a Senior Research Fellow in Physics and Astronomy…. The initial 
appointment would be for a two-year period, beginning whenever you would 
find it possible to arrive. At the end of the two years, we would like to explore 
the question of your future with a definitive possibility in mind that it may be 
mutually agreeable for you to remain with us.”27 DuBridge, who was sensitive 
to the growing interest from AUI and other east coast scientists, was anxious 
to get started and expressed the hope that Bolton would start at the begin-
ning of 1955.
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John Bolton arrived at Caltech with his family in February 1955, initially on 
a two year leave of absence from CSIRO.  At Bolton’s urging, Caltech also 
hired his long-time friend and colleague Gordon Stanley, who arrived a few 
months later to provide expert technical support. To the surprise of DuBridge, 
Bolton announced that he did not intend to build another Mills Cross as 
DuBridge had discussed with Bowen, but rather had his own ideas about a vari-
able spacing interferometer to measure accurate radio positions and morphol-
ogy of discrete radio sources.
To carry out their planned radio astronomy program Bolton and Stanley 
needed to find a large, flat radio-quiet site. Stanley located an appropriate site 
in the Owens Valley nestled between the Sierra Nevada on the west and the 
Inyo Mountains to the east. Starting early in the twentieth century, the city of 
Los Angeles diverted water from the Owens Valley to the rapidly growing and 
water-starved city of Los Angeles, destroying farms and leaving the Owens 
Valley as a dry wasteland. With a diminishing source of livelihood, the popula-
tion of the Owens Valley stagnated or even declined.28 In order to minimize 
population growth in the area, in 1920, the Los Angeles Department of Water 
and Power (LADWP) purchased a large track of land located near the small 
town of Big Pine about 250 miles north of Pasadena. Caltech seized the oppor-
tunity to rent for $1 per year several hundred acres of land from the LADWP 
about five miles from Big Pine where they could be assured of minimal popula-
tion growth in the area and relative freedom from RFI.29
DuBridge had already laid the foundation with ONR for support of Bolton’s 
proposal, and for the first few years the construction and operation of the 
OVRO was supported primarily by generous funding from ONR, with some 
private funding raised by Caltech for the buildings needed to house the control 
room, workshops, and living quarters for visiting staff. Arnold Shostak, the 
ONR program officer, did not bother with formal proposals or project reviews, 
but had an informal unmilitary-like seat-of-the pants approach to deciding who 
and what to fund and what not to fund. Aside from Caltech, Shostak provided 
ONR funds for George Swenson at the University of Illinois and Fred Haddock 
at the University of Michigan.30 However, starting with the construction of the 
OVRO 130 foot (40 meter) antenna in 1964, OVRO, as well as the other 
ONR funded American radio observatories, depended more and more on NSF 
funding, fomenting an increasing level of competition between NRAO and the 
university-operated radio observatories.
Although much of the heavy construction of the OVRO interferometer was 
initially carried out by commercial contractors, as Bolton began to run out of 
ONR funds, the construction and operation at OVRO was increasingly done 
largely by his graduate students, who were mostly recruited from the Caltech 
physics rather than the astronomy departments. Under Bolton and Stanley’s 
supervision, and especially Bolton’s iron handed management, the students 
designed much of the instrumentation as well as ran bulldozers and tractors, 
dug trenches, laid cables, painted antennas, designed and built electronic sys-
tems, etc. The students were paid only a small fraction of what the commercial 
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contractors were paid, which did not escape the attention of the local contrac-
tors. On one hot summer day, a local union organizer showed up while Bolton, 
along with a group of students, were laboring out in the desert sun and 
demanded to know if this was a union job. Bolton assured him that he was a 
member of the International Astronomical Union and that was the last time 
any labor union was involved at OVRO. For the students, who provided skilled, 
but cheap, labor, the experience was invaluable in their later careers, and many 
of Bolton’s students and junior staff themselves went on to distinguished 
careers in radio astronomy. Robert Wilson received the 1978 Nobel Prize for 
Physics, along with Arno Penzias, for their discovery of the cosmic microwave 
background, which created a new field of precision observational cosmology 
from what previously had been a mathematical exercise. Six other former stu-
dents later served as directors of radio observatories in the US, Europe, India, 
and Australia.
When the OVRO East-West interferometer went into operation at the end 
of 1959, NRAO had only a single 85 foot antenna and was struggling with 
what turned out to be only the beginning of extensive problems with the 140 
Foot antenna. By the end of 1960, OVRO had a fully functional two- 
dimensional interferometer using two 90 foot (27.4 meter) antennas that 
could be moved on railroad track to various stations separated by up to 1600 
feet in both the east-west and north-south directions. Young radio astronomers 
were recruited from around the world to join the OVRO staff. Jim Roberts 
and Kevin Westfold arrived from Australia and were soon followed by 
Venkataraman Radhakrishnan (known as “Rad”) from India by way of Sweden, 
Per Maltby from Norway, and Dave Morris from Jodrell Bank. Tom Matthews, 
who had been Bolton’s host while at a visit to Harvard, was the sole US-trained 
staff member.
At the end of his initial two-year appointment, Bolton resigned from CSIRO 
and accepted an indefinite appointment at Caltech, and on 1 January 1958 he 
became Director of the Owens Valley Radio Observatory (OVRO) and 
Professor of Radio Astronomy. To the surprise of many, citing Caltech bureau-
cracy, what he perceived as excessive overhead charges, pressures to teach, and 
family reasons, Bolton left Caltech and returned to Australia at the end of 1960 
to take charge of the Parkes 210 foot radio telescope and to oversee the final 
stages of its construction.
Following Bolton’s departure, Caltech tried to recruit Robert Hanbury 
Brown as OVRO director, but he had already committed to go to the University 
of Sydney to build a large optical intensity interferometer. It is not clear to 
what extent Caltech low-keyed the radio astronomy program for fear it would 
compete with either the ONR funded program at the Caltech synchrotron or 
Caltech/MWPO ambitions to build a southern hemisphere 200 inch tele-
scope. Finally, in 1965 Caltech appointed Gordon Stanley as OVRO director. 
Stanley had even fewer academic qualifications than Bolton, and unlike Bolton 
was never given a professorial appointment. When Stanley retired in 1975, 
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Professor of Radio Astronomy Alan Moffet, who had been one of the earliest 
radio astronomy students at Caltech, became the OVRO director.
The early OVRO research program fully met Greenstein and DuBridge’s 
ambitions to bring together radio and optical astronomy at Caltech. During his 
six years at Caltech, Bolton led the development of the OVRO which became 
in those years the most productive radio observatory in the world. The OVRO 
interferometer measured radio source positions with an accuracy of a few arc 
seconds (e.g., Read 1963; Fomalont et al. 1964) leading to secure identifica-
tions with radio galaxies at ever increasing distances (Minkowski 1960; Maltby 
et  al. 1963). Caltech students and staff demonstrated the pervasive double 
nature of radio galaxies (Maltby and Moffet 1962), discovered the first quasars, 
made a number of important solar system discoveries (e.g., Clark and Kuzmin 
1965), and pioneered interferometric radio spectroscopy (Clark et al. 1962; 
Clark 1965) and interferometric polarization studies (Morris et al. 1964). By 
the mid-1960s, the Owens Valley Radio Observatory with its modest funding 
from ONR was a clear success, in contrast to the much better NSF-funded 
NRAO, which was struggling with the 140 Foot antenna, and until the 1962 
completion of the 300 Foot transit antenna, NRAO did not have a competitive 
radio telescope.
Tensions between NRAO and Caltech had existed since DuBridge had 
announced at Berkner’s July 1953 meeting that he was going to begin a radio 
astronomy program at Caltech (Sect. 3.2). Bolton, and later Gordon Stanley, 
served on various NRAO advisory committees, and never missed an opportu-
nity to criticize the NRAO operation. Stanley’s mixer receivers were more sen-
sitive than NRAO’s expensive receivers using commercial parametric and maser 
amplifiers, and he was not hesitant to remind NRAO of their problems. One 
Caltech student, unenthusiastic about doing manual labor in the Owens Valley, 
asked Bolton if he could instead spend the summer at the NRAO summer stu-
dent program, which offered an apparently better opportunity to be involved 
in research as well as a series of interesting lectures. Bolton flatly told him, 
“Sure, but, if you go to NRAO, you don’t need to come back.” That student 
never got his PhD.
The rivalry between NRAO and OVRO reached its peak in late 1960s and 
1970s when both organizations proposed to build the array of dishes that had 
been recommended by the first decade review of astronomy (Whitford 1964) 
(Sect. 7.2) and later, to a lesser, extent the competing proposals for a dedicated 
Very Long Baseline Array (VLBA) (Sects. 8.6 and 8.7). Ironically, however, 
nearly 40 former Caltech students, staff, and faculty later worked at NRAO, 
including two NRAO directors as well as a number of NRAO assistant direc-
tors. After the early influx of Harvard graduates, it was the Caltech graduates 
and postdocs who played major roles in planning and designing the new instru-
mentation and software that kept NRAO at the forefront of radio astronomy 
over the next half century. In particular, Barry Clark, Ed Fomalont, Eric 
Greisen, and Richard Sramek were key players in the design, construction. and 
operation of the NRAO VLA, and Ron Ekers, who had been a Caltech  postdoc, 
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became the first director of the VLA (Sect. 7.7). Clark, Jon Romney, and Craig 
Walker, along with one of the present authors (KIK) were heavily involved in 
planning for the VLBA (Sects. 8.6 and 8.7) while Alwyn (Al) Wootten became 
the ALMA Project Scientist for North America (Sect. 10.7).
The Caltech plan to build an eight-element array led to the construction of 
the first 130 foot (40 m) prototype dish which was used in conjunction with 
the two 90 foot (27 m) antennas as a three element interferometer (Sect. 7.2). 
But following the failure of the Caltech Owens Valley Array proposal in favor 
of the NRAO VLA, Caltech turned its attention first to Very Long Baseline 
Interferometry (Sect. 8.1) using the 130 foot telescope and then to millimeter 
astronomy based on a novel 10 meter dish designed by Caltech physics profes-
sor Robert Leighton (Sect. 10.4).
Jodrell Bank American ambitions were dwarfed by Bernard Lovell’s 250 foot 
(76 m) fully steerable radio telescope at Jodrell Bank, near Manchester in the 
UK. Lovell was familiar with Grote Reber’s work and, indeed, during WWII 
Lovell had implemented some of Reber’s receiver designs in developing British 
radar systems. As early as 1950, Lovell (1987) began talking about building a 
very large fully steerable dish at the University of Manchester. Interestingly, 
Lovell’s plans were not motivated by radio astronomy, but by his interest in 
detecting radar echoes from ionized trails left by cosmic rays as they passed 
through the Earth’s atmosphere. Lovell’s 250 foot Jodrell Bank radio tele-
scope was finally finished in 1957, and would remain an icon of radio astron-
omy for many years. However, the years of delay and cost escalation during the 
250 foot construction were sadly prophetic of many of the other large steerable 
radio telescope projects which were to follow throughout the twentieth 
century.
After nearly a decade of continual operation, the Mark I telescope was 
beginning to show signs of wear resulting from stresses induced by the repeated 
elevation motion. The antenna needed a major overhaul, more than could be 
accomplished from the regular maintenance program. Lovell managed to raise 
£350,000 to not only overhaul the Mark I, but to upgrade it to what he called 
the Mark IA, which would work at frequencies up to several GHz. This was to 
be accomplished by overhauling the azimuth track, reducing the load on the 
elevation bearing, strengthening the backup structure, increasing the dish 
diameter by 15 feet (4.5 m), putting a new surface on the dish, strengthening 
the single feed support, and revamping the control system. But the cost esti-
mate turned out to be over £500,000, and it was admitted by the designer, 
Charles Husband, that this was only an estimate, and that the price could not 
be determined without actual contractor bids. Once again, repeated delays and 
design changes ran the final cost of the overhaul and upgrade to £650,000, 
even including some descoping of the upgrade, including the decision to 
strengthen the single feed support structure rather than replace it with a tetra-
pod and abandoning any plan to increase the dish diameter. In 1987, the 
Jodrell Bank 250 foot Mark IA radio telescope was renamed the “Lovell 
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Telescope” and remains in operation more than 60 years after its comple-
tion in 1957.
In addition to extensive stand-alone radio astronomy research programs, the 
Jodrell Bank telescope was a key component of the very successful Manchester 
long baseline interferometer program, and later MERLIN, the Multi-Element 
Radio Linked Interferometer Network (Sect. 8.1).
The 250 foot’s delays and cost increases were in part the result of upgraded 
performance specifications following the Harvard discovery in the US of the 
21 cm hydrogen line. Lovell naturally wanted to exploit this exciting discovery, 
and introduced costly design changes which the University was unable or 
unwilling to meet. Following the accelerated space program resulting from the 
Sputnik launch by the USSR, the US found itself with inadequate facilities to 
track either Russian or American spacecraft, especially those in so-called “deep 
space,” beyond Earth orbiting satellites. Rather embarrassingly to the US, 
NASA had to contract with the University of Manchester to use their still 
unfinished 250 foot antenna at Jodrell Bank to track the rocket that launched 
the Sputnik spacecraft and for subsequent tracking of the first US satellites. 
Probably only the fortuitous launch of Sputnik and the income from the NASA 
contract saved Lovell from going to prison for his alleged misuse of University 
funds. Lovell himself became perhaps the best-known figure in radio astron-
omy, and was rewarded by knighthood a year earlier than Martin Ryle, who 
headed the very innovative and successful, but contentious, radio astronomy 
program at Cambridge (Sect. 7.1).
The Australian 210 Foot Parkes Radio Telescope The events leading to the con-
struction and early operation of the Parkes 210 foot radio telescope have been 
described by Robertson (1992). After first flirting with Caltech, Taffy Bowen 
succeeded in raising $500,000 from the US-based Carnegie and Rockefeller 
Foundations for his Giant Radio Telescope (GRT) in Australia. Although he 
was able to obtain matching funds from the Australian government, they were 
not sufficient to meet Bowen’s ambitions for an antenna that would compete 
with Lovell’s 250-footer. Moreover, the Australian government money came 
with strings attached. The other, still very productive, Radiophysics radio 
astronomy programs would need to be cut, so there was little support for 
Bowen’s GRT among the Radiophysics staff, who saw it as competition to 
their own ambitious plans. Bernie Mills wanted to build an expanded version 
of his successful Mills Cross, the so- called “Super Cross.” Chris Christiansen 
and Paul Wild each had plans for solar radio telescopes. Ultimately Mills and 
Christiansen would leave Radiophysics for the University of Sydney where 
they could pursue their goals. Wild almost accepted an attractive offer to go 
to Cornell University in New York, but with the help of Joe Pawsey, he was 
able to obtain additional funds to build his solar radioheliograph near 
Culgoora in northern New South Wales. Later, as discussed in Sect. 4.6, Joe 
Pawsey planned to leave to become Director of NRAO, but became ill and 
died before he could take up the NRAO position. John Bolton supported 
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Bowen’s plans for building a GRT, but Bolton had gone off to Caltech with 
Gordon Stanley to start the Owens Valley Radio Observatory.
Bowen first recruited Barnes Wallis to help design his radio telescope31 and 
then engaged Freeman Fox, who had designed the Sydney Harbor Bridge, for 
the detailed engineering design. Freeman Fox produced several designs for 
various sized telescopes. The available funds suggested a diameter of 210 foot 
(64 meter) if the elevation was limited to 30 degrees above the horizon and if 
the operating wind speed was limited to only 30 miles per hour. The shortest 
operating wavelength was specified as 10 cm (3 GHz). A site near the farming 
town of Parkes in the rural New South Wales Goobang Valley was chosen due 
to its isolation from local sources of radio interference, expected low winds, 
mild snow-free climate, geological stability, and relative proximity to Sydney. 
With a 210 foot diameter, the Parkes radio telescope was clearly too large to 
use a conventional equatorial (polar) mount. Instead Wallis developed a novel 
“Master Equatorial” consisting of a small equatorially mounted unit located at 
the intersection of the antenna’s azimuth and elevation axis (Robertson 1992, 
p. 147). Using a light beam reflected off a mirror on the back of the dish, the 
pointing of the radio antenna was servo-controlled to the position of the 
Master Equatorial and provided remarkable stable and precise pointing. 
Although the Master Equatorial design was known to the AUI Planning 
Committee, it was never seriously considered for the Green Bank 140 Foot 
Telescope.
After he returned to Australia from Caltech at the end of 1960, John Bolton 
oversaw the completion of the Parkes radio telescope, which was opened on 31 
October 1961, a full four years before the completion of the NRAO 140 Foot 
Telescope (Sect. 4.4). As with the Jodrell Bank 250 foot antenna and many 
subsequent large radio telescope systems built in the US and in other countries, 
there were many construction delays and cost increases. The final cost of the 
Parkes radio telescope was about US$2 million, considerably more than the 
initial budget estimates, but only about one-seventh the cost of the 140 Foot. 
Although smaller than the Jodrell Bank radio telescope, the Parkes dish had far 
better surface and pointing accuracy than Lovell’s telescope, and twice the col-
lecting area of the NRAO 140 Foot Telescope. At least initially it did not oper-
ate at the same short wavelengths as the 140 Foot antenna, but subsequent 
upgrades, resurfacing, and strengthening resulted in it being used up to 
22  GHz (1.3 cm) with a sensitivity comparable to that of the 140 Foot 
Telescope.
During the first few years of operation, Bolton began a variety of research 
programs, including a systematic survey of the sky south of +20 degrees 
Declination. Following his close involvement with optical astronomers at 
Caltech and at the Mt. Wilson and Palomar observatories, Bolton initiated a 
very productive collaboration with astronomers and students from the Mt. 
Stromlo Observatory near Canberra, leading to the discovery of many new 
quasars and the determination of their redshifts. Later, Richard (Dick) 
Manchester led a vigorous Parkes pulsar program and the first Fast Radio Burst 
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was discovered at Parkes in 2007 by Duncan Lorimer et al. (2007). Along with 
the Sydney Opera House and the Sydney Harbour Bridge, the Parkes radio 
telescope has become an Australian icon, and the role of the Parkes telescope 
in support of the Apollo 11 Moon landing was the subject of the well-known 
movie, The Dish.
The Canadian Algonquin Park 150 Foot Dish Canadian scientists had devel-
oped a modest program in radio astronomy, mostly centered at an attractive 
and relatively radio quiet site near Penticton, British Columbia. Research at 
Penticton was based on several simple and inexpensive arrays operating at rela-
tively long wavelengths of 15 to 30 meters, as well as a small instrument to 
monitor solar radio noise at 10 cm. The daily solar monitoring program, which 
began in 1947 near Ottawa, continues to this day, providing important data on 
solar activity and its impact on short wave radio proportion. It is certainly the 
longest running uninterrupted program in radio astronomy, and arguably the 
longest running scientific study of any kind. However, with the growing inter-
est in the exciting developments leading to the discoveries being made in in 
Europe and Australia, Canadian radio astronomers needed a competitive radio 
telescope that would operate at centimeter wavelengths.
In 1966 the Canadian National Research Council completed a 150 foot 
antenna at Algonquin Park in Ontario. The Algonquin Radio Observatory 
(ARO) antenna was designed by Freeman Fox, who built the Parkes radio tele-
scope, and followed many of the same design concepts, including a Master 
Equatorial to control the antenna pointing. The ARO radio telescope had a 
more precise surface and better pointing than the NRAO 140 Foot, and, owing 
to the alt-az design, gravitational deflections were better understood than they 
were for the polar-mounted 140 Foot. However, there was limited funding in 
Canada for instrumentation or operation. Except for the early success of the 
Canadian VLBI program, the scientific impact of the Algonquin Park 150 foot 
radio telescope was limited. After an ambitious plan to upgrade the telescope 
for operation at short millimeter wavelengths was cancelled following an NRC 
review, further radio astronomy observations with the Algonquin Park radio 
telescope ceased.
The Giant Metrewave Radio Telescope (GMRT) in India Radio astronomy in 
India began later than in many other countries. Govind Swarup started his 
radio astronomy career at the CSIRO Radiophysics Laboratory under the tute-
lage of Joe Pawsey. After spending a year at Harvard’s Fort Davis radio tele-
scope, Swarup earned his PhD at Stanford working under Ron Bracewell. In 
1961, T. Krishnan, M. R. Kundu, T. K. Menon, and Swarup proposed starting 
a radio astronomy program in India. But only Swarup actually returned to 
India, where he led the design and construction of a novel new radio telescope 
located near the small town of Ooty and intended to observe lunar occulta-
tions. During the 1970s, Swarup and his growing cadre of young scientists 
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used the Ooty radio telescope to determine the positions and morphology of 
more than a thousand extragalactic radio sources. With the construction of the 
more powerful VLA and the WSRT (Chap. 7), however, the time for lunar 
occultations had passed.
Swarup then led his young group to design and build the GMRT, com-
prised of thirty parabolic dishes each 45 meters (148 feet) in diameter. The 
GMRT, which went into full operation in the year 2000, is 25 km in extent, is 
located about 100 km from the city of Mumbai (Bombay), and covers the fre-
quency range from 40 to 1700 MHz. Each dish is based on Swarup’s novel 
SMART (Stretched Mesh Attached to Rope Trusses) design intended to exploit 
the low labor costs in India. Following a series of upgrades, the GMRT remains 
one of the world’s most powerful radio telescopes, especially in the frequency 
range below 1 GHz.
6.7  GROte RebeR chAlleNGes NRAO32
Since Karl Jansky’s early work, and starting with Reber’s activities at Wheaton, 
radio astronomers have steadily moved to ever-shorter wavelengths in the quest 
for better angular resolution and to study the multitude of molecular transi-
tions that exist in the millimeter and submillimeter bands. In 1953 Reber was 
approached by Merle Tuve of the Carnegie Institution to return to Washington 
to help develop plans for building a large parabolic dish. Characteristically 
departing from conventional wisdom, Reber decided to concentrate instead on 
the extremely long hectometer wavelengths where he felt he could make a big-
ger impact. While he was working in Hawaii, he had access to ionospheric 
records which showed regions of minimum ionospheric attenuation between 
latitudes of 40 and 50 degrees in both hemispheres. Reber chose Tasmania, 
with its access to the rich southern sky and more favorable climate compared 
with Canada. In November 1954 he moved to Bothwell, Tasmania, where, 
except for visits to the United States and Canada, he lived and worked for 
almost the next 50 years.
In Tasmania, Reber designed and built a series of arrays to study galactic 
radio emission at wavelengths as long as 2.1 km. Reber hoped to exploit the 
fluctuations in the ionosphere which he claimed led to the creation of narrow 
holes which would form a high resolution window to the Universe. Observing 
at hectometer wavelengths, he noted that the sky is very bright everywhere, 
especially at the poles, and that the Milky Way appears as a dark absorption 
band which he correctly understood was due to free-free absorption by inter-
stellar electrons (Reber and Ellis 1956). Unfortunately, increasing levels of 
ionospheric absorption and the increased density of the interplanetary plasma 
following the unusually low sunspot minimum of 1955, combined with increas-
ing levels of broadcast interference, limited the results of Reber’s hectometer 
observations. But Reber’s 144 meter (2045 kHz) array, which he built in a 
local farmer’s pasture, consisted of 192 dipoles covering a full square km and 
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remains the largest “filled-aperture” radio telescope ever built (Reber and 
Ellis 1968).
To overcome ionospheric absorption, Reber conceived the idea of releasing 
liquid hydrogen into the ionosphere so it could recombine with free electrons 
and thus make the ionosphere temporarily transparent to wavelengths as long 
as 300 meters. For the last twenty years of his life, he relentlessly tried to obtain 
demobilized American ICBMs to carry a canister of hydrogen into space, but 
he was frustrated by the seemingly endless bureaucracy and the large cost asso-
ciated with any rocket activity. Letters to colleagues (including one of us, KIK), 
friends, observatory directors, NASA laboratory heads, and Congressmen gave 
no encouragement, but he stubbornly refused to take “no” for an answer and 
continued to seek surplus rockets until shortly before his death. However, 
Reber, Ellis, and others did convince NASA to fire the engines for 16 seconds 
on the ill-fated Challenger space shuttle during a pass over Bothwell on the 
night of 15 August 1985. A quarter ton of fuel was released in an attempt to 
create a temporary hole in the ionosphere. But the results of these hectometer 
observations were inconclusive (Ellis et al. 1987).
In 1967, Reber applied for an NSF grant of $1.25 million to construct a 
large array in the northern hemisphere to operate at a wavelength of 144 
meters, but was turned down. Reber did not easily accept the rejection of his 
proposal or the growing emphasis on short wavelengths. His suggestion that 
his array could be funded by “slight curtailment of routine operations at Green 
Bank,” and that “N.R.A.O. should be gradually contracted in favor of scientifi-
cally more auspicious long wave programs at other places throughout the 
country”33 was not well received in Washington or by NRAO. He researched 
previous NSF astronomy grants and challenged the legality of the national 
astronomy centers, which he argued were prestige institutions designed to 
impress the ignorant, which constituted “a mortgage on astronomy money,” 
and said that the members of the National Science Board were stuffy old men.
Reber wrote letters to the NSF Director Leeland Haworth; the President of 
the National Academy of Sciences Frederick Seitz; various Congressmen, 
including Senator William Proxmire, as well as Ralph Nader and his Center for 
the Study of Responsive Law. He testified before Congress that too much NSF 
funding for radio astronomy was going to NRAO instead of individual investi-
gators34 and claimed that the “staff at the NSF are mostly clerks quite uninter-
ested and incapable of imaginative scientific leadership.”35 From the National 
Academy of Sciences he asked for “positive leadership instead of basking in 
renown.”36 To establish his credentials so that that the recipients of his letters 
did not think they were coming from a crank, he would often start his letters 
referring the reader to the Encyclopedia Britannica article describing his 
accomplishments.
Reber also expressed great concern at the National Academy of Sciences 
report (Whitford 1964) on the future of ground-based astronomy in the US, 
in particular what he considered an overemphasis on “huge instruments.” In a 
letter to Science, Reber (1966) argued against the construction of a large radio 
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array [the VLA, Chap. 7] and commented that the plans for a 400–600 foot 
radome enclosed dish “displays an acute lack of imagination.” He was espe-
cially critical about NRAO and about the present and future NRAO scien-
tists, writing,
Green Bank might as well be closed down. The best work likely to ever be done 
there has already been completed and published: namely my beans.37 Some of the 
things that go on there in the name of administration shouldn’t happen to a dog. 
The net effect is that of a mortgage on astronomy. Only the duller members of 
the new generation will try to find a place at these institutions.38
His prescient remarks about the need for a tracking multi-beam array made 
of simple wire elements preceded by more than a quarter of a century the inter-
national discussions about building a Square Kilometre Array (e.g., Ekers 
2013), but his uninhibited comments about mainstream radio astronomy, 
especially concerning NRAO, left Reber as a bit of a pariah.
6.8  chANGiNG leAdeRship
NRAO By 1977, Dave Heeschen was getting tired of dealing with the increas-
ing NSF bureaucracy and announced his desire to step down as Director of 
NRAO and spend more time with his family, sailing on Chesapeake Bay, and in 
reactivating his research career. During his 17 years, first as NRAO Acting 
Director and then as Director, Heeschen had transformed NRAO from an 
organization on the brink of failure into a highly respected facility that was 
universally acknowledged as the leading radio observatory in the world. During 
his tenure as NRAO Director, Heeschen established NRAO as the national 
observatory that had been envisioned by Menzel, Bok, Stratton, Berkner, and 
others. He saw the completion, finally, of the 140 Foot Telescope, led the drive 
to build the VLA, established millimeter radio astronomy at NRAO, and 
enthusiastically supported the early VLBI program and later the initiative to 
build the VLBA. He recruited an outstanding scientific and engineering staff 
and oversaw NRAO’s transition into a true visitor institution. He took particu-
lar interest in the professional growth of the scientific staff, and throughout his 
tenure as Director, he remained the head of the “Basic Research Division.” 
Accustomed to the informal discussions with Randy Robertson in the early 
years, he was annoyed when the NSF started to record their discussions and 
rebelled against the NSF request to review and edit the lengthy transcript of 
one of their meetings. Instead it he sent it back with the terse note, “If that’s 
what we said, then that’s what we said.”39 Nevertheless, he was greatly respected 
at the NSF which considered NRAO to be the best run of the national 
centers.40
After his retirement, Heeschen broke his personal tradition and gave an after 
dinner talk at an NRAO internal scientific symposium where he outlined his 
“advice to directors and managers and to would-be-directors and managers:”41 
(1) Hire good people, then leave them alone; (2) Do as little managing as 
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 possible; (3) Use common sense; (4) Don’t take yourself too seriously; and 
finally, (5) Have fun.
Throughout his tenure as Director, Heeschen expressed concern that 
NRAO was getting too large and that university operated facilities were not 
receiving adequate support. In a letter to then AUI President, Keith Glennan, 
Heeschen wrote,42
For all its logical, quantitative aspects, I think the best science is a highly personal, 
individualistic activity—as much so as art or music or writing—and it needs the 
right kind of atmosphere. If NRAO, in one context, or AUI in another, gets so 
large that that the atmosphere can’t be maintained then we become just high- 
level technicians or facility operators, and while it may be necessary that someone 
do this, I don’t think it is for us.
When Heeschen announced his retirement, AUI, under the direct leader-
ship of President Gerry Tape, initiated a search for a new Director. But running 
a “user” oriented observatory does not necessarily appeal to the typical research 
scientist. After a national search, the top three candidates all turned down the 
NRAO Directorship, and AUI asked Mort Roberts to become the NRAO 
Director. Roberts was a long time member of the NRAO Scientific Staff and 
had previously served for a year as the Green Bank site director from 1969 to 
1970. He had a distinguished research career primarily using 21 cm spectros-
copy to study the kinematics of nearby galaxies which led to best evidence for 
the existence of dark matter.
Roberts became the Director of NRAO just as the construction of the VLA 
was being completed and NRAO was gearing up for the 25 meter millimeter 
radio telescope and the VLBA. He oversaw the completion of the VLA con-
struction (Sect. 7.6) and the complex transition from VLA construction to 
VLA operations (Sect. 7.7), hired Ron Ekers, then working in the Netherlands, 
to become director of VLA operations, and helped procure the funding for the 
VLBA (Sect. 8.7). However, he was blamed, probably inappropriately, for the 
failure of the popular 25 meter millimeter-wave telescope proposal (Sects. 8.7 
and 10.3).
Roberts strongly believed that NRAO should have a world class scientific 
staff, and tried to protect the research time of the staff. Young staff members, 
especially those on term appointments, were encouraged to concentrate on 
their research. As he put it, their job was “to get tenure.” This led to some 
resentment from those staff members on continuing or indefinite appoint-
ments, as they had to absorb the full load of supporting Observatory opera-
tions, but, in return, they weren’t subject to the threat of termination at the 
end of a few-year term appointment.
After the completion of his five year term as NRAO Director in 1984, 
Roberts returned to full time research. Hein Hvatum became the Interim 
Director for three months until Paul Vanden Bout arrived as NRAO Director 
from the University of Texas on 1 January 1985. Vanden Bout had built a solid 
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reputation for making the University of Texas Millimeter Wave Observatory a 
major player in millimeter spectroscopy, and he had trained a new generation 
of millimeter wave astronomers. Before coming to NRAO, Vanden Bout had 
served on both the NRAO Visiting and Users Committees, and chaired the 
Advisory Committee charged with selecting the site for the VLBA Operations 
Center, so he was well known to the AUI Board. During his 17 years at the 
helm of NRAO, Vanden Bout oversaw the construction of the VLBA (Sects. 
8.7 and 8.8); dealt with the unprecedented circumstances surrounding the col-
lapse of the 300 Foot Telescope leading to funding and construction of the 
Green Bank Telescope (Sects. 9.6 and 9.7); began the Expanded Very Large 
Array project (Sect. 7.8); together with Bob Brown, initiated the design of the 
Millimeter Array (MMA); and was an important part of the complex negotia-
tions that lead to the international partnership and the funding and construc-
tion of ALMA (Atacama Large Millimeter/submillimeter Array) (Sects. 10.6 
and 10.7). Vanden Bout resigned as NRAO Director in June 2002 to become 
Interim Director of ALMA, and W.  Miller Goss became the Interim 
NRAO Director.
AUI reached out to Kwok-Yung (Fred) Lo, then director of the Taiwan 
Institute of Astronomy and Astrophysics to fill the Director position. Earlier, 
Lo had been the Chair of the University of Illinois Department of Astronomy 
and had served on the faculty at Caltech. He received his PhD in physics from 
MIT in 1974 and had a wide range of research interests including star forma-
tion and VLBI. Lo’s management style contrasted with that of Vanden Bout, 
who tried to rule by consensus, whereas Lo ruled more by edict. During his ten 
year, sometimes contentious, tenure as NRAO Director, Lo oversaw the com-
plex transformation of the VLA to the JVLA (Sect. 7.8); made the tough deci-
sion to curtail the long running AIPS++ project; and played a crucial role in the 
establishment of ALMA and the North American ALMA Science Center at 
NRAO in Charlottesville. Lo stepped down as NRAO Director in May 2012 
and died in 2016 after a 25-year-long struggle with cancer (Fig. 6.12).
The next Director of NRAO was Anthony (Tony) Beasley who arrived at 
NRAO with impressive credentials obtained as a result of his forceful manage-
ment of some of the NSF’s largest projects. Beasley first came to NRAO in 
1991 on a postdoctoral appointment after receiving his PhD in Astrophysics 
from the University of Sydney. He rapidly rose through the ranks, becoming 
Deputy Assistant Director for VLA/VLBA Operations and for Computing in 
1997, and Assistant Director in 1998. In 2000 Beasley left NRAO to become 
Project Manager for the Combined Array for Research in Millimeter-Wave 
Astronomy (CARMA) which combined the Caltech and BIMA millimeter 
arrays (Sect. 10.4) at a relatively dry site in the Inyo Mountains east of 
OVRO.  In 2004 he returned to NRAO as an Assistant Director and 
International Project Manager for ALMA, under construction in Chile by 
NRAO and ESO (Sect. 10.7). His next challenge was as Chief Operating 
Officer and Project Manager for the NSF-funded National Ecological 
Observatory Network (NEON), a continental-scale ecological observatory 
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designed to detect ecological change and enable forecasting of its impacts. In 
2012 Beasley returned as Director of NRAO and in 2016 he also became AUI 
Vice President for Radio Astronomy Operations. He brought a new style of 
aggressive no-nonsense management to an Observatory faced with NSF- 
mandated changes and was committed to bringing under-represented 
groups to NRAO.
While open to input and criticism, Beasley responded decisively to each cri-
sis situation facing NRAO. Hitting the ground running, he initiated the new 
VLA Sky Survey, began the effort to provide Science Ready Data Products to 
enhance the productivity of the increasingly complex NRAO telescopes, and 
initiated the early development of the next generation VLA (ngVLA) project43 
(Sect. 11.2) to provide the US response to the international SKA project 
(Ekers 2013).
AUI Following the rapid turnover in the AUI Presidency discussed in Sect. 
4.6, Gerry Tape returned from his appointment as Ambassador to the 
International Atomic Energy Commission to become President of AUI from 
1969 to 1980. Tape was succeeded by Cornell chemist Robert E. Hughes, 
who had previously served as the NSF Assistant Director for Math and Physical 
Sciences. Hughes retired in 1997 and was replaced by Lyle Schwartz from the 
Fig. 6.12 Four NRAO Directors at the NRAO 50th anniversary symposium, June 
2007. Left to right: Fred K. Y. Lo (5th Director), Paul A. Vanden Bout (4th Director), 
Morton S. Roberts (3rd Director), David S. Heeschen (2nd Director). Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
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National Institute of Standards and Technology (formerly the National Bureau 
of Standards). Schwartz was immediately confronted with the Brookhaven 
controversy over the alleged leakage of radioactive tritium into the local drink-
ing water (Sect. 9.7), resulting in the loss of the contract with the Department 
of Energy to operate Brookhaven.
AUI was in serious trouble. Faced with the loss of the lucrative Brookhaven 
contract which was an order of magnitude larger than the NRAO contract, 
Schwartz resigned just over a year after he arrived. Some of the AUI Trustees 
also resigned, and AUI was restructured to become a self-perpetuating not-for- 
profit manager of scientific facilities. No longer were the nine original universi-
ties represented on the Board by a university scientist and administrator, and 
AUI was governed by a new, more diverse Board of Trustees.
The new AUI Board asked long-time Trustee and Cornell Professor of 
Astronomy Martha Haynes to act as Interim AUI President until they could 
find a permanent replacement for Schwartz. Around this time Riccardo 
Giacconi was about to complete his term as Director of the European Southern 
Observatory (ESO) where he oversaw the construction of a suite of four 8 
meter telescopes in Chile known as the Very Large Telescope. Giacconi had 
previously served as the first Director of the Space Telescope Institute in 
Baltimore, Maryland, where he defined how the Hubble Telescope would 
serve the astronomical community. Earlier, at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center 
for Astrophysics, he directed the effort leading to the Einstein Observatory and 
initiated what later became the Chandra X-ray Observatory. In 2002 Giacconi 
received the Nobel Prize for Physics for his “pioneering contributions to astro-
physics, which have led to the discovery of cosmic X-ray sources.”
Giacconi had a reputation both in the US and Europe as a strong, some felt 
too strong, leader who could return AUI to its former prominence, and on 1 
July 1999, he became the first president of AUI with a background in astro-
physics. Coupled with the fact that, for the first time, AUI had no responsibili-
ties other than NRAO, it meant Giacconi brought a strong hand to his close 
management of NRAO and its Director Paul Vanden Bout.
At ESO, there were no permanent members of the Scientific Staff, and 
Giacconi questioned the appropriateness of tenure at NRAO. He expected that 
all of the scientists should have well-defined “functional” responsibilities, insti-
tuted strong project management, and full cost accounting for all NRAO proj-
ects. Until his retirement in 2004, Giaconni also played a strong role in the 
management of ALMA (Sect. 10.7), a project which he helped to initiate while 
still at ESO.
Giacconi was succeeded as AUI President by his long-time friend and col-
league Ethan Schreier, who not only had a background in astronomy, but who 
had even been a user of the VLA. Schreier took an active role in the US partici-
pation in the planning for the international Square Kilometre Array (SKA) 
(Sect. 11.6), until it became apparent in 2011 that the US would not play a 
role in the project. In 2017 Adam Cohen, who had been the Deputy Under 
Secretary for Science and Energy at the US Department of Energy, became the 
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new AUI President. Cohen greatly expanded the AUI corporate office and 
initiated a number of new scientific, technical, and business initiatives to 
broaden AUI’s purview.
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CHAPTER 7
The Very Large Array
Starting in 1961, NRAO scientists began the process of designing a radio tele-
scope that could make images with an angular resolution comparable to the 
best optical telescopes operating from a good mountain site. In 1967, the 
Observatory submitted a proposal to the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
for the construction of the Very Large Array (VLA). The VLA proposal was for 
36, later reduced to 27, fully steerable 25 meter diameter antennas spread over 
an area some 35 km in diameter. However, there was a competing, much sim-
pler and much cheaper proposal from Caltech for an 8 element array of 130 
foot dishes. Several NSF review committees praised the VLA concept but indi-
cated that it was too ambitious, and recommended that NRAO further study 
the VLA design, and that construction of the Caltech array should begin 
immediately. Following a confrontational battle among proponents of the 
NRAO and Caltech arrays, as well as a competing proposal for a 440 foot 
radome-enclosed antenna proposed by an MIT-Harvard led consortium, sup-
port of the VLA by the 1970 National Academy Decade Review of astronomy 
led to approval of its construction.
The 1973 oil crisis and the subsequent period of excessive inflation nearly 
killed the fixed budget project. But under the leadership of Dave Heeschen, 
NRAO brought the VLA project to completion in 1980, on schedule and close 
to the planned $78M budget appropriation. The VLA has been by far the most 
powerful and most successful radio telescope ever built.
7.1  Background
The 1957 Soviet launch of Sputnik created a widespread and frenzied concern 
that the US had fallen behind Russia in all matters scientific, especially in any-
thing connected with space. In astronomy, the long tradition in optical astron-
omy of building large telescopes on excellent mountain sites clearly established 
the United States as the world’s leader in observational astronomy (see e.g., 
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Florence 1994). Meanwhile, as discussed in Chap. 2, radio astronomers in the 
US, Europe, and Australia were reporting on exciting new discoveries ranging 
from solar system science to cosmology. The time was ripe to review the status 
of US astronomy and to plan for the future growth.
Radio vs Optical Resolution In spite of the dramatic advances and new discov-
eries made during the quarter century following Karl Jansky’s pioneering work, 
by 1960 radio astronomers faced two challenges to further progress. First, the 
angular resolution of any optical or radio telescope is determined by the ratio 
of wavelength to size of the telescope. Because radio wavelengths are longer 
than optical wavelengths by a factor of about one hundred thousand, for many 
years it was assumed that the resolution of radio telescopes was fundamentally 
limited compared with the resolution of optical telescopes. Second, while opti-
cal telescopes can produce images of celestial objects with millions of indepen-
dent pixels, conventional radio telescopes typically respond to the emission 
from only a single area in the sky. Thus, in order to map the area of interest, 
radio astronomers traditionally had to make a time-consuming raster scan. In 
this chapter, we describe how radio astronomers developed interferometric 
synthesis techniques to improve the angular resolution over what is possible 
from any filled aperture instrument, and discuss how NRAO was able to over-
come considerable opposition and technical challenges to build the Very Large 
Array to make images of the radio sky with resolution comparable to that 
achieved by the best ground based optical telescopes. In the following chapter, 
we discuss how radio interferometry was extended to obtain angular resolu-
tions hundreds to thousands of times better than the best optical telescopes on 
the best mountain sites or in space.
Early Radio Interferometry and Synthesis Imaging1 The naive comparison 
between the resolution of radio and optical telescopes has turned out to be 
wrong for three important but not widely appreciated reasons. First, because 
radio wavelengths are long (indeed they are comparable with every day physical 
scales), it is possible to build diffraction-limited radio telescopes of essentially 
unlimited dimensions. Second, in practice, the resolution of ground based 
optical and infrared telescopes has been traditionally limited not by diffraction, 
but by turbulence in the Earth’s troposphere known as “seeing.”2 Finally, while 
optical and infrared interferometers are feasible, their sensitivity is limited by 
the need to divide the incoming signal among two or more detectors, with a 
corresponding loss of sensitivity, whereas at radio wavelengths the signals can 
first be amplified before splitting with little loss of sensitivity.
Using their single antenna on a cliff overlooking Sydney Harbor,3 McCready 
et al. (1947) were probably the first to recognize that the response of a simple 
two-element interferometer was one Fourier component of the sky brightness 
distribution. In their paper, McCready et al. famously noted, “It is possible in 
principle to determine the actual form of the [sky brightness] distribution in a 
complex case by Fourier synthesis using information derived from a large 
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 number of components.” However, they went on to comment that varying the 
height of the cliff antenna “would be feasible but clumsy. A different interfer-
ence method may be more practicable.”4
Wilbur (Chris) Christiansen later used Earth-rotation synthesis imaging by 
combining the output of multiple one-dimensional scans of the Sun. 
Christiansen and Warburton (1955) first formed two orthogonal phased arrays, 
which they used to make multiple strip distribution scans across the Sun at dif-
ferent orientations as the Earth rotated on its axis. They then laboriously calcu-
lated the Fourier components of each strip distribution, followed by a 
two-dimensional Fourier inversion to obtain a two-dimensional image 
of the Sun.
 It would be Martin Ryle and his group at Cambridge who were later able 
to exploit the full power of two-dimensional Fourier synthesis imaging, which 
is commonly referred to as “aperture synthesis” (e.g., Ryle and Hewish 1960; 
Ryle 1975). By combining data from a variable spacing interferometer and 
exploiting the rotation of the Earth to change the orientation of their east-west 
baseline, Ryle and Neville (1962) obtained a two-dimensional image of a 25 
square degree region centered on the north celestial pole with a resolution of 
4.5 arcmin.5 This technique was informally referred to in Cambridge as “super- 
synthesis” and in Sydney as “Earth-rotation synthesis.” However, super- 
synthesis using the meridian fixed parabolic cylinders was restricted to the 
north polar region.
The Cambridge group then went on to build the One-Mile Radio Telescope 
using two fixed and one moveable 60 foot steerable dishes located on a one- 
mile- long east-west baseline. The One-Mile Radio Telescope initially operated 
at 21 and 73 centimeters, exploiting the changing orientation of the array due 
to the rotation of the Earth to sample the Fourier transform (u,v) plane, giving 
resolutions of 25 arcsec and 1.5 arcmin respectively (Ryle 1962). Later, the 
resolution was improved to 12 and 6.5 arcsec with the installation of receivers 
for 11 and 6 cm respectively. The One-Mile Radio Telescope was followed a 
decade later by the 5-km Radio Telescope (Ryle 1972) using four fixed and 
four movable steerable antenna elements. Initially equipped to operate at 6 cm 
wavelength, and in 1974 at 2 cm, the 5-km Radio Telescope was able to make 
images with an initial resolution of only 2 arcsec and later better than 1 arcsec, 
or comparable to that of the best large ground based optical telescopes.
The Caltech Owens Valley Radio Observatory (OVRO) In Sect. 6.6 we described 
the development and the many spectacular successes of the Caltech twin 90 
foot interferometer (Fig. 7.1). One may wonder why Caltech did not make 
better use of the capabilities of their two-element interferometer to do the 
same kind of full two-dimensional super-synthesis (Earth-rotation synthesis) 
pioneered by Martin Ryle and colleagues at Cambridge. Although Cambridge 
was characteristically secretive about their plans, a full description of the first 
super-synthesis array, the Cambridge One-Mile Radio Telescope was pub-
lished in 1962 (Ryle 1962). At that time, Ryle had received funding, but 
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construction of the three-element array of 60 foot steerable dishes had not yet 
started. The OVRO two-element east-west interferometer was already com-
plete and in operation by the end of 1959. By the end of 1960 the north-south 
baseline was also operational. This was six and five years respectively, before the 
first results from the Cambridge One-Mile Radio Telescope (Ryle et al. 1965). 
But the Caltech radio astronomers Per Maltby and Alan Moffet used Fourier 
inversion of their OVRO east-west and north-south OVRO transit observa-
tions of interferometer phase and amplitude to obtain only separate one-
dimensional strip distributions which they then used to discuss the 
two- dimensional brightness distributions (Maltby and Moffet 1962). Maltby 
and Moffet did make some amplitude-only observations at different hour 
angles but these data were used only to constrain the model fitting, and they 
never made full use of Earth-rotation synthesis and two-dimensional Fourier 
inversions to derive two-dimensional source images as was done later by Ryle 
and colleagues at Cambridge. It seems that true synthesis imaging was not 
implemented at Caltech until nearly a decade later (Rogstad and Shostak 
1971).
Alan Moffet later claimed that, unlike Cambridge, Caltech did not have 
access to sufficient computing power to do a complete two-dimensional Fourier 
inversion of data taken at many different hour angles. While this may have been 
partially true, it seems that both Caltech and Australian radio astronomers were 
slow in appreciating the full power of synthesis imaging and were unable, or at 
least unwilling, to take advantage of the large digital computers available to 
Fig. 7.1 The Owens Valley Interferometer. Credit: Caltech Archives
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them. Australian radio astronomers continued to exploit hardware solutions 
(e.g., Frater et al. 2017) to build high resolution radio telescopes, while the 
Caltech radio astronomers continued to depend on model fitting techniques to 
analyze their data and never made the step to full synthesis imaging with the 
OVRO two-element interferometer system. Nevertheless, for the first half of 
the decade, OVRO was clearly the most productive US radio observatory. In 
fact, George Swenson suggested that it was just because of their success, espe-
cially the work leading to the discovery of quasars, that the Caltech radio 
astronomers did not see the need to pursue synthesis imaging.6 Nevertheless, 
many of the students who were involved in the design and operation of the 
Owens Valley interferometer later went on to play major roles in the design, 
construction, and operation of the VLA.
The Westerbork Synthesis Radio Telescope7 Based on a suggestion from US radio 
astronomer Charles Seeger,8 Dutch radio astronomers, driven by Jan Oort, 
developed plans for a large radio telescope with dimensions of 3 to 5 kilometers 
and a resolution goal of 1 arcmin. Because of the anticipated large cost, Oort 
initiated talks with Belgium and Luxembourg for sharing the cost of what came 
to be known as the “Benelux Cross.” At the December 1961 meeting of the 
European Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) on Large Radio Telescopes, Oort (1961a, b, c) presented the scien-
tific rationale for an antenna with a resolution of the order of an arcmin while 
Jan Högbom (1961) and others outlined a range of design concepts. Starting 
with a fairly conventional Mills Cross consisting of parabolic cylinder elements 
working at 75 cm (Christiansen and Högbom 1961), the Benelux Cross proj-
ect went through a series of designs and evolved to a cross composed of a 
hundred or more 25 to 30 meter diameter parabolic dishes working at 21 cm 
(Christiansen et al. 1963a,b). The revised array also included a single 70 meter 
dish to provide the missing short spacings.9 The change in operating wave-
length was motivated partly by the desire to observe the 21 cm hydrogen line 
and partly because this frequency is protected by international agreement from 
RFI.  Also, using steerable parabolic dishes instead of cylindrical parabolas 
opened the possibility of observing at wavelengths in addition to 21 cm, thus 
facilitating spectral and polarization studies. In each of these early designs, 
Leiden visitors Chris Christiansen from Australia, William (Bill) Erickson and 
Charles Seeger from the United States, and Jan Högbom from Sweden, 
together with Leiden’s Lex Muller, provided the technical leadership for the 
Benelux Cross, which they planned to locate near the Belgian-Dutch Border.
All of these early designs were based primarily on phased arrays which 
formed multiple simultaneous beams, although Christiansen et  al. (1963a) 
commented on the possibility of recording the interferometer amplitudes and 
phases from the different antenna spacings. Högbom had joined the Leiden- 
based Benelux Cross group after receiving his PhD with Ryle’s group in 
Cambridge, so was fully familiar with the techniques of Earth-rotation aperture 
synthesis. In fact, Högbom’s 1959 PhD thesis on “The Structure and Magnetic 
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Field of the Solar Corona” included the first detailed description of what came 
to be called “Earth-rotation synthesis.” According to Högbom (2003), after 
writing up his work on the Sun, he was embarrassed that his thesis contained a 
mere 78 pages, far fewer than other Cambridge radio astronomy theses, which 
were all longer than 100 pages. So he “fattened” up his thesis with two addi-
tional chapters, one on “The Fundamental Relations of Aperture Synthesis” 
based on well-known ideas, and a completely original chapter on “Aperture 
Synthesis Using the Earth’s Rotation.”
Högbom’s analysis of using the rotation of the Earth to cover the Fourier 
transform plane was based on using a transit interferometer with a broad pri-
mary beam to allow the necessary observations at large hour angles. It was not 
until Högbom saw Ryle’s (1962) published description of the One-Mile Radio 
Telescope that he appreciated the possibility of doing Earth rotation synthesis 
using tracking antenna elements, and immediately applied these ideas to a 
more practical and cost effective implementation of the Benelux Cross. 
According to Raimond (1996), in 1963, Högbom proposed two possible 
21 cm east-west arrays of 28 (34) parabolic dishes spread over 1600 (3000) 
meters based on Earth-rotation synthesis to give a resolution of 17 (10) arcsec. 
Apparently Luxembourg was never a serious participant, and by 1967, with no 
active radio astronomers and commitments to the newly established European 
Southern Observatory (ESO), Belgium had lost interest in the project, which 
then became a responsibility of the Netherlands Foundation for Research in 
Astronomy (NFRA). A new, more radio-quiet, site was chosen in the northern 
part of the Netherlands, and the Benelux Cross became the Westerbork 
Synthesis Radio Telescope (WSRT).
With the loss of the expected funding from Belgium, the design was further 
modified to contain only ten fixed 25 meter diameter equatorially-mounted 
antennas uniformly spaced over 1.6 km, plus an additional dish moveable along 
a 300 meter railroad track. However, when the bids came in, there were suffi-
cient funds to build two moveable antennas. The WSRT (Fig. 7.2) was com-
pleted and went into operation in 1970, initially at only 21 cm. Originally, each 
of the ten fixed antennas were correlated each with only the two moveable 
antennas. Since the fixed antennas were uniformly spaced, all of the available 
Fourier components were still recovered. However, ignoring the data from the 
fixed interferometer pairs resulted in a loss of sensitivity by nearly a factor of 
two. Although not at the time anticipated by Högbom or anyone else, after the 
correlator was upgraded in 1977 to include all antenna pairs, the redundant 
spacings turned out to be a great advantage in removing the effects of iono-
spheric and tropospheric phase fluctuations.10 This enhancement of conven-
tional self-calibration techniques gave the WSRT greatly improved image 
dynamic range (Noordam and de Bruyn 1982).
Initially WSRT adopted a hands-off approach to observing and data reduc-
tion. The local staff supervised the observations, and the data were reduced by 
NFRA staff at the Leiden University computer center to produce the radio 
images.11 Considering the long traditions of H I research by Oort and other 
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Dutch radio astronomers, a spectroscopic capability was soon added to the 
initial continuum-only system. Over the next years the reliability, flexibility, 
resolution, and sensitivity of the WSRT continued to improve with the intro-
duction of new low noise amplifiers, the addition of new observing bands at 
3.6, 6, and 49 cm, and the migration to digital electronics. Two additional 
moveable antennas were added in 1976, and later the baseline length was dou-
bled to 3 km to improve the resolution, and the telescope continued to be used 
by astronomers from around the world.
7.2  origins of the Very Large array and the owens 
VaLLey array
By the end of the 1950s, it was becoming increasingly clear from the exciting 
results coming from Sydney, Cambridge, Manchester, and Caltech that the 
major outstanding problems in radio astronomy required interferometers and 
arrays capable of arcsec resolution. As described in Sect. 3.2, as early as 1954, 
during the debate over the appropriate size antenna for the planned national 
radio astronomy facility, Bob Dicke’s innovative suggestion to build an inter-
ferometer system was lost in the enthusiasm for building the largest possible 
antenna, but it would resurface nearly a decade later.
Fig. 7.2 The ten fixed antennas of the Westerbork Synthesis Radio Telescope. Credit: 
NFRA
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The Pierce Committee Following the establishment of NRAO in 1956 and the 
uncertain start on the construction of the Green Bank 140 Foot Radio 
Telescope, NRAO Director Otto Struve suggested that the AUI Advisory 
Committee on Radio Astronomy request that the NSF appoint a committee to 
review the scientific goals of radio astronomy and the instruments needed to 
address these goals. The NSF responded in December 1959 by appointing a 
committee under the Chairmanship of John Pierce, to “1) study the present 
and predictable needs of radio astronomers with regard to improved instru-
mentation; 2) study existing and proposed instruments with regard to improved 
instrumentation; and 3) advise the Foundation with regard to the desirability 
and feasibility of constructing more powerful instruments” (Keller 1961). 
Pierce, Executive Director of the Bell Labs Communication Sciences Division, 
was a well-known engineer and expert on information theory who had con-
ceived and promoted the first communication satellites and the national net-
work of microwave-linked telephone relay towers. Together with Claude 
Shannon and Barney Oliver, Pierce had developed the first concepts of speech 
digitization. He coined the term “transistor” for the revolutionary device 
which was developed under his direction, and wrote science fiction under the 
name of J.J. Coupling (David et  al. 2004). The other Panel members were 
primarily radio astronomers.12
The Panel was impressed by the newly emerging very high resolution obser-
vations coming from Jodrell Bank (Sect. 8.1), the interferometric observations 
at Caltech (Maltby and Moffet 1962) and Nançay (Lequeux 1962), and the 
demonstration of the power of aperture synthesis by Ryle and Neville (1962). 
With great perception, they noted that “as the Manchester group has shown, 
the addition of a third element gives the phases without the need for calibra-
tion.” The Panel discussed, in some detail, a proposal by John Bolton for 
8- element and 16-element arrays of 200 foot dishes arranged in a Mills Cross 
configuration. But Bolton proposed a real-time phased array of parabolic ele-
ments, possibly making use of multiple spacings to reduce sidelobe levels, but 
not aperture synthesis and certainly not Earth-rotation (super) synthesis. 
Indeed, the later 1962 Caltech proposal for the Owens Valley Array followed 
the basic strategy that Bolton had presented to the Pierce Committee before he 
left Caltech at the end of 1960. The Panel also discussed the merits of Cornell 
Professor William (Bill) Gordon’s plan to build a fixed spherical reflector in 
Puerto Rico, and anticipated the electrical and mechanical problems of design-
ing suitable feed systems.
The Panel report, which, curiously, was published under the name of the 
NSF Assistant Director for Mathematical, Physical, and Engineering Sciences, 
Geoffrey Keller (1961), recognized the need for angular resolution of at least 
1 arcmin and ultimately 1 arcsec. Although the Panel appreciated the power of 
aperture synthesis to obtain the needed high resolution, they correctly worried 
about how to achieve the instrumental and atmospheric phase stability needed 
to obtain 1 arcsec resolution. They recommended further “experimental and 
theoretical studies of aperture synthesis, antenna design, phase preservation, 
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phase shifting, and stable low noise preamplifiers that that would lead to a 
detailed and practical plan for a radio telescope of high resolving power” and 
went on to suggest that “technical considerations of terrain, atmospheric and 
interference environment, and other scientific factors should govern the selec-
tion of the site, and convenience of access to particular institutions should be 
given only secondary consideration.” But they also noted that “in the United 
States, the chief weakness of radio astronomy is not the lack of instruments or 
funds for instruments but a lack of radio astronomers,” so the Panel recom-
mended that universities support their most promising graduates and give 
postdoctoral fellowships using a combination of government and private fund-
ing. Unfortunately, it would be another decade before US radio astronomers 
could agree on what to build and who should build it, and yet a further decade 
before the Very Large Array would be completed and in operation. Meanwhile, 
in 1970, the WSRT began operating in the Netherlands, and in the UK, Martin 
Ryle and colleagues were doing exciting work with his One-Mile and, starting 
in 1971, the 5  km radio telescopes. In Australia, Paul Wild completed his 
96-element solar heliograph array in 1967 and was making impressive movies 
of solar radio bursts.
Early NRAO Planning At the 1961 IAU General Assembly in Berkeley, CA, 
Commission 40 (Radio Astronomy) discussed high resolution radio telescopes. 
Campbell Wade later recalled that Dave Heeschen returned from the IAU 
meeting enthusiastic about the potential for building an array for high resolu-
tion radio observations, and led an impromptu discussion with Wade, Frank 
Drake, Roger Lynds, and Dave Hogg in the Green Bank cafeteria.13 While 
there was apparently a lot of interest among the Green Bank staff, there was no 
one at NRAO with any experience in interferometry. As discussed in Chaps. 3, 
4, and 9, in the early 1960s, NRAO was focused on building a very large filled-
aperture radio telescope, using either a fully or partially steerable reflector or a 
large fixed reflector. They had even given a name to this hypothetical future 
project—the Very Large Antenna or VLA! Later this became the “VLAA” for 
Very Large Antenna Array, which finally reverted back to “VLA,” but now 
meaning Very Large Array. NRAO and AUI were struggling to deal with the 
increasing problems surrounding the 140 Foot Telescope construction and the 
threats from Bliss to sue AUI for breach of contract regarding the 85 foot tele-
scope project (Sect. 4.4), as well as completing the construction and commis-
sioning of the 300 Foot Transit Telescope. Nevertheless, through the autumn 
of 1961 Heeschen, Wade, and others gave further thought to constructing an 
array of dishes. However, there was little dedicated effort until Heeschen 
brought things into focus on 5 March 1962 when he called a staff meeting for 
that same afternoon to discuss a draft development program for what he called 
“the very large telescope,” declaring that the plan “will be submitted to NSF 
this week (probably tomorrow) as justification for our 1964 budget.”14
Joe Pawsey had already been appointed to succeed Struve as the next NRAO 
Director, and was due to visit two weeks later. Although Heeschen was only 
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serving as an Acting Director until Pawsey was to take over in October, he 
acted boldly and requested $3 million to be included in the FY1964 budget 
“for the first phase in the development of a very large radio telescope.”15 
Heeschen proposed that Phase I begin by establishing the performance require-
ments and the antenna configuration needed to meet those requirements, fol-
lowed by designing the antenna elements and electronics, studying of the 
effects of the atmosphere on phase stability, along with selecting a site and 
building a small number of antenna elements with electronics as a prototype. 
Regarding the site, Heeschen noted, in passing, that “Green Bank may not be 
suitable.” Phase II, which Heeschen optimistically projected could begin in 
FY1965 or 1966, would be to “construct full telescope by expanding the por-
tion built in Phase 1.” As Heeschen noted in a 1991 handwritten note scrib-
bled on a copy of his 5 March 1962 memo, “We never got the $3M – but this 
was the formal beginning of the VLA pjt [project] & in fact the pgm [pro-
gram] outlined was generally carried out.”16
Heeschen’s ambitious plan was encouraged by Pawsey during his March 
1962 visit to Green Bank, although a week after he arrived in Green Bank, 
Pawsey’s trip was abruptly terminated by his illness (Sect. 4.6). Following his 
surgery in Boston, Pawsey described his “high resolution project” as part of his 
carefully considered plans for the future of NRAO.17 However, the following 
day, AUI President Jerry Tape and Pawsey agreed that Pawsey would not take 
up the NRAO directorship, but that he would stay involved in NRAO pro-
grams. It is curious that, while Pawsey’s report acknowledged his discussions 
with Drake and Heeschen about their proposed millimeter initiative (Chap. 
10), he makes no reference to any discussions about an imaging antenna array. 
Earlier, Pawsey had written from his Massachusetts General Hospital bed to 
Bill Erickson to recruit Erickson to come to NRAO to be in charge of a project 
to develop the necessary “equipment capable of giving pictures … of discrete 
sources in the sky with sufficient resolution to show all the significant physical 
features.”18 Pawsey sent a copy of his letter to Heeschen who distributed 
Pawsey’s ideas about an imaging array to the NRAO Scientific Staff. Pawsey 
also contacted Peter Scheuer, expressing the hope that Scheuer and Henry 
Palmer might also come to Green Bank to examine the statistics of radio source 
interferometric measurements from Cambridge, Jodrell Bank, Sydney, and 
Caltech, and, in this way, define the needed instrument parameters.19 Erickson 
responded that he had accepted a position at the University of Maryland and 
was unable to consider Pawsey’s request, but remained interested and expressed 
willingness to help where feasible.20 Palmer did spend a year at NRAO from 
October 1972 to October 1973 working with the Green Bank Interferometer.
Heeschen did not wait for Erickson or Scheuer, and asked Wade and others 
to assemble what was known about radio source structure and to investigate 
the various technical issues that would be needed to plan for the construction 
of the VLA.21 Some guidance on the desired array parameters was already avail-
able to NRAO from the Pierce Advisory Panel, which led Heeschen to suggest 
a goal of “one arcminute beam at 21 cm and usability at 10 cm to later give 
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even higher resolution.” For the most part, Heeschen’s 5 March plan was 
 actually implemented, but the time scale would be much longer than he had 
anticipated, and it would take another decade before funding was approved 
and nearly two decades before the VLA became fully operational. NRAO never 
got the $3 million that Heeschen requested for the FY1964 budget, but by late 
1962, Heeschen had been named as the NRAO Director and was ready to seri-
ously address the construction of a large radio telescope array. In January 1963, 
he informed the AUI Board about the Green Bank discussions of an “array 
made up of 100’ to 150’ antennas”22 and appointed Deputy Director John 
Findlay to initially lead the VLA development program.
Recognizing that a major fraction of the cost of the planned array would be 
in the individual antenna elements, NRAO needed “the best telescope for the 
lowest cost” and issued a Request for a Proposal to antenna companies, solicit-
ing design studies for “a very large radio astronomy antenna system …. [that] 
will consist of a number of parabolic dish telescopes.” Prospective bidders were 
asked to determine “the relative cost of the various choices that will have to be 
made by the Observatory staff,” which included dish diameter, upper fre-
quency limit, polar or alt/az mount, surface accuracy, and sky coverage.23
In 1962, NRAO had no experience in interferometry. Indeed, although the 
Pierce Committee enthusiastically endorsed an interferometric array to advance 
US radio astronomy, the only place doing serious interferometry in the US was 
Caltech, where John Bolton, his students, and post docs had built the Owens 
Valley two element interferometer. Bolton, and later Gordon Stanley, served 
on the AUI Visiting Committee for NRAO, so there were good opportunities 
for NRAO to learn from Caltech experience, and in October 1962, Cam Wade 
was dispatched to spend three weeks at Caltech to become more familiar with 
interferometric techniques. It was the first time Wade had actually seen an 
interferometer in operation. His main reaction on returning to Green Bank 
was that NRAO needed to find a better way of taking data than the pen and ink 
tracings on chart recorders used at Caltech. Wade also visited Stanford, as well 
as several industrial laboratories in Silicon Valley, where he learned about early 
developments of fiber optic technology, but concluded that while the technol-
ogy was promising, it “had a hell of a long way to go,” and concluded that 
NRAO should “stick with cable.”24
By the end of 1963, Wade (Fig. 7.3) was able to put down on paper a basic 
description of the VLA.25 Assuming that the proposed array would need to be 
able to observe a few hundred discrete radio sources with hundreds of pixels 
per source and that it should not take longer than a month to observe each 
source, Wade concluded that they needed to build an array several miles in 
extent, with at least twenty 80 foot diameter paraboloids able to be placed on 
106 stations arranged on a Tee configuration. The VLA that was later built 
had little resemblance to Wade’s early plan except perhaps for the antenna 
diameter, which Wade later admitted was based more on the commercial avail-
ability of 25 meter diameter antennas than on sensitivity arguments.26 Dave 
Hogg later recollected that Wade’s memo marked the real starting point of the 
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VLA project.27 A few months later, Heeschen brought the project to the 
 attention of the AUI Executive Committee, where the acronym VLA appears 
to have been used for the first time for the Very Large Array and not for the 
Very Large Antenna, which was being pursued as a separate project now known 
as either the Largest Feasible Steerable Telescope or the Largest Feasible 
Steerable Paraboloid (Sect. 9.4).28 Assuming that the VLA design would be 
completed in 1967 and 1968, the schedule called for “construction to begin in 
FY1969 and be completed in FY1971,” and that “as the VLA approaches com-
pletion, the effort on the Largest Feasible Steerable Paraboloid will be 
augmented.”29
The Owens Valley Array Hoping to build on their outstanding successes with 
the two-element OVRO interferometer, Caltech proposed adding four new 
125 foot diameter antennas and an extension of the track to be used in various 
configurations of a phased or synthesis array. Knowing that operations sup-
port from the Office of Naval Research was becoming more difficult to obtain, 
Gordon Stanley sent the proposal to the NSF.30 Although Stanley and others 
were aware of the growing problems with the NRAO 140 Foot Telescope, 
they boldly proposed a polar mount for the new OVRO antennas.31 Working 
at a minimum wavelength of 10  cm, the proposed array would be able to 
 synthesize a 1 arcmin beam or work as a simple one-dimensional interferom-
eter with 10  arcsec resolution. The proposed cost was about $5 million. 
However, as early as October 1962, tensions started to build between NRAO 
Fig. 7.3 Cam Wade 
wrote the 1963 memo 
that initiated the VLA 
project. Later, Wade led 
the study leading to the 
choice of the VLA site on 
the plains of St. Agustin, 
and became the first 
Director of VLA 
Operations. Credit: 
NRAO/AUI/NSF
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and Caltech, when during a visit of Marc Vinokur to Pasadena, Caltech direc-
tor Gordon Stanley expressed concern that the proposed Green Bank interfer-
ometer might compete with the Caltech proposal for enlarging the OVRO 
interferometer.32
The First Decade Review of Astronomy—The Whitford Report In late 1962, the 
National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on Science and Public Policy con-
vened what was to become the first of a series of Decade Reviews of astronomy. 
Albert Whitford, of the University of California’s Lick Observatory, chaired 
the Panel on Astronomical Facilities, which was charged “to study the probable 
need for major new astronomical facilities in the United States during the next 
five to ten years, and to recommend guiding principles and estimates of cost in 
order that federal funds might be employed with maximum efficiency to pro-
mote advancement of astronomy in all of its branches.”33
Recognizing the growing importance of radio astronomy that led to the 
discovery of “new and previously unsuspected phenomena,” three of the six 
scientists on the seven-person panel were radio astronomers and three others 
were optical astronomers. Bruce Rule, a Caltech engineer who had been instru-
mental in the construction of both the Palomar 200 inch telescope as well as 
the two Owens Valley 90 foot radio telescopes, rounded out the committee. So 
although effectively half of the Panel represented radio astronomy interests, the 
NAS first convened a separate ad hoc committee “to guide the deliberations … 
concerning the current and future needs in the field of radio astronomy.”34 
Some 20 radio astronomers participated in the two-day meeting held at the 
NAS, which was attended by Frederick Seitz, NAS President, along with other 
representatives from the NAS Committee on Science and Public Policy 
(COSPUP), the NSF, ONR, and the President’s Science Advisory Committee 
(PSAC). This was clearly a high level meeting reflecting the perceived impor-
tance of radio astronomy as a national priority.
The two days of discussion “developed a consensus of opinion” on the need 
for “the largest single undertaking,” recommended by the group, which 
“would be the construction of a large array composed of about 100 separate 
parabolic antennas partially steerable, each of about 100 foot diameter, with 
surfaces good for 3 cm work,”35 with an intended resolution of 1 arcmin. “A 
project of this magnitude,” the group continued, “is obviously beyond the 
capabilities of a single university and naturally falls within the province of the 
NRAO, …. which would have the responsibility for the planning and the actual 
construction of the instrument.” However, the report of the meeting also went 
on to discuss “a second, less expensive array with a resolution of 10 arcsec but 
with higher side lobes, designed primarily for the investigation of extragalactic 
sources that is already funded for construction at the Owens Valley Radio 
Observatory (OVRO).”36 In fact the OVRO array had not been funded; it 
would require the next Decade Review to resolve the growing animosity 
between NRAO and Caltech over who would get NSF funding to build 
their array.
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The Whitford Committee confined its deliberations to ground-based 
astronomy and called attention to the discoveries of “exploding galaxies” and 
quasars, the better picture of the rotation of our Galaxy, the distribution of 
galactic neutral hydrogen, along with the solar system studies leading to the 
measure of the magnetic field surrounding Jupiter, the structure and tempera-
ture of the invisible surface of Venus, and an improved measure of the 
Astronomical Unit. Citing the study of quasars as “excellent examples of the 
complementarity of radio and optical astronomy,” and the faintness of quasars 
at all wavelengths, the committee drew attention to the need for better access 
to large facilities at both optical and radio wavelengths. In their 1964 Report, 
however, the committee tempered their evaluation of very large new optical 
telescopes with concerns about seeing, the cost effectiveness of large apertures 
and corresponding ancillary instrumentation, and “the need for access to large 
telescopes by a much larger number of astronomers.” The report recom-
mended the construction of three optical telescopes with apertures in the range 
150 to 200 inches as well as “four general purpose telescopes of aperture range 
60 to 84 inches” and “eight telescopes of 36 to 48-inch aperture.” They then 
went on to suggest that only after the construction of three large telescopes 
was underway, “a representative study group be assembled to consider the 
problems of building a telescope of the largest feasible size.” As would be the 
case in future Decade Reviews, reflecting the different emphasis by the radio 
and optical communities, the committee recommended constructing more 
modest-sized optical instruments in order to provide more observing time 
rather than instruments which would give new capabilities.
The report took a much more aggressive approach on radio astronomy. 
Noting that “the technical knowledge exists to build instruments that can 
reach beyond the thresholds of information now foreseen.” the Whitford 
(1964, p. 19) Committee drew attention to:
• The major factor that limits the advance of radio astronomy is not par-
ticularly lack of observing time …but rather the lack of instruments of the 
proper design to meet problems now recognized.
• None of the proposed or existing instruments will provide the versatility, 
the speed, and particularly the resolution demanded for substantial 
progress.
• Contrary to the situation in optical astronomy, radio telescopes have not 
nearly approached the ultimate limitation on performance produced by 
inhomogeneities in the Earth’s atmosphere.
• Clearly … no definitive knowledge of the radio sources throughout the 
universe can be obtained until the resolution of the order of seconds of 
arc is available for radio astronomers.
Although the Whitford Committee report recognized the need for “a group 
of lesser instruments useful in special problems and for student training,” their 
highest recommendation for radio astronomy was for “a major high resolution 
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instrument … with a resolution of less than 10 arcsec at centimeter wave-
lengths.” The panel recommended “as the largest single undertaking in radio 
astronomy, the construction of a large array that would achieve these goals.” As 
an example of the magnitude of the project, the Committee suggested an array 
of “about 100 separate parabolic antennas, each perhaps 85 feet in diameter” 
capable of operating “down to wavelengths as short as 3 cm” which they esti-
mated could be built for a cost of about $40 million. Characteristic of the 
unwarranted confidence of many preliminary cost estimates, the panel noted 
that “the cost is fairly predictable,” since 85 foot antennas were readily avail-
able from several industrial suppliers, and that there was considerable experi-
ence in interferometry. Although the considerations about the antenna cost 
were probably not far off, the panel failed to recognize the true complexity and 
corresponding costs involved in building and using an array that would meet 
the astronomical requirements. In the end the VLA cost about twice the 
Whitford Committee estimates, perhaps not so bad considering the significant 
inflation that would occur before the VLA was completed 15 years later.37
The Whitford Committee noted that the complexity of the array would 
place the project “beyond the capabilities of a single university.” However, they 
fell short of a full endorsement of NRAO to construct the array, only remark-
ing that the project “falls naturally into the category of instruments that should 
be constructed by NRAO,” and went on to specify that “means should be 
provided for extensive participation by scientists who are not members of the 
NRAO staff in the planning and development of the instrument.” (Whitford 
1964, p. 52) Moreover, recognizing that it might take a decade to build the 
VLA, and prompted, no doubt, by Bruce Rule and knowledge of the growing 
ambitions at Caltech, the Committee not only recommended the funding of 
the “already-proposed extension” of the OVRO array to add four new 130 
foot antennas along with an increase in the length of the interferometer, but 
suggested that “a further increase in the available equipment by a factor of two 
will allow useful resolutions of less than 10 seconds of arc.” (Whitford 1964, 
p. 52) The estimated price tag for the enhanced OVRO array was only $10 
million dollars, and the panel recommended that “construction should be 
commenced immediately.” Comparison with the $40 million price tag and 
decade-long construction time estimated for the VLA positioned the Owens 
Valley Array and the VLA for a long and bitter conflict that would drag out for 
another decade, during which time nothing would be built in the United States.
Proposing the VLA Encouraged by the August 1964 Whitford Report, NRAO 
began serious planning for the VLA in the summer of 1964. Progress was 
greatly expedited by the arrival of Barry Clark on the NRAO staff only a few 
months later. Clark had just received his PhD from Caltech, where he had 
become an expert in radio interferometry and participated in the early design 
of the Owens Valley Array. For the next half a century, Clark, probably more 
than anyone else, was the intellectual force behind the VLA software, and argu-
ably was the only person who understood all aspects of the VLA design. Dave 
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Heeschen formally established the VLA Project, and in September 1964 he 
hired George Swenson (Fig. 7.4), on leave from the University of Illinois, to 
come to NRAO to help design the VLA. On 20 October 1965, Sander (Sandy) 
Weinreb came to NRAO to lead the Green Bank Electronics Division and to 
be responsible for the conceptual design of the VLA hardware, including the 
front ends and correlator. The proposed NSF FY1967 budget contained $1 
million for preliminary design of the VLA, and Heeschen later noted that this 
was “the first specific action taken by the NSF to allocate funds for this 
facility.”38 
Swenson, together with Cam Wade, investigated potential sites for the VLA; 
Wade also investigated the needed sensitivity and antenna size. David Hogg 
worked on the antenna configuration, Hein Hvatum on the antennas, Sandy 
Weinreb and Warren Tyler on the electronics, and Barry Clark on the comput-
ing system and data processing (Heeschen 1981, p.  16). Under Swenson’s 
leadership, by the end of 1965 the Design Group had made sufficient progress 
“to solicit comments, criticisms, ideas, and assistance for further work.” NRAO 
(1965) released a preliminary design report for the VLA that described in con-
siderable detail the status of work on the development of the VLA and the 
desirable properties for an instrument to address the outstanding astronomical 
problems of the time.39 These early specifications were:
 (a) Wavelength: 10 cm
 (b) Resolution: 10 arcsec
 (c) Field of view: 5 arcmin
 (d) Sensitivity: 4 mJy rms
 (e) Versatility to address a wide variety of problems
 (f) Expandability
Fig. 7.4 George 
Swenson served as VLA 
Project Manager while on 
leave from the University 
of Illinois. Credit: 
NRAO/AUI/NSF
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After comparing the various approaches to obtaining high angular resolu-
tion, the VLA report concluded that a correlator array based on super-synthesis 
or Earth-rotation synthesis ideas was the only practical way to meet the desired 
goals of the VLA. Various configurations including a Tee, circle, cross, and a 
random configuration were investigated, but Leonard Chow, visiting from 
Waterloo University in Canada, came up with an innovative 3-arm Wye con-
figuration with each of the arms separated by 120 degrees. The Wye has the 
same comparable coverage of the Fourier transform plane as a ring, but has the 
advantage that the antenna elements can transported on rails or road along a 
straight line so that the antenna spacing can be varied, and, if later desired, the 
array can be extended. The proposed configuration in the 1965 report had 12 
antennas spaced along each of the three arms of the Wye, with one additional 
antenna placed at the center. It was suggested that initially each arm would be 
2.4 km long, which gave the desired 10 arcsec resolution at 11 cm. Later, “as 
can be justified by the progress of observations … and as funds become avail-
able, the arms of the Wye can be extended,” and it was noted that, “In choos-
ing a site, the requirement for 25 km arms will be considered … to achieve 1” 
resolution.”
The NRAO report made the point that the VLA would use point sources to 
calibrate the baselines, rather than the laborious precision survey used by Ryle 
for the Cambridge One-Mile Radio Telescope. The report left open the ques-
tions of antenna size, alt-az or equatorial mount, Cassegrain or prime focus 
feed, Wye or Tee configuration, railroad track or road, length of the arms, type 
of delay system, local oscillator distribution, and single or dual polarization. 
NRAO proposed that the VLA use the same basic system being used for the 
Green Bank Interferometer (GBI), with uncooled parametric amplifiers fol-
lowed by a double sideband mixer, and with each antenna pair multiplied in a 
correlator. There was no discussion of possibly using digital delays or a digital 
correlator, although it was recognized that as in the GBI, the correlator output 
would be digitized and fed to a high speed computer for further processing. 
Cautiously, the report remarked, “Cooling the amplifier to achieve low noise 
temperature should be avoided.”
The ambitious—many felt too ambitious—NRAO VLA Report No. 1 
indeed generated a lot of community interest, but also generated controversy. 
As later described by Heeschen (1996), initially,
The VLA did not enjoy much support, either in the US or in the rest of the 
world. The proposed instrument was considered to be unimaginative, undesir-
able, unneeded, technically unfeasible, far too costly, or some combination of 
these. It took a long time to convince the community and the NSF that was what 
they really wanted.
From the beginning, “the primary mission of the telescope” was considered 
to be “mapping of extra-galactic sources,” so there was no provision for spec-
troscopy, which was dismissed with the remark that “the addition of line spec-
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trometer equipment to the already formidable array of data processing apparatus 
required for seconds-of-arc angular resolution appears to increase the complex-
ity of the whole system to a point not consistent with the present state of the 
electronic art” (NRAO 1965, p. 6). This raised a lot of objection from H I 
observers and the growing group of outspoken molecular and maser 
spectroscopists.
A major challenge to the feasibility of the VLA concept came from the UK, 
where Martin Ryle argued that atmospheric irregularities and turbulence would 
introduce phase fluctuations on interferometer baselines longer than a few 
kilometers. While the Cambridge development of aperture synthesis and later 
super-synthesis had an enormous impact on the future development of radio 
astronomy, and in particular on the NRAO proposal to build the VLA, ironi-
cally, Cambridge radio astronomers incorrectly argued that phase fluctuations 
due to tropospheric irregularities would fundamentally restrict the resolution 
of radio telescopes to about 1 arcsec (Hinder and Ryle 1971), or about the 
same seeing limit achieved by optical telescopes located on a good mountain site.
The instrumental phase of the Cambridge instruments was sufficiently sta-
ble that calibration observations were needed only at the start and end of each 
12 hour run. In fact, there was no capability provided in the control or data 
reduction software to allow calibration data to be inserted during the continu-
ous 12 hour track. Since, at least initially, the Caltech interferometer had poor 
instrumental phase and amplitude stability, it was standard practice to observe 
a calibration source several times an hour. Unlike the Cambridge One-Mile 
Radio Telescope which ran under computer control, at Caltech, the pointing 
of the telescope was manually controlled at all times, and data were reduced by 
hand from chart recordings. So, even when later instrumental improvements 
greatly reduced the instrumental instabilities, it was natural at Caltech to extend 
the same calibration technique to reduce the effect of tropospheric phase fluc-
tuations. In this way it became possible to build radio telescopes with resolu-
tion better than the nominal seeing limit. With the later development of 
“self-calibration,” radio telescopes were routinely able to achieve resolutions 
orders of magnitude better than optical telescopes.
In January 1966, Heeschen informed the AUI Board that he planned to 
allocate $1 million to the design of the VLA, and appointed a VLA Design 
Group of ten scientists and engineers with George Swenson as the Chair.40 
Over the following year, the Design Group under Swenson studied various 
antenna configurations, explored potential sites, and, with industrial contrac-
tors, studied various antenna designs. In January 1967, NRAO (1967) sent a 
formal proposal to the NSF to build the VLA. The proposal called for opera-
tion at 2.7 and 5.4 GHz (11 and 5.5 cm) with up to 1 arcsec resolution. To 
achieve the desired sensitivity (0.02 mJy rms at 2.7 GHz) and dynamic range 
(20 dB) NRAO proposed to use thirty-six 25 meter diameter antennas in a 
Wye configuration with each arm up to 21 km in length. Still, there was no 
spectroscopic capability planned, other than to note that the design “should 
not preclude the ultimate use of the instrument for line work.” The estimated 
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cost of construction, including 15% contingency and allowance for cost escala-
tion over the planned four-year construction period was $51.9 million. Annual 
operating costs were projected to be $1.7 million. As noted earlier, the NRAO 
proposal was not without controversy. Many radio astronomers, both external 
to NRAO as well as within NRAO, felt that the VLA was too ambitious and 
too expensive. Moreover, with the increasing US budget deficits resulting from 
the escalating confrontation in Vietnam, there was little national interest in 
spending money on an expensive scientific enterprise of dubious national rele-
vance. The NRAO budget request for FY1969 was reduced from $24.091 
million to $6.4 million, and it was clear that there would be no VLA construc-
tion funds in 1969.41
7.3  the green Bank interferometer (gBi)
As early as December 1958, while the Tatel Telescope (85-1) was still under 
construction, Dave Heeschen inquired of Blaw-Knox about the possibility of 
putting the antenna on a railway track so that it might be used later with the 
140 Foot as part of a variable spacing interferometer. Cam Wade suggested 
starting instead with a small two-element interferometer to (a) test methods of 
local oscillator and IF signal transmission, and (b) develop methods of correlat-
ing the data. Wade recognized that these questions needed to be addressed 
before waiting for the completion of the first two VLA antennas, which he very 
optimistically stated “can hardly be finished sooner than 18 months from now.”42
In January 1963, the AUI Board of Trustees approved Heeschen’s request 
to obtain a second 85 foot antenna in order to “gain experience with interfer-
ometers.”43 The 85-2 antenna as it was called, was essentially a clone of 85-1, 
except that it was mounted on a set of 96 large truck tires and could be towed 
by two bulldozers along a roadway. For actual observing the antenna was low-
ered and bolted to stations with spacings that varied between 1200 meters and 
2700 meters from 85-1, oriented along an azimuth of 243 degrees as restricted 
by the site geography.
The two-element Green Bank Interferometer was in operation by the mid-
dle of 1964 at 2695 MHz (11.3 cm) using a double sideband mixer with an IF 
band extending from 2 to 10 MHz.44 A room temperature commercial para-
metric amplifier was used in front of each mixer to give a system temperature 
of about 125 K.45 Initially all the GBI observations were recorded and reduced 
using strip chart recorders, but soon Wade discussed the techniques needed to 
find the amplitude and phase of digitally recorded interferometer data.46 Then, 
in December 1964, only a month after arriving at NRAO, Barry Clark refined 
Wade’s procedure for the digital reduction of GBI data47 which was then imple-
mented by Clark and Wade.48
The GBI had a resolution of about 10 arcsec. It met all of its design require-
ments and provided the interferometry experience the NRAO staff needed to 
pursue the VLA project. However, Caltech’s Owens Valley two-element inter-
ferometer was still getting all the attention because of its exciting series of 
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quasar identifications at larger and larger redshifts, new planetary results, pio-
neering observations of radio source polarization, and the ground-breaking 
investigations of radio galaxy structure (Sect. 6.6). Heeschen was anxious to 
get some visibility for the Green Bank Interferometer, and encouraged Wade 
to give a talk on his precision position measurements at the spring 1965 
American Astronomical Society (AAS) meeting in Lexington, Kentucky.
Unfortunately, a large gulley located between 85-1 and the nearest 85-2 
station precluded interferometer spacings less than 1200 meters. With no short 
spacings, the GBI had limited imaging capability, and in January 1966 
Heeschen informed the AUI Board that NRAO needed a second moveable 
dish for the GBI.49 As shown in Fig. 6.1, a third element, 85-3, allowing base-
lines as short as 100 meters, was added in 1967, along with a new interferom-
eter control building and a new observing station. Interferometer control and 
data reduction were handled by a DDP-116 computer.50 Starting in 1966, a 
portable 42 foot dish was placed at Spencer’s Ridge, 11.3  km from Green 
Bank, to form the world’s first phase stable radio interferometer with a baseline 
longer than a few kilometers (Fig. 7.5). The 2 to 12 MHz IF signal from the 
remote antenna was returned over a microwave radio link operating at 
1347.5 MHz, which also provided the local oscillator synchronization. John 
Basart et  al. (1970) ran a long series of observations to study the effect of 
atmospheric turbulence on interferometer phase.
Fig. 7.5 The 42-foot antenna components arrive at Bartow railway depot. George 
Grove standing at the far right with his ever present pipe. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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In 1968, the GBI was further upgraded to operate at both 2695 and 
8085 MHz (11.3 and 3.6 cm) with dual polarized front ends, and the portable 
42 foot dish was replaced with a 45 foot dish having sufficient precision to 
operate at 8 GHz.51 The 45 foot antenna was placed on a hilltop near the town 
of Huntersville, about 35  km from Green Bank, and was operated with an 
upgraded link. To avoid attenuation of the link signal from intervening foliage 
located in the direct line of sight, the radio link was bounced off a reflector 
mounted on a nearby Green Bank hill. In this way, NRAO was able to demon-
strate the ability to maintain adequate phase stability over the longest baselines 
planned for the VLA and to make images with 1 arcsec resolution.
The 45 foot antenna was operated unattended with only a few-hour main-
tenance visit scheduled once a week. A decade later, the success of the remotely 
operated radio-linked antenna gave NRAO some confidence that it could suc-
cessfully maintain and remotely operate the antennas of the proposed Very 
Long Baseline Array (Sect. 8.6).
The first GBI spectroscopic observation occurred in 1968, an unsuccessful 
attempt to detect the H134α radio recombination line near 2700  MHz. 
Following a meeting in Green Bank in August 1968, attended by 13 NRAO 
and university scientists, 21 cm single sideband front ends, a wider bandwidth 
delay system, and a digital correlator were added to permit H I spectroscopy.
By 1969, with no clear prospects for VLA funding, the NRAO staff began 
to discuss enhancements of the GBI to improve its imaging capability by add-
ing a fourth 85 foot dish, three 13 meter dishes, two additional observing sta-
tions along the existing roadway, and a new baseline orthogonal to the existing 
one. NRAO made it clear that the proposed expansion of the GBI was not a 
substitute for the VLA, but rather, in view of the delay in funding the VLA, it 
was intended as a stopgap measure to permit the kind of research not possible 
with the existing GBI. As described below, following the recommendations 
from the Greenstein Committee, NRAO received the first VLA construction 
funds in late 1972, and so the proposed GBI expansion never happened.
The GBI served its intended purpose, giving the NRAO scientific and tech-
nical staff the experience needed to credibly design and build the VLA, as well 
as exposing the broader NRAO user community to the opportunities provided 
by synthesis imaging. Perhaps the most important contribution of the GBI was 
the demonstration, using the radio linked interferometer, that although phase 
fluctuations initially increase with antenna separation, beyond spacings of a few 
kilometers each antenna is looking through essentially independent atmo-
spheres, and the interferometer phase fluctuations remain essentially unchanged 
as the separation is further increased (Basart et al. 1970). Specifically, with the 
35 km spacing of the portable dish, NRAO was able to demonstrate that it 
would be possible to maintain phase coherence over interferometer scales 
 comparable to those planned for the VLA, especially since the VLA would be 
located on a far better site than Green Bank. The concerns expressed by Martin 
Ryle, who of course had great influence, were shown to be unfounded: there 
were no natural constraints to achieving the stated goals of the NRAO pro-
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posed VLA. Another clear result of the experience with the GBI antenna trans-
port and the limited lifetime of its tires was that the VLA antennas should be 
moveable on rails and not a roadway.
An unanticipated but far-reaching contribution of the GBI came, ironically, 
from the deficiencies of the GBI and not from its merits. Jan Högbom, when 
visiting from Sweden in 1967, had observed some 60 radio galaxies and qua-
sars, but was discouraged by the poor quality of the images resulting from the 
large gaps in the distribution of GBI antenna spacings. As he later described it 
(Högbom 2003),
I found myself looking at ‘dirty maps’ of many sources including some calibration 
sources. It was then a small step to ask: if I subtract a full theoretical point source 
pattern, a suitably scaled and positioned ‘dirty beam’ from the map then there 
should be nothing left – unless of course there is something else out there. Often 
there was, and I went on subtracting. Returning to the map only the nice part – 
the central lobe – of each subtracted pattern was a temptation I couldn’t resist 
and it actually seemed to work. … So CLEAN had a very simple minded begin-
ning but in the end it turned out to be more useful than I had ever expected.
By October 1978, the VLA was in operation in four frequency bands at 
1.4–1.8  GHz, 5  GHz, 15  GHz, and 22  GHz, on baselines up to 12  km. 
However, the NSF provided little or no VLA operating funds at this time, so 
NRAO closed the GBI as an NSF funded user facility, not only to free up oper-
ating funds for the VLA, but to encourage staff and visitors to use and debug 
the VLA.  This met with some resistance, since at this time the GBI was a 
smoothly operating and scientifically productive instrument, whereas the VLA, 
not unexpectedly for a new facility, was still under construction and not 
straightforward to use. Moreover, there was no overlap in frequency. The VLA 
did not operate in the GBI bands at 2.7 and 8.1 GHz, so observations begun 
on the GBI often could not be completed on the partially finished VLA. But 
Heeschen had no sympathy for complainers. He knew the only way to get the 
VLA debugged was to discontinue access to the GBI and force the staff and 
visitors to turn their attention to the VLA.
However, until 1996, NRAO continued to operate the GBI under contract 
to the US Naval Observatory for their program in Earth orientation and time 
keeping, together with their long-running project to monitor variable radio 
sources at 3.6 and 11 cm. Although the GBI was originally conceived of and 
was built to give the NRAO staff experience in interferometry and to prototype 
instrumentation for the VLA, it was an important research instrument as well 
for both NRAO staff and visitors. Chapter 6 discuses some of the key discover-
ies made with the GBI.
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7.4  the nrao-oVro wars
Buoyed by the Whitford Committee report, and by NSF funding for the start 
of the first 130 foot antenna, Caltech quickly submitted a revised and enhanced 
proposal for the Owens Valley Array (OVA). The new proposal now included 
a total of eight 130 foot alt-az-mounted antennas to operate at wavelengths as 
short as 3 cm.52 Caltech proposed completing the construction of the array by 
1971 at a cost of nearly $15 million. The new OVA proposal apparently 
received “excellent reviews,” but in an April 1967 visit to the NSF, Stanley was 
informed that there was no possibility of funding in FY1968 but that FY1969 
looked more promising.53 Stanley also suggested the possibility of funding only 
one additional antenna in 1969, a suggestion he later regretted when he learned 
that the OVA was already included in the NSF’s planning for FY1969.54
The VLA and OVA proposals were very different. NRAO was proposing to 
build an elaborate national facility to be used by any qualified scientist with an 
appropriate program, and thus needed to be “flexible and versatile” (Heeschen 
1981). This meant full sky coverage and ability to form images in one day or 
less. Caltech proposed a more modest instrument, with only limited public 
access. When first proposed, NRAO considered the VLA primarily as a con-
tinuum instrument, but recognized that spectroscopy was important, and that 
the design should not “preclude its future use for spectroscopy” (Heeschen 
1981). The OVA put more emphasis on spectroscopy. In spite of the Whitford 
Committee recommendation to phase the construction of both instruments, it 
was clear that it would not be feasible to build both instruments, and until 
someone decided which would get built, nothing would get built. But, how 
would the decision be made? Who should decide?
The Dicke Committees By 1967 the NSF had been either unable or unwilling to 
fund either the OVA or the VLA. Moreover, there were other competing pro-
posals: from Cornell for upgrading the Arecibo radio telescope to permit 
observations down to at least 10  cm wavelength, from Harvard/MIT for a 
large radome- enclosed radio telescope, and from a Caltech-Berkeley-Michigan 
consortium for a 100 meter fully steerable dish. These were all viable projects 
with persuasive scientific need and strong technical preparation. To consider 
these five major proposals, NSF convened an “Ad Hoc Advisory Panel for 
Large Radio Astronomy Facilities” with Princeton’s Robert Dicke as the chair.55 
The Panel met in Washington DC for five days at the end of July 1967 to 
receive testimony from each of the five proposed projects and to make recom-
mendation to the NSF. In addition to the eight members of the Panel, more 
than 40 representatives of the proposing organizations, government agencies, 
and all three military services participated in at least some of the deliberations.
The Panel report,56 issued just over two weeks after their final meeting, rec-
ommended as its clear first priority that the Caltech proposal for the eight- 
element Owens Valley Array “be accepted in its entirety and funded as soon as 
possible, with an adequate operating budget.” Secondly, the Panel urged that 
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the Cornell proposal to upgrade the Arecibo telescope “also be accepted in its 
entirety, and funded as soon as possible.” The MIT-Harvard proposal for the 
440 foot dish was deferred pending the outcome of the Arecibo upgrade and 
further engineering studies. The Caltech-Berkeley-Michigan proposal was 
declined. Acting on the recommendations, the Arecibo upgrade was included 
in President Richard Nixon’s proposed FY1970 budget, but was not approved 
by Congress. The NSF also took the first steps toward funding the OVA, and 
included funds for building the first 130 foot antenna at the Owens Valley. As 
it turned out, the rest of the OVA was never funded, but the single 130 foot 
telescope had a long successful history as part of the early US VLBI program 
(Chap. 8) and for single dish studies.
All of the Dicke Committee recommendations carried the proviso “that at 
least 50% of the time available for astronomy on such facilities should be made 
nationally available to qualified visitors,”—a clear endorsement of an “open 
skies” operating philosophy, but noticeably “open” only to US-based scien-
tists. The Panel supported the VLA concept and the need for 1 arcsec resolu-
tion. However, they argued that more work was needed to demonstrate the 
advantage of the VLA proposal “in terms of economy of dishes and tracks, 
optimization of picture resolution elements, sky coverage, observation time, 
and flexibility,” and only recommended continued study and actual measure-
ments to “demonstrate the feasibility of interferometric techniques over very 
long baselines.”
Disappointed and upset with the Dicke Committee report, which appeared 
to “damn the VLA with faint praise,” NRAO had no choice but to continue 
the design effort as recommended by the Committee and demonstrate that the 
VLA would work as claimed. To reduce the cost, the number of antennas was 
decreased from 36 to 27. This resulted in an increase in the side lobe level from 
about one percent to about two percent. The updated design was issued in 
January 1969 as Volume III of the VLA proposal (NRAO 1969). Volume III 
included a discussion of prospective sites, a more detailed analysis of possible 
configurations, a conceptual design of the antenna elements and transportation 
system, along with the design of various components and subsystems, includ-
ing the local oscillator, IF distribution, and delay systems. The proposal also 
reported on the successes of the GBI, including the demonstration that it is 
possible to maintain the required phase stability over baselines comparable to 
the extent of the VLA. The antenna and transporter studies, the design of the 
front end parametric amplifiers, the IF delay system, and the evaluation of com-
puting requirements were contracted to industry. Most of the instrumental 
design work and planning for computing resources was done by NRAO scien-
tists and engineers, to a large extent led by Weinreb and Clark respectively. As 
Cam Wade later explained “We took advantage of the delays to do things over 
again that we’d done in haste the first time.”57 The new cost estimate was now 
only just over $32 million.
Volume III of the VLA proposal made only brief mention of a possible 
future spectroscopic capability. In June 1969, Caltech countered with an 
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update of their OVA proposal which focused on current spectroscopic observa-
tions at OVRO and spectroscopic applications of the OVA.58 The new OVA 
report also discussed the possible expansion of the OVA within the Owens 
Valley and to adjacent valleys as well as stating that 50 percent of the observing 
time at OVRO was being made available to outside observers, thus addressing 
two of the NRAO criticisms of the OVA. The proposed cost of the OVA was 
close to $17 million.
Meanwhile, the NSF continued to be vague about VLA funding and asked 
that NRAO submit two construction plans, one for receipt of funds in FY1971 
and the other in FY1974 or later. Heeschen advised the AUI Board that 
FY1971 “would not be unsatisfactory,” but “if construction funds are post-
poned until 1974 or thereafter, it would be necessary to stop all design work 
until it was known precisely when construction funds would be available.”59 
However, the NSF would not commit to the VLA or to the OVA without more 
explicit community endorsement.
Volume III brought the VLA design up to a point where NRAO felt the 
VLA was ready for final prototyping and construction. With no clear prospects 
for VLA construction, in 1969 Dave Heeschen dissolved the VLA Design 
Group and ceased further development work. With the uncertain prospects for 
VLA funding NRAO enthusiasm waned. George Swenson had no enthusiasm 
for continued fighting for the VLA and likened the situation to “scrubbing the 
decks on the Titanic.”60 Dave Heeschen had no patience for defeatism and sug-
gested that it was time for Swenson to return to the University of Illinois.
By 1969 none of the Dicke Committee recommendations had been funded, 
but the Arecibo Observatory became part of the NSF-funded National 
Astronomy and Ionospheric Center (NAIC). The discovery during the previ-
ous two years of pulsars (neutron stars), atomic recombination lines and inter-
stellar (organic) molecules, along with new precision tests of General Relativity 
and new observations of quasars and radio galaxies, had changed the landscape 
of radio astronomy, which the Committee “contrasted with the tragic standstill 
in the funding of new facilities.” Meanwhile, the 100 meter Effelsberg antenna 
and the 12-element Westerbork Array were nearing completion, as were new 
radio telescopes in India (Ooty) and at Cambridge in the UK. In view of the 
changes since the 1967 Dicke Committee report, the NSF reconvened the 
Committee “to reconsider its former recommendations, … and to reaffirm or 
alter the recommendations and priorities.” There was no mandate to prioritize 
the recommendations. Accordingly, the Panel “reaffirmed its previous recom-
mendation” that the Arecibo telescope be improved and that the Owens Valley 
Array be constructed,” and recommended “with equal urgency the construc-
tion of the large radome-enclosed fully steerable dish and the Very Large 
Array.” (Dicke 1969)61 The Committee reaffirmed the recommendation that 
at least half of the observing time on these facilities be available to visitors and 
that there be sufficient operating funds to facilitate their use by non-expert 
observers. They also made a point of endorsing “the support of radio astron-
omy research and facilities at the universities.” All the proposed projects 
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received an enthusiastic excellent recommendation and were all deemed urgent. 
Such an unrealistic blanket endorsement wasn’t really useful to the NSF. Only 
the Arecibo resurfacing would get a new start in FY1971, but there was no 
resolution of the VLA/OVA issue. NEROC tried an end run to fund the con-
struction of the 440 foot dish through a special Congressional appropriation to 
the Smithsonian Institution (Sect. 9.5), but that plan failed in Congress.
In an attempt to resolve the stalemate, Heeschen and the NRAO staff held 
several discussions with Caltech to explore the possibility of jointly building an 
array. At an 18–19 September 1968 meeting in Charlottesville, Heeschen and 
OVRO Director Gordon Stanley discussed their views on some of the scien-
tific, technical, and administrative issues facing a joint operation.62 Apparently 
there was sufficient common ground to agree to extend the discussions with a 
visit by NRAO staff to the Owens Valley. On 11–12 November, Clark, 
Heeschen, Hogg, Hvatum, and Wade met with OVRO’s Marshall Cohen, 
Alan Moffet, Duane Muhleman, and George Seielstad. While there was general 
agreement that the two groups needed to have close and continued contact on 
scientific and technical issues, both sides came away suspicious of the motives 
and commitment of the other. Curiously, Stanley could not, or chose not, to 
attend the meeting, but his report to the Caltech administration emphasized 
the disadvantages to Caltech of a joint program.63 In early 1969, Stanley again 
met with NRAO scientists during visits to the potential VLA sites in Arizona 
and New Mexico, but returned claiming to have detected “the unshakable 
determination of the NRAO people to proceed with the VLA,” and said that 
“the unanimous consensus of the [Caltech] radio astronomy group is that we 
do not proceed further with the attempt at cooperation on an array with the 
NRAO people.”64
As later described by Hogg,65 there were perhaps four areas of disagreement 
between the Caltech and NRAO concepts:
 (a) Caltech argued for a smaller number of larger dishes to facilitate calibra-
tion and to minimize maintenance. NRAO argued for a larger number of 
smaller elements to improve the u,v coverage.
 (b) The Owens Valley was too small in the east-west direction to accommo-
date the full extent of the NRAO VLA concept. At one point Heeschen 
offered to consider a joint project that would more closely follow the 
Caltech design, but only if the array were built on a site that allowed for 
future expansion.
 (c) The NRAO scientists designing the VLA and using the GBI all had strong 
backgrounds in continuum research, while spectroscopists were mostly 
using the 140 Foot and 36 Foot. Noting that the H I work at Westerbork 
was clearly very productive, Caltech put more emphasis on spectroscopic 
observations. NRAO ultimately appreciated this deficiency of the VLA and 
adopted full spectroscopic capability for it.
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 (d) Caltech did not fully buy into the visiting user concept and envisioned an 
operating model more like that of the Owens Valley Observatory and not 
the NRAO national observatory model which emphasized user support.
Desperate to find funding for the VLA, in August 1969 Heeschen, Hvatum, 
and Wade met in Reno, Nevada, with officials from the University of Nevada 
to seek their possible support in obtaining VLA seed money from the Reno- 
based Max C. Fleischmann Foundation. The University expressed interest and 
offered office space, but could offer no help with persuading the Foundation 
to support the VLA. AUI President Gerry Tape’s three-page proposal to the 
Fleischmann Foundation66 was rebuffed with a curt response that the 
Fleischman Foundation was not interested in funding the VLA.67
The Greenstein Committee By early 1969, both NASA and the NSF, as well as 
the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), were becoming increasingly aware of the 
need to prioritize the many planned initiatives in both space and ground based 
astronomy. Following a “prospectus” prepared by the BOB,68 both the NSF 
and NASA approached the National Academy of Science (NAS) to conduct 
“an independent study … which can assess the priorities of astronomy from the 
scientific point of view, specifically cutting across the lines of responsibility 
which may tend to bias the planning of individual agencies in favor of particular 
techniques.”69 It took the NAS four months to respond with a two page pro-
posal to form a “main committee of approximately 12 experts … to undertake 
detailed planning of the study, to oversee the work of some 12 panels, and to 
prepare the final report” with oversight by the NAS Committee on Science and 
Public Policy (COSPUP) chaired by Harvey Brooks.70 The NAS moves delib-
erately with their studies, and expected that the report would take two years 
and would be delivered in mid-1971. The NSF, perhaps surprisingly, was 
apparently optimistic about the prospects for early construction funding, and 
NSF Director Leeland Haworth responded that the summer of 1971 would be 
marginally late to address even the NSF FY1973 budget proposal. He expressed 
concern that “information on astronomy is urgently needed by the Federal 
agencies and the Executive offices to develop astronomy support plans for ear-
lier fiscal years. Absence of this information might slow down the U.S. astron-
omy program.”71 Haworth then proceeded to request “an interim preliminary 
report … by early spring 1970 … [which would] make it possible for your 
study to have a real impact already on the FY1972 budget and prevent any 
undue delays.”
Jesse Greenstein from Caltech was approached to lead the study, but was less 
than enthusiastic. Although he had devoted most of his career to optical spec-
troscopy, as discussed in Chaps. 1–3, Greenstein was involved in radio astron-
omy almost from its beginnings. He had organized the first major international 
conference on radio astronomy which ultimately led to the creation of the 
NRAO, had convinced DuBridge to begin a radio astronomy program at 
Caltech, and had played a major role at Caltech in the 1963 discovery of 
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 quasars, although his personal (and Caltech’s?) goals were unmistakably for a 
southern hemisphere partner for the Palomar 200 inch optical telescope 
(Greenstein 1984a, b; Trimble 2003; Kraft 2005).72
Greenstein noted that none of the recommendations of the five-year-old 
Whitford report had been implemented, and anticipated that the Second Dicke 
Committee meeting scheduled for the following month would serve to set 
priorities for radio astronomy. He expressed doubt on the value of a new study 
without some broader indication from BOB, Congress, and the President’s 
Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), of what they wanted from a new report, 
whether it was an appropriate time for a new report, and he asked whether 
“there is any point at all in proposing large sums of money for a physical science 
which is not notorious for its extensive contributions to the industrial welfare, 
to the inner-city, to pollution etc. which seems to be the major interest of the 
informed Congress, and of the current administration.”73
Greenstein was ultimately persuaded to Chair the Astronomy Survey 
Committee and agreed to provide the requested interim report. He initially 
approached 21 colleagues to join the main Steering Committee, only one of 
whom, Bernard Burke from MIT, was a radio astronomer. At their first meet-
ing on 11–12 October 1969, the Steering Committee heard from the NSF, 
NASA, BOB, and Congress about their plans and expected budget levels, dis-
cussed the final composition of the committee and membership of the panels, 
and reviewed previous recommendations, including the Whitford report and 
the recently issued, but inconclusive, second Dicke Committee report.
Rather than appoint panel members who would be perceived as neutral, as 
was done for the Dicke Committee, Greenstein populated the Radio Panel 
with representatives of all the competing proposals: Dave Heeschen for the 
NRAO VLA, Marshall Cohen for the Caltech OVA, Frank Drake for the 
Arecibo resurfacing, and Bernie Burke for the NEROC 440 foot dish, and he 
asked Heeschen to Chair the panel. The choice of Heeschen as panel chair was 
not without controversy, as some committee members felt that he would bias 
the panel toward the VLA.74
Greenstein promptly informed Heeschen and the Panel that, “the NSF has 
recently taken a very strong position in favor of a major expansion in radio 
astronomy,” and he put the Radio Panel on a fast track so that the BOB could 
not use the existence of the Greenstein Committee as an excuse to delay.75 
Understanding that the Arecibo resurfacing would be in the NSF FY1971 bud-
get, at their first meeting on 10 November 1969 the Radio Panel debated only 
the relative merits of the VLA, the OVA, and the NEROC dish.76 But they 
were unable to reach any consensus. If they assumed that all three projects 
would be funded during the next decade, the Panel argued that the OVA 
should be built first, but if only one project were to be funded, then the Panel 
favored the VLA, with only Cohen and Burke dissenting, supporting instead 
the OVA and the NEROC dish respectively. With so little time to meaningfully 
address the long-unresolved issues of priority, the Panel report did little more 
than endorse the Dicke Committee report that all four proposed projects 
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(including the Arecibo upgrade) were important and urgent and that they be 
started in FY1971, although they also added a fifth project, a millimeter wave-
length dish also being proposed by NRAO (Chap. 10). The Radio Panel 
interim report,77 dated 1 December 1969, was approved by Greenstein and 
Brooks without the normal lengthy Academy approval process, and was for-
warded to the new NSF Director William McElroy on 16 December.78 
However, at the same time, the NAS President Philip Handler informed 
Greenstein, that
the whole picture developed more rapidly than McElroy or DuBridge79 expected, 
and the FY 1971 books are now closed. At this time nothing would be gained by 
dissemination of the report beyond Dr. McElroy within the Foundation … but 
you can appreciate the privileged and sensitive nature of this paragraph.”80
Greenstein could only reply, “We do what we can, in a rather rough world. 
I shall try to encourage our younger experts in the field of radio astronomy to 
plan for a realistic future.”81
With the exception of the Radio Panel, all of the other panel chairs were 
members of the parent Survey Steering Committee, but the Radio Panel was 
represented only by Frank Drake and Bernie Burke, each of whom had their 
own priorities. Heeschen informed Greenstein that this was a problem, and 
threatened to resign if it wasn’t fixed.82 Whether Greenstein was trying to cor-
rect this imbalance or was reacting to NAS President Handler’s criticism that 
there were no committee members from the South,83 in March 1970, 
Greenstein belatedly asked Heeschen to join the Steering Committee.84 Again, 
there was some concern raised, including by Heeschen himself, that this would 
give NRAO and the VLA an appearance of an inappropriate advantage, but 
Greenstein pointed out that Heeschen was sensitive to the issue of bias, that he 
was a member of the NAS, and that “he is viewed by radio astronomers of the 
country as one of the most well-balanced and fair-minded persons possible.”85 
Still, having concerns that his “real or assumed bias toward NRAO could serve 
to work against radio astronomy in general and NRAO in particular,” Heeschen 
only reluctantly accepted this increased responsibility.86
The four previous studies of radio astronomy priorities, the Pierce, Whitford, 
and two Dicke Committees had all endorsed the construction of a large radio 
array, but none set priorities among the modest sized university array proposed 
by Caltech, the more elaborate and more expensive national facility proposed 
by NRAO, a large steerable radio telescope of the type proposed by NEROC, 
or the proposed upgrade of the existing Arecibo fixed spherical reflector. 
Greenstein realized that the only way to get anything funded required making 
hard decisions about priorities, and Heeschen was determined that the NRAO 
VLA be the top priority.
As requested by the NSF, the Astronomy Survey Committee issued an 
interim report which was limited to ground based astronomy projects that 
might be started in FY1972 or FY1973. Having been told that there would not 
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be more than $3 to $6 million a year for any new starts in these years,87 which 
excluded even a start on the high price tag VLA or OVA, the Radio Panel could 
not agree about the relative merits of enlarging either the Owens Valley or 
Green Bank interferometers. After much debate, the Radio Panel endorsed the 
65 meter millimeter wave dish also proposed by NRAO as its top priority 
(Sects. 8.7 and 10.3) and recommended that the NSF also take over the uni-
versity radio astronomy projects that had been dropped by the Department of 
Defense (DoD) as a result of the Mansfield Amendment.88 But after the meet-
ing, Cohen wrote to Heeschen, “I am very concerned over the millimeter dish 
being put in front,” and he argued instead for “two more telescopes at Owens 
Valley, with about 1½ miles of track,” pointing out the “cost effectiveness of 
the Owens Valley Observatory” and that three Caltech OVRO graduates were 
on the NRAO senior staff.89 The interim report of the Radio Panel also sug-
gested that the NSF explore the possibility of increased cooperation with NASA 
for very long baseline interferometry (Chap. 8).
The interim report of the parent Survey Committee included the NRAO 
millimeter telescope as its first priority, NSF support for all former DoD astron-
omy facilities, and gave an honorable mention to expanding the GBI along 
with other modest optical and infrared opportunities. In approving the report, 
COSPUP stressed that “such interim measures should not be taken as implying 
any decreased importance of the various items in the list provided by the Dicke 
panel of the NSF [and that] delay in the Dicke program will permit the 
Europeans to move ahead of the U.S. in this important area.”90 This caveat 
seems to have escaped the notice of the BOB, as did the concern expressed by 
NAS President Handler about the eroding position of US radio astronomy and 
the “brain drain” of young American radio astronomers.91
In responding to the interim report, the NSF Director expressed his view 
that “In spite of the present fiscal stringencies, I am convinced that the U.S. must 
start on the VLA.”92 Although the OVA would have been the cheaper choice 
between the two array proposals, the NSF was reluctant to spend so much 
money on a single university facility, rather than at the NRAO where the array 
would serve the broader community. Moreover, the NRAO was the poster 
child of the NSF and NRAO had a direct link to relatively high levels at the 
NSF that university groups did not enjoy. The NSF was committed to making 
the national observatory a success and wanted to build the VLA, but they 
needed the endorsement of the community. This recognition that the NSF, as 
well as the White House Office of Science and Technology (OST), already 
favored the VLA helped to ultimately swing the Radio Panel to support the VLA.
However, the modest recommendations for radio astronomy contained in 
the interim report appeared inconsistent with the ambitious Dicke Committee 
recommendations and the earlier endorsement of the Radio Panel which 
claimed that the VLA, the OVA, the NEROC dish, and the Arecibo resurfacing 
were all important and were all urgent. The apparently unaggressive interim 
report was based on earlier information provided by BOB Director Hugh 
Lowerth and Philip Yeager from the House Committee on Science and 
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Astronautics “that there was no possibility at all of funding for any part of the 
Dicke program beyond resurfacing of Arecibo for at least the next two years.”93 
But as Harvey Brooks reported to Handler, “I am now told by Bill McElroy 
that the information given to us … was wrong, and that the interim report and 
COSPUP letter have confused the issue within OMB [White House Office of 
Management and Budget],94 and resulted in general confusion about the pri-
orities within the Administration…. The NSF now feels that the VLA should 
be top priority but that the COSPUP letter undermined [their] case with OMB 
for the VLA,” and that according to McElroy, “The difference between the 
interim report and the Dicke panel seems to have been deliberately used as an 
excuse for deferring any new starts in radio astronomy.”95 Indeed, the minutes 
of National Science Board (NSB) Executive Session for 3–4 September 1970 
show that the NSF had already included the VLA in the NSF FY1972 budget 
request to OMB, although in view of the on-going Vietnam War and the then 
large budget deficit, it did not survive to get into the President’s FY1972 bud-
get request. Interestingly, this information was already known to NAS President 
Handler, since at the same time, Handler was also a member (and recent Chair) 
of the NSB, but he was not free to divulge this confidential information to the 
members of Greenstein Committee. In fact, the NSB minutes show that “The 
Chairman reminded the Board that all subjects discussed in Executive Session, 
particularly with respect to the budget, are to be treated as highly 
confidential.”96
Having dispensed with the interim report for modest new starts in FY1971 
and FY1972, the parent Survey Committee and the Radio Panel now had to 
address the serious issue of dealing with the major projects: the VLA, the OVA, 
and the NEROC dish. Since the Radio Panel interim report had included the 
NRAO newly proposed 65 meter millimeter wave radio telescope in its prelimi-
nary recommendation for a 1972 new start when they had thought that any 
new start had to be limited to $6 million, Heeschen was caught having to 
either appear to reverse that interim recommendation, or support a project that 
was competing with the VLA.
Greenstein stressed the need to prioritize the panel’s recommendations and 
not just to present what might appear as a shopping list. Burke, Cohen, and 
Heeschen were committed to the large dish, the OVA, and the VLA respec-
tively, to which they and their colleagues had already devoted many years of 
hard work and significant design funds. They were not in the mood to compro-
mise. According to anecdotal reports, the Radio Panel deliberations were 
intense, with no holds barred, resulting in figurative “blood on the floor.” On 
one occasion, when a panel member complained of the bias of the Chair toward 
the VLA, Heeschen walked out in disgust and threatened to resign.
After several Radio Panel meetings, it was clear that the non-committed 
panel members as a whole preferred one of the arrays over the NEROC dish, 
and it came down to choosing between the OVA and the VLA. Burke had 
participated in the VLA Design Group, and appreciated the potential power of 
the VLA.  Perhaps more relevant, he was a member of the AUI Board of 
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Trustees, and was sympathetic to the role of a national observatory of which he 
was a major user and from which he received significant support. With the 
NEROC dish off the table, Burke cast his lot with the NRAO VLA, and the 
rest of the panel went along. But there was no real agreement on whether or 
not the Panel should report a prioritized list which might make it more likely 
that at least the top one would be funded, or an unranked list which might 
increase the chance for two or more projects to be supported. At the last meet-
ing of the Radio Panel in San Francisco on 18–19 February 1971, the panel 
agreed to stress that the entire program was needed if the US was to be preemi-
nent in radio astronomy, but, recognizing that they could not all start at the 
same time, that the first new start would be the VLA. Once the Radio Panel 
agreed to support the VLA as the first priority for the radio astronomy, things 
moved very fast. Even before the Steering Committee had issued its formal 
report, Greenstein, together with Heeschen, went to OST to make the case 
for the VLA.
The formal report of the Radio Panel (Heeschen 1973), which appeared 
much later than the report of the parent Survey Committee (Greenstein 1972), 
was broad and convincing, citing the exciting discoveries by radio telescopes 
over the past decade that so fundamentally changed our view of the Universe. 
While not mentioning any specific proposals, appropriately leaving that for the 
NSF, the Radio Panel recommendations were nevertheless clear and unam-
biguous. Recognizing that the Arecibo resurfacing had already been autho-
rized for construction, the Radio Panel recommended in order of priority the 
construction of (1) a large aperture synthesis array, (2) a large fully steerable 
parabola, and (3) a large telescope for millimeter observations (Sect. 10.3) 
(Findlay and von Hoerner 1972). To balance the strong support given to the 
NRAO VLA and millimeter telescope projects, the panel also expressed strong 
support for a wide range of university activities by recommending that “con-
struction of new instruments at university facilities should continue, … in some 
cases, where outstanding competence exists, major new university instruments 
should be provided,” and said that “Support for new operations, new state-of- 
the-art equipment, and maintenance of existing university facilities must be 
maintained at a level that will allow effective research.” In support of the VLA, 
the Radio Panel specifically noted, “One of the most active areas of radio 
astronomy is the study of non-thermal sources, including quasars and radio 
galaxies.”
Concurrent with the Astronomy Survey, the NAS also ran a physics study, 
led by Alan Bromley from Yale. A panel on astrophysics, chaired by George 
Field from Harvard, was appointed to jointly support both the astronomy and 
physics surveys. One of the present authors, (Kellermann), represented radio 
astronomy interests on the Astrophysics and Relativity Panel, which recom-
mended that “the Astronomy Survey Committee take into account the need 
for a large array that can synthesize a beam of the order of seconds of arc in a 
reasonable period of time, for study of extragalactic radio sources” (Field 
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1973a, b) so the VLA came to the parent Survey Committee blessed by two 
separate panels.
There were no other large “shovel ready” projects coming up from the 
other panels. The optical astronomers preferred more observing time and 
improved detectors over building more powerful new facilities, and were will-
ing to support the VLA.97 Acceptance of the VLA as the top project for the 
Committee was perhaps easier in the full Steering Committee than it was in the 
Radio Panel. Multiple straw ballots, each with different constraints and weight-
ing criteria, put the VLA on top each time, usually by a wide margin. According 
to Heeschen,98 Greenstein was initially very opposed to the VLA. Although he 
had played a prominent role in founding NRAO, Greenstein had come to see 
the relatively well-funded big national observatories as a threat to university- 
based, individually-driven scientific research.99 He too threatened to resign 
from the Committee but realized that doing so would undermine the 
whole study.100
Heeschen knew that the VLA had strong supporters on the Committee, and 
thought it better that he did not attend the final Steering Committee meeting 
held in Boulder, and thus it was Burke who presented the case for the 
VLA. Greenstein himself later explained that he was finally sold on the VLA by 
its expected capability to resolve the long-standing radio source count contro-
versy, and also by the expectation that it would contribute to the broader cos-
mological issues facing astronomy.101 Also, Greenstein was never enthusiastic 
about the OVA. He came into the Survey hoping to get a copy of the Palomar 
200 inch telescope in Chile. Moreover, he had little confidence in the OVRO 
management to construct and operate something of the magnitude of the 
OVA. At a higher level, within Caltech, there was more interest in enhancing 
the high energy physics program than in the radio astronomy program. Indeed, 
after John Bolton left Caltech at the end of 1960, there was only a token effort 
to bring in a new Director from the outside. The main competition to the VLA 
came from the NASA proposed series of High Energy Astronomy Observatories 
(HEAO) but since this was a NASA, not an NSF program, and since the cost 
of HEAO was an order of magnitude larger than that of the VLA, they were 
not really in any direct competition.
The final report of the Astronomy Survey Committee (Greenstein 1972) 
recommended as its top priority “A very large array, designed to attain a resolu-
tion equivalent to that of a single radio telescope 26 miles in diameter,” but 
added, “this should be accompanied by increased support of smaller radio pro-
grams and facilities at the universities or other smaller research laboratories.” A 
program to develop instrumentation for optical telescopes, support for the new 
field of infrared astronomy, a series of High Energy Astronomy Observatories, 
and the large millimeter-wavelength antenna received second through fifth pri-
orities respectively. The NEROC proposal for “a large steerable radio telescope 
designed to operate efficiently at wavelengths of 1 cm and longer” was given 
only tenth priority and was never built. Radio astronomers would need to wait 
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another 30 years before a large steerable radio telescope would be built in the 
US, and it only happened then as a result of a freak accident (Chap. 9).
The Survey Committee report probably ended up with a stronger endorse-
ment of the VLA than intended by many members of the Radio Panel. Indeed 
after the report was released, Cohen again wrote to Heeschen that he was hav-
ing second thoughts; that “the VLA will not touch on the exciting and funda-
mental problems: molecules and compact objects,” and that he was getting a 
lot of negative comments from other radio astronomers.102 Nevertheless, on 22 
March 1971, Heeschen, together with Cohen and other members of the radio 
panel, met with Edward David, President Nixon’s controversial new Science 
Advisor, at a meeting organized by Geoff Burbidge. David noted that the 
group’s support for the VLA “reaffirms the budgetary proposal made last year 
by NSF,” and indicated that no further discussion was needed on this topic.103 
However, as result of his abandonment of the NEROC dish and his public sup-
port of the VLA, Burke faced a formidable challenge at home from his MIT/
Harvard colleagues, who accused him of something just short of treason.104
Sensing that the tide was shifting toward the VLA, in May 1970 Stanley 
wrote to the Caltech management suggesting that the time had passed for the 
OVA.105 Trying to salvage something for OVRO, Caltech withdrew the OVA 
proposal and instead proposed a more modest Owens Valley Interferometer 
(OVI). The new Caltech proposal exploited a perceived weakness of the VLA 
proposal and emphasized the spectroscopic opportunities made possible by 
building only two new 130 foot antennas to operate together with the existing 
130 foot and two 90 foot antennas. In an apparent about-face from their ear-
lier position, the new proposal discussed the OVI as “a nationally-available 
facility.” The proposal for $6.5 million was sent to both the NSF and NASA, 
but was never funded.106 Gordon Stanley stepped down as OVRO Director in 
1975 and was succeeded by Alan Moffet. Under the leadership of Marshall 
Cohen, Caltech shifted their emphasis to VLBI (Chap. 8).
Ironically, following the lengthy period of controversy between NRAO and 
Caltech, once the decision was made in favor of the VLA, it would be Caltech 
graduates such as Barry Clark, Edward Fomalont, Eric Greisen, and Richard 
(Dick) Sramek who played major roles in the final design, construction, and 
later the operation of the VLA. Two of the long-time VLA site directors, Ron 
Ekers and Miller Goss, had both worked at Caltech.
7.5  choosing the VLa site
There is no “best site” for a radio telescope, or for that matter for any tele-
scope, as the quality of the site depends on many different criteria. The “best 
site” will depend on how the different criteria are weighted, and different peo-
ple will weight them differently. The criteria adopted for choosing the VLA site 
included many of the criteria that went into choosing the Green Bank site. 
These included:
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 1. Freedom from radio frequency interference, which meant isolation from 
population centers and being surrounded by mountains to shield the 
array from radio transmissions;
 2. Low latitude in order to observe the largest part of the sky, particularly 
the galactic center region, and in US territory;
 3. Freedom from extreme weather conditions and earthquakes that might 
damage the instrument, and also low average wind speeds so as not to 
compromise the antenna pointing;
 4. Availability of adequate power and water;
 5. Proximity to a nearby town with adequate schools, cultural, and medical 
facilities, and access to reasonable surface and air transport.
As is the case for all radio telescopes, criteria 1 and 5 can be mutually exclu-
sive, and the VLA had its own additional requirements. As was noted in the 
VLA Report No. 1, a large flat area of at least 20 miles in diameter was required 
to allow the individual antenna elements to be transported, and the land had to 
be available at reasonable cost. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly clear 
from experience with the GBI and at OVRO that to operate at centimeter 
wavelengths, clear dry skies were required, as atmospheric turbulence contrib-
utes to interferometer phase fluctuations. All the criteria suggested a site in the 
desert southwest. From examination of topographic maps, NRAO engineer 
Sidney Smith identified 14 potential sites, which he labeled Y1 through Y14. 
Wade later added the Plains of San Agustin in central New Mexico, which 
Smith had missed as it lay on the corners of four different topographic maps, 
but which clearly stood out as potentially an attractive site. It was labeled Y15.
Wade and Smith went to New Mexico in November 1965 to inspect the 
Plains of San Agustin both from the ground and the air, and to enquire about 
land availability. Wade was immediately impressed, and for the next five years, 
he considered this as the site to beat. In choosing the site for the VLA, NRAO 
had to consider not only the technical and logistical criteria, but a variety of 
social, economic, political, and environmental criteria as well. Everyone wanted 
to be involved—the local landowners, the politicians, concerned citizens, and 
of course the NSF. Although the Y15 site stood out from the beginning as 
being the most desirable, 33 other sites were considered. Some of these were 
quickly rejected. Two were active oil drilling fields; several others were Air 
Force bombing ranges (Heeschen 1981, p. 11). Wade and others investigated 
all 34 sites between 1965 and 1971. As Wade described it, “I got to eat in lots 
of backwoods restaurants.”107
Much later, Wade recalled that he was troubled about discrepancies in the 
contour levels which described some of the potential sites that were located on 
different topographical maps, so before one of his trips to investigate prospec-
tive sites in the Southwest he purchased an altimeter that had been salvaged 
from a wrecked airplane to check site altitudes. Taking off from the Cleveland 
airport on the second leg of his flight back to Charlottesville from inspecting 
the Arizona site, Wade was playing with the altimeter to see if he could detect 
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when the cabin pressure changed. Suddenly, the pilot announced that they 
were returning to the airport for an emergency landing. Like the other passen-
gers, Wade, concerned about the emergency landing, hastened his exit through 
one of the emergency chutes, only to be taken aside by FBI agents for ques-
tioning. Apparently, spotting Wade fooling with his altimeter, another passen-
ger notified the flight crew that Wade was about to set off a bomb. The plane 
set off again, but only after a long delay, and Wade was not the most popular 
passenger on the flight.108
To the extent possible, NRAO tried to keep the search process quiet to 
avoid possible political interference and land price speculation. Unlike in Green 
Bank, where the Observatory land was privately held, the area chosen for the 
VLA was mostly federal and state owned land, but was leased to private ranch-
ers who were very protective of their grazing rights. Fortunately, Wade had 
grown up on a farm in Kentucky and knew how to talk to farmers and ranchers 
without alarming them and without the local politicians getting too involved. 
After multiple visits, Wade, often accompanied by NSF or AUI staff, managed 
to satisfy the ranchers that the VLA would not harm their ranching interests.
Of 34 potential VLA sites, NRAO let contracts to a civil engineering firm to 
study seven sites109 for ground stability, drainage, the suitability of underground 
water for drinking, suitability of soil content for construction, etc. While Wade 
continued to prefer the Y15 site, there were strong arguments for the Y23 site 
which was close to Tucson and close to where NRAO was already operating its 
36 Foot Telescope (Sect. 10.2) and also close to the Kitt Peak National 
Observatory. But according to Wade, the Y23 site was subject to flooding, had 
a large rattlesnake population, and was too close to potential interference from 
Tucson.110 Y27, the site near Marfa, Texas and the McDonald Observatory, was 
considered by some to be attractive as it was in Texas, the home state of then 
President Lyndon Johnson. In 1967, the Plains of San Agustin became NRAO’s 
proposed site, but it was kept quiet until 1971 when it was clear that further 
progress on the project depended on developing the site. This meant going 
public with disclosing the Plains of San Agustin as the preferred site, and NRAO 
(1971) submitted Volume IV of the VLA proposal to the NSF in December. 
Volume IV described the site selection process, discussed the relative merits of 
seven acceptable sites, the reasons for rejecting the remaining 27 sites, and the 
merits of the Plains of San Agustin as the preferred site for the VLA.
All astronomers think they are experts on telescope site selection, and noth-
ing is ever more controversial in any big telescope project than choosing a site. 
The VLA was no exception. In submitting Vol. IV to the NSF, Heeschen’s 
covering letter succinctly summarized the choice of Y15 in terms of its eleva-
tion, level ground, drainage, accessibility, and cost, concluding with “The site 
Y15 in the Plains of San Agustin is remarkable, and is perhaps uniquely suited 
to the requirements of large radio astronomy arrays.”111 Although Vol IV of 
the VLA Proposal probably gave more detail and more extensive justification 
for the VLA site selection than for any previous telescope project, the NSF 
needed reassurance before approving the selection of the site, and asked the 
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National Academy of Science to review Vol. IV, to advise on the adequacy of 
selection criteria, to review the analysis of the site selection data, and to assess 
the conclusions. The NAS sent Vol. IV, along with Heeschen’s cover letter, to 
C. Mayer (NRL), E.M. Purcell (Harvard), J.R. Pierce (Caltech), R.B. Leighton 
(Caltech), and R.N. Bracewell (Stanford), requesting their advice. All responded 
positively endorsing the methodology and the choice of the Plains of San 
Agustin, but one reviewer could not resist the opportunity to question whether 
or not the VLA was worth the huge cost and suggested that some of the money 
could better be spent on VLBI (Chap. 8).112
Work on the site began in 1974. Even though most of the land was owned 
by the state or federal government, gaining access was not straightforward. It 
took more than seven years to complete the paper-work to give the NSF the 
right-of-way through one parcel of land owned by the Department of the 
Interior. Each of the ranchers who owned land near the ends of the three arms 
brought suit against the government condemnation of their land, and the suits 
had to be settled by a court appointed commission, costing the project another 
$200,000. One of the ranchers, who owned land near the end of the north 
arm, objected to the encroachment on a piece of land that he had developed 
for irrigation and farming. Unable to negotiate a mutually agreeable settle-
ment, the north arm of the VLA was shortened to 19 km, and so is 2  km 
shorter than the other two arms. Only one square mile of land, housing the 
control building, cafeteria, dormitory buildings, and the Antenna Assembly 
Building, was actually purchased for the VLA; the three strips of land, 300 feet 
on each side of the baselines, are leased.
New Mexico state law requires that land used for any new project be 
inspected by a state-licensed archeologist for evidence of historical land use. A 
preliminary survey by a New Mexico State University archeologist disclosed 
evidence of ancient habitation near the end of the planned array’s southwest 
arm. The site was on land owned by a local rancher who refused admittance to 
the site until a court order rejected his claim (Lancaster 1982). The state of 
New Mexico, the NSF, and the Department of the Interior all turned down 
applications to fund the required excavation, and the VLA project had to pay 
almost $100,000 for the archeological work, which uncovered more than 
3,000 artifacts dating back as much as ten thousand years (Beckett 1980).
7.6  BuiLding the VLa
Selling the VLA to the radio astronomy community, to the NSF, and to 
Congress took a decade, but this was only the beginning. It would take nearly 
another decade to address the multitude of managerial, funding, technical, and 
logistical challenges facing NRAO and the NSF. In the spring of 1971, when it 
first appeared that the VLA would be funded, Heeschen appointed Hein 
Hvatum, the NRAO Associate Director for Technical Services, as the new VLA 
Project Manager. Heeschen declared his own work finished and left for a well- 
earned six-month Caribbean sailing trip with his family, leaving Hvatum in 
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charge. Hvatum then led a detailed review of the design of the antenna and 
other instrumentation. The 1960s were not only a period of rapid discoveries 
in radio astronomy, but one of major technical advances. Cryogenically cooled 
low noise amplifiers, largely developed at NRAO by Sandy Weinreb and his 
staff, greatly improved the sensitivity of radio telescopes, although there 
remained reliability issues. Digital signal processing had replaced chart record-
ers and analogue electronics, and astronomers were becoming more comfort-
able with large scale computing machines. The rapid scientific and technical 
advances represented both opportunities and challenges. In 1971, astronomers 
expected more from the VLA than they did when it was first discussed in the 
1965 report, and even the 1969 proposal was technically obsolete. But no one 
had ever simultaneously operated 27 cryogenically cooled receivers. Indeed, it 
was often a challenge in Green Bank to keep a single cooled receiver opera-
tional for more than a few days at a time. The VLA goal of 10 arcsec resolution 
was replaced by 1 arcsec, but the dynamic range requirement was modestly set 
at only 50 to 1 corresponding to maximum sidelobe levels of the order of two 
percent, or comparable to that of a carefully illuminated parabolic dish.
Following the Congressional approval of the VLA project in August 1972, 
the NSF made $3 million available in November 1972 for VLA design and 
prototyping. The final antenna configuration was based on a total of 28 anten-
nas, nine along each of the three arms plus a spare, so that at any given time 
one antenna could be scheduled for routine servicing and possible installation 
of new receiving equipment. Four configurations of the antennas were pro-
posed to vary the resolution and field of view. The four antenna configurations 
provided maximum arm lengths of 600 m, 1.95 km, 6.4 km, and 21 km, and 
became known as the D, C, B, and A configurations respectively. Along each 
arm, the spacing of the nine antennas was concentrated toward the center and 
followed a power law distribution of spacing that minimized the total number 
of stations required.
Electronics Division head Sandy Weinreb did most of the system design for 
the VLA instrumentation. The Green Bank Interferometer (GBI) operated in 
only two bands with concentric feeds, and the initial proposal to build the VLA 
was based on a similar system. Due to satellite interference near the 11 cm 
band, the primary VLA band was shifted to 6  cm with additional bands at 
18–21 cm, 2 cm, and 1.3 cm. Each receiver first-stage was mounted on sepa-
rate circularly polarized feeds located on a 2 meter diameter ring centered on 
the vertex of the dish. An asymmetric secondary reflector at the Cassegrain 
focus was rotated to illuminate each feed and direct the beam along the electri-
cal axis of the telescope. The 6 cm receiver was conventional and included a 
parametric amplifier followed by a mixer and IF system. For the 18–21  cm 
system, the signal was up-converted to 5 GHz (6 cm) and the 6 cm paramp 
used as the second stage. In order to properly illuminate the 18–21 cm sub- 
reflector and to keep the feed from being prohibitively large, a dielectric lens 
was placed in front of the feed. The 1.3 and 2 cm mixers also used the 6 cm 
paramp as the second stage. Although the addition of the 1.3 and 2 cm bands 
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improved the resolution to 0.1  arcsec at the shortest wavelength, this cost 
effective arrangement resulted in relatively poor sensitivity at both 1.3 and 
2 cm. At each band there were two independent receivers, one each for left and 
right hand circular polarization. For each polarization, the 100 MHz IF band 
was split into two 50 MHz bands, which was the largest that the digital elec-
tronics of the era could accommodate.
In order to optimize the aperture efficiency, the primary and Cassegrain 
secondary reflectors differed from their canonical parabolic and hyperbolic 
shape (Williams 1965). To evaluate the planned fixed position 4-feed system, 
the Green Bank 140 Foot Telescope was converted to a Cassegrain optics 
employing a rotating asymmetric secondary reflector. Unfortunately, the Green 
Bank prototype did not uncover a problem caused by the offset feed geometry, 
which resulted in the two circularly polarized beams being displaced by 0.06 
beam widths (Napier and Gustincic 1977). By the time the problem was dis-
covered, six systems had already been purchased, and it was decided not to 
implement any changes.
Although NRAO had experienced considerable issues with the reliability 
and stability of cryogenically cooled receivers on the Green Bank 140 Foot 
Telescope, Weinreb made the bold decision that in order to obtain the best 
sensitivity he needed to use cooled parametric amplifiers on the VLA front 
ends. There were initial reliability issues with the VLA front ends, but by the 
end of the construction project Lancaster reported that “reliability was no lon-
ger a problem” (Lancaster 1982). Ultimately the 5 GHz paramps and mixers 
were replaced by separate cooled Gallium Arsenide Field Effect Transistor 
(GaAsFET) amplifiers for each band which gave lower noise, better stability, 
and improved reliability.
One of the key technical innovations employed during the construction of 
the VLA, was the use of the newly-developed low loss TE01 mode circular 
waveguide to carry the IF signals back from each antenna. The same waveguide 
carried the common local oscillator reference signal from the central laboratory 
to each antenna and the extensive monitor and control signals to and from 
each antenna and the central control building.113 In the 1967 VLA proposal, 
the signals were to be transmitted by conventional coaxial cable, but to com-
pensate for the attenuation over the long baselines extending up to 27 km, 
expensive and perhaps unreliable amplifiers would be needed every few kilome-
ters to maintain the needed signal strength. It was felt that optical fiber tech-
nology was not sufficiently well developed at the time to be used for the 
VLA. Weinreb became aware of the new low loss circular waveguide that had 
been developed to replace the microwave relay towers then in use to support 
the AT&T national telephone network. However, when they went to the 
NRAO business office to get approval to buy the waveguide, Weinreb and 
Hvatum had to admit that the waveguide was being manufactured only in 
Japan. Moreover, the Japanese plant where the waveguide was being fabricated 
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was scheduled to be closed. In order to procure the waveguide needed for the 
VLA, NRAO only had a month to place the order. NSF approval was straight-
forward, but the US Department of Commerce was not so easily convinced 
why such a large government contract should go to Japan, especially without 
an open bidding process.
No one at NRAO had any experience in using the new circular waveguide. 
The loss resulting from inserting couplers at the many antenna stations in the 
inner few kilometers of the array meant that there would not be enough signal 
to reach the outer antennas.114 Moreover, standing waves set up by the cou-
plers threatened to generate spurious propagation modes in the waveguide. 
After a five-year effort, NRAO solved the problem with the invention of a new 
coupler with a low insertion loss (U.S. Patent No. 4025878). Also, as used by 
Bell Telephone, the waveguide was mounted on steel springs attached to an 
outer steel pipe. NRAO wanted to save money and directly buried a 1.25 km 
test section at the VLA site to evaluate the long-term stability. Although the 
attenuation of the waveguide increased significantly over the next few months, 
it ultimately stabilized and the decision was made to directly bury the wave-
guide at least one meter deep (~3 feet) along each of the VLA arms without 
using any protective enclosure (Fig.  7.6). According to Lancaster (1982), 
because the incremental funding prevented placing a single order and there was 
only one manufacturer, the Sumitomo Corporation, which was located in a 
foreign country, “the procurement of the waveguide was one of the most dif-
ficult actions of the VLA construction.” Although the test section was obtained 
at a cost of $32 per meter, subsequent asking prices jumped to $79 per meter, 
but after negotiations were reduced to keep the waveguide procurement 
within budget.
Another important design change from the original proposal, made possible 
by the rapid development of digital signal processing technology, was to build 
a digital delay-multiplier system based on custom designed Application Specific 
Integrated Circuits (ASICs) to process the four 50 MHz IF bands, two in each 
circular polarization. To compensate for the delay of up to 140 microsecs in the 
differential path length from each antenna, the digital delay system needed to 
maintain an accuracy of better than two nanoseconds across the 50  MHz 
band.115 This complex digital system included a test and replacement capability 
to automatically detect component failures and replace failed components with 
spare units. However, the actual implementation of all four IF bands had to be 
deferred as the initial computer system was not adequate to handle the full data 
load. Although a spectral line capability was not included in the original pro-
posal, the VLA correlator that was finally built employed a technique known as 
recirculation, whereby an increased number of frequency channels could be 
obtained at the expense of limited bandwidth.116 The VLA correlator was a 
large digital system operating at 100 MHz and included 13 racks of NRAO 
developed hardware containing 85,000 integrated circuits. It was made feasible 
by using two custom developed integrated circuits which reduced the number 
of multilayer circuit cards from 864 to 156.117 In simple terms of megaflops, 
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the VLA correlator rivaled the most powerful general purpose computers then 
available.
A particularly challenging area, the computing hardware and software, was 
divided into two areas. Real time control of the VLA, data acquisition, and data 
processing were assigned to the “synchronous” system comprised of a series of 
Modcomp II mini computers, and was designed to have minimal real time 
Fig. 7.6 The TE01 mode circular waveguide was buried alongside the railway track to 
transfer the local oscillator and IF signals between the central control building and each 
antenna. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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interaction with the VLA operator or the observing scientist. The “asynchro-
nous” system included off-line data editing, calibration, and processing and 
imaging that was initially implemented in a Digital Equipment Corporation 
DEC 10 mainframe computer. Recognizing the enormous challenge that the 
VLA image processing presented, NRAO investigated the feasibility of using 
analogue optical imaging processing.118 An internal committee appointed by 
Heeschen reported that the optical system could give better dynamic range for 
about the same price, but as the risk was higher, they fortunately recommended 
the digital processor, which was initially implemented in PDP 11/40 and PDP 
11/70 mini-computers and an array processor. The original PDP 11s were later 
replaced by several more cost-effective and popular VAX 11-780 machines, 
including one in Charlottesville, and later by Convex C1 mini-supercomputers. 
Robert (Bob) Hjellming119 led the development of the asynchronous software 
system and Barry Clark the synchronous system, but they were supported by a 
growing team of programmers along with a growing software budget. In order 
to take advantage of the rapid growth in computing power, the initial hardware 
acquisition was limited to that needed to handle only the 10 antenna contin-
uum system, with the intention of acquiring the rest of the computing hardware 
closer to the end of the VLA construction. In the end, this approach gave the 
best computing power for the money, but severely limited the use of the par-
tially completed VLA. In part, this was the result of the excellent VLA sensitivity 
and an antenna configuration that could give reasonable images even for short 
“snapshot” observations lasting only a few minutes rather than 8 to 12 hours. 
This meant one could observe a hundred or more sources per day instead of the 
planned two to three sources, with a corresponding increase in the computing 
load. Moreover, the VLA proposal assumed a relatively straightforward single 
data pass of gridding and Fourier transform, but the use of deconvolution tech-
niques and self-calibration led to multiple passes and an interactive data reduc-
tion process. NRAO scientists initially assumed that due to the large number of 
interferometer baselines deconvolution would not be needed for VLA data. 
Attempts to develop a so-called “pipeline” combination of hardware and soft-
ware lasted over a decade, but were never satisfactorily implemented.120
Finding the Money The FY1973 Congressional Appropriation Bill HR 15093 
including initial funding for the VLA was signed by President Richard Nixon 
on 14 August 1972. Cam Wade recollected that when he learned Nixon had 
approved the VLA, Heeschen’s mixed response was, “We’ve wanted this thing 
so long, and now we are getting it from a crook.”121 The original NRAO plan 
called for a one- year design phase followed by a four-year construction plan at 
a total cost of $63 million. However, the NSF wanted to limit funding to not 
more than $10 million per year to minimize the impact of the VLA construc-
tion on other NSF programs. A new construction plan was negotiated, with the 
first year for final engineering design and prototyping funded at $3 million, 
followed by a constant funding level of $10 million per year, which stretched 
the construction over a period of nearly eight years. This not only delayed the 
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start of full VLA operations, but the extended production schedule increased 
the cost due to the then high level of inflation, the loss of quantity discounts for 
large purchases, as well as the need to maintain the administrative, scientific, 
and technical support structure over a longer period of time. With an assumed 
rate of inflation of 6% a year, the total cost projection increased to $76 million. 
As it developed, the extra time and increased funding turned out to be a bless-
ing, as it allowed time for prototyping, testing, and, where necessary, design 
changes with a minimum of retrofitting. Although the VLA was technically 
state-of-the-art, because most of the construction cost was in straightforward 
areas such as antennas and railway track, it was felt that the budget plan was 
sound, and “NRAO was determined to build the VLA on schedule and within 
budget” (Heeschen 1981, p. 31). However, as described below, the actual rate 
of inflation became much higher, which resulted in continual modifications to 
the construction plan and threatened the successful completion of the VLA.
The FY1973 NSF budget passed by Congress included the requested $3 
million for VLA design and prototyping, but funding for the first year of con-
struction hit a roadblock in Congress.122 The House of Representatives Science 
and Astronautics Authorization Committee included the planned $10 million 
for VLA construction as part of the NSF’s total $610 million authorization bill 
for FY1974. However in the House Appropriations Sub-Committee for 
Housing, Urban Development, and Independent Agencies (HUD), 
Representative George Shipley (D-Illinois) commented, “The stars will still be 
shining in 20 or 30 years, but pollution is going to be a heck of a lot worse in 
20 to 30 years.”123 Subsequently, the Appropriations committee report stated, 
“Although this committee approved the initial funding for this project in fiscal 
1973, it now feels that that in view of general budget constraints and other 
earthbound National Science Foundation priorities, the VLA can be deferred,” 
and VLA funding was eliminated from the House NSF Appropriations bill. 
Coincidently, as reported in the Wall Street Journal,124 the Authorization and 
Appropriations bills reached the House floor and were each passed on the same 
afternoon. With no appropriation, the authorization was meaningless. The 
VLA was saved when New Mexico Governor Bruce King found himself on the 
same plane with Senator Joseph Montoya (D-New Mexico) where they dis-
cussed the VLA problem. Montoya was a member of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee and brought the VLA problem to the attention of the HUD sub- 
committee chair, Senator William Proxmire (D-Wisconsin) of Golden Fleece 
fame (Sect. 5.5), and other sub-committee members. With Proxmire’s sup-
port, the Appropriations bill passed by the Senate included the full $10 million 
for the start of VLA construction. The House-Senate Conference Committee, 
as is typical in such situations, split the difference, and the final FY1974 
Appropriations bills containing $5 million for the start of VLA construction 
passed both houses without discussion. But this reduced funding caused yet 
another redrafting of the construction plan and increase of the projected proj-
ect cost to $78.2 million. At the request of the NSF, dozens of other funding 
arrangements were prepared over the course of the project, with 17 alone 
in FY1974.
7 THE VERY LARGE ARRAY 
362
But there was still another hurdle to overcome. The NSF had to be con-
vinced that the VLA as designed was feasible and could be built for the planned 
$63 million, so they contracted with the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) to 
do a feasibility study of the proposed VLA. The charge to SRI was to (1) deter-
mine the proposed system feasibility and ability to meet specifications in the 
light of existing technology, (2) confirm the cost and time schedules for the 
construction, development, and operation of the system, and (3) evaluate the 
method for managing the VLA Project proposed by AUI. SRI convened an ad 
hoc committee that did not include any astronomers. The committee met five 
times over a period of three months. Their report125 was very favorable, but 
they expressed concern about whether NRAO’s informal management style 
would be appropriate to a complex construction project such the VLA. The 
report confirmed that (1) the VLA was technically feasible, (2) the cost had 
been accurately estimated by NRAO, (3) the time for construction could be as 
short as four years, (4) NRAO’s technical competence was confirmed, and (5) 
the proposed project management “is generally good, but could be improved.”
VLA Construction126 Instead of bidding the entire project to build the VLA to 
a single contractor, NRAO decided to act as its own prime contractor to mini-
mize the cost and to maintain tight control over the construction. Following 
the approval of the VLA by Congress in August 1972, Jack Lancaster joined 
NRAO two months later as the VLA Project Manager and NRAO Assistant 
Director (Fig. 7.7). Prior to coming to NRAO, Lancaster had been the Chief 
Project Engineer at Brookhaven, where he oversaw the construction of the 
major reactors and accelerators. In November 1972, the VLA Construction 
Project was organized as a Division of NRAO with Hein Hvatum retaining 
responsibility for the overall technical design (Heeschen 1981, p. 31). Ground-
breaking on the Plains of San Agustin took place on 4 December 1972. In 
April 1973 Lancaster opened an office in Magdalena, New Mexico, about 
20 miles from the center of the VLA site. Over the next eight years, Lancaster, 
Hvatum, and Heeschen expertly guided the VLA project to its successful com-
pletion in January 1981, on time and officially within the 1972 revised 
budget.
As with other radio arrays, the largest single cost item for the VLA was for 
the antennas. The Request for Proposals (RFP) for the antennas was based on 
an in-house design and cost estimate led by NRAO engineer Bill Horne. 
Reflecting the increasing interest in going to shorter wavelengths, the antennas 
were specified to have a surface accuracy of 0.75 mm rms and pointing accu-
racy of 2 arcsec, sufficient to permit observations at wavelengths as short as 
1.3 cm. NRAO estimated that the antennas would cost $19.3 million. The bids 
ranged from a low of $16.8 million by E-Systems Inc. to a high of $31.8 mil-
lion from the Collins Radio Company. Following evaluation of the business 
and technical aspects of the proposals and discussions with each of the potential 
vendors, NRAO received five “Best and Final” proposals. In October 1974 
NRAO signed a contract for the fabrication and construction of 28 antennas 
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with the Dallas, TX-based firm E-Systems, Inc. The E-Systems contract also 
included an Antenna Assembly Building to facilitate the construction of the 
antennas, the installation of instrumentation, as well as ongoing antenna main-
tenance and repair.127
Since the fabrication and erection of the antennas was planned to be 
stretched out over a number of years, the contract was complex, since there is 
no guarantee from year to year that Congress will appropriate the needed 
funds. During FY1974, E-Systems completed the engineering design, and the 
first two prototype antennas delivered in 1975 met all specifications. The 
antenna contract contained options for NRAO/AUI to purchase a predeter-
mined number of antennas each year at a predetermined fixed-price that 
increased each year to allow for an anticipated six percent annual inflation. This 
lead to the first serious problem in the VLA construction program.
Due to the oil crisis resulting from the OPEC oil embargo following the 
1973 Yom Kippur War, and the abandonment by Richard Nixon of the US 
Gold standard and subsequent dollar devaluation, the 1970s experienced a 
period of extreme inflation. Within eight months the cost of steel doubled. On 
6 January 1975, E-Systems notified NRAO/AUI that they were no longer able 
to meet their contractual fixed-price obligations. It was apparent that any 
attempt to enforce the predetermined prices would result in bankruptcy, leav-
ing NRAO with no path to secure the antennas. After lengthy negotiations, it 
was agreed that NRAO/AUI would advance the funds to purchase the steel for 
Fig. 7.7 Jack Lancaster, 
VLA Project Manager 
who oversaw the VLA 
construction. Credit: 
NRAO/AUI/NSF
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all of the remaining antennas, which would help mitigate the impact of the 
high national inflation, and that E-Systems would deliver the completed anten-
nas at the previously agreed price, but on a faster schedule. However, this 
meant that by spending an unplanned large fraction of the limited NSF annual 
funding on the antennas, the instrumentation of the antennas was delayed and 
the antennas were not available for commissioning or scientific observations at 
the planned rate.128
The less than satisfactory experience with moving the GBI antennas along a 
roadway led to an early decision that the VLA antennas would move along two 
parallel railway lines. Rather than trying to push or pull the antennas using a 
bulldozer as was done at Green Bank and Caltech, antenna transporters were 
specially designed to reconfigure the VLA antennas. The initial plan called for 
three transporters, one working along each arm, but there was only enough 
money in the budget for two transporters that were christened “Hein’s Trein” 
and “CamTrak” (Fig. 7.8). Also, as a result of the rapid period of inflation fol-
lowing the oil crisis, the cost of used railroad track increased from $90 per ton 
to $330 per ton. NRAO hired two retired railway track foremen who were able 
to locate 14,000 tons of US government surplus track at some 28 different 
locations around the country. As described by Heeschen (1981), with the aid 
of the NSF, some of this was declared surplus and made available to NRAO for 
the cost of shipping to the VLA site. Another 221 tons of new rail was pur-
chased at near scrap prices after it had been rejected by the US Department of 
Fig. 7.8 Hein’s Trein, used to transport the VLA 25 meter antennas when reconfigur-
ing the array. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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Transportation for not meeting the required specifications for commercial rail 
lines (Figs. 7.9 and 7.10).
All of the instrumentation, the front ends, IF systems, digital delays, and the 
correlator, were designed by NRAO engineers, and for the most part, were 
fabricated in-house. Other instrumentation, including the monitor and control 
system, feeds, paramps, cryogenics, and the waveguide distribution system, 
were fabricated commercially. With a careful system of testing and noting fail-
ure rates, redesigns and retrofitting were kept to a minimum. Not unexpect-
edly, in view of the problems experienced in Green Bank, the cryogenic systems 
proved to be the least reliable component until a new manufacturer was found.
With the instrumentation of the first completed antenna, and the start of 
commissioning, the VLA project management, scientists and engineers moved 
from Charlottesville to temporary headquarters in Socorro, New Mexico, dur-
ing the spring and summer of 1975. It was a one-hour bus ride, each way, from 
Socorro to the VLA site. Although on most days most of the staff were not 
normally needed at the construction site, Lancaster adopted the practice of 
having everyone—management and administrative personnel, scientists, engi-
neers, and technicians—all ride together to the site on one of two buses. This 
practice enabled a high level of communication among the disparate groups, 
which many later agreed was crucial to the successful completion of the VLA.
Fig. 7.9 Unloading surplus rail in Socorro. Crane is unloading Crab Orchard rail 
from rail cars. The truck in the background is leaving with rail for the VLA site. Credit: 
NRAO/AUI/NSF
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The first antenna was completed and moved from the Antenna Assembly 
Building in July 1975 (Fig. 7.11), less than three years after the initial VLA 
funding was authorized. First fringes were detected between two antennas over 
a 1.24 km baseline in February 1976. By the beginning of 1977 five antennas 
were in operation using a 2 km baseline, and the first scientific results from the 
VLA were reported by Balick et  al. (1977). By June 1978, there were ten 
antennas in operation using a 10.6 km baseline, and NRAO (1978) announced 
that the VLA was open for scientific proposals from the community. All 27 
antennas were in operation by July 1980 and in use for scientific observations. 
The installation of all 122 km of railroad track was completed by the end of 
1980. Under the tight management of Heeschen, Lancaster, and Hvatum the 
VLA was built close to the planned budget and completed on schedule. When 
completed in January 1981, the VLA met, or, in many cases exceeded, all of its 
performance goals.
Throughout the eight-year construction, Heeschen continually stressed that 
NRAO was committed to meet the agreed budget. If some item came in at 
higher than the planned price, something else had to go. Numerous such 
adjustments were made during the process; fortunately, many of the deleted 
items were restored in the later years. As a result of constantly changing budget 
projections from the NSF, OMB, and Congress, NRAO had prepared nearly 
50 different funding schemes by the time the VLA was completed in 1980. 
The final VLA price tag was $78.578 million which was only three percent over 
Fig. 7.10 Surplus rail from Holloman Air Force Base arriving at the VLA site. Credit: 
NRAO/AUI/NSF
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the original March 1971 budget of $76 million. The increase in the Consumer 
Price Index over the same period was more than a factor of two. NRAO was 
able to keep the impact of the unprecedented high inflation modest, due in 
part to the procurement adjustments made to the fixed-price antenna contract, 
the more modest rate of inflation for electronic instrumentation, and level or 
even reduced prices for computing equipment. However, some of the NRAO 
scientific and administrative staff working on VLA planning and construction 
remained on the NRAO Operations budget throughout the project, so that 
the true cost of the VLA was actually somewhat higher than the official number.
Characteristically, Congress and the NSF were nervous throughout the con-
struction period. The VLA was the most expensive NSF project ever attempted 
and they had to be convinced that it was all going well. In 1976, Congress 
initiated a review of the VLA project, followed by a Hearing at the House 
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology.129 The subsequent 
report of the House Science Committee stated, “The Committee is very 
pleased with the close agreement between the original and current budget and 
time schedules and commends the project’s accomplishments to date.” But 
they worried that the existing NRAO and AUI advisory committees might be 
concerned with only science and technology and not management, so they 
added that “The Committee strongly recommends that the Director of the 
Foundation establish an ad hoc advisory panel to examine the VLA manage-
Fig. 7.11 First VLA antenna emerges from Antenna Assembly Building in July 1975. 
Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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ment and technical plans and activities.”130 Meanwhile, in 1975 and 1976, 
several delegations of aides from the House Appropriations Committee, includ-
ing the Chief of Staff, Richard Mallow,131 and the House Committee on Science 
and Technology132 visited the VLA. They were mostly concerned about how 
NRAO was reacting to the potential cost increases resulting from escalation, 
but also asked about how telescope time would be awarded, how many women 
were employed on the project, and interestingly, what additions to the array 
were foreseen for the 1980s. Reportedly, one of the visitors noticed Barry 
Clark’s cluttered office and said, “If this is an example of how the VLA is being 
run, we’re in trouble.”133 Congressional staff also participated in the annual 
NRAO/AUI presentation to the NSF on 14 February 1976.134 This was fol-
lowed by another hearing held on 30 September 1976 where Dave Heeschen 
was asked to testify.135
The NSF responded to the Congressional mandate by appointing a panel of 
representatives from industry, universities, and government agencies chaired by 
Cornell University Vice President Robert Matyas. There were no astronomers 
on the panel, which met five times during 1977. The panel report issued on 31 
December 1977 noted that “The program has now progressed far enough to 
state with assurance that it will be both a technical and scientific success, … but 
also has the potential for discovery in allied fields.”136 However, the panel criti-
cized the NSF for creating difficulties with the stretched-out budget, and rec-
ommended that future “projects of this magnitude and complexity be planned 
and scheduled within a more optimum engineering construction time.” The 
panel praised the project management and the dedication to “living within cur-
rent budgets and schedules,” but raised concerns about the low level of the 
remaining contingency and the level of effort devoted to software. Interestingly, 
the panel endorsed the plan “in which a basic publishable ‘product’ is provided 
by the VLA facility,” a goal which took nearly another forty years to reach.137 
In addition, the NSF conducted a further audit to “render an opinion as to 
NSF management on the economy, efficiency and control with which the VLA 
Project is being administered within the Foundation and by NRAO.” 
Interestingly, eight of the ten recommendations by the audit committee per-
tained to NSF and not to NRAO record keeping and financial statements.138
The official dedication, attended by some 600 staff and guests, was held on 
10 October 1980 (Fig. 7.12). Ten years later, at an October 1990 conference 
sponsored by both the IAU and URSI, more than 220 scientists from 17 dif-
ferent countries gathered in Socorro to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the 
opening of the VLA. The conference included presentations on astronomy, 
instrumentation, history, and planning for the future (Cornwell and Perley 
1991). The first discussions leading to the Square Kilometre Array began at 
this meeting (Chap. 11).
In 1973 Heeschen established an internal VLA Steering Committee to 
replace the defunct VLA Design Group. The Steering Committee met monthly 
to provide continuing advice on the various aspects of the VLA construction 
program. Also in 1973, he appointed an external VLA Advisory Committee 
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“to help assure … that the engineering and construction of the VLA are con-
sistent with the performance goals, and to participate in the further general 
development of the concept and design of the instrument.”139 The VLA 
Advisory Committee generally met twice a year throughout the construction 
project and into the early operations phase. It contributed significantly to set-
ting the final parameters of the VLA as well as addressing various technical 
problems as they arose. The Committee also drew attention to the lack of suf-
ficient computer power to deal with making images from VLA data.
NRAO’s computing difficulties were not confined to the VLA, so in early 
1982, Roberts appointed a Computer Advisory Committee to “elicit advice 
from highly qualified experts in the field.”140 In appointing the Committee 
members, Roberts noted the “data explosion in the last half decade,” and said, 
“The recent completion of the Very Large Array (VLA) … particularly drama-
tize [sic] this problem.” All but one of the members were computing experts 
from industry and academia, but some of the VLA Advisory Committee mem-
bers,141 such as Burke and Moffet, frequently took part in the meetings, along 
with relevant NRAO staff.
7.7  transition to operations
When completed in 1980, the VLA was not only the most powerful radio tele-
scope in the world, it was, not surprisingly, the most complex radio telescope 
ever built. In recognition of its sophistication and complexity, VLA users 
Fig. 7.12 VLA dedication, 10 October 1980; President’s Science Advisor Frank Press 
standing at the podium. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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needed extensive documentation which was initially provided by a widely used 
user manual known as The Green Book (Hjellming 1978). The Green Book was 
an indispensable reference source to observing with the VLA and included 
detailed instructions for post-observation data calibration and imaging. It was 
ultimately replaced by the Astronomical Image Processing Software (AIPS) and 
its associated Cook Book.
One of the advantages of array-type radio telescopes is that they are built in 
steps, and early observations can begin as soon as there is an interesting num-
ber of antennas. Also, being able to test many aspects of the final array after 
only a few antennas were completed and instrumented meant that debugging 
and the development of observational procedures could begin early. Even the 
partially completed VLA far exceeded the scientific capability of any other radio 
telescope, so the user community got a head start on using the VLA.
A key concept of the NRAO plan was, to the extent possible, to transfer 
project development personnel, especially the scientists and engineers, to oper-
ations, and so minimize turnover and exploit the expertise and experience of 
the development team for operations. When ten antennas became operational 
in 1978, it was becoming clear that VLA operations needed to be separated 
from the continuing construction activities, but during the several years of 
overlap, this meant that operations started more slowly than desired. Richard 
(Dick) Thompson, who had been the key systems engineer, was placed in 
charge of the operations phrase. Thompson had begun his career at Jodrell 
Bank as part of the team that developed radio-linked long baseline interferom-
etry in the late 1950s (Sect. 8.1).
The operation of the VLA, with about 110 employees located in New 
Mexico, nearly doubled the size of the NRAO staff. The VLA needed a scien-
tist, not an engineer, to coordinate VLA commissioning and operations, and 
Heeschen asked Cam Wade to serve as the initial Assistant Director for VLA 
Operations. Dave Heeschen had been the energetic NRAO leader for 18 years, 
and as the VLA approached completion he decided to step down to return to 
research and to be able to spend more time with his family. Following a national 
search, Mort Roberts was named as the NRAO Director, effective 1 October 
1978. Roberts and Wade were longtime friends and colleagues, but they had 
different approaches to management. Things finally came to a breaking point 
over Wade’s supervision of some of the local staff who lived in the small town 
of Datil about 20 miles west of the VLA site. According to Wade,142 who was 
concerned that the local staff were underpaid, as a small gesture, he and 
Lancaster let them use an NRAO van to travel between their home and the 
VLA.  When he learned of this practice, Roberts instructed them to stop. 
Incensed, at what he perceived as micromanagement, Wade responded by 
resigning as VLA Director, but he agreed to stay on until Roberts could find a 
replacement. However, in defiance of Charlottesville management, Wade 
informed one of the technicians that he was to be on 24-hour call, so it would 
be necessary for him to take the van to Datil each night, and that if anyone else 
wanted to ride with him that would be OK.143
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 Roberts and AUI President Jerry Tape succeeded in recruiting Ronald 
Ekers to serve as the first permanent director of VLA Operations. Ekers was 
then a Professor at the University of Groningen in The Netherlands, where he 
had established himself as an expert in radio interferometry. He had received 
his PhD in 1967 working at Parkes under John Bolton and Bart Bok, followed 
by three years at Caltech and then a year at the Cambridge Institute for 
Astrophysics with Fred Hoyle. Ekers had been a member of the NRAO VLA 
Advisory Committee and so was familiar with the VLA. Even a year earlier, he 
and Heeschen had discussed the possibility of Ekers coming to NRAO as the 
Director of VLA Operations. However, he had just returned from a year’s sab-
batical in Australia, and was obliged to return to Groningen, so was unable to 
accept without negotiating a “buy-out” with the University. Roberts was impa-
tient to remove Wade, and after returning from vacation, Wade found that he 
had been replaced by Peter Napier as the new VLA Acting Director. NRAO 
and the University of Groningen finally did work out a deal by which Ekers 
would spend part of his time in Groningen. Starting in October 1980, Ekers 
served as the VLA Director of Operations until February 1988, during which 
time he defined the VLA operation style, much of which continues to this 
day.144 After leaving NRAO, he became the first director of the Australia 
Telescope National Facility.
NRAO never received the level of funding planned for the effective opera-
tion of the VLA. As early as 1973, Ekers drew attention to the apparent inad-
equacy of the computer plans.145 In the early years, this resulted in inadequate 
computing power to deal with the growing amount of data and the increas-
ingly sophisticated techniques being developed for image processing. Although 
the power of CLEAN had already been demonstrated by Högbom (2003) in 
dealing with the poor u,v coverage from the GBI, it wasn’t clear if CLEAN 
would continue to be effective with the initially superior images obtained from 
the VLA with its better u,v coverage. Many early opponents of the VLA, espe-
cially those at Caltech, argued, correctly as it turned out, that the VLA was 
over-designed to meet the stated goals. However, the use of CLEAN (Högbom 
1974, 2003; Schwarz 1978; Clark 1980) and then self-calibration using the 
closure phase relations (Readhead and Wilkinson 1978; Cotton 1979), resulted 
in an instrument having very much greater power than originally planned. 
Moreover, the development of CLEAN, maximum-entropy, and self- calibration 
enabled the VLA to produce tens or even hundreds of images per day instead 
of the planned two or three. All of this combined to greatly increase the com-
puting demands. Initially, the available computing power at the site was inad-
equate to fully exploit these computationally intensive algorithms, and NRAO 
was criticized for not providing adequate computing power to support the 
VLA. Heeschen later commented (Tucker and Tucker 1986, p. 31),
The expectations of what people would do with the VLA increased tremendously 
between the time we first submitted the proposal and the time we eventually 
began building it. … The techniques that are used today didn’t exist at all in the 
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sixties. … These procedures are extremely valuable, but they increase the data- 
processing requirements by orders of magnitude. When we first designed the 
computer, we thought it was adequate for what we then thought the thing would 
do. But, in the interim, so much happened that we simply couldn’t afford.
Heeschen resisted the temptation to ask for the additional funds that would 
have enabled the earlier full exploitation of the VLA, particularly for spectro-
scopic observations. In January 1980, in order to keep up with the flow of 
data, use of the VLA was reduced to 50 percent of the available observing time, 
and full time observing was not restored until April 1981. Adequate comput-
ing power was arguably the single biggest constraint to the VLA scientific pro-
ductivity, and throughout the early 1980s NRAO struggled with the computing 
issue. The VLA Advisory Committee repeatedly urged NRAO to acquire more 
computing hardware and devote more resources to VLA software develop-
ment. The NRAO Computer Advisory Committee recommended a “long 
range plan based on astronomical requirement … flexible and growable com-
puter architecture … [requiring] a major new infusion of capital from the 
NSF.”146 Fortunately, however, the rapid development of relatively inexpensive 
powerful work stations and then personal computers, along with adoption of 
the user-friendly Astronomical Image Processing System (AIPS) (Greisen 
1990, 1998)147 and other on-line documentation,148 mitigated the computing 
bottleneck and, ultimately, greatly contributed to the success of the 
VLA. Combined with the increasing availability of powerful, yet inexpensive 
work stations, AIPS made it possible for the users to reduce their VLA data at 
their home institution, thus relieving NRAO of the need to provide a major 
computing center.
Initially, computing resources were so limited that users were normally 
restricted to making images no larger than 256 x 256 pixels, and needed to 
specifically request permission if they wanted to make larger images. Although 
VLA image processing was initially restricted by the limited computing power 
available, if NRAO had instead chosen what many argued was a more cost 
effective optical image processing, it would have excluded the use of CLEAN 
and self-calibration, which would probably have restricted the VLA imaging 
capability to that proposed in 1967.
As mentioned, with the growing use of inexpensive powerful computers, the 
data processing was no longer an issue, but with time the VLA hardware 
became outdated. Other components of the VLA such as the power cables and 
surplus railroad ties were deteriorating at an alarming rate. Because the 
A-configuration makes up 70 percent of the VLA’s baseline, the high cost of 
replacing so many railway ties and power cables threatened the continued oper-
ation in A-configuration.149 Between 1984 and 1986, NRAO added simple 
uncooled 327 MHz (92 cm) receivers to the prime focus. But until the 2001 
EVLA project (Sect. 7.8), the only major VLA improvement came about from 
an agreement with NASA to provide observing time on the VLA to download 
images from the Voyager spacecraft at the time of its encounter with Neptune 
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in August 1989. To optimize the VLA sensitivity, NASA provided funds for 
NRAO to construct state-of-the-art receivers at 8.4 GHz, which for a long 
time remained the most sensitive VLA receiving band. Since support of the 
Voyager encounter required a higher level of reliability than normal radio 
astronomy observations, NRAO convinced NASA to provide sufficient fund-
ing to also replace the backup power generators, deteriorating railway ties, and 
power cables supporting the inner configurations.
As discussed in Chap. 8, the decision to co-locate the VLBA Operations 
Center in Socorro together with the VLA Operations necessitated moving 
many of the VLA activities to a new Array Operations Center on the New 
Mexico Tech Socorro campus, which opened in December 1987.
Impact of the VLA The VLA was not only completed on schedule and within 
budget, but in nearly every respect—sensitivity, resolution, image quality, 
speed, number of frequency bands, spectroscopic capability, field-of-view—it 
far exceeded its design goals. As described by Heeschen (1981), the VLA
was motivated by a clearly perceived need, in the early 1960s, for an image form-
ing instrument of the greatest feasible resolution, sensitivity and general versatil-
ity. While its designers were most strongly influenced by the opportunities and 
problems presented by extragalactic radio sources, the need for such an instru-
ment was apparent in all areas of radio astronomy, and the VLA was in fact 
designed to be used for almost all kinds of radio astronomy studies.
He went on to point out that
The VLA has 10 to 100 times greater resolution and sensitivity than any other 
existing radio telescope, and its resolution is comparable to or greater than that 
obtainable at optical and other wavelengths. Its speed, sky cover, ability to mea-
sure polarization, and ability to make high frequency, high resolution spectro-
scopic observations give it tremendous power and versatility for a wide variety 
of problems.
Perhaps the biggest change brought about by the VLA was that, prior to the 
VLA, radio astronomy was pretty much a “black belt” experience confined to 
those with training or experience in radio astronomy. NRAO users were 
expected to do their own calibration and analysis. Student use generally 
required attentive support from a faculty or in some cases an NRAO staff advi-
sor. The power and complexity of the VLA led NRAO to provide more hands-
 on support for users, which, in turn, began to attract a broader group of 
astronomers who needed radio data to enhance their research program.150
To support the growing user community, and especially to train the new 
generation of scientists who would use the VLA, NRAO started the very suc-
cessful series of synthesis imaging workshops. The first workshop held in 
Socorro in June 1982 was attended by 85 scientists and students (Thompson 
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and D’Addario 1982) and was followed by similar workshops held every two 
or three years.
An unanticipated use of the VLA developed when NRAO received two sep-
arate proposals to use the VLA for sky surveys intended to detect and catalogue 
an unprecedented number of discrete radio sources. One proposal was from an 
internal group led by Jim Condon, who proposed an “all-sky” survey with a 
resolution of the order of an arcmin to detect the nearly two million radio 
sources stronger than 2.5 mJy. A competing proposal came from a group led 
by Robert Becker from the University of California, Davis, proposing a deeper, 
higher resolution survey that would reach sources as faint as 1 mJy, but only 
covered the limited area of the sky corresponding to the Sloan Digital Sky 
Survey (SDSS) (York et al. 2000). With the higher angular resolution, the pro-
posed Becker survey would give more accurate source positions needed for 
optical identification with SDSS counterparts, as well as imaging the arcsec 
structure of detected radio sources. However, unlike the NRAO survey, it 
would be insensitive to larger scale radio emission. The two proposed surveys 
were not only in competition, but each wanted thousands of hours observing 
time. The NRAO Director, Paul Vanden Bout, polled the user community, 
who were mostly supportive of the two proposals, so he appointed a small 
internal committee chaired by Frazer Owen to make a recommendation on 
choosing which proposal to approve. Recognizing the complementarity of the 
two projects, Owen’s committee recommended that they both be approved. 
But once the observing began, other users, including those who supported the 
idea of big projects, complained that they were taking up too much 
observing time.
The two projects were each completed, but to minimize the impact to other 
observers, each was stretched out over a number of years. Both the Condon 
et al. (1998) NRAO VLA Sky Survey (NVSS) and the Becker et al. (1995) 
Faint Images of the Radio Sky at Twenty Centimeter (FIRST) were enor-
mously successful resources for the astronomy community, each receiving 
thousands of citations. To help resolve any future quandaries between the mer-
its of large proposals and their impact to other programs, Vanden Bout con-
vened a “Large Proposal Review Committee” chaired by NRAO staff member 
Alan Bridle.
The VLA has also helped to propel radio astronomy into the popular media, 
appearing in several movies and numerous TV ads. The popular movie Contact 
brought particular attention to the VLA, although it gave a misleading impres-
sion that the VLA is used to search for signals from extraterrestrial intelligent 
civilizations. Images of the VLA appear frequently in TV advertisements, 
although mostly for products and services unrelated to radio astronomy.
The impact of the VLA was not all positive. Faced with limited operating 
budgets, the NSF could not support the expensive VLA operations at the same 
time as the many more modest university-operated facilities. Funding was cut 
for the Owens Valley Observatory interferometer, where many of the tech-
niques used at the VLA had been developed and where many of NRAO staff 
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that built the VLA were trained. Only modest support remained for operating 
the OVRO 130 foot antennas as an element of the US VLBI Network (Chap. 
8). The five-element interferometer built by Ron Bracewell at Stanford 
University with NSF funds was closed soon after it was completed. A novel low 
frequency array built by Bill Erickson in the Southern California desert lost 
most of its NSF support. American radio astronomers and their students were 
more and more driven to the national observatory facilities operated by NRAO 
and NAIC. The reduction of the once vibrant university radio astronomy 
groups restricted the training of the next generation of technically-skilled 
observers, further increasing the pressure on NRAO to provide a turn-key 
observing opportunity at all of its facilities.
7.8  the karL g. Jansky Very Large array (JVLa)
The VLA has arguably been the most productive ground-based telescope ever 
built, certainly the most productive radio telescope (Trimble and Ceja 2008), 
and has more than lived up to Dave Heeschen and NRAO’s expectations. 
Although conceived primarily for extragalactic continuum research, the VLA 
has been used to study essentially all fields of astronomy from the Sun and Solar 
System bodies to a wide range of galactic and extragalactic phenomena. A par-
ticular surprise has been the large fraction of time spent studying the radio 
emission from stars, an area not even mentioned in the 1965 VLA Report No. 
1. Spectroscopic studies, which were mentioned only in passing in the 1967 
proposal, have typically represented about one-third of the VLA observing 
time. As noted by Trimble and Zaich (2006),
The VLA [is] responsible for 22% of the papers and 27 percent of the citations [in 
radio astronomy]. The VLA is, therefore, proportionally even more influential in 
world radio astronomy than HST is in world optical astronomy.
When built in the 1970s, the VLA receivers, waveguide transmission, and 
digital correlator were all state-of-the-art. However, the limited funding made 
available for VLA operations, combined with the rapid advances in technology, 
meant that only two decades after its dedication the VLA instrumentation was 
becoming woefully obsolete. Moreover, the great changes in astronomy over 
the last few decades of the twentieth century led to new demands for better 
sensitivity and image quality as well as improved spectral and angular resolu-
tion.151 Responding to these forces, in May 2000 NRAO/AUI submitted a 
proposal to the NSF to increase the sensitivity of the VLA by up to an order of 
magnitude, provide better frequency coverage, and greatly improved spectro-
scopic capability.152 NRAO intended this to be just the first phase of the VLA 
upgrade, but the Phase II proposal153 to “expand” the VLA by adding addi-
tional antennas, was never funded, although the name “Expanded Very Large 
Array” (EVLA) stuck, at least throughout the construction period. Following 
review by the NSF, the EVLA Phase I project was partially funded through an 
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increment to the NRAO operating budget rather than through the Major 
Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC) budget, but about 
half of the $96 million cost of the EVLA was born by the base VLA operating 
budget. Additional funding came from in-kind contributions from the Consejo 
Nacional de Ciencia y Technologia (CONACyT)154 of Mexico, and from the 
Canadian National Research Council for the WIDAR (Wide-band 
Interferometer Digital ARchitecture) correlator. The Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with Canada was far reaching and established the 
North American Program in Radio Astronomy (NAPRA) which, in return for 
the Canadian WIDAR correlator, gave Canadian scientists the same access as 
US scientists to all NRAO facilities. The NAPRA agreement included Canadian 
participation in ALMA as well as joint NRAO-Canadian efforts toward the 
SKA development.155
Upgrading the VLA instrumentation began in 2001 and was completed a 
decade later. A particularly challenging aspect was the stated goal of keeping 
the VLA in operation throughout the decade-long EVLA construction period, 
which meant simultaneously operating combinations of old and upgraded 
antennas with first the old and then the new correlator. Except for a seven- 
week period in 2010 when the old VLA correlator was replaced by the new 
one, the VLA remained in operation during the entire 10 years of construction. 
The upgraded VLA, which was dedicated on 31 March 2012, was given a new 
name, the Karl G. Jansky Very Large Array (JVLA), replacing the term “EVLA,” 
which has since been redefined to refer to the construction project and not the 
instrument (Fig. 7.13).
The JVLA has complete frequency coverage across the entire band from 1 
to 50 GHz provided by eight feeds and receivers at the secondary focus. A 
ninth receiving band at the prime focus covers the range from 50 to 450 MHz 
with reduced sensitivity. The front end systems are based on cooled HEMT 
amplifiers and corrugated feed horns, while the local oscillator is derived from 
a hydrogen maser frequency standard, and distributed via fiber to each of the 
27 antennas. The IF signals are digitized at the antenna and sent by fiber to the 
new WIDAR correlator, designed by Brent Carlson from Canada. The WIDAR 
combines the data on each of the 351 interferometer baselines at up to 1015 32 
bit operations per second to give up to four million frequency channels, or, for 
continuum studies, up to 8 GHz total bandwidth in each of two polarizations. 
More detailed descriptions of the JVLA are given by Perley et al. (2009, 2011). 
The basic performance parameters of the JVLA are shown in Table 7.1 com-
pared with the 1967 proposal, what was achieved in 1980 at the end of VLA 
construction, and in 1986 after various hardware and software upgrades.
The JVLA reaches unprecedented levels of sensitivity extending to below 1 
μJy in a 12 hour integration. But with the improved sensitivity and larger band-
widths came the need for better interference suppression and improved 
dynamic range in order to reach the thermal sensitivity limits of the array in 
long integrations. New imaging algorithms and new software needed to meet 
these challenges was implemented both within AIPS (Greisen 1990) as well as 
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Fig. 7.13 Karl G. Jansky Very Large Array rededication, 31 March 2012. Center: The 
JVLA in D array. Top: Attendees at the rededication ceremony. Lower right: NRAO 
Director Fred Lo (standing) initiates the start of first official Jansky VLA observation. 
Seated behind Lo are Ethan Schreier, AUI President, and James Ulvestad, NSF 
Astronomical Sciences Division Director. Lower left: Anne Moreau Jansky Parsons, 
daughter of Karl Jansky. Credit: D. Fiinley/NRAO/AUI/NSF
Table 7.1  VLA performance
Parameter 1967 1980 2000 2011 JVLA
Resolution (arcsec) 1 0.1 0.04 0.04
Sensitivity (μJy) 300 50 10 1.5
Dynamic Range 100 1000 100,000 200,000
Field of View (arcmin) 1 to 10 1 to 30 1 to 300 1 to 300
No. λ Bands 2 4 6 1–40 GHz 
continuous
Shortest Wavelength (cm) 11 1.3 1.3 0.7
Declination Range −20° to +90° −40° to +90° −40° to +90° −40° to +90°
Speed (images/day) 3 100 200 20,000
No. Freq. channels none 256 512 4 × 106
Map Size (pixels) 100 × 100 512 × 512 4096 × 4096 4096 × 4096
Notes: The first three columns are adopted from Ekers’ 1987 report on the First Seven Years of VLA Operations (Ekers 
1987, op. cit.) and the final column from Perley et al. (2011). The values given for the sensitivity represent the 3σ 
detection level from a 12 hour synthesis image. The specification of the dynamic range is a bit subjective as it depends 
in part on the complexity of the field being imaged. The number of images per day given for the JVLA is based on the 
number of independent fields observed in the NRAO VLA Sky Survey using a scan rate of 3.31 arcmin/sec
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CASA (Common Astronomical Software Application) (McMullin et al. 2007). 
Although data analysis, especially from the first few years of the JVLA, was 
rather labor intensive, the publication of a special issue of the Astrophysical 
Journal Letters in 2011 (Vol. 739), demonstrated the already wide range of 
possible research and the enormous potential of the JVLA for new 
discoveries.156
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CHAPTER 8
VLBI and the Very Long Baseline Array
Beginning in the 1950s radio interferometers and arrays of antennas were con-
nected by cable, waveguide, or radio links separated by up to a hundred kilo-
meters or more. Starting in 1967, radio astronomers in the US and Canada 
began to experiment with independent local oscillators and broad band tape 
recorders to record data collected by widely separated antennas, a technique 
which came to be known as Very Long Baseline Interferometry or VLBI. Using 
radio telescopes spread throughout the United States, Australia, and Europe, 
VLBI baselines were increased to thousands of kilometers, and ultimately to 
space, with baselines ranging out to hundreds of thousands of kilometers.
Within the United States, the informal US VLBI Network initially managed 
the complex logistics of organizing simultaneous observations by many radio 
telescopes, each with their own management and their own scientific programs. 
European radio astronomers later organized the European VLBI Network 
(EVN). The non-optimum location of the antennas being used for VLBI and 
the difficulty of scheduling observations flexibly led NRAO to construct the 
Very Long Baseline Array (VLBA), consisting of ten 25 meter diameter anten-
nas spread throughout the United States from St. Croix in the US Virgin 
Islands to Hawaii. With an angular resolution as good as 0.0001 arcsec, the 
VLBA was the highest angular resolution telescope in the world. Observations 
with the VLBA have revealed the nature of jets ejected from the supermassive 
black holes found in quasars, shown the structure of cosmic masers associated 
with the birth and death of stars, determined the expansion rate of the Universe 
independent of the traditional cosmic ladder, measured the rotation of the 
Milky Way, and determined with great precision the relativistic bending of 
radio waves.
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8.1  Independent-OscIllatOr- 
tape-recOrdIng InterferOmetry1
With its overall dimensions of 35 km, the Very Large Array (VLA) at the time 
represented about the longest practical interferometer baseline with direct 
electrical connections. As early as the 1950s and 1960s radio astronomers at 
Jodrell Bank, led by Henry Palmer, began to experiment with radio links to 
provide a common frequency reference and to return the data from a remote 
antenna to Jodrell Bank, where they were correlated with data from the Jodrell 
Bank 250 foot antenna. In a series of elegant observations, they gradually 
extended their interferometer out to baselines of 115 km to show that some 
radio sources were smaller than an arcsec (Allen et al. 1962). Later the Jodrell 
Bank radio astronomers teamed up with a group at the Malvern Royal Radar 
Establishment to link two antennas separated by 127 km. Observing at wave-
lengths as short as 6 cm, Palmer et al. (1967) were able to demonstrate that 
some radio sources were as small as 0.05 arcsec. The Jodrell Bank to Malvern 
radio link involved two repeater stations. Extension to longer baselines was 
impractical or at best would exceed radio observatory budgets.
However, motivated by the Jodrell Bank results, the rapid variability of radio 
quasars,2 the observation of low frequency cutoffs in the quasar radio spectra,3 
and observations of interplanetary scintillations,4 several radio astronomy 
groups around the world had begun to think about further extending interfer-
ometer baselines using atomic frequency standards as independent oscillators 
and high speed (broad bandwidth) tape recorders to record the data at each 
end of the interferometer for later playback and correlation.
Early VLBI Development The first serious discussions of independent-oscillator- 
tape-recorder-interferometry apparently took place in Moscow in early 1962 
(Matveyenko et al. 1965). Realizing the potential applications of this powerful 
technique, the Russian scientists wanted to publish and patent their ideas, but 
were thwarted by Soviet bureaucracy and secrecy (Matveyenko 2013). The fol-
lowing year, during Jodrell Bank Director Bernard Lovell’s visit to the USSR, 
Leonid Matveyenko discussed the possibility of doing interferometry between 
Jodrell Bank and the USSR. However, neither Jodrell Bank nor the Russians 
were able to develop or obtain the needed instrumentation, and nothing 
resulted from these discussions. Matveyenko, Nikolai Kardashev, and Gennady 
Sholomitsky (1965) were finally able to publish their paper, but they wrongly 
concluded that the sensitivity depended inversely on the interferometer base-
line length because they incorrectly assumed that integration times were lim-
ited by the natural fringe rate.
VLBI became a practicality as a result of three key technical advances: preci-
sion atomic clocks to provide precise time and frequency,5 high speed tape 
recorders capable of recording the broad bandwidths needed to obtain ade-
quate interferometer sensitivity,6 and fast digital computers to correlate the 
data, all of which became commercially available in the mid-1960s. Starting in 
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1965, unaware of the Soviet work, two groups, one in Canada and one in the 
United States, began to develop a VLBI capability. The Canadian group used 
analog-type tape recorders, which had just become popular in the TV industry, 
to record a 1 MHz IF bandwidth. The observing frequency was 448 MHz 
(67 cm), and time synchronization was facilitated by simultaneously recording 
timing data on the audio track. In order to compensate for any timing uncer-
tainties, the speed of one of the playback systems was adjusted until the appear-
ance of interference fringes signaled proper time alignment.7
The NRAO program was initiated by NRAO scientists Barry Clark and Ken 
Kellermann, who were joined by Professor Marshall Cohen from Cornell and 
David (Dave) Jauncey, a Cornell postdoc who had just arrived at Cornell from 
Australia as part of the new Cornell-Sydney University Astronomy Center. 
After informal discussions between Cohen and Kellermann in August 1965, 
the following month Kellermann approached NRAO Director David Heeschen 
about possible funding to develop a tape-recording independent-oscillator 
interferometer. When asked about the cost, Kellermann was caught off guard 
as he and Cohen had not really thought about cost, so he threw out a guessti-
mate of $100,000. After a brief pause to check the status of the NRAO budget, 
Heeschen responded with, “Will $50,000 be enough until the end of the 
year?” That was it! No proposal. No review committee. No debates within 
NRAO or discussions with the radio astronomy community. Work could begin 
immediately. A few days later, however, perhaps perceiving that this might 
become a big enterprise, or perhaps just wanting to cover himself in case it was 
a failure, Heeschen asked for a short written proposal which was quickly pro-
duced.8 An equally brief proposal was submitted to Cornell which shared in the 
development costs.9 Heeschen’s formal request to the NSF to include 
$100,000 in the budget for “an independent local oscillator interferometer” 
came six months later.10
The NRAO group chose to use digital rather than analog recordings. The 
sensitivity of a digital interferometer depends on the number of bits recorded 
and correlated. This, in turn, is proportional to the product of the observing 
time and the bandwidth (bit rate). The length of the integration time is limited 
by the coherence of the independent local oscillators or the atmosphere and 
ionosphere. Since each bit is recorded at a precise time determined by an 
atomic clock, the digital recording is self-clocking which reduces the need for 
precise stability of the record-playback system. The data are then precisely 
aligned in time in the playback computer. By storing and shifting the data bits, 
it was easy to examine a range of time alignments to compensate for any uncer-
tain timing or antenna location. In order to minimize development costs and 
to be able to do the correlation in a general purpose computer, NRAO used 
standard computer reel-to-reel tape drives to record one-bit digital data at 
720 kilobits per second (kbps) appropriate to sampling a 360 kHz bandwidth 
at the Nyquist sampling rate.11 Each 12-inch reel of tape lasted about three 
minutes, and it took about an hour to correlate each pair of tapes in the NRAO 
IBM 360/50 computer.
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To optimize the sensitivity and to compensate for the necessarily narrow 
bandwidth which was limited by the recording system, the NRAO-Cornell 
team planned to use the 1000 foot Arecibo radio telescope at one end of the 
interferometer baseline and the newly completed Green Bank 140 Foot 
Telescope at the other. Claude Bare from the NRAO Electronics Division 
joined the team to provide engineering support. The commercially available 
Hewlett Packard HP 5065A Rubidium standard (Fig. 8.1) was used as the time 
and frequency reference.12 Considering the advertised frequency stability of 
one part in 1011, NRAO felt that this would be adequate for operation at 
611 MHz (50 cm) for integration times up to a few hundred seconds. At the 
time, this was also the highest frequency where the Arecibo telescope was 
operating.
Two approaches were considered to synchronize the separate clocks at each 
end of the interferometer. The most straightforward method was to first bring 
a running clock to Washington by car, where it was synchronized with the US 
master clock at the US Naval Observatory (USNO), and then driven to Green 
Bank where it would be synchronized with a second clock, which would then 
be carried by car or by commercial airline to the other end of the interferom-
eter baseline. Since transporting clocks more than a few hundred miles was 
impractical, the NRAO group also used the 100  kHz LORAN C stations 
located along the east coast of the United States and at several offshore 
European sites. Each LORAN C station broadcast a characteristic time code 
Fig. 8.1 Hewlett-Packard Model 5065A Rubidium frequency standard and power 
supply used to maintain time and to determine the local oscillator frequency for the 
early NRAO VLBI experiments. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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that was synchronized with the USNO master clock.13 At nighttime when ion-
ospheric disturbances were low, the timing signals could be measured with an 
accuracy of a few microseconds.
Serious development work at NRAO began in late 1965 with the design of 
the recording hardware by Claude Bare and the correlator software by Barry 
Clark. A friendly rivalry developed between the NRAO and Canadian groups, 
with frequent telephone exchanges reporting successes and problems. As 
described by Norman Broten (1988),
During all of this time Kellermann and I had stayed in touch. It was a remarkably 
friendly competition between the two teams striving to be the first to use success-
fully tape-linked interferometry. Scarcely a week would go by without the phone 
ringing, either in Ottawa or at Green Bank, to keep both teams abreast of each 
other’s progress. … Later in the experiment the response to a telephone call 
would be “Got any fringes yet?”
All of the US participants were, at the same time, involved in other projects. 
Bare was responsible for supporting other Green Bank digital systems; Clark, 
Cohen, Jauncey, and Kellermann all were pursuing various observational pro-
grams, and Clark was busy with the VLA design (Chap. 7). Probably the proj-
ect did not proceed as fast as might have been possible, but following successful 
bench tests in October 1966, NRAO sent one of the recording terminals to 
Arecibo for the first observations. Jack Cochran, then an NRAO technician, 
traveled to Puerto Rico to install and operate the equipment. Somehow Pan 
American Airlines lost track of the shipment, which was finally inexplicably 
traced to a warehouse in Baltimore. Tired of waiting, Cochran had returned to 
Green Bank to spend the Thanksgiving holidays with his family.
Following Cochran’s return to Puerto Rico, the first observations between 
Green Bank and Arecibo were finally made in January 1967, but were unsuc-
cessful. There were no interference fringes observed. A second experiment in 
February was equally unproductive, and it was never clear what was wrong 
with either set of those first observations with Arecibo. All of the equipment 
was returned to Green Bank to be carefully checked. On the night of 5–6 
March 1967, the NRAO group ran a successful test on a 650 meter baseline 
between the 140 Foot Telescope and one of the 85 foot antennas of the Green 
Bank Interferometer. Interference fringes were readily found the next day after 
correlation on the Charlottesville IBM 360/50 computer.
The first successful observation using well-separated antennas was on 8 May 
1967, again using one of the Green Bank 85 foot antennas and the Naval 
Research Laboratory 85 foot antenna at Maryland Point (Fig. 8.2), a distance 
of 220 km or 460,000 wavelengths at 610 MHz (Bare et  al. 1967). Three 
sources, 3C 273, 3C 286, and 3C 287, were unresolved and demonstrated that 
the system worked as expected. However, considering the relatively long wave-
length, the resolution was no better than had been previously obtained by the 
Jodrell Bank-Malvern radio linked interferometer at 6 cm (Palmer et al. 1967). 
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Probably the first successful VLBI observations of real astrophysical interest 
was by the Canadian group using a 3074  km transcontinental baseline at 
448 MHz (67 cm) between the Algonquin Park 150 foot radio telescope and 
a 25 meter antenna located at Penticton, British Columbia. These observations 
were made on 13 April 1967, nearly a month before the Green Bank-Maryland 
Point observations, but they were not able to successfully correlate the data 
until 21 May, a few weeks after the US data were correlated. The Canadian 
observations directly demonstrated that several quasars were less than a few 
hundredths of an arcsec in diameter. Both groups reported their results at the 
August 1967 URSI General Assembly held in Montreal.
Meanwhile, an MIT/Haystack group was using a radio-linked interferom-
eter on a 13.4 km baseline between the Millstone Hill 84 foot antenna and the 
Agassiz 60 foot radio telescopes to show that OH maser sources appeared 
unresolved with angular dimensions less than a few arcsecs (Moran et  al. 
1967a). These maser sources were highly variable and so were expected to be 
very small. In June 1967, the MIT/Haystack group joined forces with the 
NRAO/Cornell group to observe both quasars and OH masers on a 845 km 
baseline between the Haystack 120 foot radio telescope and the Green Bank 
Fig. 8.2 NRL 85 foot radio telescope at Maryland Point, used together with the 
Howard Tatel 85 Foot telescope in Green Bank for the first successful NRAO VLBI 
observation. Credit: NRL
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140 Foot Telescope. These observations showed that both quasars (Clark et al. 
1968a) and 1.7 GHz OH masers (Moran et al. 1967b) had angular structures 
less than a few hundredths of an arcsec.
In August 1967, both the MIT/Haystack and NRAO/Cornell groups used 
the 85 foot radio telescope at the University of California Hat Creek 
Observatory together with the Green Bank 140 Foot Telescope to extend the 
interferometer baseline to 3500 km to demonstrate structures on scales less 
than 0.01 arcsec (Clark et al. 1968b; Moran et al. 1968). Also in August, the 
Green Bank-Arecibo baseline finally gave results at 611 MHz (Jauncey et al. 
1970). The next step was to go to shorter wavelengths, but negotiations with 
the University of California to install a 6 cm receiver on the Hat Creek Telescope 
fell through. Coincidently, at about the same time, Olaf Rydbeck, head of the 
radio astronomy program at the Swedish Onsala Space Observatory, was asking 
his former student, Hein Hvatum, how they could get into VLBI. An observa-
tional program was quickly formulated, and recorders and clocks were shipped 
to Sweden for a January 1968 experiment at both 6 and 18 cm. The Green 
Bank-Sweden baseline was 6319 km long, and showed that some quasars and 
active galactic nuclei (AGN) were smaller than one thousandth of an arcsec. 
This was the highest angular resolution ever obtained for any astronomical 
observation; indeed, probably for any measurement. One thousandth of an 
arcsec is equivalent to reading ordinary newsprint at a distance of 100 miles.
These were exciting times for the NRAO VLBI group, who shipped or car-
ried tape recorders, receivers, atomic clocks, and many pounds of magnetic 
tape to radio observatories around the world. Within a year, interferometer 
baselines had increased to intercontinental distances and the angular resolution 
to better than one thousandth of an arcsec. Although the principles were 
straight forward, there were enormous technical and logistical challenges to 
obtaining agreements to use antennas at observatories that may have been 
scheduled for other programs, shipping materials and supplies, synchronizing 
clocks, and dealing with failed atomic clock batteries, as well as building and 
installing new, often untested equipment at unfamiliar observatories. Anything 
that could go wrong, often did go wrong. Unlocked oscillators, time synchro-
nization errors as large as one second, crossed polarization, incorrect wiring, 
and wrong frequency settings were not uncommon, and any one such error 
would lead to no fringes, which generally wasn’t discovered until after the 
experiment was over.
The MK I14 VLBI System was used extensively from 1967 to 1971. 
Observing was very labor intensive. An experienced person could record, 
rewind, dismount, and mount a new tape in 12  minutes, but two or three 
observers were needed at each telescope to support a multi-day observing ses-
sion. On occasion, more tape would accidently end up on the floor than on the 
rewind reel. More than 100 tapes were recorded at each station in a single 
24 hour observing session. A three station experiment meant three baselines 
had to be correlated, one at a time; a four station experiment, six baselines. So 
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a single 24 hour experiment could mean 300–600 hours of playback at the 
NRAO IBM 360/50 in Charlottesville.
In 1966, Marshall Cohen left Cornell for the University of California San 
Diego, and two years later moved to Caltech, where he started a major VLBI 
program. Many of the later VLBI leaders were trained at Caltech as students or 
as postdoctoral fellows. Caltech operated a 360/75 machine that was able to 
correlate MK I VLBI tapes about five times faster than the NRAO 360/50, but 
the normal charges to use this facility to process VLBI tapes were prohibitive. 
Instead, Cohen was able to arrange to use time late at night at no charge, but 
only if he provided the personnel to run the machine and change tapes. 
Following the completion of the Caltech OVRO 130 foot radio telescope in 
1968, when it was no longer part of the proposed Owens Valley Array (Sect. 
7.2), the 130 foot became a workhorse for VLBI.
Meanwhile, the Canadian group continued their observations at 408 and 
448 MHz with a total of ten successful single baseline observations extending 
across Canada and to Jodrell Bank (Broten et al. 1969; Clarke et al. 1969). 
Many of the experiences and logistical problems encountered by the NRAO 
group were experienced as well by the Canadian VLBI observers (Broten 
1988). In particular, the Canadian group had replaced their studio TV record-
ers with the less reliable but more portable Ampex VR600 recorders (Sect. 8.4).
8.2  penetratIng the IrOn curtaIn
Following the 6 cm VLBI observations with baselines to Sweden (Kellermann 
et  al. 1968), VLBI had quickly reached a resolution of about 0.001  arcsec 
(1 milli-arcsec). Many sources, particularly quasars, still had unresolved fea-
tures. The longest baselines were already a significant fraction of the Earth’s 
diameter, so it was clear that the only way to further improve the angular reso-
lution would be to go to shorter wavelengths or to space, but the only radio 
telescopes outside the United States that could work at short centimeter wave-
lengths were located in the Soviet Union. Although this was during the depths 
of the Cold War, in February 1968, Marshall Cohen and one of the authors 
(KIK) boldly wrote to Viktor Vitkevich, a well-known leader of Soviet radio 
astronomy, suggesting a VLBI experiment between the NRAO 140 Foot 
Telescope and the Lebedev Physical Institute’s precision 22  meter antenna 
located at the Puschino Observatory near Moscow. Although both Cohen and 
Kellermann had previously met Vitkevich, they did not realistically expect that 
a US-USSR VLBI experiment involving the exchange of highly sensitive atomic 
clocks and high speed tape recorders would be feasible, so were not surprised 
when they initially received no response to their letter.
But to their pleasant surprise, after five months Vitkevich responded by tele-
gram, followed by a letter from his colleague Leonid Matveyenko, reporting 
that the proposed experiment had been approved by the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences. However, Matveyenko suggested that instead of using the 22 meter 
dish at Puschino, the program use the more precise 22 meter dish in Crimea. 
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Much later, NRAO learned that during the five month period before sending 
his response, Vitkevich, with the aid of the Soviet astrophysicist Iosef Shklovsky, 
had sought and gained approval not only from the USSR Academy of Sciences 
but also from the Soviet political and military authorities (Matveyenko 2013).
In spite of the Cold War tensions there were no objections from NRAO or 
the NSF to the proposed experiment, but NRAO first had to obtain an export 
license from the US Department of Commerce for all of the specialized equip-
ment that would be temporarily sent to the USSR, including a commercial 
atomic clock and a high speed computer tape recorder.15 There was an addi-
tional, potentially more serious military concern. VLBI observations are used 
by radio astronomers to investigate the size and structure of cosmic radio 
sources, but there are also a variety of terrestrial applications, including the 
precise determination of the Earth’s axis of rotation as well as the distance 
between the two antennas that form the interferometer. It was just these two 
quantities that are needed for the precise delivery of ICBMs. While the Soviet 
government had similar concerns, there was a curious asymmetry. Since accu-
rate US maps were publicly available, any American adversary could derive the 
distance from the Crimean radio telescope to any potential US target, such as 
the Pentagon, the White House, or a US based missile site. However, since 
maps of the USSR were not accessible to Americans, or to anyone outside of 
those who needed to know, there was no reciprocity. Indeed, it was widely 
recognized that even tourist maps of Moscow were deliberately distorted.
Clark and Kellermann were not surprised to receive a visit one day in Green 
Bank from two men who identified themselves as representing the US Defense 
Intelligence Agency. They wanted to know all the details of the proposed 
observations. It was clear from the questions asked that they were remarkably 
familiar with VLBI and what it could and could not do. They correctly noted 
that it would be easily possible for NRAO to corrupt the baseline and Earth 
rotation information without compromising the intended astronomical goals 
of the proposed experiment, but NRAO refused to take part in any such cha-
rade. In the end, it was agreed that since accurate global mapping was becom-
ing widely available from satellite imaging, there were really no security 
concerns as long as either Clark or Kellermann were present with the equip-
ment at all times. Rather, it appeared that the intelligence agencies on both 
sides recognized that there were no secrets in this business, but their goals were 
to not make it easy for the other side, and to not give away information.
Following a visit from two Russian scientists to Green Bank,16 the first 
observations were scheduled for October 1969 at both 2.8 and 6  cm. The 
ensuing program turned out to be a logistical challenge. All of the NRAO 
instrumentation and 25 cartons of magnetic tape were sent by air to Moscow, 
where it was supposed to be sent on to Crimea. However, the Russians claimed 
that the tape recorder was too big to fit into the cargo hold of a Russian jet, so 
arrangements had to be made to send it by train. But the recorder was also over 
the train weight limit, and required an appeal for a waiver from the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences. Telephone or telex communications between the USSR 
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and the US were at best unreliable. Calls had to be booked in advance, perhaps 
to give the intelligence agencies on both sides the opportunity to listen. Often 
one side or the other would be barely audible, and after a few minutes of yell-
ing, the connection would be broken.
The biggest problem concerned the synchronization of the atomic clock in 
Crimea with the one in Green Bank.17 Normally, VLBI observations made use 
of the extensive network of LORAN C stations established to facilitate naviga-
tion. Each LORAN C station broadcast accurate timing signals that were syn-
chronized by periodic visits from USNO personnel carrying an atomic clock 
that had been synchronized to the master clock at the US Naval Observatory 
in Washington. However, the LORAN C station in Turkey, just across the 
Black Sea from the Crimean radio telescope, had not yet been synchronized 
with Washington. The backup plan was to synchronize the clock in Leningrad 
using a LORAN C station in the Baltic Sea and to carry the running clock by 
plane to Crimea. But the American LORAN C transmissions were blocked by 
a powerful Soviet imitation. The Russian radio astronomers denied any knowl-
edge of any such Soviet transmission, but it later turned out that it was well 
known to the Swedish timekeeping service. Plan C involved shipping a running 
atomic clock from Sweden, recharging the batteries at the Leningrad Pulkova 
Observatory, and then flying it to Crimea. Since the batteries had died during 
the first flight from Leningrad to Crimea, the clock was returned to be resyn-
chronized. The running clock was then placed on the floor of the commercial 
flight along with a backup car battery. The American and Russian radio astron-
omers, equipped with their voltmeter, ran back and forth from their seats to 
check on the health of the battery during the flight. With hindsight it is hard 
to believe that the Soviet authorities allowed such activities, which might be 
compared with having Russian scientists playing with a lot of sensitive equip-
ment on an American flight from New York to Miami. 
The scheduled observations were split into two parts, with a gap of several 
weeks to allow time for the tapes to be correlated in Charlottesville. A few of 
the first tapes recorded in Crimea were hand carried to Moscow, but when it 
turned out to be difficult to arrange for them to be shipped by air freight to 
New York, they were just given to a PanAm pilot at the airport with instruc-
tions that they would be picked up by a colleague at New York’s Kennedy 
Airport. During the gap between the two observing sessions, the NRAO scien-
tists were taken on an escorted trip to Armenia and Uzbekistan. Many years 
later, it was learned that as soon as the Americans left Crimea on their trip, 
KGB engineers arrived to take careful notes and photographs of the sensitive 
US instrumentation.
After a few false starts, characteristic of the early VLBI experiments, the 
observations were successfully completed over the 8035 km long baseline and 
resulted in the then record angular resolution of 0.0004 arcsec, or only a few 
light-years at the distance of the quasar 3C 273 (Broderick et  al. 1970). 
Following the close of the marathon observing session, the Russian scientists 
insisted on celebrating the occasion with toasts to VLBI and to continued 
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Russian-American friendship. While the Americans were able to deal with the 
Russian beer and vodka, it was a challenge to keep up with the Russian hosts 
who downed shots of (nearly) pure (190 proof) alcohol washed down with 
beer (Fig. 8.3).
Two years later, a second experiment, this time at wavelengths as short as 
1.3 cm, using NRAO’s new MK II VLBI recording system gave another factor 
of two improvement in resolution (Burke et al. 1972). In subsequent years the 
Russian radio astronomers, led by Leonid Matveyenko, built their own MK II 
compatible recording and playback systems. Russia became a regular partici-
pant in global VLBI observations using a variety of radio telescopes located 
throughout the USSR, and in 2011 launched the very successful space VLBI 
mission, RadioAstron (Sect. 8.9), extending VLBI baselines to more than 
250,000 km in length.
It was only through the cooperation and support of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences, Aeroflot, and governments on both sides that it was possible to rise 
above the pervading culture to carry out one of the few scientific collaborations 
of that Cold War period that involved the exchange of sensitive instrumenta-
tion. Although there had been a long-time exchange program between the US 
and the Soviet Academies of Science, it was typically shrouded on both sides in 
suspicion of the visiting scientists. The support of the Soviet Academy and the 
US government to grant the needed export license was crucial, as the USSR 
VLBI experiments were perhaps unique in that they were initiated and 
Fig. 8.3 From left to right, Ivan Moiseev, John Payne, and Viktor Effanov celebrate 
the conclusion of the first US-USSR VLBI observations in October 1969. Seated is an 
unnamed member of the Crimean radio telescope staff. Credit: KIK/NRAO/AUI/
NSF
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 organized from the ground up by the participating scientists, with a minimum 
of government or even institutional involvement. 
The good will established by the 1969 joint experiment nearly evaporated 
when the return shipment of the atomic clock, tape recorder, state-of-the-art 
digital instrumentation, as well as 25 cartons of recorded computer tape, appar-
ently disappeared. As part of the agreement with the Commerce Department, 
NRAO had agreed that the Russians would return all of the American instru-
mentation immediately after the experiment was concluded. When the pur-
ported shipment apparently did not arrive in the US, NRAO followed with two 
weeks of frantic queries to PanAm and Aeroflot, along with a series of tele-
grams to the USSR with increasing concern and threats about the impact to 
future exchanges. To the embarrassment of NRAO, everything turned up in an 
Air France warehouse in New York where it had been sitting for two weeks. To 
avoid a repetition of this awkward situation after the 1971 experiment, the 
NRAO team was taken to the Moscow airport to witness the loading of the 
return shipment on an Aeroflot plane bound for New York. Sitting in the truck 
on the tarmac, as the plane left the ground, Matveyenko proudly informed the 
NRAO group, “Now it is your problem.”
8.3  faster than lIght
In October 1970, an MIT/Haystack group observed the strong quasars 3C 
273 and 3C 279 at 7840 MHz (3.8 cm) on a 3900 km baseline between the 
Haystack 120 foot antenna near Tyngsboro, MA and the NASA Deep Space 
Network Goldstone 210 foot dish near Barstow, CA (Knight et al. 1971). Both 
antennas used low noise maser amplifiers to give improved sensitivity over ear-
lier observations, as well as hydrogen maser frequency standards for improved 
phase stability. These observations, colloquially referred to as “Goldstack,” 
were not intended to study the structure of compact radio sources, but to mea-
sure the apparent change in the relative position of 3C 279 due to relativistic 
bending as it passed close to the Sun.18 Nevertheless, for the first time, the 
observed fringe amplitudes were of sufficient quality to show unambiguously 
that both sources contained at least two distinct components. The separation 
of the two components was accurately determined as only 0.005 arcsec.
Four months later, in February 1971, both Whitney et al. (1971) and Cohen 
et al. (1971) repeated the October observations using the same equipment. 
Cohen et al. observed 31 sources including 3C 273 and 3C 279. Irwin Shapiro 
had made the October 1970 results available to the NRAO-Caltech group, 
who wanted to see if there had been any changes in their structure since the 
Knight et al. observations made four months earlier.
By this time, Cohen had moved to Caltech, and he assigned third-year grad-
uate student David Shaffer19 the task of analyzing the data which had been 
correlated on the Caltech IBM 360/75.20 When Shaffer plotted the data, he 
was surprised to note that 3C 279 had changed in a manner reflecting an 
increase in the separation of the two components. Knowing the distance of 3C 
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279, Shaffer calculated the speed of separation to be three to four times the 
speed of light and burst into Cohen’s office to pronounce his discovery. The 
results for 3C 273 were less clear, but also indicated component motion greater 
than the speed of light, a phenomenon which came to be referred to as “super-
luminal motion.”
Although they were initially alarmed at this apparent violation of special 
relativity, Cohen et al. (1971) soon realized that superluminal motion had, in 
fact, been previously predicted by Martin Rees (1967). A long-standing prob-
lem of astrophysics was that the rapid variability of the powerful radio emission 
from quasars seemingly implied such small dimensions that they would rapidly 
self-destruct.21 However, Rees pointed out that if the radio source was expand-
ing or moving toward the observer at close to the velocity of light, the radia-
tion would be focused along the direction of motion and so appear to be more 
luminous than it was if the radiation were assumed to be isotropic. Moreover, 
since the source of radiation was nearly catching up to its own radiation, any 
changes in luminosity seen by a distant observer located nearly along the direc-
tion of motion would appear to happen in a shorter time span than the intrinsic 
change. Thus, the apparent velocity could be arbitrarily large.
Whitney et al. (1971) also noticed the apparent superluminal motion when 
comparing their data taken four months apart. Both groups presented their 
results at the 13–14 April 1971 Rumford Symposium (Rogers and Morrison 
1972) (Fig. 8.4). They considered alternate interpretations, including properly 
phased time variability in a set of stationary sources such as one observes on a 
Fig. 8.4 Members of the NRAO-Cornell, MIT-Haystack, and Canadian VLBI teams 
gathered in Boston in April 1971 to receive the Rumford Medal of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences. From the NRAO-Cornell team, Dave Jauncey is seated 
in the front row 2nd from the left, Marshall Cohen, 7th from left, and Ken Kellermann, 
9th from left. Barry Clark is standing in the rear center
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movie marquee, or a searchlight effect where stationary material is excited by a 
shock front moving at an oblique angle. Also, because the Goldstack observa-
tions covered only a limited part of the Fourier Transform plane, it would be 
possible to reproduce the limited data with a time variable, more complex, but 
stationary morphology. Interestingly, the near equal double structure of 3C 
279 observed in 1970/1971 has never been repeated. The actual structure of 
3C 279 is indeed much more complex than a simple double, and the early 
interpretation of superluminal motion based on the limited data then available 
was probably premature, but nevertheless has been confirmed by later more 
detailed imaging of radio sources and their kinematics (e.g., Lister et al. 2016). 
However, perhaps the biggest challenge to superluminal motion came from the 
small but persistent group of scientists who argued that quasars are closer than 
indicated by their large redshifts, and so the observed angular motion would 
correspond to a much slower linear velocity (e.g., Burbidge 1978). These argu-
ments continued for decades and only died when their proponents died.
8.4  advanced vlBI systems
The NRAO MK II VLBI System Although the NRAO digital VLBI system 
proved to be more reliable and easier to use than the Canadian analog system, 
there were several serious limitations. Tapes were expensive and only ran for 
three minutes, the tape drives were large and heavy and thus expensive to ship, 
and the narrow 360 kHz bandwidth limited the sensitivity. Processing time on 
general purpose computers was lengthy, which in some cases meant expensive. 
Nevertheless, compatible recording units were built at Haystack and used by 
CfA and NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) for a series of geodetic 
studies. Soon after the first successful experiments, under the leadership of 
Barry Clark, NRAO began the design of an advanced recording system referred 
to as the MK II VLBI system. The NRAO MK II system used the same por-
table Ampex VR660C helical scan TV recorder then in use by the Canadian 
VLBI group, but recorded digital instead of analog data. Each reel of two-inch 
wide tape lasted for three hours instead of the three minute MK I tapes, 
weighed only about 10 pounds, and recorded a 2 MHz bandwidth with one-
bit samples at 4 Mbps (Clark 1973). Initially seven record units were built by 
NRAO in cooperation with the Leach Corporation. Requiring only IF, 5 MHz, 
and a 1 pulse per second timing signals, the MK II units could be easily trans-
ported for temporary use at other observatories. By the end of 1976, 19 MK 
II units were in operation throughout the world either built by NRAO or built 
elsewhere following detailed designs made available by NRAO.
Allen Yen, one of the architects of the Canadian VLBI system, had advised 
NRAO against using the VR 660 recorder which the Canadians had found to 
be unreliable. Although the NRAO team anticipated that digital recordings 
would be more robust to timing irregularities or to imperfections in the tape 
itself, variations in the mechanical alignment among the different units used for 
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recording and playback led to difficulties in playback, with losses in synchroni-
zation and unacceptably high error rates. An elaborate set of interactive 
mechanical adjustments in the playback units required considerable experience 
and skill to successfully play back MK II tapes (Fig. 8.5). Moreover, the record-
ing problems were exacerbated by the use of government surplus tape, which 
turned out not be suitable for the VR 660 recorder. After years of frustration 
and unreliable observations, thousands of pounds of tape were buried in Green 
Bank. In 1976, at the suggestion of Yen, the record/playback units were 
replaced by the more reliable IVC 825 recorder that used one-inch wide tape. 
The IVC machines, manufactured by the International Video Corporation, 
proved to be more reliable than the VR 660s and required fewer adjustments 
on playback. But each reel of tape only lasted one hour, and playback errors 
were still a problem.
A major breakthrough occurred in the late 1970s with the introduction of 
the home Video Cassette Recorder (VCR). During the course of extended 
visits to NRAO, Caltech, and the Max-Planck-Institut für Radioastronomie 
(MPIfR) in Bonn, Germany, Yen developed remarkably inexpensive modifica-
tions which could be applied to consumer VCRs to record MK II compatible 
data. Each tape cost only a few dollars instead of a few hundred dollars, and 
could be inexpensively shipped by regular (customs-free) first class mail instead 
of the complex and costly air freight shipments required for the Ampex and 
Fig. 8.5 Mark II VLBI correlator at NRAO offices in Charlottesville. Two reels of 2 
inch wide tape are shown mounted on the VR660 video tape recorders. Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
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IVC tapes. With their simplicity, low cost, and wide-spread availability, dozens 
of MK II units were built and operated at radio observatories throughout the 
world, including Europe, Russia, China, South Africa, Brazil, and Australia. 
Global VLBI became a practicality, with some experiments using ten or more 
separate telescopes to obtain milli-arcsec images of unprecedented resolution 
and image quality.
Initially the MK II tapes were correlated one baseline at a time on a two- 
station correlator operated in Green Bank. Later the correlator was expanded 
to simultaneously play back tapes recorded at three telescopes and the spectro-
scopic capability was increased from 32 to 288 and finally 512 frequency chan-
nels. With the growing use of VLBI, the MK II correlator evolved from an 
experimental operation to an NRAO facility, and was moved from Green Bank 
to Charlottesville to enable easier access to visiting users. At first, VLBI inves-
tigators came to Charlottesville to operate the processor themselves, but with 
the growing demand for time and the complexity of the playback operation, 
trained operators provided support in the same manner as the NRAO telescope 
operators. As in the case for telescope users, NRAO helped to defray the cost 
of travel to Charlottesville, provided access to the NRAO computing facilities, 
and support for publication page charges. Other MK II correlators based on 
the NRAO processor were later built and put into operation in Germany, the 
USSR, and China for limited use by investigators in these countries.
Frustrated with the long delays at the NRAO correlator, Marshall Cohen 
and Arthur Niell of JPL built a two-station MK II processor at Caltech which 
was expanded to five stations in 1978. Later, in collaboration with JPL, Caltech 
built a large playback facility that allowed up to 16 MK II tapes to be simulta-
neously played back and correlated. The Caltech/JPL processor had no spec-
troscopic capability, but starting in 1986 it became the correlator of choice for 
multi-station MK II continuum observations (Cohen 2007).
The MIT/Haystack MK III VLBI System Not long after the first successful 
VLBI observations in 1967, NASA initiated an ambitious geodetic VLBI pro-
gram initially using a MK I compatible recording system. In order to obtain 
increased sensitivity, a new broadband record system, known as MK III, was 
developed at the Haystack Observatory with NASA funding (Rogers et  al. 
1983). Like the NRAO MK I and MK II VLBI systems, the MK III system 
recorded 1-bit Nyquist sampled data but used a Honeywell Model 96 multi-
track instrumentation recorder to simultaneously record up to 28 tracks each at 
up to 4 Mbps (2 MHz bandwidth) sustained rate, giving better than a five times 
improvement in sensitivity over the NRAO MK II system. Initially the tapes 
were all correlated in a special processor built at the Haystack Observatory, but 
other processors were later put into operation at the MPIfR and at Caltech/
JPL. However, with a tape speed of 135 inches per second, each 9200-foot-
long tape only held about 13 minutes worth of data. Since each reel of the one-
inch wide tape cost about $250, the astronomy community continued primarily 
to use the less sensitive and less expensive MK II system. Although as early as 
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1975 there were fully developed plans within NRAO to build a large MK III 
correlator in Charlottesville, there were never sufficient funds to begin any con-
struction. All MK III astronomy observations were correlated at Haystack, 
Caltech/JPL, or at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, and later at Bonn. 
Real Time VLBI Although the advances in magnetic tape recordings allowed 
improvements in VLBI data rates and sensitivity, the recordings were often 
defective, resulting in large playback errors. Moreover, shipping the large 
quantities of magnetic tape was both expensive and logistically demanding. 
International experiments had additional complications requiring customs 
clearance, sometimes accompanied by demands for tariffs. On one occasion, 
when clearing tapes being returned to the US after being recorded in Australia, 
the Los Angeles Airport customs officer wanted to collect import taxes, even 
though the tapes were owned by the NSF and had only been sent to Australia 
a few weeks earlier. Apparently, as he explained, now that the tapes contained 
data they were more valuable, and so were subject to import taxes. As he tried 
to explain, Hollywood movies that were filmed abroad were taxed, but it was 
the movie content, not the film that was taxed. Fortunately, in that particular 
instance, whether it was because he was told that the tapes only contained noise 
and no information, or whether he just tired of arguing with astronomers who 
clearly had no money, he gave up and cleared the shipment.
Even more important than the cost, inconvenience, and reliability of mag-
netic tape recordings, as previously discussed, any one of a number of errors in 
timing, polarization, or other technical malfunctions could ruin observations, 
and it might be weeks or months before the tapes were correlated and the fail-
ure recognized. Several approaches to suitable long-distance, broad- bandwidth, 
real time data links were considered, including a series of microwave radio 
links, late nighttime use of the national television network, and communica-
tions satellites, but all appeared prohibitively expensive. In 1976 and 1977, a 
team of US and Canadian radio astronomers were able to obtain time on the 
Canadian Communications Technology Satellite (CTS) (later named Hermes) 
for a series of real time VLBI Observations, first between the Green Bank 140 
Foot Telescope and the Algonquin Radio Observatory (ARO) 150 foot 
antenna, and later between OVRO and ARO (Yen et al. 1977). The CTS was 
a joint project of the Canadian Department of Communications and NASA, 
and was available at no cost for approved investigations.
The successful real-time CTS-based VLBI observations were made at 
10.7 GHz (2.8 cm) using a 10 MHz wide IF bandwidth (20 Mbps data rate, 
five times that of the MK II tape recording system). The one-bit IF data streams 
were time stamped based on timing signals from independent hydrogen maser 
clocks at each end and sent from Green Bank, via the geostationary CTS tran-
sponder, to ARO where they were correlated in real time. Because there was an 
approximately 0.25  second delay in the signal from Green Bank arriving at 
ARO, Benno Rayher at NRAO built a 0.27 second 5.5 million-bit delay line 
for the 20 Mbps ARO data stream. Small fluctuations in the data path length 
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were accommodated by the 64 channel (3.2 μsec) correlator built by Yen at the 
University of Toronto.
As with tape recording VLBI, the hydrogen masers also provided indepen-
dent coherent local oscillator reference signals. A later series of observations 
used the ANIK-B synchronous satellite to synchronize the local oscillators at 
two radio telescopes located in British Columbia, and the NRL radio telescope 
at Maryland Point, Maryland (Knowles et  al. 1981). These phase coherent 
observations were used to demonstrate the feasibility of geodetic, time syn-
chronization, and Earth rotation VLBI observations.
Between 1977 and 1980, European radio astronomers studied a real time 
link using the European Large Satellite (L-SAT) to distribute both data and 
local oscillator signals to European radio telescopes. However, their ESA spon-
sored investigation never progressed beyond the Phase A Study.22 Starting in 
2006, the EVN began to accept proposals for real time VLBI whereby the data 
are sent by fiber from the observing stations to JIVE for correlation, with data 
transmission costs supported by the European Commission. A similar capabil-
ity was demonstrated the following year in Australia. This so-called eVLBI has 
become increasingly popular for time-critical observations such as flaring AGN.
8.5  vlBI netwOrks
In order to determine radio source structure in any detail, simultaneous or near 
simultaneous observations over a range of baseline spacings and orientations 
are necessary. Under the leadership of Marshall Cohen, what had now become 
the NRAO-Caltech VLBI group arranged to use the 85 foot radio telescope at 
the Harvard Radio Astronomy Station near Fort Davis, TX to supplement the 
telescopes in Green Bank and at OVRO, as well as the telescopes in Sweden 
and later Effelsberg, Germany. In support of the Fort Davis VLBI observa-
tions, NRAO provided a MK II record system, frequency standard, and receiv-
ers for 2.8 and 6 centimeters.
The US VLBI Network As described in Sect. 8.1, the early VLBI observations 
were all organized by the scientific investigators. Each series of observations 
necessitated writing separate proposals to each observatory, innumerable phone 
calls to arrange for the common observing time at multiple telescopes, ship-
ping equipment and magnetic tapes, and arranging for people to travel to the 
telescopes to change tapes, to run the experiment, and then travel to 
Charlottesville to oversee the correlation of tapes. After the discovery of super-
luminal motion, the pressure for repeated observations to monitor radio source 
kinematics strained the available resources and personnel. The three-station 
VLBI correlator in Charlottesville required multiple playback passes to deal 
with the increasing number of four and five or more station observations, and 
was hopelessly backed up. Moreover, the record-playback system proved to be 
unreliable. At best, the multiple interactive adjustments needed to play back 
tapes recorded on different recorders required skill and patience; often play-
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back error rates were so bad that the data had to be discarded. At other times, 
it was not clear if a low measured amplitude was real or the result of record/
playback errors. Other issues included the lack of an antenna in the Midwest to 
complement the cluster of radio telescopes in the Northeast and in California, 
and the lack of antennas that worked well at short centimeter wavelengths.
In April 1974 NRAO held a meeting in Charlottesville to confront the 
mounting VLBI problems and to plan for the future. The 25 participants 
agreed that in principle a new dedicated array of properly located modern 
antennas, complete with standard instrumentation including hydrogen maser 
frequency standards, and a large central processing facility were needed to meet 
the increasing requirements of the growing VLBI community. Such an ambi-
tious program was clearly in the future, and a short term solution, even if not 
ideal, was needed to exploit the growing opportunities for VLBI research.
The group envisioned a three-phase program:
 1. Given the limited funds available, and recognizing the independent man-
agement of existing US radio observatories, the existing radio telescopes 
should be organized to the extent possible.
 2. A new antenna located in the Midwest should be built to fill in the “Midwest 
Gap” in baseline coverage.
 3. NRAO should pursue the design of a new array of antennas dedi-
cated for VLBI.
Over the next few years, a series of reports called “VLBI Network Studies” 
were written to address the three phases discussed in Green Bank.
 I. A VLBI Network Using Existing Telescopes (Cohen 1977)
 II. Interim Report on a New Antenna for the VLBI Network (Swenson 
et al. 1977)
 III. An Intercontinental Very Long Baseline Array (Kellermann 1977)
 IV. On the Geometry of the VLBI Network (Swenson 1977)
Interested scientists continued to meet to discuss the formation of a US 
VLBI Network in order to provide reliable, versatile, and convenient facilities 
for VLBI observations and to provide an organization to discuss VLBI prob-
lems of national interest (Cohen 1977). Cohen (2000) later recalled that he 
adopted the term “network” rather than “array” as the NSF objected to 
“array,” since NRAO was already building the VLA and the NSF was con-
cerned that Congress might wonder why radio astronomers needed two arrays. 
Five organizations, NRAO/Green Bank, MIT/Haystack, Harvard/Fort 
Davis, Caltech/OVRO, and the University of California/Hat Creek, each 
committed one week of coordinated observing time to VLBI every two 
months. The University of Illinois and the USNO agreed to make their tele-
scopes available at the Vermillion River and Maryland Point Observatories 
respectively. A Network Users Group (NUG) was organized to provide a single 
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source for receiving and refereeing proposals, to organize the distribution of 
magnetic tapes, and to coordinate the observations and correlation. The NUG, 
which included some 40 VLBI scientists, met regularly, usually in connection 
with the annual URSI meeting in Boulder, CO, and addressed many of the 
proposal and scheduling issues. The NUG also organized a Technical 
Committee to establish standards, but logistical and technical problems contin-
ued as the NUG had no power or funds to implement changes at the partici-
pating observatories, which each had their own priorities.
Volume IV (Swenson 1977) of the “VLBI Network Studies” series addressed 
the question of the so-called “Midwest Gap” in the array of existing antennas. 
Both the University of Illinois23 and the University of Iowa proposed to con-
struct a new Midwest antenna to plug the existing gap and to ultimately 
become the first antenna of a multi-element dedicated array. The proposals 
were supported by the NUG and were seriously considered by the NSF, but 
before funding became available the motivation for the Midwest telescope was 
overtaken by the VLBA.
In 1981, six groups, Caltech, Harvard-Smithsonian, MIT, University of 
California at Berkeley, University of Illinois, and University of Iowa, signed an 
MOU to form a VLBI Consortium with the goal of increasing the effectiveness 
of the Network by making observations more convenient and more reliable. 
For legal reasons connected with NRAO’s status as a national facility, NRAO 
did not initially join the Consortium, although at least one NRAO scientist 
participated in each Consortium meeting as an at-large member, and NRAO 
participated in all Network organized activities. In 1986 this arrangement was 
formalized when NRAO became an Associate Member of the VLBI Network 
Consortium. Each member contributed $2000 a year to the Consortium, 
which could then purchase recording media and arrange for their distribution 
among the observatories and the correlators at Caltech or NRAO,  set techni-
cal standards, and handle proposal reviewing and scheduling. Each observatory 
appointed a VLBI friend to help support in-absentia observing. No longer was 
it necessary for the observers to provide personnel at each telescope. With a 
single proposal, a small group, or even one person with a good scientific proj-
ect, could now get simultaneous observing time at all the radio telescopes 
operated by Consortium members.
The European VLBI Network (EVN) Starting with the 1968 and 1969 VLBI 
observations with Sweden and the Soviet Union, European radio observatories 
became increasingly involved in VLBI observations, generally using NRAO 
MK II recorders but on occasion borrowed MK III systems. The data were 
mostly correlated in Charlottesville at the NRAO MK II processor. In 1977 the 
MPIfR began an ambitious VLBI program with the construction of first a MK 
II and later a MK III playback system and, in August 1978, the MPIfR hosted 
a major international VLBI Symposium in Heidelberg, Germany, attended by 
about 100 scientists.
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Inspired by the US VLBI Network, and following a series of informal meet-
ings, in March 1980 the directors of five European radio observatories24 met in 
Bonn and agreed to create the European VLBI Network (EVN), and then in 
1984 created the more formal Consortium of European Radio Astronomy 
Institutes for Very Long Baseline Interferometry. The EVN formed a Program 
Committee to review proposals three times a year and to schedule VLBI obser-
vations every two months. A Technical Working Group (later Technical and 
Operations Group) specified standard observing frequencies, polarization stan-
dards, and data formats. As in the US, the EVN accepted proposals from any 
qualified scientists, including those with no European affiliation, and provided 
local support at the individual telescopes. Italy built two new radio telescopes 
dedicated to VLBI, one near Bologna and one in Sicily, and other radio tele-
scopes in UK were added to the EVN.
As the number of antennas involved in EVN observations increased, the 
three-station MPIfR MK II processor became oversubscribed due to the mul-
tiple passes required for each observation. Some of the larger MK II experi-
ments were processed at NRAO or Caltech, or, in the case of MK III 
observations, at Haystack. MPIfR built a three station MK III processor which 
was later expanded to five stations, but even this was inadequate to handle the 
growing number of multiple antenna observations, and priority was given to 
experiments involving MPIfR staff.
Following several unsuccessful attempts to fund a large European VLBI 
processor, in 1993 the Dutch government established the Joint Institute for 
VLBI in Europe (JIVE) in Dwingeloo to build and operate a 16 station MK III 
processor to support European VLBI observations. Richard Schilizzi was 
appointed the Director of JIVE. With the support of the EVN observatories, 
EVN observations have, since 1999, been processed at JIVE, which has devel-
oped into the center of VLBI research in Europe. In addition to its role in 
processing EVN observations, JIVE archives the correlated EVN data.
The EVN ultimately grew to more than 20 telescopes at 15 institutes in 12 
countries, including some in Africa, Asia, and North America. A unique feature 
of the EVN has been the series of well attended EVN Symposia and the EVN 
User Committee meetings, which started in 1993 and have been held every 
two years since 1994. These symposia, which are usually held in conjunction 
with one of the regular EVN Director’s meetings, have served to coalesce the 
European VLBI community and specifically to introduce new young scientists 
to VLBI opportunities. More detailed discussions of the EVN are given by 
Porcas (2010), Booth (2013, 2015), and Schilizzi (2015). 
Global VLBI To accommodate transatlantic observations, the EVN and NUG 
combined to schedule “Global” VLBI observations, which often also included 
radio telescopes elsewhere in the world. As many as 18 different antennas (e.g., 
Reid et al. 1989) were included in some of these global observations. In Japan, 
scientists began a VLBI program, partly motivated by geodetic interests rele-
vant to potential earthquake prediction. Other VLBI networks were initiated 
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in Australia, Korea, and China. In South Africa, a former NASA tracking 
antenna at Hartebeesthoek was given to the South African hosts and instru-
mented for VLBI. Initially, most global VLBI observatories used the simple 
and economical MK II record system, which was gradually replaced by MK III 
and later VLBA- compatible recording systems, although for a while Canada, 
Jodrell Bank, Australia, and Japan each continued to use their own incompat-
ible recording systems. 
8.6  plannIng the vlBa
The first discussions about building a dedicated Very Long Baseline Array 
(VLBA) began at NRAO in the summer of 1973.25 Shortly after the 1974 
meeting in Charlottesville, Dave Heeschen set up a “VLBA Design Group  to 
continue the development of the concept of a dedicated Intercontinental Array 
and to help upgrade the present activities in VLB Interferometry.”26 Following 
the Charlottesville meeting, Swenson and Kellermann (1975) discussed the 
status of VLBI and some early ideas about a dedicated VLBA. A more complete 
description of a ten element dedicated Intercontinental Very Long Baseline 
Array based on tape-recording interferometry was prepared at NRAO as a col-
laborative effort of NRAO and external scientists and engineers, especially 
those from Caltech and Haystack Observatory (Kellermann 1977). The NRAO 
report noted that in addition to addressing a wide range of astrophysical prob-
lems, the proposed array could be used for precise tests of General Relativity 
and for interplanetary spacecraft navigation, and would have applications to a 
variety of terrestrial phenomena including the measurement of Earth tides and 
continental drift, accurate global clock synchronization, and the possibility of 
earthquake prediction. Like other NRAO facilities, the VLBA would operate as 
a single instrument available to all scientists based on competitive proposals. 
The proposed VLBA consisted of ten 25  meter diameter antennas, at least 
eight of which were in the continental United States. Placing the other two 
antennas in Hawaii and Spain or the Azores would increase the angular resolu-
tion to be about the largest possible on the surface of the Earth. Locations in 
Alaska, Iceland, Mexico, and Easter Island were also discussed to improve the 
north-south resolution. Unlike the VLBI Network antennas, which were origi-
nally built for other purposes, the proposed Intercontinental Very Long 
Baseline Array antenna elements would be more optimally placed, but with 
consideration of road access and the availability of power. Each antenna would 
be supported by a small staff to maintain the instrumentation and the antenna, 
change tapes, and arrange for their transportation to and from the central pro-
cessor. However, overseeing the observations, pointing the antennas, changing 
frequency, etc. would be under the control of a remote central operator.
The proposed VLBA was based on demonstrated technology: VLA type 
antennas and receivers and MK II or MK III recording and playback systems. 
The biggest challenge was to provide sufficient staff to change tapes as often as 
four times an hour, devising a robot tape changer, or developing a cost effective 
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real-time satellite data link. Another challenge was the lack at the time of a 
commercial source of the hydrogen masers needed to provide the necessary 
frequency stability for operation at wavelengths as short as 1  cm. NRAO 
 estimated the VLBA construction cost to be about $26 million, and the opera-
tion plan called for a staff of 53 including two people at each antenna site to 
oversee the observations, change tapes, and provide basic technical support.
At this time NRAO was in the midst of the VLA construction (Chap. 7) and 
was also being pressured to build the 25  meter millimeter radio telescope 
(Chap. 9) which had received considerable support from the Greenstein 
Decade Review Committee (Sect. 7.4). Support for the VLBA was divided, 
even among practicing VLBI scientists. More meetings were held, but NRAO 
had inadequate resources to pursue serious engineering work on the VLBA, 
and little progress was made.
In 1979, a conceptually similar idea, called the Canadian Long Baseline 
Array (CLBA), was proposed by Canadian radio astronomers “to serve the 
needs and interests of Canadian astronomers.” The proposed CLBA contained 
eight antennas located in Canada and one in France for both scientific and 
political reasons.27 The Canadians proposed using larger antennas for better 
sensitivity, but the VLBA operated at a shorter wavelength so would have bet-
ter angular resolution.28 The US and Canadian groups discussed a possible 
collaboration, but the Canadian group thought that their government would 
be more receptive to a purely Canadian project. Perhaps reflecting their true 
fears, the Canadian radio astronomers also expressed concern that any joint 
effort with the US would be dominated by the Americans, and felt that the 
CLBA was a chance for Canada to take the lead. At a meeting of the Canadian 
Astronomical Society, Ernie Seaquist, Chair of the CLBA Planning Committee, 
claimed that “the CLBA is currently funded,” and that the funding prospects 
were poorer in the US, so that the CLBA would be built before any US instru-
ment.29 Instead of reacting to the challenge of competition from Canada, 
William E. (Bill) Howard III, then the NSF Director of Astronomical Sciences 
and a former NRAO Assistant Director, saw the CLBA as his solution to the 
growing competition between the VLBA and the NRAO millimeter telescope 
and asked, “Why not let the Canadians do it?” By 1983, the positions on both 
sides had softened, but only slightly. Both the Canadians and Americans wanted 
to go ahead with both the CLBA and VLBA proposals.  At an April 1983 meet-
ing in Charlottesville, the two groups discussed ways to collaborate in the 
unlikely possibility that both arrays were built.30 There were many compatibil-
ity issues, particularly regarding the recording systems used. All of the VLBA 
technical, scientific, and management memos were available to the Canadian 
group and some Canadians participated in the VLBA Working Groups, but 
little information flowed in reverse. The CLBA was chosen by the National 
Research Council of Canada over several other big science projects. However, 
with increasing CLBA cost estimates and the deteriorating economic situation 
in Canada, funding never materialized; the CLBA initiative eventually died, 
and Canadian radio astronomers turned their attention to other directions.
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Although there was as yet no formal proposal requesting NSF funds for the 
VLBA, informal exchanges between NRAO and the NSF led to the inclusion 
of the VLBA in the Astronomy Division’s planning for new starts, but after the 
NRAO 25  meter millimeter wave telescope, and in competition with the 
planned KPNO NTT 15 meter optical telescope, along with one or two 10 
meter submillimeter telescopes, as well as a wide range of upgrades, instrumen-
tation, and support for existing telescopes at all wavelengths.
Uncertain about the commitment of NRAO and concerned about input to 
the upcoming Decade Review of astronomy, Marshall Cohen, a member of the 
Decade Review radio panel, began a semi-independent design effort at Caltech 
in collaboration with JPL, although many of the same people, including NRAO 
scientists and engineers, participated in both the NRAO and Caltech design 
programs. The broad goals which would motivate the design of both the 
NRAO and Caltech arrays were discussed in a meeting held in January 1980 at 
Caltech, which was attended by about 30 scientists and engineers. The partici-
pants agreed that ten antennas would be a reasonable compromise between 
cost and imaging quality. Caltech issued the results of their design study in 
September (Cohen et  al. 1980), in time for consideration by the Decade 
Review Committee. The existence of two institutions pushing for a VLBA 
added credibility to the project, and the item by item comparison of the inde-
pendent cost estimates ultimately led to a better understanding of the VLBA 
construction costs.
Encouraged by a specific request from the NSF for a “Conceptual Proposal” 
and by the apparent increase in community support, NRAO responded by 
resuming its VLBA design program. In May 1980, NRAO Director Morton 
Roberts appointed a formal VLBA Design Group to re-examine the scientific 
motivation and technical feasibility of the VLBA.31 Working Groups on anten-
nas, configuration, correlators, data transfer, electronics, feeds, front ends, 
local oscillator, recording systems, monitor and control, operations, post pro-
cessing, science, sites, and management focused on preparing a new report, 
and continued throughout the VLBA construction period  to oversee the 
design and provide engineering support. NRAO staff were joined by Working 
Group members from the US and Canadian VLBI communities, particularly 
members from Haystack and Caltech, who led the recorder and correlator 
groups respectively. From 16–18 September 1980, a group of some 70 astron-
omers, geodesists, and engineers from Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Italy, as well as from the US, met in Green Bank to iron out the differences 
between the NRAO and Caltech studies. The first day was devoted to scientific 
presentations highlighting recent VLBI research, followed by a VLBI NUG 
meeting. The second day began with overviews of the Caltech-JPL, NRAO, 
and Canadian design concepts, followed by discussions of the array configura-
tion, the antennas, front end, record, local oscillator, and playback designs. 
The Green Bank meeting consolidated the main concepts behind the VLBA 
and served to unite its supporters to urge action from NRAO.32
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Following the Green Bank meeting, the 1977 NRAO report was updated to 
reflect the scientific and technical progress over the preceding three years. The 
February 1981 “Very Long Baseline Array Design Study” included only anten-
nas located in the United States, but also considered the use of real time  satellite 
links to replace the expensive and commercially unavailable hydrogen masers, 
and also an upgraded MK III system that could allow an order of magnitude 
increase in capacity of each tape, allowing a single tape to last for up to six 
hours instead of 13 minutes (Kellermann 1981). The proposed construction 
and annual operating cost of the VLBA were given as $39.1 million and $3.8 
million respectively. In order to help prepare a formal proposal to the NSF and 
to consolidate the community, in November 1981 Roberts appointed a VLBA 
Planning Group of external scientists to advise on the preparation of an actual 
proposal to the NSF for VLBA construction.33 Although the Planning Group 
was initially expected to function for only a few months, it remained in exis-
tence until June 1985 when it was dissolved by Paul Vanden Bout.
8.7  fundIng the vlBa
In December 1978, the National Academy of Sciences began its next Decade 
Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics. Patrick Thaddeus from Columbia 
chaired the Radio Astronomy Panel. VLBI interests were represented by 
Marshall Cohen from Caltech and Bernard (Bernie) Burke from MIT.34 Both 
the NRAO and Caltech reports had demonstrated the potential scientific 
impact of a dedicated VLBI system, that such an array was technically feasible, 
and that the cost could be reliably estimated. However, the VLBA was compet-
ing with a proposed high altitude 10 meter submillimeter telescope and the 
long overdue 100 meter class fully steerable short centimeter wavelength dish, 
as well as the need for maintaining and upgrading the VLA and Arecibo. 
Although early in their deliberations Thaddeus and the Radio Panel placed the 
VLBA as the highest priority new start for radio astronomy in the coming 
decade, there were still important undecided issues. Who would build it? What 
was the right tradeoff between the number of antennas and cost? What was the 
best recording system?
To address these and other questions, Thaddeus took the unusual step of 
bringing the key VLBA protagonists to his country cabin in rural New York to 
thrash out the issues. Although he expressed enthusiasm for the VLBA project, 
Thaddeus was concerned that in order to sell it to the parent Survey Committee, 
and later to the NSF and Congress, it would be necessary to keep the cost 
below $30 million. But $30 million was insufficient to build a ten element 
array. This generated vigorous discussion about the minimum number of 
antennas needed, whether some existing antennas could be used instead of 
building all new ones, the broad issue of international participation, and the 
optimum funding schedule. Unlike the strict confidentiality of later Decade 
Reviews, both the NSF and NRAO personnel had the opportunity to comment 
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on and contribute to successive drafts of the reports of both the panels and the 
main committee. 
As expected, the final report of the Radio Panel listed the VLBA as its clear 
first priority for new ground-based construction (Thaddeus 1983).35 Based on 
the NRAO and Caltech design studies, the Committee suggested a total 
 construction cost of $35 million.  The Radio Panel report also listed space 
VLBI as the first priority for space radio astronomy and gave strong endorse-
ments to the construction of a 100 meter class centimeter wavelength tele-
scope, primarily for the support of space VLBI. At the same time, the Ultraviolet, 
Optical, and Infrared (UVOIR) Panel was divided among those who argued 
for a state- of- the-art large ground-based OIR telescope and those who wanted 
more intermediate class instruments. Unable to reach a consensus on priority, 
the UVOIR Panel recommended as their first priority both a “national New 
Technology Telescope (NTT) of the 15-m class for optical and infrared obser-
vation,” and “the construction at good sites of several smaller national tele-
scopes with apertures between 2.5 and 5 m” (Wampler 1983, pp. 98–99).
The parent survey steering committee, chaired by Harvard’s George Field, 
endorsed the construction of the VLBA as the first priority for all of ground- 
based astronomy in the 1980s with a price tag of $50 million that included ten 
years of operation funding (Field 1982).36 The Committee also noted, “The 
25-Meter Millimeter-Wave-Radio Telescope, which was recommended in an 
earlier form in the Greenstein report, has not yet been implemented” but left 
unanswered any recommended priority between the VLBA and the 25 meter 
telescope, both proposed NRAO projects. Moreover, the Panel made no rec-
ommendation about who would build or who would manage the VLBA once 
built. As with the proposed VLA and the OVRO Array a decade earlier, Caltech 
and NRAO were again competing for NSF support.
The second priority for ground-based astronomy was the 15 meter New 
Technology [optical] Telescope (NTT) which was deemed to be of equal sci-
entific merit to the VLBA, but not yet technically ready for construction. So 
the report recommended only that the NTT “design studies … are of the highest 
priority and should be undertaken immediately” (Field 1982, p.  16). The 
National Optical Astronomy Observatory undertook design studies for a 
15 meter OIR telescope, but as of 2019 the largest optical-infrared telescopes 
operating in the United States are only in the 8–11 meter class. A 24 meter 
equivalent Giant Magellan Telescope (GMT) is under construction in Chile, 
and a Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) is planned pending the identification of 
a suitable site.37 Meanwhile a 39 meter equivalent diameter telescope, known 
as the Extremely Large Telescope (ELT) is under construction in Chile by ESO.
During the Field Committee deliberations, the NSF National Science Board 
discussed “Big Science Policies and Procedures.” The NSB recognized “Big 
Science” projects not only cost a lot to build, but would have a continuing 
operating cost that with level or even declining budgets could adversely impact 
a broad range of other programs in the field. The Board wisely set a high bar 
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for supporting big projects at the NSF and defined a demanding procedure for 
funding “big science.”38
The VLBA Versus the 25 Meter Millimeter Wave Telescope After years of planning 
and development, in 1977 NRAO had sent a proposal to the NSF to build a 
25 meter millimeter wave telescope on a high altitude site chosen for low water 
vapor (Sect. 10.3). In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter’s FY1981 budget 
proposal included $1.7 million for the engineering design of the 25 meter mil-
limeter telescope, but a few months later the proposal was withdrawn by the 
NSF following a $70 million cut in the NSF budget. Carter’s budget proposal 
for FY1982 again included a start for the 25 meter telescope, now on a pro-
posed three instead of four year construction schedule. But with the nation 
dealing with high unemployment and inflation resulting from the unprece-
dented gasoline prices brought about by the Iran Oil Crisis, incoming President 
Ronald Reagan’s economic recovery plan froze all FY1982 new starts, specifi-
cally mentioning the 25 meter telescope,39 and the 25 meter telescope did not 
appear in the FY1983 budget request. However, the Decade Review Radio 
Panel had made an early decision, probably in 1980, not to re-evaluate “ongo-
ing programs approved by previous advisory committees.” Specifically, their 
report noted that “the most important such project in radio astronomy is the 
25-m millimeter-wave telescope proposed by the NRAO.” Assuming that better 
times lay ahead following the end of the Iran Hostage Crisis, the Radio Panel 
Report stated that, “The present report of the Panel on Radio Astronomy is 
predicated on the assumption that the 25-m telescope will be constructed dur-
ing the early or middle years of the 1980’s” (Thaddeus 1983, p. 212) [original 
underlining]. Similarly, the parent Survey Committee emphasized “the impor-
tance of approved, continuing, and previously recommended programs,” and 
specifically noted that “The 25-Meter Millimeter-Wave-Radio-Telescope … has 
not yet been implemented” and would permit “the United States to maintain 
its leadership in this exciting and highly productive field” (Field 1982, pp. 13–14, 
120). Both the Radio Panel and the parent Survey Committee stopped short of 
making the difficult decision of how to proceed if the 25 meter was not funded.
Meanwhile work on both projects continued at a low level at NRAO. With 
the new strong Field Committee recommendation for the VLBA, as well as a 
letter writing campaign from the VLBI community, and the long outstanding 
but still unfunded 25 meter project, Roberts was faced with a dilemma. NRAO 
was just bringing the VLA into operation with inadequate staff and an insuffi-
cient operating budget, and was dealing with conflicting pressures from the 
VLBI and millimeter communities for another new start. These were two 
fields, millimeter astronomy and VLBI, that had been started at NRAO, but 
where US leadership was being threatened. The NRAO scientific staff itself was 
split over the two projects (Gordon 2005, pp. 140–145), and there was grow-
ing concern from both communities that nothing was happening.
To help decide on the best approach, Roberts convened an ad-hoc commit-
tee to adjudicate between the two projects.40 The committee met in the 
Washington offices of AUI on 25 January 1982. Their views ranged from 
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“25 meter with enthusiasm; the VLBA not yet ready; stay with mm telescope;” 
to “VLBA new, more attractive and more saleable; VLBA to maintain credibil-
ity of Field Report; 25 meter no longer attractive.”41 As Roberts later reported 
to the NSF, the committee felt that the scientific case for both projects was 
“equally strong” and that “a majority favored seeking funds in the FY1984 
budget for the 25 meter telescope.”42 Following a discussions within NRAO, 
and realizing the long term impact “to the astronomy community in general 
and on NRAO in particular,” Roberts wrote to Francis Johnson, NSF Assistant 
Director for Astronomy, Atmospheres, Earth and Oceans, to “urge the NSF to 
include the 25-meter telescope in its plans for FY1984.” He also told Johnson, 
“We will complete, as rapidly as possible, the preparation of a VLBA proposal 
for submission to the NSF.”43
This ambiguous NRAO position, along with the lack of any clear recom-
mendation from the Field Committee, left the NSF in a quandary. They could 
not fund both NRAO radio astronomy projects in the coming decade and 
sought the advice of their own Astronomy Advisory Committee (AAC)44 which 
met on 5–6 April 1982 at the NSF in Washington. Mort Roberts made the 
good suggestion to the NRAO and Caltech VLBA advocates that “it would be 
completely inappropriate to use that occasion to push for one’s own proposal. 
Not only inappropriate but ineffectual, for the details of approving one pro-
posal versus another will not be left to the AAC, but will be based on peer 
reviews and internal gyrations within the NSF.”45
The presentations for the millimeter telescope went first, but ran overtime, 
leaving little time for the VLBA and for probing questions about the CLBA, 
the differences between the Caltech and NRAO plans, the use of existing radio 
telescopes instead of building new ones, and other delicate concerns. During 
the discussion following the presentations, the committee noted that the 
25  meter proposal was clearly getting old; Japan had just completed the 
45 meter Nobeyama millimeter wave telescope, and the 30 meter IRAM mil-
limeter telescope on Pico Veleta, in the Spanish Sierra Nevada, was already 
under construction. On the other hand, the 25 meter concept was mature, 
while there was no real proposal or engineering design for the VLBA. The 
25 meter was “shovel ready;” the VLBA was not. 
Nevertheless, soft spoken committee member Richard McCray unexpect-
edly suggested that the time had passed for the millimeter telescope and that 
the VLBA represented a new opportunity to extend US leadership in this 
important area which had broad applications beyond astrophysics. McCray 
was a respected theoretical astrophysicist and had been a member of the Field 
Committee, so his comments were taken seriously, and the committee subse-
quently recommended unanimously that the NSF pursue funding for the 
VLBA, and at the same time voted seven to three to not go ahead with the 
25 meter proposal.46 Two weeks later, Roberts wrote to the NSF Director, 
John Slaughter, to “request that the NSF set aside our request for funds to 
construct [the 25-meter millimeter wave telescope]”47 This was the effective 
end of the NRAO 25 meter project. Although Roberts’ controversial action 
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left a bitter taste among the millimeter astronomers, including those at 
NRAO, it would eventually lead to a major new US initiative in millimeter 
astronomy (Sects. 10.6 and 10.7) as well as to the funding and construction 
of the VLBA.
At its 19 October 1982 meeting, the AAC revisited the VLBA and unani-
mously passed the following resolution:48
The Very Long Baseline Array radio telescope was recommended by the 
Astronomy Survey Committee as the highest priority new facility for ground- 
based astronomy. The Astronomy Advisory Committee recommends that the 
NSF seek the necessary funds to construct this facility as soon as possible.
Interestingly, another major previously approved but still unfunded project 
was the Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF). But unlike the NRAO 
25  meter telescope, the infrared community and NASA did not abandon 
SIRTF, which was finally realized with the launch of the Spitzer Space Telescope 
in 2003, and its subsequent very successful mission.49
Multidisciplinary Use of the Very Long Baseline Array The response of any 
radio interferometer depends not only on the structure of the radio source, but 
also on the interferometer baseline length and its orientation, the coordinates 
of the radio source, and the local oscillator frequencies. In practice, the data are 
correlated using a range of probable fringe rates and time delays which are then 
examined in a computer to find the fringe rate and delay that gives the maxi-
mum interference fringe amplitude. Working backward, the observed fringe 
rate and delay can then be used to determine with great accuracy the geometry 
of the interferometer baseline and the relative time offset between the two 
antennas. It was, therefore, immediately clear from the first 1967 VLBI obser-
vations that in addition to astronomy and astrophysics, VLBI techniques also 
had a variety of important terrestrial applications, including the measurement 
of Earth rotation (UT1), polar motion, Earth tides, continental drift, and pos-
sibly earthquake prediction (e.g., Gold 1967; Cohen et al. 1968). Since radio 
source coordinates can be determined with great precision, VLBI is also used 
for precise tests of General Relativistic gravitational bending, for spacecraft 
navigation, and to locate lunar and planetary exploration vehicles.
Although NRAO and the VLBI community had promoted the VLBA to the 
NSF and the Field Committee based partly on the geodetic and other non- 
astronomical applications, the design discussions had not really responded to 
the needs of these other applications. It was clear that support of the geodetic 
community as well as the astronomy community was needed before the NSF 
would fund the construction of the VLBA. At Bernie Burke’s initiative, the 
National Research Council held a two-day workshop at the National Academy 
of Sciences in Washington on 6–7 April 1983.
During the course of the Workshop on Multidisciplinary Use of the Very 
Long Baseline Array (NAS 1983), it became increasingly clear that although the 
8 VLBI AND THE VERY LONG BASELINE ARRAY 
420
geodetic community needed and wanted the VLBA, their support was predi-
cated on NRAO being more sensitive to the needs of geodesy in designing the 
array, calibration procedures, providing auxiliary instrumentation, and in dealing 
with proposals and scheduling. To better accommodate the wide range of non-
astronomical observations discussed at the workshop, NRAO agreed to increase 
the elevation range of the antennas, to increase their slew speed, to provide for 
simultaneous observations in the 4 and 13 cm bands commonly used for geo-
detic studies, and to increase the number of IF channels. All of these modifica-
tions added to the construction cost. From the viewpoint of the astronomy user, 
perhaps the most serious compromise was the choice of the IF system and some 
frequency bands to be compatible with existing geodetic VLBI systems rather 
than the VLA. Interestingly, the NAS meeting was not only funded by the NSF, 
NASA, and the NOAA National Geodetic Survey, but also by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Defense Mapping Agency.
The NSF and Congress As with the VLA (Chap. 7) and the GBT (Chap. 9), 
obtaining VLBA construction funding was complex, but in each case for differ-
ent reasons. Following the NSF Astronomy Advisory Committee decision in 
April 1982 and the President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy 
(OSTP) briefing, things moved very fast, at least at first. The following month, 
Roberts sent the formal proposal for a Very Long Baseline Array (Kellermann 
1982) to the NSF Director, John Slaughter, requesting “funds for such con-
struction and operation.”50 In accordance with the agreement with Caltech, 
the front page of the proposal noted that it had been “prepared in collabora-
tion with the California Institute of Technology.” The NSF was still remember-
ing the 25  meter situation and was unsure of NRAO’s intentions. Roberts 
wrote to NSF Assistant Director Francis Johnson in July, saying, “We [NRAO] 
conclude that we must now ask that the VLBA proposal be accorded the highest 
priority on the Foundation’s agenda, … [and] we look forward to vigorous sup-
port of the VLBA project by the NSF and the NSB and hope that significant 
planning, design, and development funding will be available in FY 84.” [italics 
in original].51
By this time Bill Howard had left the NSF over the disruption resulting 
from the reversal of support for the nearly funded 25 meter telescope in favor 
of the VLBA,52 and had been replaced by Laura (Pat) Bautz as the NSF 
Astronomy Division Director. Larry Randall, the NSF Program Officer for 
NRAO and later Head of the Astronomy Centers Section, generously inter-
acted with the NRAO Project Manager, (KIK), over the preparation of the 
VLBA proposal and the development of a budget plan for its construction, as 
did Kurt Weiler, who had specific responsibility for the VLBA at the NSF. During 
the final preparation of the proposal, some concern was raised that “VLBA” 
was not a very inspiring name, and that it might be easily confused with the 
VLA.  Other names considered included “Trans American Radio Array 
(TARA)”, “Trans American Radio Telescope (TART)”, and “Trans American 
Telescope (TAT)”. NRAO decided to adopt the appealing Caltech name, 
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Transcontinental Radio Telescope, or TRT, much to the dismay of the NRAO 
secretary who had to retype the proposal. But noting that they were already 
discussing the VLBA with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and 
Congress, Larry Randall rejected the name change, and the proposal had to be 
retyped yet again using “VLBA.”
The 1982 proposal submitted to the NSF specified a construction budget of 
$50.729 million and an annual operating budget of $4.15 million. 
Characteristically, the NSF and the community focused their attention on the 
capital cost with little consideration paid to the operating cost. Indeed, NRAO 
never received the full incremental operating funds needed for the VLBA, and 
in particular, the annual $500,000 requested to upgrade the instrumentation 
never materialized. NRAO proposed an optimum five year construction plan to 
start in FY1984 that included a first year of engineering design along with the 
construction and corresponding site acquisition for the first antenna prototype. 
The plan initially called for $2.5 million for engineering design and to procure 
the first antenna, with the rest of the construction spread out over the next 
three years.
By this time, the price of oil and the rate of inflation had stabilized and Jay 
Keyworth, President Reagan’s Science Advisor, announced that he was looking 
for “high leverage” areas where modest investments would have a “high 
impact” with regard to the 1984 budget. In response to Keyworth’s request, 
the NAS appointed seven Briefing Panels to identify “those research areas 
within the field which are most likely to return the highest scientific dividends 
as a result of additional federal investment.”53 One of the authors (KIK) was a 
member of the “Briefing Panel on Astronomy and Astrophysics,” which was 
chaired by George Field. Unlike most NAS studies and reports, this one was 
remarkably fast. It was just over a month between the appointment of the panel 
and the final report and presentation to OSTP, and “the Briefing panel quickly 
and unanimously identified the VLBA as the number one priority to bring to 
the attention of OSTP for a 1984 new start.”54 Field and NAS President Frank 
Press presented the report of the Briefing Panel on Astronomy and Astrophysics 
to Keyworth and other OSTP staff on 15 October 1982. Apparently Keyworth 
had already read the report, and told Field that “the briefing had revealed 
nothing new to them,” and the one-hour presentation was dominated by the 
broader issues of the space station and NASA’s emphasis on technology over 
science. In response to Field’s “concern that the NSB looks unfavorably on 
large projects such as the VLBA,” Keyworth reassured him that “OSTP, not 
the NSB, decides such issues,” and that “several of the items were already being 
taken care of.”55
The National Science Board, nervous about continuing operational require-
ments of big projects and their impact on grant support, only approved $0.5 
million funding for the VLBA in FY1984. However, OSTP and OMB restored 
the full $2.5 million in President Reagan’s budget proposal, which was included 
in the Congressional FY1984 NSF Appropriation as part of a large increase in 
the administration’s support for science.
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Although the VLBA had not yet gone through the NSF review process, 
Reagan’s FY1985 budget request included $15 million for the first year of a 
four year VLBA construction project planned at approximately $15 million per 
year. Nevertheless, the NSF apparently still wanted to review the proposal and 
obtain endorsement from the National Science Board. In preparation for a 
presentation to the NSB, the NSF sent the NRAO proposal out for peer review, 
and convened a “blue-ribbon panel” led by Joseph Taylor from Princeton to 
make recommendations on the overall soundness of the project, management, 
technical specifications, staffing, timing, and costing.56 In preparation for the 
September NSB meeting, the Review Panel met at the NSF on 30–31 May 
1984. Their report concluded that the VLBA was scientifically important, the 
specifications were appropriate and attainable, the staffing and management 
plans were adequate, construction and operating costs credible, and the time 
scale realistic. But the panel suggested that the contingency be increased to 15 
percent.57
However, in spite of the support from OMB and OSTP, the VLBA ran into 
an unforeseen snag in Congress. Massachusetts Representative Edward Boland 
was the powerful Chair of the House Appropriations Sub-Committee on 
Housing, Urban Development (HUD), and Independent Agencies that had 
jurisdiction over the NSF appropriations. Boland had little regard for astron-
omy or astronomers, apparently because of an earlier battle with supporters of 
the Hubble Space Telescope, and he pushed to include more funds to support 
supercomputing and for science education at the NSF. Five years earlier, at the 
dedication of the Five College Radio Astronomy Observatory 14  meter 
millimeter- wave radio telescope, Boland told the gathered astronomers that 
hard times were coming and not to expect money for more new radio tele-
scopes, and he decided to hold the VLBA hostage to achieve his goal of increas-
ing support for science education.
Boland’s Chief of Staff, Richard Mallow, was also a formidable adversary. He 
had just authored a report supporting increased funding for supercomputing 
and cautioning against funding the VLBA and other Field Committee recom-
mendations in view of the projected increasing costs of the Space Telescope 
and other ground-based optical telescopes in Arizona, Hawaii, and Chile. 
According to another Congressional staff member, “Dick Mallow tries to run 
the committee, but the other staff members do not always let him have his 
way.”58 Armed with Mallow’s report, Boland argued that “it is more important 
that the NSF put more money into science education than into VLBA.” To 
complicate the situation, Boland and Mallow’s interest and support for com-
puting was not entirely unwelcome at NRAO, since the Observatory was also 
interested in obtaining a super computer to deal with the growing volume of 
data from the VLA. 
George Field and others wrote Boland a strong letter of support for the 
VLBA, explaining that the federal government spent a lot more on science 
education than was found in the NSF budget, and that the VLBA correlator 
was itself at the frontiers of computing technology.59 In response, Boland 
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remarked,60 “This nation’s future does not and will not depend on building the 
VLBA.  It does depend, however, on how adequately we educate our chil-
dren—particularly in science and mathematics.” Field, Kellermann, and others 
tried to defend the VLBA with visits to key Congressional Offices,61 but were 
unable to see either Boland or Mallow.
The “old boy network” then went to work to save the VLBA. MIT Professor 
Bernie Burke, a long-time supporter of VLBI and the VLBA, brought the 
VLBA problem to the attention of the MIT Dean of Science John Deutch and 
past MIT President Jerry Wiesner. Wiesner was a friend of Speaker of the 
House Tip O’Neill, who represented the old 8th Congressional District which 
included Cambridge. O’Neill previously shared living accommodations in 
Washington with Boland and reportedly persuaded Boland not to kill the 
VLBA in the House appropriations bill. 
Following the community pressure, Boland allowed the VLBA to remain in 
the FY1985 House appropriations bill at the requested $15 million, but the bill 
stipulated that this money could not be spent until the NSF FY1986 budget 
request included at least 8.5 percent for science education.62 The Senate appro-
priations bill also included the requested $15 million and, with the help of New 
Mexico Senator Pete Domenici and Jake Garn, Chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, eliminated the House education rider. 
With $15 million for the VLBA included in both the House and Senate 
appropriations bills, the prospects looked encouraging. But to everyone’s 
apparent surprise, when the House-Senate Conference Committee met on 26 
June 1984, they “compromised” and appropriated only $9 million for FY1985 
and retained the proviso that no money could be obligated until 1 April 1985, 
six months into the fiscal year,63 and then only if Boland’s education require-
ment were met in the NSF’s proposed FY1986 budget. Boland had suggested 
a 4th quarter (July 1985) start for the VLBA, apparently a widely used tactic to 
avoid implementing an approved program, and the Senate had countered with 
a February start. April 1 was a compromise, but the final bill also specified that 
NRAO could not issue a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the antennas until 
after this date. When Mallow found out that an RFP had already been issued 
on 9 March, he reportedly went “non-linear.”64 Further, when Boland’s com-
mittee agreed to include $15 million in the House Bill for the VLBA, they 
reduced the overall appropriation for the NSF AAEO Division by $12 million 
in order to minimize the impact to the federal deficit. But when the VLBA 
funding was reduced to $9 million by the Conference Committee, the AAEO 
cut remained, resulting a net loss of $3 million. The NSF was not happy about 
this, and suggested that community pressure was not necessarily useful and 
might even be counterproductive.65 
When Kellermann met with Senator Domenici staffer George Ramonas in 
the Senator’s office on 16 August 1984, he was assured that “As long as Pete 
Domenici is in the Senate, the VLBA will be protected, particularly if he 
remains as part of the majority party,” but Ramonas acknowledged that Boland 
would probably try to remove the VLBA from the 1985 budget at the time of 
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the FY1986 Appropriation Committee hearings in the spring of 1985.66 
Although the House and Senate HUD Appropriations sub-committees had to 
deal with 13 separate agencies and a total of $59 billion of appropriations, the 
VLBA had become a pawn in the OMB-House-Senate-NSF relationship. 
Reportedly most of the discussion at the House-Senate Conference for the 
FY1985 appropriation was devoted to the VLBA. Ramonas was a valuable con-
tact in following the NSF-Congressional debates until he left Domenici’s office 
in early 1985. When George Field later spoke with Ramonas’s replacement, 
Joseph Trujillo, Trujillo indicated that he had never heard of the VLBA.67 
The FY1985 VLBA construction funding was finally released to NRAO on 
15 May 1985. By this time, reflecting the increased level of contingency sug-
gested by the Taylor Committee and the projected inflation over a proposed 
project stretch-out, the expected cost of the VLBA had risen to $68.2 million. 
For FY1986, the NSF and OMB requested $11.5 million for continued 
construction of the VLBA, but again asked for only $51 million for science 
education, and in defiance of previous instructions from Boland, they had 
deferred spending $31 million from the prior year’s appropriation. At the 1986 
budget hearings on 26 March 1985, Representative Boland was incensed at the 
NSF and the administration and informed Keyworth that, “The Administration 
doesn’t seem to have any trouble finding money for VLBA. But it can’t help 
with science programs for children.” Keyworth responded by pointing out that 
the VLBA was the highest priority in astronomy and had gone through exten-
sive peer review, adding, “I cannot think of a scientist in America who is a 
recognized authority in astronomy who questions the utility and viability of the 
VLBA,” to which Boland retorted “Outside of astronomy, do you find any 
enthusiasts?” Under pressure from Boland, NSF Director Erich Bloch agreed 
to the further VLBA funding delay until May 15. There was more at stake than 
the FY1986 funding level.68 Since Boland had cleverly delayed obligating the 
FY1985 funds, NRAO feared that if the FY1986 VLBA funding was zeroed 
out by the appropriations committee, Boland would then contrive to reverse 
the FY1985 VLBA appropriation, possibly leading to the same fate as the 
25 meter millimeter dish. Fortunately for NRAO, the discussion at the hearing 
drifted away from the VLBA to the relative merits of HST and the Keck 
10 meter telescope.
Two days later, in the Senate hearings, Domenici chastised Bloch for delay-
ing the NSF science education program and spoke in strong support of the 
VLBA. Bloch responded that he could not fund the VLBA unless the rest of 
the NSF budget was preserved, but Domenici reminded Bloch that Congress, 
not the NSF Director, makes these decisions.69 Again, George Field, Maarten 
Schmidt (AAS President) and Peter Boyce (AAS Executive Officer) led a letter 
writing campaign to Representatives and Senators involved in the appropria-
tions process. As finally passed, the 1986 HUD-Independent Agencies 
Appropriations (P.L. 99–160) included $9 million for the VLBA, and this 
amount became the de-facto basis for the more or less level funding in subse-
quent years. The construction budget went first from three years at $20 million 
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each, to four years at $15 million, and finally eight years at $9–$11 million a 
year. However, as it developed, it would have been challenging to have com-
pleted the VLBA on the original schedule. The design and production of the 
record and playback systems would prove to be more difficult and time con-
suming than originally anticipated, and it was fortunate that the NSF not only 
stretched out the funding, but added funds to account for inflation and 
increased management costs over the additional years. 
8.8  BuIldIng the vlBa
The 1982 VLBA proposal noted the considerable technical progress made 
since the 1977 NRAO Design Study. In particular, Readhead and Wilkinson 
(1978) and Cotton (1979) had demonstrated how to recover most of the 
phase information from VLBI observations to produce full synthesis images 
with milli-arcsec or better resolution. At the same time recording data rates had 
increased, allowing bandwidths comparable to that of the VLA. The order of 
magnitude improvement in tape storage density offered a comparable reduc-
tion in consumption of tape, with a corresponding decrease in the cost of ship-
ping tape and the ability to operate for many hours without human intervention. 
Meanwhile, the progress made with low noise cooled FET amplifiers offered 
both a cost saving and improved reliability over parametric and maser amplifiers.
The Antenna Configuration The far-flung location of the VLBA antennas pre-
sented a new paradigm for NRAO. Starting with the construction phase, in 
addition to Arizona, New Mexico, Virginia, and West Virginia, NRAO had to 
become licensed to do business and obtain legal counsel in eight additional 
states. The configuration of the array presented another challenge. The ten 
antenna sites would ideally be located to give the best imaging capability, but 
there were practical aspects to consider. The antennas had to be on land and it 
was important to avoid areas of high tropospheric water vapor such as the 
southeast or northwest parts of the country. Southern locations were preferred 
over northern locations to maximize access to the southern sky. Locations near 
the VLA and Socorro were desired both to exploit the finite size of the VLA 
when used with the VLBA, and to provide a convenient center for mainte-
nance. Other considerations included availability of water, power, and com-
munications, road access, freedom from RFI, low winds, proximity to 
transportation services for shipping magnetic tapes, security, and the ease of 
acquiring the land. Location at or near another radio observatory was consid-
ered attractive as a source of logistical support, but this turned out to be naïve, 
as the staff at most observatories did not have the expertise, training, or special 
skills needed to support the unique VLBA instrumentation. As pointed out by 
Napier (2000) each site had its own logistical, legal, and technical challenges—
a bankrupt contractor at Ford Davis, a contract award protest at Owens Valley, 
DOE bureaucracy at Los Alamos, and environmental concerns at Hancock.
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NRAO assumed that access to government-owned land would be more 
straightforward than private or institutionally-owned land. In fact, the opposite 
was true. The small plot of land needed for a VLBA antenna could be readily 
purchased or leased from private owners. But it was a bureaucratic nightmare 
to transfer land from one federal agency to another agency, and long term 
agreements were subject to changing agency personnel and changing 
priorities.70 
Everyone agreed that each antenna should probably be on US soil, although 
some overtures were made about locating one antenna in Mexico to improve 
the north-south resolution.71 There was also discussion about possibly placing 
one element at the Canadian radio astronomy observatory in Penticton, BC, 
instead of Washington, but this was discouraged by the NSF. In order to maxi-
mize the resolution of the VLBA, two of eight antenna sites were chosen to lie 
outside of the continental United States, but still on US territory. The antenna 
site in Hawaii presented a unique challenge. Except for the high altitude loca-
tions on Mauna Loa, Mauna Kea, and Haleakala, the water vapor content over 
the rest of the Island state was judged to be unattractive for radio astronomy. 
Extensive radio transmissions from an Air Force Laboratory on Haleakala ren-
dered it unacceptable.  The National Atmospheric Laboratory on Mauna Loa, 
which provides the important historical records of carbon dioxide in the atmo-
sphere, did not want radio astronomers running around and possibly contami-
nating their measurements. Moreover, Mauna Loa is an active volcano and 
would have required a dyke to protect against possible lava flow. Mauna Kea, 
of course, was the home of many optical telescopes and offered good support-
ing infrastructure. The summit of Mauna Kea within the so-called “science 
reserve” was unattractive due to icing72 and the prevailing high winds at the 
summit. So a site was chosen at an 11,800 foot location, but because it was 
outside of the “science reserve” long negotiations with the local governments 
and the University of Hawaii were necessary. Normally, the University of 
Hawaii requires a “guaranteed entitlement of UH scientists to a specified 
amount of observing time” at astronomy facilities located on Mauna Kea. The 
University of Hawaii waived this requirement “in view of the vital role of a 
Hawaiian VLBA antenna,” but in return, the University asked for 100% of the 
single dish observing time on the Mauna Kea antenna. This was unacceptable, 
but NRAO did agree “to carry out tasks related to maintaining the radio fre-
quency properties of astronomical sites in Hawaii.”73 And finally, NRAO agreed 
to give the UH astronomers some access to single dish observing, but this 
capability was never implemented, and the issue has been long forgotten. 
The most eastern site was first planned to be in Puerto Rico. A location near 
the Arecibo Observatory where it could be supported by Arecibo personnel 
was interesting, but was rejected due to concerns about interference from the 
powerful ionospheric and planetary radar systems used at the Observatory. 
NRAO staff found another site at an about to be abandoned CIA communica-
tions station on Puerto Rico’s southern coast that was shielded by a mountain 
range from the Arecibo radar. However, that location was threatened by a 
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planned Voice of America powerful transmitting station right next to the 
intended VLBA site. At Frank Drake’s suggestion, NRAO found a site on the 
island of Saint Croix. Being located near sea-level on a Caribbean island, the 
Saint Croix site not only suffered from the high precipitable water vapor con-
tent, but the salty damp air meant that the antenna had to regularly be repainted 
with a special corrosion-resistant paint. Moreover, dealing with the local legal 
system and a developer who objected to having the view of the ocean obscured 
by the 25 meter dish became a continuing issue. It wasn’t until 1998, five years 
after the completion of the VLBA, that NRAO was finally given the approvals 
needed to make the erection of the VLBA antenna on Saint Croix legal. 
Construction of the Saint Croix antenna had just begun and only the concrete 
foundation existed at the time of Hurricane Hugo in 1989, but damage to the 
rest of the island delayed the completion of the antenna. Finally, Hurricane 
Maria in 2017, which caused widespread destruction on the island, did not do 
major damage to the antenna, but the impact to communication and transpor-
tation limited the operation of the antenna for many months.74 
A different type of controversy arose over the location of the northeastern 
antenna site. While needed for good imaging quality, sites anywhere in the 
North East were subject to potential RFI due to the large population density 
throughout the region and the poor tropospheric conditions resulting from 
the large cloud cover and water vapor content prevalent throughout the area. 
Sites at the Five College Radio Observatory in central Massachusetts, near the 
University of Rochester in New York, and even in Canada were all considered. 
Craig Walker, who was responsible for optimizing the antenna configuration, 
argued for a location in northern New England, and Cam Wade located an 
attractive site in New Hampshire only about 50 miles from the MIT Haystack 
Observatory. But George Seielstad, the NRAO Assistant Director for Green 
Bank, argued that it would be more cost effective to place the VLBA antenna 
in Green Bank, where it could be supported by the existing Green Bank staff at 
no increased cost and with little impact to the array imaging capability. The 
arguments between optimizing the Array configuration and supporting Green 
Bank with a new antenna became very divisive within NRAO, but were finally 
decided in favor of the New Hampshire location. Figure 8.6 shows the final 
configuration adopted for the location of the VLBA antennas. 
Construction The expected VLBA construction cost at the time of the pro-
posal was $50.7 million, including an inventory of spare parts and 13 percent 
contingency. The annual operating costs were estimated to be about $4 mil-
lion. After President Reagan signed the NSF budget in July 1983, which 
included $2.5 million for the VLBA design, NRAO rented additional office 
space in Charlottesville, and began the process of developing a staffing plan, 
completing a detailed work schedule, and establishing annual budgets. Hein 
Hvatum was appointed VLBA Project Manager and Kellermann became the 
Project Scientist. When Hvatum retired in 1987, Peter Napier,75 who had been 
the Deputy Project Manager, took over as Project Manager.
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The antenna elements were the most expensive part of the VLBA.  In 
response to their RFP, NRAO received three bids to construct the ten anten-
nas. TIW Systems Inc. and Radiation Systems Inc. (RSI) each proposed a con-
ventional wheel and track antenna, while the Electronic Space Systems 
Corporation (ESSCO) proposed a pedestal mounted antenna enclosed in a 
radome. Following an independent analysis of the technical and business 
aspects of each proposal, NRAO chose RSI as the contractor for the ten anten-
nas. The contract signed with RSI on 19 December 1984 for $19.61 million 
called for a five-phase approach, with each phase subject to authorization pend-
ing the availability of funds. In order to minimize state taxes, the contract was 
in two parts, one for the design, fabrication, and delivery of each antenna, and 
the other for the assembly and testing on site. But due to subsequent reduc-
tions in the expected NSF rate of funding, the contract with RSI was later 
renegotiated to deliver only two instead of three antennas a year. 
While the Field Committee had recommended the construction of a VLBA, 
they were properly silent on who should build and operate the array, correctly 
leaving that as an NSF decision to be based on proposals and peer review. 
Although there had been acrimonious conflicts over the VLA and Owens Valley 
arrays (Sect. 7.2), NRAO and Caltech had worked together in developing 
Fig. 8.6 Locations of the VLBA antennas: St. Croix, VI; Hancock, NH; North 
Liberty, IA; Fort Davis, TX; Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM; Pietown, NM; Kitt 
Peak, AZ; Owens Valley, CA; Brewster, WA; and Mauna Kea, HI.  Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
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plans for the VLBA and in advocating support from the community, even 
though their roles in the construction and operation of the VLBA were not 
clarified by the Field Committee. While it was becoming clear to Cohen that 
the construction and operation of a facility of the scope of the VLBA was 
 probably beyond their interests and capability, Caltech still wanted to preserve 
some significant involvement. Maybe Caltech could build and operate the pro-
cessor? But NRAO would not accept the responsibility for operating the VLBA 
without control over the processor, and several options were discussed. Maybe 
the processor could be located in Pasadena and be operated by NRAO. Maybe 
there should be two processors, one in Pasadena and one at NRAO.76 NRAO 
needed Caltech’s continued support if the VLBA was to be built. Perhaps more 
importantly, Caltech and the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) had a lot of experience 
and expertise on antennas, correlators, and imaging software that was vitally 
important for building the VLBA.
NRAO and Caltech staff met in Albuquerque, NM on 1 October 1981 to 
discuss how to best collaborate on the VLBA project.77 Although Caltech rec-
ognized that NRAO would be the lead organization, they wanted to be “co- 
proposer,” sharing decision-making responsibility through a joint “steering 
committee,” but this was not acceptable to NRAO. Discussions and exchanges 
of seven draft MOUs continued for more than a year. NRAO stressed its need 
to maintain control, while Caltech stressed the value of its expertise and 
support.78 
NRAO and Caltech finally agreed that Caltech would design and build the 
VLBA playback processor or correlator, but that when completed it would be 
moved to the NRAO. But there was no agreement about where NRAO should 
locate the processor or the VLBA Operations Center, and this became a matter 
of serious contention. The VLBI consortium leaders, especially from Caltech 
and MIT, continued to argue for a location near a major university to facilitate 
interaction with the broad astronomical community, while NRAO was more 
concerned about the logistics of VLBA operations and coordination with VLA 
operations. Even within NRAO, the VLBA debate triggered discussions about 
possibly shifting VLA operations to Socorro or Albuquerque from the array 
site on the Plains of San Agustin and possibly relocating the NRAO 
Headquarters. Four options were considered for the VLBA Operations Center: 
(a) Socorro, to facilitate coordination and to share resources with the VLA, (b) 
Charlottesville, where the NRAO Headquarters was located, (c) Albuquerque, 
which would provide some of the advantages of locating in Socorro, but per-
haps provide more attractive living conditions for the VLBA staff and conceiv-
ably even VLA staff, and (d) co-location with VLA Operations on the Plains. 
At the request of AUI, in September 1983 Mort Roberts appointed a com-
mittee to “review and advise on NRAO’s selection of a site for the VLBA 
Operations Center.”79 Paul Vanden Bout, from the University of Texas and 
Chair of the NRAO Visiting Committee, was appointed as the committee 
chair.80 The Vanden Bout committee was informed by a detailed report of the 
VLBA Operations Working Group, chaired by Carl Bignell, which examined 
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the advantages and disadvantages of each option along with the potential 
impact on VLBA operations.81 Vanden Bout’s committee concluded that the 
control of the array operations and correlation of array data should be done at 
a common site, and that the Array Operations Center should be located near 
the VLA, specifically in Socorro or Albuquerque.82 The committee, however, 
declined to make a recommendation on the location of the NRAO central 
offices, commenting only that “this issue depends on the future development 
of NRAO’s activities,” and that they found no connection between recom-
mending a site for VLBA operations and the question of moving the NRAO 
headquarters to a new site.83
The discussions about moving the NRAO Headquarters slowly died away, 
but the decision to co-locate the VLBA and VLA operations had a profound 
impact on both facilities. The VLBA construction plan included funds for a 
VLBA Operations Center. Senator Pete Domenici was able to convince the 
New Mexico State Legislature to issue a $3 million bond that allowed New 
Mexico Tech to construct an Array Operations Center (AOC) which housed 
both the VLA and the VLBA operations staff. As a result, the VLA scientific, 
engineering, and business staff were able to move from the VLA site to Socorro, 
saving a two-hour daily commute.  Locating all VLA personnel at the site had 
served well during the construction period, but by the 1990s, the operation 
had become sufficiently mature and most staff were not needed each day at the 
site, especially when the daily commute had some adverse impact on both the 
VLA operations and on staff morale. Ground breaking for the new combined 
Array Operations Center took place on 26 June 1987, and the AOC was 
opened for business on 8 December 1988. In 2008 the AOC was renamed the 
Pete V. Domenici Science Operations Center (DSOC) recognizing Domenici’s 
“strong and effective support for science,” and his role in securing Congressional 
support for the VLA as well as the VLBA along with the New Mexico legisla-
ture’s support for the AOC (Fig. 8.7). 
Perhaps the biggest technical challenge facing the VLBA was the choice of 
the recording system (Rogers 2000). The NRAO MK II VCR based system 
was reliable, relatively inexpensive, and could record for up to three hours on a 
single tape costing only a few dollars. But the MK II VCRs only recorded at 
4 Mbps, limiting the bandwidth to 2 MHz. NRAO proposed to implement an 
upgrade based on work by Allen Yen at Toronto that would allow VCRs to 
record at 12.5 Mbps. The Haystack MK III system had a demonstrated record-
ing rate (bandwidth) of 112 Mbps, or 28 times greater than the MK II system. 
But the MK III Honeywell Model 96 tape transport was very expensive; a 
single tape cost about $250 and lasted for only 13 minutes. The NRAO pro-
posal suggested using a bank of eight upgraded MK II VCRs with a robot tape 
changer that would allow 24  hours of unattended recording at 100  Mbps 
(Fig. 8.8). Haystack proposed replacing the standard 28 track MK III head-
stack with a newly designed moveable 36 narrow track headstack that would 
allow multiple 128 Mbps passes on a single half-inch tape.
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Neither the upgraded NRAO MK II based system nor the upgraded 
Haystack MK III based system had been demonstrated, and considerable 
design work was still needed in each case. While there was some technical pref-
erence within NRAO for the MK II based system, MIT wanted to stay 
involved,84 and NRAO agreed that MIT/Haystack would develop the VLBA 
recording system based on the upgraded MK III system. As the Haystack 
record system pushed the state of the art for magnetic tape recordings, its 
development suffered from continually increasing costs and corresponding 
delays. This led to constant tension between NRAO and Haystack/MIT. As a 
nonprofit university, neither Caltech nor Haystack/MIT could accept fixed 
priced contracts, and Hein Hvatum liked to complain that the Caltech/MIT 
definition of a deliverable was a new proposal asking for more money. As with 
Caltech, the increasing tensions between NRAO and Haystack and what 
NRAO called the Haystack/MIT/Caltech “grant mentality” resulted in 
NRAO assuming responsibility for the production of much of the record/
playback system. However, responsibility for the design of the challenging tape 
recorder upgrade remained with Haystack, since they had the unique expertise 
and experience to engineer the recorder to demanding specifications. 
Though there were delays at Haystack in meeting the specified performance, 
the resulting VLBA recording system was a remarkable technical achievement. 
It recorded over 20 million bits of information on a square inch of magnetic 
Fig. 8.7 The VLA-VLBA Array Operations Center, later named the Pete V. Domenici 
Science Operations Center (DSOC) in Socorro, New Mexico. Credit: NRAO/AUI/
NSF
8 VLBI AND THE VERY LONG BASELINE ARRAY 
432
tape. Each 3.4 mile-long 38 micron-wide track of data deviated from a straight 
line by less than 0.001 inch. With 14 passes on each tape, a 14-inch reel of tape 
lasted for 10.5 hours at the nominal 128 Mbps recording rate, so that by using 
two recorders the tapes needed to be changed only once every day. For special 
experiments requiring higher sensitivity, the tapes could be run at twice the 
nominal speed to record at 256 Mpbs (128 MHz bandwidth) and on occasion 
the two tape drives were run in parallel, each at twice the nominal speed, to 
record at 512 Mbps (256 MHz bandwidth). In order to facilitate the use of 
other radio telescopes with the VLBA, VLBA-compatible record systems were 
fabricated and delivered at cost to radio observatories around the world.
Fig. 8.8 Artist’s 
conception of the 
proposed bank of eight 
modified consumer TV 
Video Cassette Recorders 
using a robot cassette 
changer to allow up to 24 
hours of unattended 
VLBA recording at a 100 
megabit per second data 
rate. The VCR concept 
was abandoned in favor a 
MK III based recording 
system. Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
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Although the VLBA record system met the design goals, it pushed the state- 
of- the-art bit density, and recordings were sensitive to environmental condi-
tions. Prior to recording, tapes needed to be stored in a room with carefully 
controlled temperature and humidity, and were easily damaged by friction 
heating as the tape rubbed against the transport tape edge guides at 140 inches 
per second. Before recording, each tape had to undergo a “pre-pass” to relax 
strains introduced during shipping. Nevertheless, recordings were not always 
error free, and the lifetime of the expensive headstacks was limited. A major 
improvement in the sensitivity, reliability, and operational ease of the VLBA 
occurred in 2007 when the tapes were replaced by commercial computer disk 
drives. Later advances in disk recording technology led to recording rates up to 
2 Gbps, resulting in a factor of four increase in sensitivity for continuum obser-
vations over the original VLBA 128 Mbps tape recording system. By 2010, 
some 40 years after the first NRAO software correlator that ran on IBM 360, 
computers had been replaced by more powerful hardware correlators, the orig-
inal VLBA hardware correlator was replaced by a cluster of commercial com-
puters running a program known as DiFX (Deller et al. 2007).
As happened with the VLA construction, the annual NSF budget allocations 
were in a constant state of negotiation with OMB and Congress, resulting in 
continuing adjustments of the VLBA construction funding. By 1985, more 
than 30 separate budget scenarios had been prepared in response to constantly 
changing NSF requests. Probably the most serious funding impact was a result 
of the gap introduced in the FY1985 Congressional appropriations bill and the 
cut from $15 to $9 million. In order to purchase the long-lead times for all ten 
antennas, the NSF Astronomy Division considered supplementing the VLBA 
Congressional appropriation with a few million dollars of Division funds. But 
the NSF director was reportedly too “terrified of Boland” to reprogram NSF 
funds for the VLBA,85 and it became necessary to delay work on the receivers, 
masers, record system, and processor, as well as renegotiate the antenna con-
tract with RSI. Meanwhile, there was pressure from the user community, rep-
resented by the VLBI consortium, to fully instrument each antenna as it was 
completed and provide a correlator in order to begin observing programs, 
resulting in continual tension between NRAO and the VLBI community.
For two reasons, NRAO wanted to maintain the antenna construction 
schedule to the extent possible. First, if the contractual arrangements with RSI 
were not maintained, the cost of the antennas was likely to increase. Second, 
there was the residual concern that if the NSF or Congress were to cut off 
VLBA funding, it was important to at least complete the construction of all ten 
antennas, assuming that one way or another the instrumentation would some-
how get built. However, maintaining adequate funding to complete the anten-
nas on schedule meant that funding for other parts of the project would need 
to be deferred. In particular, this meant delaying the playback processer work 
at Caltech. 
The VLBA playback processor was in a sense the brain and heart of the 
VLBA (Romney 2000). This was where the tapes from the ten remote sites 
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were returned to be simultaneously played back and the data correlated. Using 
time stamps from a hydrogen maser atomic clock encoded at each antenna at 
record time, the tapes were synchronized at playback time to a small fraction of 
a microsecond and the signals from each antenna were correlated with the sig-
nals from each of the other nine antennas. Caltech did not have the resources 
to keep the correlator design team during a several year delay in funding, and 
agreed to terminate the correlator contract, which shifted back to NRAO, a 
move which was not completely unwelcome at NRAO.  Jonathon (Jon) 
Romney, who had originally been hired at NRAO to work with the Caltech 
group, assumed responsibility for finishing the VLBA playback system in 
Charlottesville. Exploiting the delay resulting from the reduced level of fund-
ing, Romney and his group decided on a then unconventional approach to the 
design of the correlator, an idea originally suggested by Marty Ewing at Caltech 
and based on a concept proposed by the Japanese scientist Yoshihiro Chikada.86 
The VLBA correlator used a custom designed “FX Chip” which itself turned 
out to be a challenge, and had to undergo several rounds of prototyping before 
a satisfactory version was fabricated.87
When completed in 1992 and moved to Socorro, the VLBA correlator was 
able to execute nearly a trillion (1012) multiplications a second, and supported 
up to 20 simultaneous playback systems, allowing the use of up to ten external 
antennas as well as the ten VLBA elements (Romney 2000). Alternatively the 
20 playback drives could be used to support a double data rate (512 Mbps) if 
two drives were simultaneously used to record at double the sustainable rate 
(256 Mbps). The VLBA divided the data into 16 IF bands, each 8 MHz wide, 
and was not fully compatible with the MK III systems being used elsewhere 
which divided the data into 64 bands, each 2 MHz wide. But with time, VLBI 
systems at radio observatories around the world were modified to conform 
with the VLBA standard. 
As a result of the constant budgetary concerns and the need to defer aspects 
of the VLBA construction, along with a confident, but naïve belief that most 
of the needed post-processing software was already available, NRAO did not 
devote sufficient resources to post-processing software development. As a 
result, VLBA users depended on the widely used Caltech Difmap VLBI pack-
age and on the Astronomical Image Processing System (AIPS), which had been 
developed for VLA data analysis. It would be several years after completion of 
the VLBA hardware before the VLBA could be considered fully operational 
and could be used by the non-expert observer. But the monitor and control 
software also lagged the hardware, in part due to a late start, and this impacted 
testing of the correlator (Walker 2000).
The last antenna at Mauna Kea was completed in April 1993, and was fol-
lowed by the formal VLBA dedication on 20 August 1993 (Fig. 8.9). Pete 
Domenici, who played such a vital role in funding both the VLBA and AOC 
construction, was the keynote speaker. As Paul Vanden Bout later recollected, 
Domenici’s staff and others were amused when, despite having it spelled out in 
large letters on a strip taped to the top of the podium, Domenici kept referring 
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to the “Very Large Big Array.” The final VLBA construction cost was $85 mil-
lion, considerably more than the proposed $50.7 million. Much of the increase 
was the result of the stretched out, nearly level NSF funding and the conse-
quential incremental purchases, and the need to maintain the standing army for 
the seven year construction period. Nevertheless, it would still be some years 
after the 1993 dedication before the VLBA became fully operational, including 
the specialized data reduction software needed to transform the data into high 
quality astronomical images.
The VLBA was arguably unique in having the broad involvement of the 
potential user community in specifying the design and contributing to its 
development. The Working Groups met regularly by teleconference and occa-
sionally in person to discuss the many issues as they arose. However, the VLBA 
had an unexpected unfortunate consequence for VLBI research in the United 
States. It was understood by everyone that the construction of the VLBA 
would likely lead to the termination of NSF funding support for the operation 
of the OVRO, Iowa, Illinois, Fort Davis, Texas, and Haystack antennas that 
were being used in support of VLBI Network observing. The first casualty of 
Fig. 8.9 VLBA dedication on 20 August 1993. US Representative Joe Skeen (left) 
and NRAO Director Paul Vanden Bout (right) watch as Senator Pete Domenici scans 
the bar code below the word “Start” to initiate observations of the galactic hydroxyl 
(OH) gas cloud known as W3OH. The bar code triggered lights for each station on the 
displayed map, sequencing from east to west, and put a message on operators’ screens 
prompting them to manually start the actual pointing sequence. Credit: NRAO/AUI/
NSF
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the VLBA was the critically located antenna at Fort Davis following the rejec-
tion of Harvard’s 1986 proposal to the NSF to operate the antenna through 
1989, although the VLBA construction had barely begun. This was followed 
by the gradual but premature termination of NSF funding for VLBI support at 
OVRO, Haystack, Iowa, Hat Creek, and Illinois, which limited their participa-
tion in Network VLBI activities using the partially completed VLBA.
The closing of these facilities for VLBI itself was not a surprise, nor neces-
sarily a disappointment, to their faculties and students, since it meant the end 
of their responsibilities to support VLBI observations in which they had no 
scientific involvement. But unexpectedly, the faculty and staff at these univer-
sity radio observatories also lost their research funding, which had previously 
been packaged as part of the observatory operations grants. This had a long- 
ranging impact, specifically to the VLBA and more broadly to US radio astron-
omy. Without research support, it was just those university scientists that had 
developed VLBI techniques, including their active participation in the design 
of the VLBA and in supporting the proposal to build the VLBA, that were 
forced to turn their attention elsewhere. At Caltech, former VLBI scientists 
migrated to millimeter and optical astronomy, went to JPL to work on NASA 
missions, or left radio astronomy. Readhead and Tim Pearson devoted the next 
years to building an interferometer in Chile to investigate the small scale struc-
ture in the cosmic microwave background. At Haystack, the VLBI group 
focused their activities on NASA-supported geodetic research. At Berkeley, 
Don Backer became increasingly involved in pulsar, SETI, and Epoch of 
Reionization (EoR) research. Perhaps more important in the long term was the 
loss of students who had to follow the money. As a result, following its comple-
tion in 1993, the VLBA was used primarily by scientists from Harvard/
Smithsonian, USNO, and NRL, with funding from Smithsonian and DoD 
respectively, as well as NRAO and foreign-based scientists. Indeed, much to 
the irritation of the NSF, about half of the available VLBA observing time has 
been used by non-US-based scientists, largely from Europe, but increasingly 
from China, Japan, and Korea, and ironically this probably contributed to the 
later NSF decision to divest from the VLBA (Sect. 8.10).
Transition to Operations88 VLBA operations began as early as 1987, starting 
with the first completed VLBA antenna at Pie Town which was used to supple-
ment the existing VLBI Consortium antennas. Additional VLBA antennas 
were added to the VLBI network antennas as they were completed. Initially, 
proposal review and scheduling were handled by the existing VLBI Consortium 
scheduling procedures, but starting in 1992, these activities were assumed by 
VLBA Operations.  To support the Consortium observations, pending com-
pletion of the VLBA correlator, MK II terminals were installed at the first seven 
VLBA antennas, and the data continued to be correlated at the Caltech/JPL 
processor. Data obtained using the broad band VLBA recorders were initially 
processed at Haystack, Caltech, Goddard, or Bonn as appropriate. For these 
observations with the Consortium antennas, the capabilities at the stations 
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included recording on narrow track recorders using either thick or thin tapes, 
or recording with the older wide track recorders. Maintaining capabilities to 
process all combinations stressed the operational capabilities of the 
processors.
During this period of “interim” VLBA operations, the NSF was unsympa-
thetic to requests for interim “pre-operating” funds. Even after the completion 
of the VLBA, NRAO never received the planned additional $7 million annual 
operating funds. This impacted other NRAO operations as well as slowing 
upgrades to the VLBA. 
8.9  OrBItIng vlBI (OvlBI)
From the time of the first VLBI experiments, radio astronomers appreciated 
that there were no theoretical limits to the resolution of radio interferometers. 
Interferometers the size of the Earth were easily and quickly implemented. By 
going to space, baselines could be extended without limit, and the possibility 
of Earth-Space VLBI, commonly referred to as “Space VLBI,” or “Orbiting 
VLBI” (OVLBI) was recognized as early as the Field (1982) Report. Its Radio 
Astronomy Panel Report (Thaddeus 1983) boldly suggested that a space VLBI 
mission required no new technology, and recommended that the VLBA be 
supplemented with a 25 meter orbiting radio telescope with compatible instru-
mentation, including IF data transmission to the Earth via the NASA Tracking 
and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS).
Probably the first serious Orbiting VLBI proposal was made in 1976 by 
Burke (MIT), Kellermann, and others, who suggested putting a 4 meter 
antenna on SpaceLab. The proposal was almost successful, but was beaten out 
by an infrared mission that apparently had broader engineering and surveil-
lance applications. Burke’s team proposed again in 1978 to orbit a 30 meter 
diameter antenna, but NASA later withdrew from the SpaceLab program. In 
1979, Burke suggested that the NASA Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar antenna 
could be used as a variable spacing interferometer during its voyage from Earth 
to Venus. But after initial approval, NASA concerns about being able to stow 
the antenna before going into orbit around Venus killed Burke’s ambitious 
VLBI project. Next, Burke and Frank Jordon (JPL) led an unsuccessful effort 
to fly a VLBI mission on the Space Shuttle.
The first demonstration of the practical feasibility of doing radio interferom-
etry from an orbiting spacecraft came not from a mission designed for the 
purpose, but from the NASA TDRSS. In 1986 and 1987, a team of scientists 
from the US, Japan, and Australia, led by Gerry Levy from JPL, used a 
4.9  meter antenna onboard the first NASA TDRSS antenna at 2.3  GHz 
(13 cm) together with 64 meter antennas in Australia and Japan to demon-
strate the feasibility of Earth to space VLBI (Levy et al. 1986; Levy 1989). The 
TDRSS spacecraft are in geostationary orbit, and operational restrictions 
allowed only a restricted range of observations to give a maximum projected 
baseline up to 2.15 Earth diameters (27,400 km). These OVLBI observations 
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demonstrated, for the first time, that some radio sources had brightness tem-
peratures as high as a few times 1012 K, at or above the traditional Inverse 
Compton Limit supporting the existence of bulk relativistic motion (Linfield 
et al. 1989).
Starting in the early 1980s and continuing for the next three decades, US 
and European radio astronomers, sometimes separately, sometimes collabora-
tively, proposed a number of Earth to space interferometers including 
QUASAT,89 the International VLBI Satellite (IVS),90 and the Advanced Radio 
Interferometry between Space and Earth (ARISE) mission.91 With primary 
support from ESA, NASA, and the US National Academy of Sciences, numer-
ous reports were written and meetings held in Gross Enzersdorf (Austria), 
Budapest, Bologna, Noordwijk (Netherlands), Paris, and Tokyo, and in the US 
at NRAO (Green Bank and Charlottesville), JPL (Pasadena), NASA (Cape 
Canaveral, Florida), and at the NAS (Washington DC). Burke and Frank 
Jordon (JPL) led the effort in the US, and Richard Schilizzi in Europe. 
Kellermann, and later Bob Brown and Larry D’Addario, represented NRAO at 
these meetings. To coordinate these efforts, COSPAR set up an ad-hoc 
Committee on Space VLBI under the leadership of Graham-Smith of the 
UK. Meanwhile, the four space agencies from the US (NASA), Europe (ESA), 
Japan (ISAS), and the USSR (Intercosmos) set up their own Inter-Agency-
Consultative-Group to exchange information on international OVLBI plan-
ning. The Global VLBI Working Group (GVWG) was organized at the 1990 
URSI General Assembly in Prague at the suggestion of NRAO Director Paul 
Vanden Bout and URSI Commission V Chair Ron Ekers to coordinate both 
space and ground-based observing and tape management. Many of the same 
people from the small OVLBI community served on these multiple committees.
Considerable development work went into the studies, but none of the pro-
posed US or European missions ever reached the launch pad. Launching large 
radio telescopes into Earth orbit is very expensive, and radio astronomy was 
doing very well from the ground. Within both Europe and the United States, 
radio astronomers were only looking to space to enhance their resolution, and 
they could not compete with the many proposals for infrared and high energy 
astrophysics missions where the science and the scientists were completely 
dependent on opportunities to observe from above the Earth’s obscuring 
atmosphere. Moreover, except for spectroscopic observations or a few special-
ized observations relating to the maximum brightness temperature of synchro-
tron sources,92 improved resolution can be obtained more easily and more 
cheaply by simply observing at shorter wavelengths. As a result, the relatively 
small radio astronomy community was unable to convince NASA or ESA to 
support a space VLBI program. However, they were more successful in Russia 
and Japan.
OVLBI also presents another challenge. Unlike other space astrophysics 
programs, OVLBI requires a network of ground radio telescopes to form the 
ground-based ends of Earth-Space interferometers. Moreover, typical space 
programs share the use of ground stations to send their data back, and OVLBI 
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requires the full time use of at least two ground stations to receive the broad- 
band spacecraft data on a continuous basis. The need for NASA and ESA  to 
team up with the ground community and surrender their control of the mis-
sion may explain their reluctance to become involved in OVLBI. In the US, the 
separation of funding for ground- and space-based astronomy between the 
NSF and NASA complicated the funding situation.
The 1984 meeting in Gross Enzendorf not only provided a focus for the 
proposed QUASAT mission, but western scientists heard, for the first time, 
about the proposed Japanese VSOP and Soviet RadioAstron OVLBI missions 
from Masaki Morimoto and Roald Sagdeev respectively. Morimoto was well 
known to US and European radio astronomers, not only for his role in build-
ing the Japanese 45 meter radio telescope at Nobeyama, but also for his bois-
terous, alcohol-enhanced after dinner performances at numerous scientific 
conferences. Sagdeev, by contrast, was the prominent director of the Soviet 
Space Research Institute (IKI) who was an advisor and confidant of Mikhail 
Gorbachev, but at the time, was not known personally to the US or European 
radio astronomers.93 Each of the two missions established their own interna-
tional advisory committees—the RadioAstron International Science Council 
(RISC) for RadioAstron and the VSOP International Steering Committee 
(VISC) for VSOP. Both VSOP and RadioAstron were identified in the 1991 
Decade Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics (Bahcall 1991) as excellent 
opportunities for international collaboration in astronomy, and recommended 
by the Radio Panel (Kellermann 1991) for NASA support for US participation 
in both missions.
VSOP The Japanese VLBI Space Observatory Programme (VSOP) was 
approved as an experimental mission by ISAS and was launched on 12 February 
1997 aboard the first test flight of the Japanese Space Agency M-V rocket. It 
was widely assumed by the participants that the acronym VSOP was chosen by 
Morimoto  after his favorite beverage. However, after launch, the spacecraft 
was renamed Highly Advanced Laboratory for Communications and 
Astronomy (HALCA). HALCA carried an 8 meter diameter dish into an ellip-
tical orbit with a 21,400 km apogee, and was instrumented with receivers for 
22 GHz (1.3 cm), 4.85 GHz (6 cm), and 1.66 GHz (18 cm). Unfortunately, 
the 1.3 cm system was damaged at launch. Without 1.3 cm, the resolution of 
VSOP/HALCA at the shortest wavelength (6  cm) was no better than the 
VLBA at 2 cm, and the opportunity to study H2O maser emission was lost. 
VSOP remained in operation for six years, and was used primarily to study 
quasars at both 6 and 18 cm, and also made observations of pulsars and OH 
masers (Hirabayashi et al. 2000a). During the six-year lifetime of the mission, 
the VISC oversaw the proposal and scheduling process. NRAO played several 
important roles supporting VSOP operations. Starting in 1997, after modifica-
tions under Jon Romney’s leadership to accommodate Earth to Space base-
lines, NRAO processed data from VSOP using the VLBA correlator. Larry 
D’Addario was successful in obtaining funds from NASA to build and operate 
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a ground station in Green Bank using the old 15 meter antenna previously used 
as the remote station of the GBI. Ed Fomalont spent time at ISAS providing 
support for planning observations and analyzing data after it was correlated.
A later Japanese initiative, tentatively named VSOP2, proposed to use a 
9 meter diameter antenna with cooled receivers at 5, 22, and 43 GHz in an 
elliptical orbit ranging from 1000 to 25,000 miles. To provide advisory sup-
port, the VISC was reconstituted as VISC-2. JPL, in collaboration with NRAO 
and US radio astronomers, requested NASA support for US supporting activi-
ties. The SAMURAI (Science of AGNs and Masers with Unprecedented 
Resolution in Astronomical Imaging) proposal requested NASA funding for a 
VSOP-2 tracking station, along with operational support for data analysis, and 
use of the VLBA and GBT. However, although VSOP 2 was initially approved 
by ISAS, they subsequently canceled the VSOP2 program due to technical 
problems and escalating costs. 
RadioAstron Discussions of space-based interferometer systems in the USSR 
go back to the 1960s, but the details of the early planning have been lost to 
Soviet era secrecy. RadioAstron, also known as Spectrum-R, was one of three 
planned Soviet space astrophysics missions developed at the Cosmic Research 
Institute (IKI), the others being Spectrum-UV and Spectrum-X-gamma to 
work in the ultraviolet and high energy parts of the spectrum respectively. 
Each of the planned Soviet missions was led by an influential and respected 
Soviet academician—Nikolai Kardashev for RadioAstron, Alexander Boyarchuk 
for Spectrum-UV, and Rashid Sunyaev for Spectrum-X-γ, who vigorously 
competed for scarce resources. For years, the claimed priority for the first 
launch of the Spectrum series of satellites seemed to depend on who you were 
talking to.
Unlike VSOP, which was only 22,000  km above the Earth, Kardashev 
planned that RadioAstron would go out to 100,000  km, which he later 
extended to 350,000  km, close to the distance to the Moon. Like VSOP, 
RadioAstron required international participation, partly to provide access to 
large ground radio telescopes, partly to obtain the advanced VLBI recording 
technology not available in the Soviet Union, along with the need to have a 
global tracking network. From the beginning, the Western RISC members, as 
well as prominent scientists in the Soviet Union, argued against the high orbit 
proposed by Kardashev, first on the grounds that due to inverse Compton scat-
tering, there would be no radio sources so small that they could be detected on 
such long interferometer baselines. Second, they argued that even if such small 
sources existed, interstellar scattering, at least for observations at the longer 
wavelengths, would likely broaden the source size, also rendering it unobserv-
able with the high resolution corresponding to such long interferometer 
baselines.
It seemed for years that launch of RadioAstron was always scheduled to be 
five years from the date of inquiry, possibly reflecting the need to keep the 
project within the rolling Soviet five-year plan. When Kardashev lost his bid to 
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become director of IKI he moved his whole team to the newly formed Astro 
Space Center (ASC), part of the well-known Lebedev Physical Institute, but 
due to space limitations at Lebedev, the ASC physically remained in the IKI 
building. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the ensuing deterio-
ration of the Russian economy further delayed the mission. Kardashev man-
aged to keep the RadioAstron team intact, but for at least a decade there was 
little progress toward a launch.
In 1989, Soviet Academicians Andrei Sakharov and Vitaly Ginzburg wrote 
to NASA Administrator Admiral Richard Truly asking for NASA support to 
provide tracking and data acquisition for RadioAstron and for funding for 
NRAO to build VLBA terminals for recoding the downlinked data in the 
USSR. The letter was signed by Sakharov only two weeks before he died.94 
Three months later, Vice President Dan Quayle, who headed the National 
Space Council, informed the Soviet ambassador to the US and issued a press 
release announcing that the US would participate in RadioAstron.95 NASA set 
up a “Joint Working Group” specifically to deal with US-Soviet collaboration 
on astrophysics space missions.96 US scientists, particularly from JPL and 
NRAO (Brown, D’Addario, Kellermann, and Weinreb), met frequently to 
develop plans for NRAO participation in RadioAstron. However, with the 
ensuing delays and uncertain status on the Russian side, as well the widely held 
skepticism about the choice of the orbit, NASA never got involved in 
RadioAstron, in spite of the NAS Decade Review which recommended “mod-
erate” support from NASA for both VSOP and RadioAstron (Field 1982). 
Later, at the request of Kardashev, NRAO did build two low noise 1.3 cm FET 
amplifiers for RadioAstron which were sold to the ASC at cost after obtaining 
the necessary export license. The 1.3 wavelength receiver was particularly 
important for the success of RadioAstron, as it provided the highest resolution 
for continuum sources and was also needed for observations of the 1.3  cm 
H2O maser sources.
RadioAstron was finally launched successfully from the Baikonur 
Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan on 18 July 2011. The spacecraft contained a 
10 meter diameter antenna and receivers for the 1.3, 6, 18, and 92 centimeter 
bands. At the time of the launch Russia had only one ground station at 
Puschino, near Moscow, to receive the IF data from the spacecraft. A second 
ground station was badly needed to support observations when the satellite 
was not in view of Puschino. Since the high orbit extending out to 350,000 km, 
a high gain antenna was needed, and the retired NRAO 140 Foot was an obvi-
ous choice. But the 140 Foot antenna had been mothballed years earlier, and 
considerable work was needed before it could be restored to operational status. 
As NASA funding to support these activities never materialized, and OVLBI 
was beyond the purview of NRAO’s NSF funding, shortly after the launch of 
RadioAstron NRAO and the Astro Space Center executed an MOU whereby 
the ASC provided the funds needed to refurbish the 140 foot antenna and to 
operate it as a downlink for RadioAstron. The Astro Space Center built a copy 
of the instrumentation used at Puschino and brought a team to Green Bank to 
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install the equipment and to train the NRAO staff in its operation. Under a 
series of further MOUs, the 140 Foot antenna continued to downlink data 
from RadioAstron for later correlation in Bonn or in Moscow. After six years of 
operation, the on-board hydrogen maser that provided the local oscillator ref-
erence signal finally died, and starting in July 2017, both Green Bank and 
Puschino have transmitted to the spacecraft a real time local oscillator link ref-
erenced to ground-based masers. Following the loss of communication with 
the spacecraft, scientific observations with RadioAstron ceased in early 2019.
Starting in 2012 RadioAstron was used with a variety of ground-based radio 
telescopes to study quasars, OH and H2O masers, pulsars, and the ISM, as well 
as doing tests of General Relativity with angular resolution as fine as 10 micro-
arcsec. The RadioAstron scientific program was based on annual open calls 
for proposals which were reviewed by an international Program Review 
Committee.97 For observations requiring the highest sensitivity, the GBT was 
used as the ground end of the Earth-Space interferometer. Much to the pleas-
ant surprise of Western colleagues, RadioAstron observations showed fringes 
out to more than 200,000 kilometers, demonstrating brightness temperatures 
more than 1013  K, or several orders of magnitude greater than the Inverse 
Compton Limit for stationary sources (e.g., Kovalev et  al. 2016; Pilipenko 
et al. 2018). The observation of fringes at 18 and even 92 cm on surprisingly 
long baselines has led to a new understanding of turbulence in the ISM and the 
nature of refractive scintillations (e.g., Johnson et al. 2016).
8.10  reflectIOns
The extraordinary milli-arcsec angular resolution of images made with the 
VLBA has enabled a wide range of galactic and extragalactic astronomy obser-
vations as well as important geodetic studies of continental drift and Earth 
rotation. As anticipated in the 1982 VLBA proposal, continuing observations 
of AGN jets have been a large part of VLBA observing programs, with data on 
individual sources now extending to as much as 25 years. Although much has 
been learned about the shapes (e.g., Pushkarev et al. 2017), kinematics (e.g., 
Cohen et al. 2007; Kellermann et al. 2007; Lister et al. 2016; Jorstad et al. 
2017), and polarization (Homan et al. 2018) of AGN jets, there is still much 
unknown about how the jets are launched, collimated, and accelerated to 
nearly the speed of light.
Phase referencing, only briefly mentioned in the proposal, has become an 
important and routine part of the VLBA.98 Precision VLBA astrometric mea-
surements at unprecedented levels (Reid and Honma 2014) have been a pleas-
ant surprise, more than meeting the proposal promises, and have enabled the 
determination of parallaxes (distances) to radio source throughout the Galaxy 
and the better delineation of its spiral arms (Reid et al. 2016) and overall struc-
ture, including size and rotational velocity. One of the important successes of 
the parallax measurements was the resolution of the distance controversy to the 
Pleiades star cluster (Melis et al. 2014).
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Probably the single biggest impact of the VLBA, one of critical importance 
to cosmology, has come from the direct geometric measurement of the dis-
tance to the galaxy NGC 4258 to an accuracy of 3 percent through precise 
temporal monitoring of the motions of water masers in Keplerian orbits about 
the galaxy's center (Herrnstein et al. 1999, 2005; Miyoshi et al. 1995). This 
has provided an accurate anchor for the Cepheid distance scale (Riess 2016). 
This work has led to the Megamaser Cosmology Project that determined the 
Hubble Constant, based on maser distances alone, to an accuracy of 5 percent 
(Reid et al. 2013). These measurements also led to the best evidence for the 
existence of a supermassive black hole (108 solar masses) in another galaxy.
Throughout this period, the VLBA has also contributed to studies of Earth 
orientation and plate tectonics (e.g. Petrov et al. 2009), tests of general relativ-
ity (e.g., Fomalont et al. 2009), and interplanetary spacecraft navigation (e.g., 
Jones et al. 2011). The ongoing USNO program makes daily VLBA measure-
ments to provide Earth orientation and rotation parameters needed for preci-
sion navigation. However, there have been some duds as well. Observations of 
stimulated radio recombination lines, which was claimed to be of “particular 
interest” in the 1982 proposal, never materialized.
Many VLBA observing programs have involved other radio telescopes, 
mostly in Europe, but also in Australia, Japan, China, Korea, and South Africa. 
More recently, the Large Millimeter Telescope (LMT) in Mexico and ALMA 
in Chile have been used to supplement millimeter VLBI.  The use of these 
external antennas improves the image quality over that of the VLBA alone, but 
introduces compatibility and operational complexities of the kind that existed 
before the VLBA and that the VLBA was intended to eliminate. A particularly 
attractive mode of operation has been the High Sensitivity Array (HSA) which 
adds two or more of the large radio telescopes at Green Bank, Bonn, Arecibo, 
and the VLA99 to the VLBA.
By the end of the 20th century, the VLBA had to an extent become a victim 
of its uniqueness. Because telescopes at other wavelengths do not have the 
resolution comparable to that of the VLBA, the range of VLBA scientific inves-
tigations has had little overlap with the interests of the broader American sci-
entific community. Quasars, AGN, cosmic masers, and radio stars are point 
sources to OIR, X-ray, and γ-ray telescopes. Moreover, the US VLBI commu-
nity never fully recovered from the loss of funding resulting from the VLBA 
construction and the termination of university based VLBI grant support. At 
the same time, VLBI has thrived in the rest of the world. Modest VLBI 
Networks were created in Australia, Russia (KVASAR Network),100 China, 
Korea, and Japan to complement the broader East Asian and Asia-Pacific VLBI 
Networks. As part of the African SKA program, Africa has begun an ambitious 
program to repurpose redundant communication dishes for VLBI.  Within 
Europe, VLBI has received strong national support, as well as generous fund-
ing from the EU, perhaps as a relatively non-controversial and relatively inex-
pensive means of promoting European unity. The EVN has expanded to 
include observatories in Africa, China, and even the US Arecibo Observatory.
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Unlike the user community at other NRAO facilities, only about half of the 
VLBA users have been from US-based institutions, many from NRL, USNO, 
SAO, and the NRAO staff, rather than from the university community. Faced 
with limited operating funds and in anticipation of increased demands for oper-
ating funds for the planned Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST), DKIST, 
and ALMA (Sect. 10.7), the VLBA became a likely target for decreased NSF 
funding. Claiming that future NSF budgets would grow no faster than infla-
tion, in 2005, the NSF charged a “Senior Review Committee” to “examine the 
impact and the gains that would result by redistributing ~$30 million of annual 
spending from [Astronomy] Division funds.”101 As a boundary condition of 
the study, the NSF specified, “we will not use resources from unrestricted 
grants programs (AAG) to address the challenges of facility operations or the 
design and development costs for new facilities of the scale of LSST, GSMT, 
SKA, etc.” AUI was asked to make “the case for and priority of each compo-
nent of NRAO (VLA, VLBA, GBT, ALMA operations, etc.), along with a 
defensible cost for each.” In addition, the NSF asked that AUI provide “as 
realistic an estimate as possible of the cost and timescale that would be associ-
ated with divestiture of each component.”102 
In its report, the Senior Review Committee recommended that
The Radio-Millimeter-Submillimeter base program should comprise the Atacama 
Large Millimeter Array, The Green Bank Telescope, and the Expanded Very 
Large Array [JVLA], operations together with support for University Radio 
Observatories and technology research and development through the Advanced 
Technologies and Instrumentation Program.103
The Committee went on to recommend that
The National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center and the National Radio 
Astronomy Observatory, … should seek partners who will contribute to person-
nel or financial support to the operation of Arecibo and the Very Long Baseline 
Array respectively by 2011 or else these facilities should be closed.
Unless additional non-NSF sponsors could be found, the VLBA was clearly 
in trouble. Over the next few years, NRAO did reduce VLBA operating costs, 
but at the expense of reduced user support and poorer reliability. An agreement 
was reached with USNO by which USNO helped to support the VLBA in 
order to carry out their time measurements. Additional support to keep the 
VLBA operating was provided by the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de 
México (UNAM) in Mexico, MPIfR, and the European Radio Net. This exter-
nal support helped, but was not sufficient to keep the VLBA operating. “In 
order to assess the most promising scientific areas for the VLBA, as well as 
review the options for new operational models and explore opportunities for 
additional support of VLBA operations,” NRAO Director Fred Lo invited 
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national and international observatory directors, NSF staff, and VLBI leaders 
to participate in a “Workshop on the Future of the VLBA.”104 
More than 60 scientists from 12 countries attended the Charlottesville 
Workshop held on 27–28 January 2011 (Fig. 8.10). Unfortunately, the start of 
the workshop was delayed by a major snow and ice storm which swept the East 
Coast on 26 January. Many participants spent the night at various airports or 
were on the road for up to nine hours to drive the 110 miles from Dulles 
Airport to Charlottesville. One participant obtained refuge in the back seat of 
a police vehicle when his rental car became stuck in the road. Following a series 
of talks on the major VLBA observing programs, the status of the various inter-
national VLBI networks, and discussions about recent and planned technical 
improvements, the participants agreed that the VLBA should emphasize key 
science and other large projects that involved less support from NRAO staff. 
The workshop participants also pledged sufficient external support that, com-
bined with further cost saving measures, would enable NRAO to continue to 
operate the VLBA.  In return NRAO would recognize the contributions of 
subscribers by awarding them a larger fraction of observing time, meaning less 
time for Open Skies proposals, even from US-based observers.
However, even this tough approach proved to be inadequate. The 2010 
Astronomy Decade Review, “New Worlds and New Horizons” (Blandford 
2010), provided an ambitious new agenda for the NSF Astronomy Division, 
which now faced potential additional operating funds for the highly recom-
mended OIR, GSMT,105 and LSST projects as well as for a variety of moderate 
programs. The NSF projected astronomy budgets were unable to support 
Fig. 8.10 MPIfR Director Anton Zensus (right) confers with USNO Scientific 
Director Kenneth Johnston at the January 2011 Charlottesville VLBA Workshop. 
Credit: KIK/NRAO/AUI/NSF
8 VLBI AND THE VERY LONG BASELINE ARRAY 
446
these new initiatives as well as all of the existing facilities. James (Jim) 
Ulvestad,106 the NSF Astronomy Division Director, convened a new “Portfolio 
Review Committee, Advancing Astronomy in the Current Decade: 
Opportunities and Challenges,” that was charged with recommending the 
“AST portfolio best suited to achieving the decadal survey goals” under several 
budget scenarios. The Committee, chaired by Daniel Eisenstein107 from 
Harvard, considered the whole AST portfolio of new and existing facilities and 
recommended that “AST divest from [the VLBA and GBT] before 
FY17,” and that
Within the context of open skies, the NSF should look to leverage its assets to 
maximize the ability of U.S. astronomers to access non U.S. capabilities or to 
obtain contributions toward operations and maintenance costs for U.S. facilities 
with high fractions of foreign users.108
In response to the Portfolio Review Committee report, when the AUI 
Cooperative Agreement to operate NRAO was due to expire in 2015, the NSF 
issued a competitive program solicitation for proposals to operate only the 
NRAO Jansky Very Large Array (JVLA), the North American share of ALMA, 
and the Charlottesville Central Development Lab.109 It was the first time in the 
60 year history of AUI management of NRAO that the NSF did not renew the 
NRAO five-year contract or Cooperative Agreement based on a non- 
competitive proposal. This time, a competing proposal was submitted to man-
age NRAO by the Southeastern Universities Research Association (SURA). 
Following a lengthy and detailed evaluation and review process, the NSF 
awarded AUI two new ten-year Cooperative Agreements, one to manage the 
North American share of ALMA and the other for NRAO operation of the 
JVLA, the Charlottesville Headquarters, and the Central Development Lab, 
effective 1 October 2016. Management of the Green Bank Observatory (GBO) 
and the VLBA under the Long Baseline Observatory (LBO) continued under 
an extension of the previous Cooperative Agreement, but with reduced fund-
ing for operations. Moreover, the LBO and GBO were established as new 
independent observatories, reporting directly to AUI and not as part of 
NRAO.110 However, AUI appointed NRAO Director Tony Beasley as the AUI 
Vice President for Radio Astronomy, with direct responsibility for the NRAO, 
GBO, and LBO. Walter Brisken, a long-time member of the Socorro staff, was 
named as the LBO Director reporting to Beasley.
As planned when the decision was made to locate the VLBA operations in 
Socorro, the long-time operation of the VLBA jointly with the VLA as part of 
NRAO’s New Mexico Operations was very effective. Many of the scientific, 
technical, computing, and administrative staff seamlessly supported both 
instruments. The new split, mandated by the NSF, added an extra layer of 
administration. The LBO did not have sufficient staff or resources to manage 
proposal review, human resources, or other administrative responsibilities, and 
depended on NRAO for these tasks, and it continued to use the nrao.edu email 
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server. As mandated by the NSF, the LBO reimbursed NRAO for the cost of 
providing these various services. Considerable effort by AUI, NRAO, LBO, 
and the NSF was devoted to preparing the guidelines by which the LBO would 
operate as an “independent observatory” which was not really independent, 
and the NSF provided a one-time $1.5 million budget increment to set up the 
needed administrative framework.
Under the leadership of Brisken and Beasley, the LBO concluded an arrange-
ment by which the USNO paid for half of the cost of the VLBA operations and 
development in return for half of the observing time to conduct observations 
to determine UT1 and other Earth rotation parameters. Smaller agreements 
with Australia, China, the MPIfR, the New  York University in Abu Dhabi 
(UAE), and DoD provided additional financial support in return for observing 
time, enough that the NSF was satisfied that NRAO had created a sustainable 
operations model for VLBA.  Following a non-competitive AUI proposal 
requested by the NSF, the once-threatened VLBA was reintegrated back into 
NRAO effective 23 October 2018. While providing less Open Skies observing, 
especially for small individual investigator projects, the long term stability of 
the VLBA was assured.
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CHAPTER 9
The Largest Feasible Steerable Telescope
From the very earliest stages, planning for NRAO included the construction of 
a very large fully steerable radio telescope with a diameter up to 1000 feet. 
However, following the 140 Foot debacle, there was no support for funding 
such an ambitious and risky construction program. After the construction of 
the 300 Foot Transit Telescope with its limited capabilities, NRAO initiated 
the Largest Fully Steerable Telescope (LFST) program to design and poten-
tially construct a very large fully steerable radio telescope. The LFST team 
produced a series of designs for a 300 foot antenna capable of working at 1 cm 
wavelength, a 64 meter antenna working to 3 mm wavelength, and finally a 25 
meter telescope working to 1 mm wavelength, but none of them were ever 
built. Although every review of the needs of radio astronomy supported the 
construction of a large fully steerable radio telescope, there was always a higher 
priority—the VLA, the VLBA, and most recently ALMA.  In 1988, an NSF 
review committee recommended that the 27-year-old NRAO 300 Foot Transit 
Telescope be closed in order to provide funds for operating other new astro-
nomical facilities. However, when the 300 Foot Telescope unexpectedly col-
lapsed in November 1988, it was reported in the media as a national disaster 
for U.S. astronomy. West Virginia’s Senator Robert Byrd demanded that the 
telescope be replaced. Although the NSF had other plans, Byrd included $75M 
in the 1989 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill. The new 100 meter 
Green Bank Telescope would not be completed until the year 2000, and only 
after contentious litigation as to who was responsible for the delays and nearly 
factor of two increase in cost.
9.1  Early Discussions
Probably the first use of a parabolic dish for radio astronomy was in 1933 by 
John Kraus and Arthur Adel, who used a 1 meter diameter search-light mirror 
to try to detect the Sun at 20 GHz (1.5 cm) (Kraus 1984, p. 59). Although 
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they correctly speculated that sunspots might be regions of enhanced radio 
emission, they were unsuccessful due to the poor sensitivity of their receiver. As 
reported in a series of articles in the popular magazine Radio-Craft, even ear-
lier, small parabolic dishes had been used for both transmitting and receiving 
radio waves in a variety of laboratory experiments and for communications over 
some tens of miles.1 These pioneering programs were made at what were then 
called “ultra-short wavelengths” below 1 meter. In 1928, Fredrick Kolster of 
Palo Alto, California applied for a patent for a radio beacon to be used to guide 
airplanes to safe landings during periods of poor visibility. Kolster proposed 
using a small antenna at the focal point of a paraboloid to concentrate the 
radiation into a relatively small beam.2 Even earlier, in 1888, during his pio-
neering experiments to demonstrate the existence of the electromagnetic waves 
predicted by James Maxwell, Heinrich Hertz used cylindrical parabolic reflec-
tors to both transmit and receive radio signals generated by a spark gap.
When Grote Reber decided to follow up on Karl Jansky’s discovery of cos-
mic radio emission at 20 MHz (15 meters), he recognized that a large para-
bolic dish would provide the most flexible opportunities, including the ease of 
changing frequency bands (Reber 1958). Reber’s home-built dish became a 
prototype for later generations of antenna designs ranging from the familiar 
small consumer TV receiving dishes to the Jodrell Bank 250 foot telescope and 
German 100 meter steerable dishes to the ill-fated Sugar Grove 600 foot 
antenna. Starting with the 1964 Whitford Report (Whitford 1964), all of the 
National Academy of Sciences reviews of astronomy (Greenstein 1973; Field 
1983), as well as the two NSF Dicke Committees (Dicke 1967, 1969), recog-
nized the need for a large general purpose fully steerable parabolic dish for 
radio astronomy. But there was always another higher priority radio astronomy 
project that took precedence, and it would take a freak 1989 accident, a deter-
mined Green Bank scientist, and an influential, strong-minded US Senator 
before American astronomers would have a large fully steerable dish for radio 
astronomy.
Although Grote Reber’s 32 foot radio telescope, described in Chap. 1, was 
not the first use of a parabolic radio reflector, in 1937 Reber’s telescope was the 
largest parabolic antenna ever built. During WWII German engineers went on 
to build thousands of 3 meter (9 foot) diameter Würzburg antennas and hun-
dreds of the so-called “Giant Wurzburg,” 7.4 meter (23 foot) radar dishes, 
many of which found a home doing radio astronomy after the end of war hos-
tilities (Sullivan 2009, p. 78). However, it would not be until 1951 that a larger 
purpose-built radio telescope would be erected on top of the Naval Research 
Laboratory building overlooking the Potomac River. The NRL 50 foot fully 
steerable dish had a very precise surface and made some of the first radio 
astronomy observations at millimeter wavelengths, although at the time, the 
limited sensitivity of millimeter wave receivers restricted millimeter observa-
tions to the thermal radiation from a few planets and H II regions.
Motivated primarily by the need for better angular resolution, as early as 
1946 Grote Reber conceived an ambitious project to build a 200 foot diameter 
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
463
steerable antenna essentially based on his Wheaton design. Realizing the advan-
tages of a fully steerable antenna, but also recognizing the complexity and cost 
of a 200 foot equatorially mounted telescope, he suggested using an alt- 
azimuth (alt-az) mount and an innovative analogue coordinate converter to 
provide a capability for tracking celestial sources. Reber assumed a maximum 
frequency of 3 GHz (10 cm) limited by electronics that might be available in 
the “visible future.” In a letter to Otto Struve, Reber estimated that a 200 foot 
antenna could be built for $100,000.3
Nearly a decade later, Reber prepared a more detailed design of a 220 foot 
steerable antenna with a surface accuracy of about 3 mm, including sketches of 
all joints, a complete parts list, and a small model. By this time the cost had 
risen to $650,000 plus the unspecified cost of the drive system. Reber also 
outlined how he would extend the design to apertures up to 500 foot or more 
with a corresponding decrease in surface accuracy, and sketched the design of 
a 750 foot fixed spherical reflector mounted in a natural hole in the ground, 
such as Meteor Crater near Winslow, Arizona or Crater Elegante in Mexico.4 
This concept was later developed by Bill Gordon for the 1000 foot dish near 
Arecibo, Puerto Rico (Sect. 6.6). A year later, Reber argued that instead of the 
intermediate sized 140 Foot Radio Telescope, AUI should build a 600 foot 
diameter fully steerable antenna, which he estimated could be built for 
$10 million.5
With great prescience Reber sketched out many concepts for a fully steerable 
paraboloid that were rediscovered by others only much later. This included the 
realization that a structure that is strong enough not to bend will not fall; that 
due to turbulence, a wire mesh dish will not survive wind speeds greater than 
20 mph any better than a solid surface; and that some antenna bending under 
gravity is not a problem, provided that the dish structure maintains a parabolic 
shape. Reber also made the innovative suggestion to mechanically adjust the 
dish structure using what he called “equalizers” to compensate for gravita-
tional deformations, a concept that would not be successfully implemented for 
nearly another half century. He also suggested locating the antenna on a cliff 
looking to the south. In this way, he argued, the effect of sidelobes seeing the 
ground would be kept to a minimum when the antenna was pointed at the 
center of the Galaxy which would be low in the sky toward the southern horizon.
Reber unsuccessfully tried to interest the Carnegie Institution’s Department 
of Terrestrial Magnetism, Harvard, MIT, the Office of Naval Research, and the 
NSF, as well as the nascent NRAO, in building his 220 foot radio telescope 
design. But Reber felt that his presentations were not taken seriously, no doubt, 
at least in part, due to his reluctance to follow what had by that time become 
fairly routine formal procedures to apply for NSF grant support. Only the 
New York-based Research Corporation found Reber’s ideas of sufficient inter-
est to provide modest support amounting to less than $250,000 over a 30-year 
period starting in 1951. However, the Research Corporation was interested in 
funding people, not big expensive facilities such as a large steerable radio 
telescope.
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9.2  intErnational challEngEs
Elsewhere in the world, radio astronomers were actively planning to build ever 
larger radio telescopes.
Bernard Lovell’s Ambitious Plans for Jodrell Bank Following the successful 
completion of his 250 foot Mark I radio telescope in 1957, Bernard Lovell 
ambitiously began to think about building an even larger radio telescope. The 
Mark IV radio telescope was conceived as a fixed parabaloid, perhaps 1,500 to 
15,000 feet across and up to 500 feet high. The 125 by 83 foot Mark II and 
Mark III telescopes were built as prototypes of the planned Mark IV instru-
ment, and were used together with the Mark I as part of the very effective 
Jodrell Bank radio interferometry programs described in Chap. 2. But faced 
with increased competition for funds from Martin Ryle’s group at Cambridge 
and Stanley Hey’s group at Malvern, as well as growing government interest in 
participating in an international radio astronomy program such as the Benelux 
Cross, the funding for the ambitious Mark IV design study was repeatedly 
delayed, and never materialized. However, encouraged by hopes of funding 
from the United States, Lovell and Charles Husband conceived plans for a 
radio telescope “at least half the size of the visionary Mark IV,” which Lovell 
named the “Mark V.” Lovell’s clearly stated goal was to build “the maximum 
possible size of dish for the money available,” although this would mean com-
promising the accuracy and thus the shortest operating wavelength (Lovell 
1985, p. 37).
By 1965, Lovell and Husband had a conceptual design for a 400 foot diam-
eter telescope, which Husband estimated could be built for just over £4 mil-
lion. Further engineering studies were developed by both Husband & Company 
and by Freeman Fox, who had designed both the Australian 210 foot antenna 
and the Canadian 150 foot radio telescope at Algonquin Park. During a visit to 
Harvard and MIT, Lovell became aware of the CAMROC design for a large 
radome-enclosed radio telescope (Sect. 9.5). Although the American scientists 
and engineers argued that an enclosed antenna could be built for much lower 
cost than one open to the environment, the CAMROC cost estimate was four 
times larger than the estimates for Lovell’s Mark V antenna. The large discrep-
ancy worried Lovell, but he was reassured by a meeting with the director of the 
National Science Foundation, after which Lord Francis Fleck said, “The NSF 
freely admit their dearth of genius by contrast which has led to expenditure far 
in excess of the British for far less results.” (Lovell 1985, p. 27).
With the increasing emphasis on shorter wavelengths, especially by the 
emerging cadre of young radio astronomers interested in molecular spectros-
copy, the original Mark V design goal of full efficiency at 21 cm no longer 
seemed adequate. However, the construction of a radio telescope of the pro-
posed Mark V dimensions and capable of operation at such short centimeter 
wavelengths at a cost within the expected ceiling of £4.5 million, seemed to be 
an insurmountable challenge. Lovell apparently seemed unaware until 1968 of 
the developments in the homologous design concept, and of the already well 
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advanced plans of German radio astronomers to construct a 100 meter radio 
telescope near Bonn to operate at wavelengths as short as one centimeter (see 
below). The projected price of only DM 32 million (equivalent then to about 
₤3.4 million or $8 million) dismayed Lovell and his Jodrell Bank colleagues, 
who were skeptical of the German claims. When he later learned that the 
German telescope performed as expected, Lovell claimed that following the 
UK drive to join the European Common market, the pressure to collaborate 
with Germany killed his Mark V ambitions. Perhaps as a result of keeping his 
cards close to his chest and his failure to maintain usual scientific contact with 
his international colleagues, Lovell appeared to be surprisingly naïve about the 
German plans until he read of their completion in Nature.6 The most optimis-
tic Mark V scenario called for an antenna that was 2.5 to 5 times less accurate 
than the German telescope, depending on elevation and wind, and would not 
be operational until at least five years after the Bonn telescope. As related by 
Lovell, even the Jodrell staff were “rebellious” and recognized the futility of 
pursuing the Mark V concept (Lovell 1985, p. 104). 
By late 1970, there was a further increase in the estimated (but acknowl-
edged by Husband as not firm) cost of the Mark V radio telescope to nearly £8 
million. Increased costs, the change of the UK government, Lovell’s impend-
ing retirement, and decreasing prospects of support for new scientific projects, 
led to the abandonment of the Mark V project and its subsequent resurrection 
as a smaller Mark VA radio telescope. Over the next few years, Lovell advocated 
building a 375 foot diameter radio telescope, but by 1974, it appeared that 
even this smaller radio telescope would cost at least £17–20 million. Finally, 
nearly 15 years after Lovell had first proposed constructing a very large radio 
telescope, the UK Science and Research Council informed the University of 
Manchester that it would be unable to fund the proposed Mark VA radio tele-
scope. Lovell responded by soliciting support from the respective radio astron-
omy commissions of the IAU and URSI. Citing long standing tradition, both 
of these international scientific unions declined to get involved in any political 
funding issues. Feelers from Germany offering time on the Effelsberg telescope 
were interpreted by Lovell as intending to “delay and destroy his Mark VA 
project” and “prevent us from building a larger instrument than the 100-m 
Bonn telescope.” (Lovell 1985, p. 170) Krupp offered to build a copy of the 
Bonn telescope for half of the estimated Mark VA cost, but this was rejected by 
Lovell, who did not want to abandon the Husband design and start a pro-
tracted new study. Moreover, he argued that the UK should not “inject so 
much money in another economy,” and that British engineers would not accept 
such a radical proposal.
The Effelsberg 100 Meter Radio Telescope (Fig.  9.1) The MPIfR 100 meter 
Effelsberg Radio Telescope7 that so frustrated Lovell arose as a result of the 
visionary ambitions of the German scientist Otto Hachenberg, a generous gift 
from the German Volkswagen Foundation, and the recognition by the German 
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Max Planck Gesellschaft (MPG) of the growing opportunities in radio astron-
omy. Starting from the 1888 generation and detection of radio waves by 
Heinrich Hertz, through the WWII development of sophisticated radar sys-
tems, German radio research had a long and distinguished history. However, 
due to restrictions on all radio research imposed by the occupying American, 
French, and British military forces, radio astronomy was slow to develop in 
Germany. Among the major players in German wartime radar research were 
Leo Brandt and Otto Hachenberg, who had both worked at the Berlin-based 
Telefunken Company. After the war, Hachenberg became director of the East 
Berlin Heinrich Hertz Institute, and commuted between his home in West 
Berlin and his work in the East. But following the erection of the Berlin Wall 
on 13 August 1961, Hachenberg was unable to get to work and found himself 
without a job.
After the radio limitations were lifted in the 1950s, Bonn University built a 
25 meter radio telescope on the nearby Stockert Mountain and in 1962 invited 
Fig. 9.1 MPIfR 100 meter radio telescope at Effelsberg, Germany designed by Otto 
Hachenberg. Elements of the International LOFAR Array can be seen in the fore-
ground. Credit: Norbert Tacken, MPIfR
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Hachenberg to become the director. Being on top of a mountain in one of the 
heaviest industrial areas in the world, the high level of RFI (radio frequency 
interference) limited the effectiveness of the Stockert radio telescope. 
Hachenberg initially began to develop plans for building a 65 meter dish, com-
parable to the Parkes radio telescope, to provide the university with a competi-
tive research facility. Although he was unable to find the DM 8 million needed 
to construct the 65 meter antenna, Hachenberg went on to design an 80 
meter, then 90 meter, and finally a 100 meter radio telescope. Then, teaming 
up with other Bonn University colleagues, Hachenberg finally received half of 
a DM 32 million ($8 million) grant from the German Volkswagen Foundation 
to help build a 90 meter radio telescope at the University of Bonn. 
By good fortune, Hachenberg’s friend, Leo Brandt, had become a high 
ranking official in the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen. Due to the Allied 
embargo, Brandt was unable after the War to find work in science and engi-
neering, and began a career in politics. As Minister of Economy and Transport 
and later Secretary of State of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Brandt introduced the first 
speed limits within German cities. He was also able to help his old wartime 
friend Hachenberg by providing additional funds from the state and from the 
German Ministry for Research and Education to allow Hachenberg to build a 
100 meter rather than 90 meter dish. Brandt also arranged to make a small plot 
of land available to build a radio telescope in a valley located near the small vil-
lage of Effelsberg in the Eiffel Mountains about a one-hour drive from Bonn. 
A small river which marked the boundary between Nordrhein-Westfalen and 
the Rheinland-Pfalz had to be relocated to make room for the telescope. As a 
result, the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen became larger by about 2000 
square feet. 
Meanwhile, the MPG had become interested in the exciting new field of 
radio astronomy and invited Sebastian von Hoerner to become the director of 
the new institute for radio astronomy, located in Tübingen. As a young man, 
von Hoerner was drafted into the German army and sent to the Eastern Front 
where he participated in the German siege of Leningrad. After losing an eye at 
Leningrad, von Hoerner spent the rest of the War back in Germany in a research 
laboratory. In February 1945 he narrowly escaped the ravages of the Allied 
bombing of Dresden. Life in Germany did not get much easier after the War. 
Von Hoerner survived by collecting old tire tubes discarded by the occupying 
forces which he used to fabricate into rain coats that he then sold back to the 
US soldiers. Having no money, he then worked his way through his doctoral 
studies at Universität Göttingen by harvesting farm crops, in return for which 
he was allowed to take enough food to eat and was given a place to sleep. 
Initially he studied theoretical physics under Carl von Weizsäcker who guided 
him to problems in astrophysics. After receiving his PhD, von Hoerner moved 
to Heidelberg. In 1960, he came to NRAO as a one-year visitor at the invita-
tion of Otto Struve, who was looking to broaden the scientific perspectives of 
his staff, which was heavily oriented toward radio problems. After returning to 
Germany for a few years, von Hoerner went back to Green Bank as a  permanent 
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member of the NRAO scientific staff, only to be invited back to Germany to 
become co-director of the new Max-Planck-Institut für Radioastronomie 
(MPIfR), which was to be located near Tübingen (Fig. 9.2).
Although von Hoerner planned to go Tübingen, the Volkswagen Foundation 
awarded funds to Universität Bonn, and under pressure from Leo Brandt the 
MPG agreed to locate the new MPIfR in Bonn. As a result, von Hoerner 
declined the appointment at the MPIfR and remained at NRAO where, as 
described below, he went on to design, together with John Findlay, a series of 
large radio telescopes which were never built. The conflict between Bonn and 
Tübingen was further exacerbated by two factors. Von Hoerner and Hachenberg 
had mostly, but not entirely independently, developed the concept of homol-
ogy whereby instead of trying to design a very rigid structure, the dish struc-
ture is allowed to deform to a new parabola as it is tipped to different elevations.8 
Von Hoerner used an analytical approach compared to Hachenberg’s more 
empirical approach in designing the 100 meter Effelsberg radio telescope 
(Hachenberg 1970; Hachenberg et al. 1973).  But each felt that he alone was 
responsible for developing the homology concept. Also, von Hoerner and 
Hachenberg had competed for a fixed level of Volkswagen funding which was 
initially split between them. However, when von Hoerner decided to remain at 
NRAO, the full DM 32 million was made available to Hachenberg and the 
Bonn group, sufficient to plan for a 100 meter size radio telescope. 
The Effelsberg telescope was constructed by a consortium of the German 
firms Krupp and MAN, and has been in operation since 1972. Hachenberg 
Fig. 9.2 Sebastian von 
Hoerner, 1960. As a 
member of the NRAO 
Scientific Staff, he laid the 
analytical foundations for 
the homologous design of 
radio telescopes, and, 
along with John Findlay, 
was an active participant 
in the NRAO LFST 
project. Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
469
became the founding director of the MPIfR and was shortly joined by Peter 
Mezger and Richard Wielebinski. Hachenberg brought with him scientists 
from Bonn University while Mezger, a German scientist who had earlier 
worked at the Stockert radio telescope, brought back a number of young radio 
astronomers who had been part of his team at NRAO.  Following several 
upgrades to the surface and pointing, the Effelsberg radio telescope operates 
well today at 1.3 cm and is even used at wavelengths as short as 3.5 mm. Until 
the dedication of the Green Bank Telescope in 2000, the MPIfR 100 meter 
radio telescope remained the largest fully steerable radio telescope in the world. 
Interestingly, many of the designers and builders of the large radio tele-
scopes constructed in the 1950s and 60s made their reputation building 
bridges. Sir Charles Husband, who designed the Jodrell Bank 250 foot antenna, 
later went on to design the Britannia Bridge connecting the island of Anglesey 
with the Welsh mainland as well as the bridge featured in the movie The Bridge 
Over the River Kwai. The CSIRO 210 foot radio telescope and the Canadian 
150 foot telescope were designed by Freeman Fox and Partners who had previ-
ously designed the Sydney Harbour Bridge. Ned Ashton, who built the NRL 
50 foot radio telescope and later designed the 140 Foot Radio Telescope, had 
built several bridges over the Mississippi River. The 140 Foot project was ini-
tially contracted to the General Dynamics Electric Boat Company, the contrac-
tor for most of the US Navy’s submarines, which may explain the windowless 
control room and submarine appearance of the room containing the declina-
tion bearing.
9.3  thE sugar grovE Fiasco
While AUI, the NSF, and US radio astronomers were still debating the size of 
the NRAO telescope, scientists at the Naval Research Laboratory, under the 
leadership of James Trexler, conceived a plan to build a 600 foot diameter fully 
steerable antenna that would be both a powerful tool for radio astronomy, as 
well as for a variety of intelligence gathering applications. A few years earlier, 
Trexler had led the NRL program which successfully bounced the first voice 
signals off the Moon (Trexler 1958), suggesting interesting possibilities for 
surveillance of Russian radio transmissions. Discussions between the NRL 
Radio Counter Measurers Branch led by Trexler and the Radio Astronomy 
Branch led by John Hagen and Ed McClain resulted in a proposal to build a 
600 foot fully steerable parabolic antenna. The concept was promoted simulta-
neously in the scientific and popular media as a radio telescope and in the halls 
of the Pentagon and Congress as a tool for military surveillance (van Keuren 
2001; Greenberg 1964). Funds for the 600 foot antenna became available in 
1958, and due to a perceived military expediency during the height of the Cold 
War, construction started immediately. The publicly stated use of the proposed 
600 foot antenna was to monitor Soviet radio communications and radar 
reflected off the Moon’s surface and for radio astronomy. Coincidently, the 
Navy antenna was to be located near Sugar Grove, WV, only 30 miles from 
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NRAO in Green Bank but a mountain range away. Subsequently this appar-
ently led to considerable confusion among the public, if not the Washington 
bureaucracy, about the purpose of the Sugar Grove antenna and the distinction 
between Sugar Grove and Green Bank facilities. Indeed, in 1962, NSF Director 
Alan Waterman was chastised by Congressman Albert Thomas about “the real 
bear …. down there in West Virginia,” (DeVorkin 2000, p. 56) and Harvard 
radio astronomer Edward Lilley referred to the Sugar Grove 600 foot antenna 
as “a radio telescope fiasco.”9 In part, the use of the term radio telescope for the 
Sugar Grove facility, whether intended or not, contributed to the confusion 
and misunderstanding.
The Sugar Grove antenna specifications were first laid out in December 
1957 and were revised several times up until October 1959. The antenna was 
to be built from 30,000 tons of steel, 14,000 cubic yards of concrete, 600 tons 
of aluminum, and would stand 665 feet high. The movable reflecting surface 
was equivalent to two football fields in diameter. All of this was to be accom-
plished without the aid of modern computer-based finite element analysis.10 
Initial operation was anticipated for July 1962  (Figs. 9.3 and 9.4).
Fig. 9.3 Artist’s conception of the US Navy’s 600 foot Sugar Grove antenna. Credit: 
NRAO/AUI/NSF
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The terms “radio telescope” and “radio antenna” were used interchange-
ably in Navy documentation. The coordinate conversion and steering of the 
telescope were based on an inertial guidance system under computer control 
using punched cards as the normal means of inputting instruction and punched 
paper tape to provide a continuous record of the antenna positioning. However, 
there was also a provision for allowing manual keyboard or “digital dial” input. 
The antenna surface was specified to consist of “no more than 210” individual 
panels. In order to maintain the precise surface and orientation of the dish in 
the sky under wind and thermal deformations, servo-controlled hydraulic jacks 
were designed to keep each panel within a planned 0.7 inch tolerance. Each 
panel was specified to be made of expanded, unrolled (non-flattened) alumi-
num alloy with openings not to exceed 0.625 by 1 inch, suggesting that opera-
tional frequency would not be greater than about 1 GHz. Provision was made 
to mount a four-inch optical telescope with a TV camera readout to point 
within 10  arcsec of the radio axis, presumably to support radio astronomy 
research. The antenna was to be painted with a white paint approved by the 
Navy’s Bureau of Ships or BuShips for “top side” ship surfaces.
Although initially much of the activity surrounding the design and construc-
tion was classified, the existence of the project was publicly acknowledged, in 
fact even surprisingly well advertised (McClain 1960). The 1957/1959 
antenna specifications document only carried the lowest classification level of 
“CONFIDENTIAL,” which doesn’t suggest a serious security concern, and 
was declassified in September 1962. A more detailed technical specification for 
the drive and control system, dated July 1962, was not classified. By this time, 
it was described only as a “radio telescope.” A New York Times article stated 
that the Sugar Grove “telescope will be the largest ever built to tune in on the 
radio signals created in the stars and planets …. [and] will be able to look into 
space nineteen times further than the 200-inch optical telescope on Mount 
Fig. 9.4 Partially built 600 foot surface backup structures lie on the ground at Sugar 
Grove in mid-1965. Credit: KIK/NRAO/AUI/NSF
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Palomar.”11 When construction began in early 1959, the Navy apparently acted 
with typical military expediency to begin construction without waiting for 
detailed design, engineering, and cost evaluation or with any outside review or 
oversight.12 Rather than contract with a commercial organization with experi-
ence in building large antennas, responsibility for the construction was given to 
the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks (BuDocks). According to Admiral Frank 
Johnston, the design and construction were to proceed concurrently in order 
to save three or four years for what he described as an important military facility. 
The construction cost was initially estimated to be $20 million, and it was 
expected that it would require about 30 people to operate the facility. A com-
puter aided analysis of the structure made in 1959–1960 showed that the origi-
nal design was faulty and had to be scrapped. Curiously, the 12,000 square-foot 
two-story antenna control and operations building was built underground, 
500 feet away from the antenna. It was surrounded by two foot thick concrete 
shielding, ostensibly to provide RFI protection, although a simple Faraday 
Cage constructed of wire would have sufficed. One can only speculate about 
the true purpose of this underground concrete bunker. Interestingly, RFI spec-
ifications went down to 15 kHz probably in recognition of other activities on 
the site such as communication with the US Naval submarine fleet.13 
The 600 foot cost estimates continued to grow. By the middle of 1962, 
there was considerable doubt about the feasibility of constructing such a large 
fully steerable dish, and the projected cost had ballooned to $300 million, 
while the estimated number of personnel that would be needed to operate the 
facility had increased by a factor of 30 to more than 1,000. Nearly $50 million 
had already been spent and another $50 million had been committed. 
As early as September 1960, George Kistiakowski, Science Advisor to 
President Eisenhower, received a memorandum from his staff discussing the 
growing costs of the NRAO Green Bank Observatory and the Sugar Grove 
Naval Research Station.14 In Green Bank, the projected cost of the 140 Foot 
Radio Telescope had risen to $5.5 million or nearly twice the original cost. At 
the same time, $134.6 million had been authorized to complete the Sugar 
Grove project, roughly 4.5 times the original estimate, but Kistiakowski was 
advised, “nobody believes it will” be completed. While the 140 Foot Antenna 
was expected to be exclusively used for radio astronomy, the Navy started to 
talk about Sugar Grove being available half of the time for radio astronomy, the 
remainder being for Navy operational requirements, including bouncing sig-
nals off the Moon, communication and electronic intelligence, and deep space 
probe communications. As late as October 1961, a New York Times article 
reported that McClain and Trexler had stated that “the major construction 
problems for the instrument had been solved,” and that “construction is 
expected to stay within the latest authorized figure of $135 million.”15 But the 
weight of the moveable structure had increased to 32,000 tons, about 
 equivalent to a naval battleship, in order to maintain the surface accuracy 
needed to support the now claimed maximum observing frequency of 2.3 GHz. 
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When Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara finally cancelled the Sugar 
Grove project in July 1962, the final cost to complete the construction was 
predicted to be $230 million. McNamara only mentioned in passing the tech-
nical problems and escalating costs, and stated that satellites could now provide 
the intelligence that the 600 foot antenna was to have obtained. Curiously, that 
same month the Navy issued an amendment to the technical specifications for 
the drive and control systems, by which time the Sugar Grove antenna was 
being increasingly described as a “radio telescope” that “could spot the edges 
of the Universe.” The amount of scientific use of the Sugar Grove antenna was 
variously described as 25 to 50 percent. Otto Struve had been recruited to 
head a committee to review proposals for astronomical observing time on the 
Sugar Grove antenna, and although it was speculated that any astronomical 
observing would be highly coordinated and under the control of NRL, AUI 
was concerned that the advertised existence of astronomical studies at Sugar 
Grove would compromise NRAO’s own goals of building a very large antenna.16 
As it turned out, the financial and technical embarrassment resulting from 
widely publicized cancellation of the ambitious 600 foot project, coupled with 
the apparent mismanagement, delays, and cost escalation of the 140 Foot proj-
ect, became a serious black mark on US radio astronomy, and in particular on 
NRAO, that would take years to erase. The 17,000 cubic yard concrete foun-
dation and 550 ton main bearing remain on the Sugar Grove site as a challenge 
to some future archeologists (Greenberg 1964). 
Locally, residents of this small remote Appalachian Sugar Grove community 
had anticipated that the Navy’s antenna project would bring in new employ-
ment opportunities with corresponding increases in land values. The resultant 
real estate speculation was premature and the ultimate cancellation of the 600 
foot antenna project impacted the local economy as well as the image of US 
radio astronomy, especially at Green Bank. 
Even after the 600 foot project was abandoned by the Navy, West Virginia 
Congressman Ken Hechler, a member of the House Science and Aeronautics 
Committee, asked the Navy to delay its “dismantling of the facilities” so that 
the NSF could consider a proposal by North American Aviation to use the 
already fabricated steel to build a less expensive 600 foot transit telescope at 
Sugar Grove for NRAO at a cost of only $20 million.17 By this time the radio 
astronomers were wary of any involvement by the military, and NRAO declined 
to get involved. But West Virginia Senator Robert Byrd appealed to then 
President John Kennedy to maintain a presence at Sugar Grove, which contin-
ued until 2016 as the Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC), to 
conduct communications research and development for the Department of 
Defense. A quarter of a century later Senator Byrd would again intervene, this 
time to support radio astronomy in West Virginia.
Various antenna arrays, a 150 foot fully steerable antenna,18 as well as smaller 
antennas and arrays were later built at Sugar Grove to support the Naval 
 operation.19 The Sugar Grove 150 foot antenna began as an investigation by 
John Findlay at NRAO to turn the NRAO 300 foot transit design into a fully 
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steerable instrument, and was later pursued by Austin Yeomans at NRL who 
wanted to build a 300 foot antenna at Sugar Grove. Yeomans’ planned 300 
foot antenna never got built, but Yeomans later teamed up with Trexler and 
Edward Faelten to build a scaled down 150 foot version for Sugar Grove. 
Although built primarily for intelligence surveillance, in the 1960s and 1970s 
the 150 foot antenna was used infrequently for radio astronomy and was 
included in a number of VLBI programs.
Following the terrorist attacks on New York World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the Sugar Grove facility remained in opera-
tion by the National Security Agency for various intelligence surveillance appli-
cations. The continued presence of the NSA facility at the center of the National 
Radio Quiet Zone (NRQZ) has been important in preserving the NRQZ for 
radio astronomy in Green Bank. Half a century later, the contradiction between 
the classified nature of the project and the broad public dissemination of infor-
mation about the project, along with the perhaps deliberately leaked confusion 
over the contrasting intelligence and radio astronomy goals, remains a mystery. 
After the project was canceled, a spokesman for the Defense Department 
acknowledged that “some of the capabilities from the beginning of the project 
had been overstated,” and that “certain statements …. were scientifically inac-
curate.” An obvious limitation of using reflections from the Moon to warn of 
an impending Soviet rocket attack is that the Moon is visible at both Sugar 
Grove and Russia for only a few hours a day. One wonders about the real pur-
pose of the Sugar Grove 600 foot antenna project and the massively shielded 
so-called telescope control building.20
By 2013 the NSA no longer had any need for the extensive domestic living 
facilities that had been built to support the large operational staff anticipated 
for the 600 foot antenna and other NIOC instruments. The General Services 
Administration announced the sale of the Sugar Grove Station including 80 
single family homes, a 45 thousand square foot administration building, day- 
care and community centers, athletic facilities, and “much more.”21 Bids started 
at $1 million and on 25 July 2016 the NIOC was ultimately sold to an anony-
mous bidder for $11.2 million.22
9.4  thE largEst FEasiblE stEErablE tElEscopE projEct
Although AUI wisely decided not to initially stretch its technical and financial 
resources, the construction of a very large fully steerable radio telescope was 
clearly on the agenda for the new radio observatory. As early as October 1957, 
the NRAO Advisory Committee met in conjunction with a broader group of 
astronomers, radio astronomers, and physicists to discuss future research pro-
grams at the Observatory and approved the following statement:
The NRAO must continually anticipate the needs of and future developments in 
radio astronomy, and act promptly and decisively to provide for these needs. 
Because of the great time lag in the development of major instrumentation, the 
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NRAO should through its scientific advisors and staff, look now at the general 
direction of radio astronomy development in coming years, and commence plan-
ning for the next stage of development beyond the 140-ft.23
Work on the 140 Foot Telescope had hardly started when Dave Heeschen 
requested $250,000 from the NSF for “engineering studies and design of a 
very large antenna system.” In this time period the acronym “VLA” was used 
to refer to the planned very large antenna rather than the Very Large Array, 
which came later (Chap. 7). In his proposal to the NSF,24 which ran just over 
two pages, Heeschen stated that while the 140 Foot “will solve many of the 
current problems in radio astronomy, [it will] undoubtedly make many new 
discoveries and open new fields for investigation, … many of which will require 
still more powerful instruments for their study. This is the way science works.” 
Heeschen went on to argue the virtues of an antenna with 106 square feet of 
collecting area (equivalent to a 560 foot diameter dish). But faced with the 
construction of the first 85 foot antenna, the delays in the 140 Foot Telescope, 
and the construction of the 300 Foot Transit Telescope (Chap. 4), for the next 
five years, NRAO was not able to pursue these ambitious goals. In 1959, 
Heeschen again outlined the wide range of motivations for a very large antenna 
(VLA) ranging from the Sun and Solar System bodies to problems of galactic 
structure and dynamics and the structure and evolution of distant galaxies.25 
Meanwhile, the NSF Advisory Panel on Radio Telescopes emphasized the 
emerging technique of aperture synthesis over the construction of a single 
large aperture antenna.26 (See Sect. 7.2). The Panel met three times. John 
Findlay and John Bolton were present as guests at the third meeting, which was 
held at the AUI office in Washington. Although Emberson was unable to 
attend, based on what he was told by others he informed the AUI Board that 
“John Bolton argued vigorously against the need for a Very Large Antenna, 
and that there seemed to be very little enthusiasm for the construction of such 
an instrument.”27 Undeterred, Heeschen and Findlay prepared a report for the 
NRAO Director arguing for a very large antenna or VLA at the NRAO.28 Only 
with a VLA, Findlay and Heeschen claimed, could NRAO meet the instrumen-
tal needs of radio astronomy and support the research programs of staff and 
visiting observers alike. Findlay and Heeschen laid out a plan following the 
completion of the 300 Foot Transit Antenna to form a VLA design team con-
sisting initially of 10 to 15 scientists and engineers starting in 1962. 
In January 1963, following the successful completion and initial operation 
of the 300 Foot Transit Radio Telescope, Findlay and Robert Hall of Rohr 
Corporation discussed the possibility of constructing a 400 foot transit antenna 
with greater declination coverage and the capability to operate at shorter wave-
lengths than the existing 300 Foot structure. A month later, NRAO authorized 
the first phase of a design study by Rohr. Under Hall’s leadership, Rohr 
 completed their design work by June, but in view of the continuing issues with 
the 140 Foot Telescope, the estimated cost of more than $3.5 million was 
more than NRAO could realistically hope to find. Only a few months later, 
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however, NRAO entered into a new contract with Rohr, for a feasibility study 
of a 100 meter fully steerable radio telescope capable of operating up to 3 GHz 
(10 cm). The Rohr study started with the design of the successful CSIRO 210 
foot radio telescope which was the basis for the Rohr design of the 210 foot 
dish for the JPL Deep Space Network. Also under consideration was a 100 
meter concept being developed by Harold Weaver at the University of California 
Berkeley. 
As its first and second priorities for radio astronomy, the 1964 Whitford 
Report recommended the construction of the NRAO Very Large Array and 
the expansion of the Caltech Owens Valley Array (Sect. 7.2). However, as the 
third and fourth priorities, the Committee recommended the construction of 
two fully steerable 300 foot paraboloids at a cost of $8 million dollars each, as 
well as “approximately 15 … smaller special-purpose instruments.” The panel 
also supported the need for the very large fully steerable telescope and recom-
mended $1 million for an engineering study for “the largest feasible steerable 
paraboloid” (Whitford 1964).
So even before the completion of the 140 Foot Telescope, US radio astron-
omers were looking past the 140 Foot to new possibilities. Succumbing to the 
pressure for observing time on the existing 300 Foot transit telescope, and 
buoyed by the Whitford recommendation, Heeschen sent a two-page letter to 
the NSF requesting that $2 million be added to the NRAO 1965 budget to 
build a second 300 foot transit dish, one that would work to 10 cm wavelength 
and have a larger declination range than the existing 300 foot dish.29
In October 1964, shortly after the release of the Whitford Report, a group 
of 14 American radio astronomers met in Green Bank “to discuss the question 
of whether this is the time to start thinking about a design study for a very large 
steerable telescope.”30 Although Heeschen, Director of NRAO, stated up front 
that NRAO’s first priority was now the Very Large Array, he said that NRAO 
considered a large steerable radio telescope to be a second priority, and a mil-
limeter wave telescope a third priority. The debate focused around a larger 
transit dish optimized for continuum work at centimeter wavelengths, and a 
smaller fully steerable antenna for spectroscopic studies working at somewhat 
shorter wavelengths. The group agreed at the end that radio astronomy needed 
a fully steerable telescope having a circular beam working down to at least 
18 cm and preferably to 10 cm. 
Although modest about the wavelength requirements, the group was more 
ambitious about the possible size, and discussed the construction of antennas 
with dimensions up to 600 feet (183 meters) in diameter. Perhaps unrealisti-
cally encouraged by the rapid funding and construction of the successful 300 
Foot Transit Telescope, Heeschen suggested that a 400 foot (123 meter) tran-
sit telescope could be in operation by the end of 1966, while “a 100-m fully 
steerable dish could take about two years longer.”31 In their final report, the 
committee concluded that “the meeting gave the NRAO a mandate to under-
take a feasibility study of a steerable instrument with a circular beam, a diame-
ter of at least 600 ft. useful down to 18 cm and hopefully down to 10 cm.”32 
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The following January, NRAO Deputy Director John Findlay documented 
the scientific and technical case for using NRAO resources to investigate design 
concepts for a large fully steerable radio telescope to be located in Green 
Bank.33 Heeschen appointed a working group under Findlay (1965) to investi-
gate the feasibility and options for constructing a very large fully steerable radio 
telescope as envisioned in the original NRAO planning discussions.34 Initially 
the group began as “The Largest Feasible Steerable Paraboloid Working 
Group,” but morphed into the “Largest Feasible Steerable Telescope” or 
“LFST” Group when they realized that configurations other than a paraboloid 
might be feasible and more cost effective. The group met for the first time on 
2 April 1965. Over a period extending until 1972, the working group issued 
57 reports, 42 of which formed a numbered series.35 Engineers from interested 
industrial firms often attended the meetings. 
A major result of these studies came from the work of von Hoerner, who 
investigated the fundamental principles and constraints for the design of large 
antennas. In an important paper, von Hoerner defined a “stress limit,” a “grav-
itational limit,” and a “thermal limit.” Von Hoerner showed that for any given 
diameter there is a corresponding minimum wavelength, and stated that “any 
design that did not reach this limit was a waste of resources.” (von Hoerner 
1967). The stress limit, argued von Hoerner, is important only for diameters 
greater than 600 meters. Antennas larger than 40 meters are gravitationally 
limited, that is, they will deform under their own weight, while smaller ones are 
thermally limited due to temperature gradients across the structure, although 
thermal effects can be reduced at night, on cloudy days, or if the antenna is 
enclosed in a radome. However, he concluded that radomes are of no value for 
antennas larger than about 50 meters since they are limited by gravity, and even 
for smaller antennas, the value of a radome is “doubtful” (Fig. 9.5). 
Another outcome of the LFST study, although one which was already sub-
jectively understood by experienced observational radio astronomers, is that 
when pushed to shorter wavelengths, the performance of a radio telescope 
does not degrade as fast as theoretically predicted, assuming that the surface 
deviations from an ideal paraboloid are random. Moreover, it was recognized 
that, in practice, the effects of changing gravitational deformation result in a 
shift of the focal point of the dish as it folds up under gravity, and that the sub-
sequent loss of gain experienced when the antenna is tipped in elevation can be 
partially mitigated by moving the antenna feed vertically to the new focal point. 
An extension of these ideas led to von Hoerner’s “homologous deformation” 
concept described earlier. Traditional antenna designs required that the struc-
ture be as rigid as possible to minimize the impact of gravitational deforma-
tions. In homologous designs, the structure is allowed to bend, but in a 
carefully controlled way, so that under gravity, as the antenna is tipped, the 
surface bends into a new parabola, and the loss of gain can be recovered by 
merely moving the feed to the new focal point. But the price paid for a homol-
ogous design is that each structural member must be of a precise weight and 
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cross section, so the use of standard structural steel is mostly precluded, thus 
increasing the cost. 
The group also considered “ground supported antennas” such as the 
Arecibo 1000 foot antenna, as well as parabolic designs up to 200 meter in 
diameter with limited elevation movement which they argued could be built 
for about $60 million. One of the first concepts studied was for a 650 foot 
diameter floating concrete sphere structure that would support a 600 foot 
diameter reflector that would be driven in azimuth while a moving feed allowed 
celestial sources to be tracked up to one or two hours.36 The motivating idea 
behind this concept was that in conventional radio telescopes, the limiting fac-
tor is the gravitational deflection as the dish structure is tipped. With a fixed 
elevation structure, gravitational deflections would not be relevant. Also, such 
a structure would have minimum wind and thermal loads as well as minimum 
maintenance and friction due to the lack of a mechanical bearing. Considerable 
effort was expended in developing the fixed spherical reflector concept with 
several commercial consultants as well as with University of Virginia civil engi-
Fig. 9.5 Sebastian Von Hoerner’s diagram showing the natural limiting size of anten-
nas as a function of diameter and operating frequency due to gravitational and thermal 
distortions. The solid points show existing telescopes in 1972, while the open circles 
reflect planned new facilities. The proposed NRAO 65 meter millimeter-wave telescope 
shown in Fig. 9.7 is number 6 on the plot. Other major telescopes are Effelsberg (13), 
Arecibo before and after planned resurfacing (26 and 27), and the NEROC design 
(19). Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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neers contributing to the design. Construction cost was estimated to be 
between $34 and $50 million to produce a structure capable of operating at 
wavelengths as short as 10  cm. However, the massive structure suggested 
unusual construction and drive problems requiring “unusual solutions,” such 
as the large amount of antifreeze that would be needed to prevent freezing of 
the supporting liquid (Fig. 9.6). 
In the end, it was clear that a conventional alt-az mounted fully steerable 
dish represented the only practical means to build a large radio telescope that 
would meet the scientific requirements of full sky coverage and flexibility. Over 
a period of seven years, the LFST group produced reasonably advanced designs 
for three telescopes that were thought to meet the requirements for a scientifi-
cally strategic antenna. The first was for a 200 meter dish based on the Navy’s 
Sugar Grove design. Although the LFST design was for a dish ten percent 
larger than the Sugar Grove antenna, had a solid instead of mesh surface, and 
a considerably more accurate surface and pointing accuracy, the LFST group 
estimated the construction cost of a 200 meter fully steerable radio telescope as 
$105 million, or less than half of the estimated completion cost of the Sugar 
Grove 600 foot antenna. 
Nevertheless, it was soon realized that a 200 meter antenna would be too 
heavy, too complicated, and too costly. The group went on to consider a 300 
foot homologous dish that would operate with good performance down to 1 
or 2 cm wavelength and could be built for only $8 million.37 This was NRAO’s 
answer to the radome enclosed 450 foot CAMROC antenna. However, the 
Fig. 9.6 Floating spherical antenna concept, North American Aviation. Credit: 
NRAO/AUI/NSF
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discovery of a variety of interstellar molecular species with transitions below 
1 cm wavelength quickly made the 300 foot design appear obsolete, and the 
group turned its attention to the design of a radio telescope that could operate 
at millimeter wavelengths to exploit the new opportunities presented for study-
ing interstellar chemistry.38 It would be another four years before the group 
would produce a fully homologous 65 meter radio telescope design with good 
performance down to 3.6 mm, but only under “benign conditions” of tem-
perature and wind (Findlay and von Hoerner 1972). The cost of constructing 
the 65 meter antenna was estimated to be just under $10 million (Fig. 9.7). 
The 65 meter antenna was never built, and in fact was never even formally 
proposed, but for a short time it competed with the Very Large Array in the 
deliberations of Greenstein’s (1973) Astronomy Survey Committee Radio 
Panel (Sect. 7.4). With the increased emphasis on shorter wavelengths, the 
LFST group turned their attention to a 25 meter radio telescope which was 
later proposed by NRAO for operation at wavelengths as short as 1 mm wave-
length. Following review by the NSF, the 25 meter millimeter telescope actu-
ally made it into President Carter’s FY1981 and 1982 budget requests, but was 
ultimately dropped in favor the VLBA (Chaps. 8 and 10).
Years later, von Hoerner commented that LSFT should have been the 
Largest Fundable Steerable Telescope, noting that the project began with 200 
Fig. 9.7 Artist’s conception of the 65 meter millimeter wave telescope. Credit: 
NRAO/AUI/NSF
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meter diameter, then went down to 100, to 65, to 25 meters, and finally con-
verged to zero. Although meant in jest, there was a real message here that 
ambitions must be carefully weighed against funding realities or, more accu-
rately, perceived funding realities, because in practice it is so difficult to realisti-
cally predict funding scenarios even a few years downstream. 
As late as 1979, NRAO Director Morton Roberts asked Findlay for an 
updated cost estimate to construct a large, fully steerable antenna for future 
planning. However, there is no record that anything further developed as a 
result of this initiative.
9.5  challEngEs From caliFornia anD cambriDgE
Planning for the next generation of large steerable radio dishes was not con-
fined to NRAO. In 1965, around the same time as the NRAO LFSP/LFST 
program, two other independent initiatives appeared on the scene in apparent 
competition with the NRAO project as well as with each other. In the East, the 
MIT Lincoln Laboratory and the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory at 
Harvard University formed the Cambridge Radio Observatory Committee 
(CAMROC) to study designs for a large steerable radio/radar telescope to be 
located in the northeastern part of the United States.39 Around the same time, 
OVRO Director Gordon Stanley wrote to Harold Weaver at U.C. Berkeley 
and Ron Bracewell at Stanford suggesting collaboration among the three uni-
versities for the construction of a 100 meter antenna. Caltech, Stanford, the 
University of California Berkeley, and later the University of Michigan joined 
to form a consortium known as the Associates for Research in Astronomy 
(ARA) to develop a “western regional radio astronomy facility.” In 1965, the 
newly formed Western Regional Facility submitted a proposal to the NSF to 
design a 100 meter dish good to 10 cm for a cost of $12.3 million.40
The ARA antenna was to be located at the Owens Valley Radio Observatory 
where it could operate together with the proposed Caltech synthesis array 
(Chap. 7). Although it seemed expeditious to involve other universities in the 
proposal, Caltech was firm that they would maintain control. In particular, the 
OVRO site director, George Seielstad, questioned the added value of the con-
sortium and urged construction and operation by Caltech alone, although he 
conceded that the antenna should be available for everyone with a “proposal to 
be judged solely on the basis of scientific merit” by a committee including rep-
resentatives from outside Caltech but not confined to Stanford, Berkeley, and 
Michigan.41 However, the ARA proposal ran head up against the competing 
MIT-Harvard proposal for a 440 foot radome enclosed radio telescope.  Just as 
Lovell found in the UK with his proposed Mark V antenna, the NSF was 
unwilling to fund a $350,000 design study without some expectation of fund-
ing the construction, but they were also unwilling to consider construction 
funding without a detailed design and cost estimate. Moreover, both the NSF 
and Caltech were concerned that the proposed ARA 100 meter radio telescope 
would be in competition with the proposed expansion of the OVRO interfer-
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ometer which had already received good reviews, and so the plan for the pro-
posed Western Regional Facility in Radio Astronomy did not attract much 
national interest. It was unceremoniously killed in August 1967 by the first 
Dicke Committee “because of the more revolutionary possibilities inherent in 
the Arecibo and NEROC concepts”42 (Sect. 7.4).
While it was noted that the US needed a large steerable radio telescope to 
keep up with the Jodrell Bank and Parkes radio telescopes, initially the motiva-
tion of the Harvard-MIT group was apparently to provide a competitive facility 
for Harvard, MIT, and other New England universities located close to home. 
Concerns about the extreme RFI environment in the New England area were 
dismissed as being no worse than anywhere else due to the increasing prolifera-
tion of RFI from aircraft and satellites which occur essentially everywhere.
Following the success of the Haystack 120 foot radome-enclosed antenna, 
the Lincoln Laboratory commissioned a study of even larger radomes. The 
report issued by Ammann & Whitney, Consulting Engineers, concluded in 
1965 that radomes in the range 550 feet to 1100 feet were feasible at costs 
ranging from $7.75 million to $46 million respectively, and that such struc-
tures would result in antenna cost savings greater than the cost of the radome.43 
The CAMROC initial planning was for a 400 foot radome-enclosed structure 
working to 3 GHz (10 cm) wavelength. The actual CAMROC proposal, sub-
mitted two years later, discussed in two volumes the scientific merits of a large 
filled-aperture steerable dish, and the preliminary design of a 400 foot radome- 
enclosed dish with a surface good for operation up to 6 GHz (5 cm).44
As has been characteristic of the radio astronomy community, at the same 
time as there was a certain level of competition between the CAMROC and 
NRAO LFST groups, there was good technical cooperation, with members of 
each group serving on the “competition’s” design committees and a number 
of common commercial consultants serving both projects. Indeed, when the 
Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO) initiated a meeting in 1968 to 
solicit community support for their antenna project, SAO Director Fred 
Whipple asked NRAO’s John Findlay to chair the meeting held at the 
Smithsonian Museum of History and Technology located on the Washington 
Mall.45 The 31 meeting participants included representatives of Harvard, 
Smithsonian, MIT, Cornell, Ohio State, JPL, NRL, Caltech, the Universities 
of California and Maryland, NSF, and NASA. Whipple informed the group 
that given the “approval and endorsement” of the participants, the Smithsonian 
Institution would “attempt to take steps on their behalf to bring into being a 
national radio and radar filled-aperture telescope.” According to Findlay, the 
Smithsonian was “ready to serve the national users.”46
However, the participants largely had their own priorities and gave less than 
enthusiastic endorsement to the proposed CAMROC radome-enclosed large 
radio telescope.  Instead they prefaced their report by pointing out the need for 
both “large arrays and large dishes,” and urged the timely completion of the 
Arecibo upgrade. The report did point out the “urgent need for a large filled 
aperture radio-radar telescope,” but recommended that it be located at a “site 
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selected primarily on the basis of scientific and technical criteria,” thus effec-
tively rejecting the Smithsonian arguments for a New England site. They also 
agreed to endorse the Smithsonian design as the basis for the final design, 
encouraged the SAO to submit a proposal to an unspecified “appropriate 
agency of the Federal Government,” and said that the Smithsonian should 
“carry the general responsibility for the funding, design, construction, and 
operation” of the antenna as a national facility for radio-radar astronomy.47
In 1967, thirteen northeastern institutions, including the Smithsonian 
Astrophysical Observatory, Harvard, and MIT, formed the Northeast Radio 
Observatory Corporation (NEROC), a nonprofit consortium to plan an 
advanced radio/radar facility. In an attempt to circumvent the normal but 
lengthy NSF proposal review process, NEROC sought to have the telescope 
funding included in the FY1970 Smithsonian budget. The bill died in Congress, 
partly as the result of what was considered only a lukewarm endorsement from 
the two Dicke Committee reports (1967, 1969) (Sect. 7.4). In June 1970, 
NEROC submitted a new proposal to the NSF for the design and construction 
of a radome-enclosed 440 foot diameter fully steerable antenna capable of 
operating to wavelengths as short as 1.2 cm (25 GHz).48 But this time, after a 
heated battle within the NAS Greenstein Committee reviewing the needs for 
astronomy in the 1970s, the ambitious NEROC proposal to finally provide 
American radio astronomers with the long planned large steerable radio tele-
scope lost out to the NRAO proposal to build the Very Large Array (Sect. 7.4) 
(Greenstein 1973).49
9.6  a national DisastEr lEaDs to a nEw 
raDio tElEscopE
By the mid-1980s, the UK’s Jodrell Bank 250 foot antenna had been upgraded 
several times with a new, more precise surface and a new precision pointing 
system which allowed operation at wavelengths as short as 6 cm. Meanwhile in 
Australia, the 210 foot dish had also been upgraded, in part with funds received 
from NASA to support the Apollo lunar program. Australian scientists were 
using the inner part of the dish at 1.3 cm wavelength to study interstellar water 
vapor and ammonia. In Canada, the National Research Council was operating 
a 150 foot fully steerable alt-az mounted dish which had a better surface than 
the 140 Foot Telescope. The most visible competition came from the Effelsberg 
100 meter fully steerable antenna operated by the Max-Planck-Institut für 
Radio Astronomie in Bonn, Germany.
The New Large Steerable Radio Telescope Study In September 1987, users of 
the 300 Foot Telescope and other radio astronomers gathered in Green Bank 
to celebrate 25 years of discoveries and to plan for future research programs. 
But with the still-unfinished VLBA construction and the growing interest at 
NRAO in millimeter astronomy, there appeared little prospect for the long-
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desired US 100 meter class fully steerable antenna of the kind that was envi-
sioned when NRAO was formed in the 1950s.
At the suggestion of one of the present authors (KIK), MIT Professor 
Bernard Burke, a longtime NRAO user, AUI Board member, and supporter of 
NRAO, wrote to NRAO Director Paul Vanden Bout, suggesting that NRAO 
explore the possibility of replacing the aging 140 Foot Telescope with its 
“antique” equatorial mount, inferior surface, poor pointing, and high mainte-
nance cost. In a prescient remark, Burke noted that, “It would certainly be 
prudent to have the plans in readiness as soon as possible, should the proper 
occasion arise on short notice.” Burke suggested the formation of a working 
group at NRAO to examine the scientific motivation, size-wavelength trade- 
offs, and cost of a 140 Foot replacement telescope.50 The most likely funding 
source identified by Burke was support of the space VLBI missions planned by 
Japan and the USSR. Unable to convince NASA to support an American-led 
space VLBI mission (Chap. 8), Burke and others speculated that NASA might 
be willing to fund the construction of the large ground-based radio telescope 
that would be needed to complement the necessarily small orbiting space 
antenna, but at a small fraction of the cost needed to deploy a space-based 
radio telescope for VLBI.
Vanden Bout responded by appointing a committee to formulate a scientific 
justification for a new large antenna, to address the tradeoffs between size and 
short wavelength limit, and to consider concepts that would reduce the con-
struction and operating cost. Since NRAO was still building the VLBA and was 
committed to the construction of the Millimeter Array (Chaps. 8 and 10) as 
the next NSF-funded major NRAO project, Vanden Bout instructed the com-
mittee to consider sources of funding other than the National Science 
Foundation.51 The committee was charged with reporting by the end of 1988. 
Unable to come up with a reasonable descriptive name for a telescope that had 
not yet been designed, as a spoof on the LFST project, the prospective new 
telescope was provisionally named the NLSRT, the New Large Steerable Radio 
Telescope, “because that is so bad that there is no danger that it will, by default, 
become the final name.”52
The NLSRT Committee concentrated on antennas in the range of 70 meters 
to 120 meters that would operate with short wavelength limits from a few mil-
limeters to a few centimeters wavelength with estimated costs of $5 to $50 
million. By November 1988, in anticipation of meeting the Director’s end of 
the year deadline, a draft report was in hand discussing two broad classes of 
radio telescopes: (a) a general purpose 70 to 100 meter class instrument oper-
ating with “full efficiency” up to 22 GHz (1.3 cm), but with good efficiency 
up to 43 GHz (7 mm) and with limited performance up to 86 GHz (3.5 mm), 
and (b) a larger 100 meter to 150 meter diameter antenna capable of working 
only up to 3 GHz (10 cm). Although it was appreciated that the Green Bank 
site had limited capabilities at millimeter wavelengths, with the continuing 
increase in RFI, the location in the National Radio Quiet Zone offered unique 
opportunities at longer wavelengths.
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Based on estimates received from various manufacturers and by scaling 
the cost of recently constructed radio telescopes53 including the effects of 
inflation, the construction costs of the proposed “Very Large Dish (VLD)” 
were estimated to be in the ballpark of $50 million.54 Suggested cost saving 
measures included choosing a site with low wind speed, restricting the slew-
ing velocity and acceleration, limiting the elevation to 10 or 15 degrees 
above the horizon, avoiding complex joints and hard to fabricate pieces, and 
using a simple, easy to control computer such as the IBM PC-AT.55 
Understanding the Director’s charge to the NLSRT committee that the next 
major NSF-funded NRAO facility was to be a millimeter array, the commit-
tee suggested that in view of their interest in SETI and in space VLBI, NASA 
might be the appropriate agency to support construction of the VLD. But a 
lot of work was still needed to understand the size/wavelength and conven-
tional symmetric/unblocked aperture configuration trade-offs and their 
impact on the construction cost. In particular, the illumination efficiency 
and polarization properties of unblocked apertures, especially at the longer 
wavelengths, was not well understood. Community interest in the study was 
minimal. One prominent scientist wrote, “To be honest, I cannot justify 
spending any time on this now; the prospects for a positive outcome just 
seem too bleak.”56 
Meanwhile, during the course of the NLSRT study, an added incentive to 
consider the next generation of steerable radio telescopes developed as a result 
of a new threat to the continued operation of the Green Bank facility, especially 
the 300 Foot Transit Telescope. By 1988, in addition to the NRAO facilities, 
the National Science Foundation was operating a number of radio telescopes 
throughout the country. In recognition of its increased use for astronomy and 
the corresponding decrease in Department of Defense funding resulting from 
the 1969 Mansfield amendment, funding for astronomy at Haystack trans-
ferred to the NSF, although an important Haystack VLBI program remained 
largely supported by NASA. In 1969, ownership of the Haystack antennas was 
turned over to MIT, and management of the Haystack Observatory was 
assumed by NEROC, although MIT continued to provide administrative sup-
port and the Haystack Observatory staff remained as MIT employees. Similarly, 
responsibility for the Arecibo Observatory was transferred from the Air Force 
to the NSF. Cornell established the National Atmospheric and Ionospheric 
Center to administer the Observatory operation as a national observatory, join-
ing NRAO and NOAO as the third national facility for astronomy, but placing 
increased burden on the NSF operating budget. Elsewhere in the US, e.g. at 
Caltech, Michigan, and Ohio State, other radio astronomy programs were 
transferred from ONR or AFOSR to the NSF. It is always difficult to determine 
in such circumstances whether or not new money was actually added to the 
budget, since one never knows what the budget would have been in the absence 
of the new initiatives. Nevertheless, by this time there were a total of 12 radio 
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there were no comparable facilities which were operated solely with private or 
state support. 
Faced with the prospect of inadequate funds to operate two national radio 
astronomy observatories, as well as a growing number of university operated 
radio astronomy facilities, the NSF Astronomy Division Director Laura (Pat) 
Bautz convened a sub-committee of their standing Advisory Committee for 
Astronomical Sciences to identify those NSF funded radio facilities “having the 
highest scientific priority so that they could be supported at levels sufficient to 
exploit their capabilities with the resources available.”57 The sub-committee 
was asked to “recommend relative priorities” with the implication that less 
productive instruments could be closed with minimal loss to astronomy. 
Donald Langenberg, a former Deputy Director of the NSF, was appointed 
sub-committee chair.58 On 21–23 April 1988, representatives from all of the 
major US radio astronomy facilities gathered in Chicago at the Rosemont 
O’Hare Exposition Center to convince the Langenberg Committee, as the 
sub-committee was known, of the merits of continued operation of their 
facilities.
The Langenberg Committee weighed matters of frequency coverage, spatial 
resolution, versatility, future potential, ongoing research programs, impact to 
other disciplines, technology development, role in training students, and com-
munity access. Surprisingly, the Committee claimed it did not consider budgets 
and gave little weight to costs. The Committee reviewed and classified 12 US 
radio telescopes. Apparently not wanting to offend their radio astronomy col-
leagues and appear to be conspiring with the NSF to close radio telescopes, the 
Committee said nice words about each facility that they were asked to review 
and stated that “all currently funded facilities merit continued support.” 
However, given the likely prospect of extremely limited funds for at least 
another year, and to be responsive to their charge, the Committee divided the 
NSF funded radio telescopes into three priority categories.
Group A contained those “deemed absolutely essential to the continued 
health of astronomy;” Group B facilities were “highly recommended … under 
all but truly disastrous funding levels;” while Group C telescopes were declared 
to be marginally less competitive than those in Group B. Group A facilities 
included the VLA, VLBA, the Berkeley-Illinois-Maryland Array, the OVRO 
mm array, and the Caltech Submillimeter Observatory on Mauna Kea. Group 
B contained NRAO’s 140 Foot Antenna and its 12 Meter Millimeter 
Wavelength Telescope on Kitt Peak, the 14 meter millimeter wave dish at the 
Five College Radio Astronomy Observatory (FCRAO), and the Arecibo 
Observatory. The NRAO 300 Foot, the Haystack 120 foot, and the OVRO 40 
meter antennas were deemed “less competitive” and placed in Group C. In the 
case of the 300 Foot Telescope, the Langenberg Committee drew attention to 
the original limited goals and the subsequent upgrades which enabled a wide 
range of important contributions. “However,” the Committee concluded, “if 
the NSF finds that it cannot support even the current minimal complement of 
radio telescopes, the Committee reluctantly recommends diverting resources 
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from the 300 Foot to adequately support higher priority facilities.” In par-
ticular, NRAO and the NSF were about to be faced with the appreciable costs 
required to operate the VLBA, which was still under construction. As a result 
of the anticipated budget limitations and given the mandate from the 
Langenberg Committee, NSF funding was withdrawn from both Haystack 
and FCRAO. Almost surely NSF funds for the 300 Foot, and perhaps the 
140 Foot as well, would have been terminated within a few years. Not only 
were the prospects for building a new large steerable antenna bleak, but the 
long term prospects for the continued operation of the existing Green Bank 
telescopes were not encouraging. Without the 300 Foot and 140 Foot 
Antennas, the future of Green Bank and the National Radio Quiet Zone was 
in doubt. 
Collapse of the 300 Foot Telescope All that suddenly changed on the night of 15 
November 1988. At about 10:30 pm, George Seielstad (Fig. 9.8), the NRAO 
Assistant Director for Green Bank Operations, received a telephone call from 
the head of telescope operations, Fred Crews.59 “George,” Crews reported, 
“You have a telescope down.” Seielstad was not too alarmed. “The telescope is 
down,” was standard radio astronomy-speak, generally meaning that telescope 
wasn’t working properly because of some receiver or antenna malfunction, a 
not uncommon occurrence. However, Crews had a more serious message. At 
9:43 pm that evening, the entire 300 Foot antenna structure had completely 
collapsed; all that remained was a tangle of steel members (Fig. 9.9). A later 
analysis reported that a large gusset plate which joined several members high 
up in the dish backup structure had cracked due to metal fatigue. That caused 
added stress on the adjoining members which then broke, spreading additional 
force to the surrounding structure, leading to the collapse of the whole antenna. 
Greg Monk, the 300 Foot Telescope operator that night, was working in the 
control building and noticed falling ceiling tiles and a steel member that had 
Fig. 9.8 Green Bank site 
director, George Seielstad, 
played a major role in 
securing the support of 
West Virginia Senator 
Robert Byrd for the 
replacement of the 300 
Foot telescope. Credit: 
NRAO/AUI/NSF
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crashed through the roof. Fortunately, no one was killed or injured in the acci-
dent. Only five months after the Langenberg Committee had sentenced the 
300 Foot to death, the NSF was spared the administrative burden of withdraw-
ing funds for the operation of the telescope, which they knew would mean 
dealing with West Virginia Senator Robert Byrd, who had been a consistent 
and staunch supporter of the NRAO Green Bank operation. Indeed, in previ-
ous years when NRAO wanted to consolidate administrative activities at the 
Charlottesville headquarters by moving the small NRAO fiscal division from 
Green Bank, Senator Byrd made clear that he did not approve.
In the 26 years since it went into operation, more than 1000 scientists had 
used the 300 Foot Telescope for 178,830 hours and published 429 peer 
reviewed scientific papers. Fifty-three students had used the telescope for at 
least part of their PhD dissertation research. About one-fourth of all known 
pulsars, including the Crab Nebula pulsar, had been discovered with the 300 
Foot, and more than 100,000 discrete radio sources had been cataloged. This 
was more than all previously detected radio sources from all the radio observa-
tories in the world. A total of $3.6 million had been spent on 300 Foot con-
struction, upgrades, and ancillary equipment. When the telescope collapsed on 
the night of 15 November 1988, the estimated replacement value was nearly 
$10 million.
Like other US government facilities, NRAO carried no insurance, and the 
prospects for replacement appeared nil. All that might be recovered would be 
the salvage value of the nearly 500 tons of aluminum and steel lying in a West 
Virginia field. However, even that was not to be. The steel girders lay in a 
twisted mess under great tension. Releasing one member might release a dan-
gerous spring that could cause serious, possibly fatal, injury. Indeed, over the 
next months, the interlocking pile of steel girders continued to flex and move. 
Salvage was dangerous. The best deal NRAO could get was from the Elkins 
Fig. 9.9 Left: 300 Foot Radio Telescope photographed on 15 November 1988. 
Right: Remains of the 300 Foot Telescope on 16 November 1988, the morning after 
the collapse. Credit: Courtesy of Richard Porcas
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Iron and Metal company, who agreed to take away the debris at no cost. Other 
companies wanted to be paid to clean up the mess. During the cleanup nine 
months later, an unanticipated danger surfaced when a four foot rattlesnake 
emerged after being evicted from its home within the tangled jumble of 
steel girders.
Just four days after the collapse of the 300 Foot Telescope, the NSF and 
AUI commissioned an extensive formal investigation of the accident. A blue 
ribbon Technical Assessment Panel was appointed to determine the cause of 
the telescope failure. The panel was chaired by former Cornell Vice President 
Robert Matyas.60 As frequently happens with such incidents, the NSF and AUI 
wanted to know if there was someone to blame. Contrary to some statements 
made immediately following the collapse, the 300 Foot Telescope was not built 
to physically last only 5 or 10 years, although the expected scientific lifetime 
was thought to be of that order before it would be superseded by a newer, 
more powerful instrument. However, the anticipated 100 meter class fully 
steerable telescope was never built. With the various improvements to receiver 
sensitivity, the two upgrades to the dish surface, the construction of the track-
ing feed, and the implementation of fast elevation scans, the 300 Foot Telescope 
remained scientifically productive until its collapse in 1988. There were no 
known structural compromises made at the time of construction that might 
have led to its collapse after more than 25 years, although a computer finite 
element analysis, which was not available a quarter of a century earlier, clearly 
indicated that the structure had been over-stressed. Specifically, the panel 
investigation showed that the gusset plate, which joined members of the back-
 up structure to the elevation bearing mounted on one of the two towers sup-
porting the structure, had what were called “micro-fractures” that may have 
been introduced during the telescope construction, and which slowly expanded 
under repeated stress.61
At the time of the collapse, the 300 Foot Antenna was being used by James 
Condon to survey the sky at 6 cm wavelength for new radio sources. Due to 
the great improvements in receiver sensitivity since the telescope was first 
designed, it was no longer necessary to wait for the sky to slowly drift through 
the antenna beams as the Earth rotated. Instead, in order to speed up their 
observations, Condon and his colleagues were rapidly scanning the telescope in 
elevation, which likely contributed to the ultimate failure of the structure. By 
an unfortunate coincidence, at the time, the NRAO computing staff were 
“upgrading” the software needed to analyze the telescope data. So, although 
Condon was nearing the end of a month long observing program, he had been 
unable to analyze his data. Months later, when he was able to examine the data, 
he realized that even early in the previous month, there was a large hysteresis 
between the apparent positions measured when the telescope was driving up 
and when it was driving down. “Even more ominous,” Condon (2008) later 
said, “during the final week before the collapse, the north-south beamwidth 
had increased from 3 arcmin to 4 or 5 arcmin.” With the benefit of hindsight, 
Condon later realized that this was an early indication of the failing structure.
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The review panel determined that the gusset plate which had suffered from 
metal fatigue “had been cracking for years and finally ran out of cross section.” 
They also praised the original design and low cost construction of the antenna, 
as well as the quality of NRAO’s continued inspections and maintenance, and 
concluded that there was no human error involved which could have prevented 
the incident. Nevertheless, with the benefit of hindsight, the stresses on a large 
number of structural members were perhaps as much as a factor of two higher 
than would be permitted by existing codes at the time the structure collapsed, 
and therefore the “structure was marginal with respect to structural failures.” 
The panel concluded that the “failure of the telescope structure was not the 
result of inadequate maintenance or inappropriate operation of the telescope,” 
and noted that there were no “unfavorable implications about the current abil-
ity to engineer future telescopes of this or larger size.” These conclusions were 
met with a sigh of relief, not only at NRAO, but also over at the Naval Radio 
Station in Sugar Grove, where the staff was alarmed by the collapse of the 300 
Foot Antenna as their 150 foot antenna was based on a similar design, and they 
worried that it might share whatever structural deficiency caused the destruc-
tion of the Green Bank 300 Foot.
Considering that the 1988 Langenberg Committee had declared the 300 
Foot Telescope to be scientifically “less competitive,” the response of the media 
and the scientific community was surprising if not startling. Washington news-
papers sent helicopters to Green Bank to photograph the remains of the col-
lapsed telescope. On his daily radio broadcast, Paul Harvey62 announced, “The 
science of astronomy has suffered a devastating setback!” News media from 
around the world reported on “a major blow to world astronomy.” In a front 
page picture caption, The New York Times stated that “the 300 foot radio tele-
scope was one of the most powerful instruments in the world.”63 Several news-
papers, including one in South Africa, blamed the collapse on “hostile space 
aliens” who wanted to stop earthlings from eavesdropping on their activities. A 
front page headline declared “Space Aliens Destroyed Radio Telescope” 
(Fig. 9.10).
A Controversial Congressional Earmark A more serious and a more sober 
response came the day after the telescope collapse when West Virginia’s 
Senators Robert Byrd (Democrat, West Virginia) and Jay Rockefeller 
(Democrat, West Virginia) contacted the NSF about replacing the telescope. 
At the time, then NSF Director Erich Bloch was in Antarctica. Bloch, the for-
mer IBM Vice President and winner of the 1985 National Medal of Technology 
for his contributions to the development of the IBM System/360 series of 
computers, was the first NSF director to come from industry and to not have a 
PhD. He considered development of economic competitiveness to be a strong 
priority of NSF-sponsored basic research.64 On November 28, just after he 
returned from Antarctica, Bloch was summoned to an evening meeting in 
Senator Byrd’s office to explain what he planned to do to replace the 300 Foot 
Telescope. Byrd, who was at the time the Senate Majority Leader, was joined 
by Senator Rockefeller who was a member of the Senate Committee on Science, 
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Fig. 9.10 Front page of Weekly World News, 31 January 1989, declaring the revenge 
of the aliens. Credit: Weekly World News, 31 January 1989
9 THE LARGEST FEASIBLE STEERABLE TELESCOPE 
492
Space, and Technology, NRAO Director Paul Vanden Bout, AUI President 
Robert Hughes, and George Seielstad, NRAO Assistant Director for Green 
Bank Operations, who, significantly, was the only resident of West Virginia 
from the NRAO delegation. However, Bloch, who was joined by Ray Bye, 
Director of the NSF Office of Legislative Affairs, was not intimidated by 
Senator Byrd. Vanden Bout explained that NRAO planned to propose to the 
NSF the construction of a new radio telescope to replace the collapsed 300 
Foot Dish, but Bloch pointed out that any proposal to the NSF would need 
to be evaluated within the overall context of national needs and NSF priori-
ties, and that such an evaluation would take considerable time. The Senators 
countered that they hoped for a “firmer  commitment and a definite timetable.” 
Clearly, more specifics were needed from NRAO including the cost and 
timescale for building a radio telescope to replace the fallen 300 Foot 
Antenna (Fig. 9.11).
Fig. 9.11 Top: Senator Robert C. Byrd, (D-WV); Senator Jay Rockefeller, (D-WV). 
Bottom: NSF Director Erich Bloch; NRAO Director, Paul Vanden Bout. Credit: 
Rockefeller and Byrd—US GPO; Bloch—NSF; Vanden Bout—NRAO/AUI/NSF
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All NRAO had to offer, however, was the report of the NLSRT study with 
a “bench-mark” design for a 70 meter antenna operating to millimeter wave-
lengths, which was not intended to replace the 300 Foot Antenna but, as Burke 
had urged a year earlier, to replace the 140 Foot Radio Telescope, with its 
“obsolete equatorial mounting, its excessive gravitational deformations, non- 
repeatable pointing errors, and poor surface accuracy.” The NLSRT report, 
which was rushed to completion within a few weeks of the 300 Foot collapse, 
reflected an emphasis on the shorter wavelengths and correspondingly smaller 
aperture than the 300 Foot.65 At least another year of engineering work was 
still needed before a Request for Proposals (RFP) could be prepared, and a 
ballpark figure of $50 million was the only cost estimate available. Radiation 
Systems Inc. (RSI) president Richard Thomas saw an opportunity for new 
business, and within a few weeks of the 300 foot collapse, Thomas submitted 
an estimate of $9.6 million to replace the 300 Foot with a fully steerable 
antenna. In a series of letters to members of Congress from states where RSI 
had manufacturing facilities, Thomas actively lobbied to replace the fallen 300 
Foot antenna. Thomas did not give any detailed specifications, but implied that 
aside from steerability, the RSI antenna would have the same performance as 
the 300 Foot Transit Antenna.66 A re-evaluation of costs by the NLSRT com-
mittee using a wider range of data obtained from various manufacturers con-
firmed the NLSRT cost estimate of $50 million, although numbers ranged 
from less than $10 million (RSI) to nearly $100 million (JPL/Ford Aerospace).67
Just two weeks after the 300 Foot collapse, MIT Professor Bernard Burke 
sent a memo to the American Astronomical Society’s Committee on Astronomy 
and Public Policy to alert them to the circumstances surrounding the telescope 
collapse and the strong congressional interest in providing a replacement.68 
Burke, who to a large extent had initiated the NRAO NLSRT study just a year 
earlier, wrote to reassure the AAS members that “powerful forces are at work” 
to fund a new radio telescope in Green Bank, but that it would be “disastrous” 
if the construction costs of a new telescope were to come from NRAO’s limited 
operating budget. Burke pointed out that Senate Minority Leader (and former 
Senate Appropriations Committee chair) Pete Domenici (R-NM) would surely 
object if the Green Bank construction funds came at the expense of VLA oper-
ations in New Mexico or the then ongoing construction of the VLBA. Moreover, 
contended Burke, it was “absolutely essential” that Green Bank construction 
funds “not be borne by the NSF by taking resources from other areas of astron-
omy or physics without a supplement to the budget.”
At the time, the next large NSF construction project was anticipated to be 
LIGO, the Laser Interferometer Gravity Wave Observatory, but LIGO con-
struction was not yet funded. The NSF funding request for FY1990 only con-
tained a nominal sum for continued LIGO research and development. LIGO 
was a very controversial project designed to detect the gravitational waves 
expected to be generated from the final stages of collapsing orbiting binary 
neutron stars. Although conceived by physicists, the label “Observatory” sug-
gested to many that it was another expensive astronomy project. As a joint 
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project of MIT and Caltech, LIGO had powerful support, but also strong 
opposition from many in the physics community who argued that LIGO would 
not have sufficient sensitivity to detect gravitational waves. There was also 
opposition from the astronomy community which had other priorities for new 
observatories. This was one instance where radio and optical astronomers were 
united against a perceived joint rival.69 There was considerable support, how-
ever, for LIGO from NSF Astronomy Section Director Pat Bautz, who perhaps 
saw that replacing the 300 Foot Telescope with LIGO was a way of preserving 
her astronomy priorities.
As planned, LIGO consisted of a complex system of mirrors spaced 4 km 
apart located at the ends of two orthogonal excavated tunnels. The mirror 
separation was monitored by a system of lasers, and calculations showed that a 
passing gravitational wave was expected to change the mirror separation by 
only about 10−15 mm. In order to discriminate between a gravitational wave 
and disturbances from local vehicular traffic or seismic activity, the NSF planned 
to build two widely separated complexes, one of which was to be near Columbia, 
Maine. With the encouragement of the NSF, Caltech investigated the possibil-
ity of replacing the Maine site with Green Bank. In a report dated 31 January 
1989, LIGO Principal Investigator Rochus (Robbi) Vogt reported that “it is 
technically feasible to build a LIGO installation” in Green Bank, but that due 
to the more difficult “topographical complexity” there would be a $7 million 
to $18 million increase in the cost compared with the alternate site in Maine.70
So when confronted by the senators, Bloch stubbornly ignored Rockefeller’s 
offer to help, explained that the NSF had other priorities for astronomy, such 
as LIGO, and that, considering the Langenberg report, he did not plan to 
replace the Green Bank radio telescope. This apparently enraged Byrd who, 
reportedly red-faced, pointed his finger at Bloch claiming that in all his years in 
Washington he had never encountered such an uncooperative agency head. 
According to Vanden Bout, sensing that the situation was getting out of hand, 
Rockefeller then leaned over the table and, towering over the seated Bloch, 
said, “Leader is about to become Chair of Appropriations. He will have his 
finger on every dime of the Federal budget. Now, are you prepared to let us 
help you?”71 AUI President Hughes, recognizing the need for at least the sem-
blance of peer review, offered to write a proposal. Apparently all this made an 
impression on the NSF Director, who responded that he “could work with the 
Senator,” to which Byrd replied that he had “been waiting all evening to 
hear that.”72
An accomplished fiddler, former butcher, welder, and in his youth a Ku Klux 
Klan organizer, Robert C. Byrd was first elected to the US Senate in 1959 after 
serving three terms in the House of Representatives, and became the longest 
serving member of the US Congress. Since 1977, Byrd had served either as the 
 influential Senate Majority or Minority Leader, but with the new 101st 
Congress, starting in January 1989, Byrd became the powerful Chair of the 
Senate Appropriations Committee, a position which he used to bring billions 
of dollars in federal funds to West Virginia and, wherever he could, to protect 
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every West Virginian job. Recognizing that both attrition and lay-offs can 
reduce the scope of an organization, Byrd engineered the 1988 NSF 
Authorization Bill to explicitly forbid the elimination of a handful of positions 
at Green Bank which NRAO had proposed to transfer to Charlottesville.
George Seielstad, the Green Bank site director, had received his PhD from 
Caltech in 1963 for his research on radio source polarization at the Owens 
Valley Radio Observatory (OVRO). Following his graduate work, Seielstad 
spent a year on the faculty of the University of Alaska, and then returned to 
Caltech as a member of the OVRO staff and to serve as OVRO site manager. 
Living with his young family in the nearby small town of Bishop, Seielstad 
became involved in  local politics. In 1974 he took a leave of absence from 
Caltech to run for Congress as a Democratic candidate in California’s 18th 
Congressional District, representing the sparsely populated Inyo, Mono, and 
Alpine Counties. With what was probably a record low campaign budget, 
Seielstad easily won the Democratic primary, but lost the general election to 
the Republican incumbent, William Ketchum. Seielstad garnered 47% of the 
vote in this traditionally Republican district, and drew the attention of the 
Democratic National Committee. However, having spent significant personal 
funds to support his primary and general election campaigns, Seielstad gave up 
his political career to return to radio astronomy. But his service to the 
Democratic Party was not to be forgotten.
Both Senator Byrd and NSF Director Bloch were strong-minded individuals 
who normally got their way; neither wanted to be manipulated or, even worse, 
appear to be manipulated. Byrd was probably one of the most influential peo-
ple to have served in Congress, having held all of the senior appointments in 
the Senate. Seielstad later described Bloch as an “acerbic, combative tough-guy 
personality.”73 Byrd was fascinated by astronomy and what astronomers knew 
about the existence of God. He was primarily motivated, however, by the 
opportunity to enhance the economy of West Virginia by bringing jobs to the 
state and more broadly raising the profile of West Virginia, which was widely 
perceived as an Appalachian backwater. He did not really care whether it was 
going to be a new radio telescope or LIGO that would be built in Green Bank, 
as long as it employed a lot of people and brought visibility to the state and to 
himself.74
However, before it could build a new radio telescope, NRAO and the radio 
astronomy community faced a long period of planning and construction. 
Characteristic of the solidarity shared by the global community of radio astron-
omers, Peter Mezger, Director of the MPIfR and former NRAO staff member, 
kindly offered to make time available to 300 Foot users on the Institute’s 100 
meter antenna, and the NSF made grants available to American users of the 
MPIfR telescope. This was a good deal for American radio astronomers, as well 
as for the NSF. Even if a different investigator were to fly to Germany each day 
to use the MPIfR telescope, it would only cost less than half a million dollars a 
year in plane fares and travel costs, or about an order of magnitude less than the 
annual operating cost of the German 100 meter telescope.
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Meanwhile, encouraged by the apparent support of the West Virginia 
Senators, NRAO moved rapidly to present a credible plan to the NSF. Typically, 
planning for new telescopes, whether radio or optical, involves many years of 
design and engineering, years of study to choose the optimum location, as well 
as years of “selling” the facility, first to the astronomical community, then to 
the funding agencies, the Administration, and finally Congress. In this case the 
location was clear: Green Bank, WV.  Ironically, Congress, if not the NSF, 
appeared to be supportive. Yet there was no telescope design, nor even a con-
sensus of what kind of instrument to build to exploit the apparent funding 
opportunity. All that was available was the hastily completed 28 November 
1988 NGLSRT report.
On 2–3 December, NRAO convened the first of several meetings between 
NRAO staff and members of the NRAO user community to reach a consensus 
on a replacement for the ill-fated 300 Foot Telescope. Fifty-six individuals 
from 15 separate institutions, plus NRAO staff, participated in this hurriedly 
arranged meeting to discuss priorities for the replacement telescope.75 Many 
who could not attend, as well as those who did participate, wrote letters to 
NRAO and to the NSF presenting a variety of arguments supporting their par-
ticular scientific interest. Interestingly, strong support for the radio telescope 
came from Joseph Weber, who was the pioneer in developing instrumentation 
for the detection of gravity waves, but who saw LIGO as competition to his 
own search for gravity waves.76 Others wrote opposing the construction of any 
new NRAO facility at a time of great need for correcting the diminishing sup-
port for American university radio astronomy facilities, or opposing the appar-
ent use of “pork-barrel” funding.
The meeting participants were able to inspect the remains of the collapsed 
telescope and heard a report from former NRAO Director Dave Heeschen on 
the investigation already underway to find the cause of the collapse. But the 
presentations and discussion quickly turned to understanding the scientific 
drivers and to reviewing what was learned from the NLSRT study of a Very 
Large Dish (VLD). Considering the interest of the West Virginia Senators, 
suggestions for a southern hemisphere site or a drier site near the VLA, or for 
an array of small dishes, were quickly dispensed with as not being realistic. 
Recognition that the areas of scientific opportunity years in the future could 
not be defined, the participants argued for maximum flexibility. The discus-
sions quickly led to a large steerable antenna with full sky coverage working to 
relatively short wavelengths. A tentative schedule at the December meeting 
called for fixing the telescope characteristics by the end of 1988, one month 
away, developing a conceptual design by the end of 1989, and an engineering 
design by the end of 1990. This would allow construction to begin in 1992 
with a very optimistic completion date by the end of 1993. 
Nevertheless, there remained several controversial areas to be settled imme-
diately. For a given cost, there is a tradeoff between antenna size and the limit-
ing operating wavelength. Based on established scaling laws, a 100 meter 
diameter telescope was expected to cost about six to seven times more than a 
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50 meter telescope with the same performance specifications. For a fixed size, 
a telescope built to operate at 3 mm wavelength might be expected to cost 
about twice as much as one designed for only 1 cm operation. Reflecting the 
rapidly evolving scientific interests driven by the existing discoveries in molecu-
lar spectroscopy, the series of radio telescopes designed by the earlier LFST 
group had successively decreased operating wavelength and compensating 
smaller diameters to mitigate the cost, and this argued for a telescope capable 
of operation to about 100 GHz (3 mm wavelength), where the Green Bank 
atmosphere becomes noisy and unstable. But other areas of research, mainly 
pulsar studies and 21 cm hydrogen research, argued for the largest possible 
size. Achieving a high operating frequency for pulsars was not important, as 
pulsars are strongest at lower frequencies, and it was considered fairly straight-
forward to meet the relatively easy performance specifications needed for pul-
sar studies. Scaling from the costs of existing antennas in size or wavelength 
limit, as well as estimates received from various manufacturers, cost estimates 
for antennas in the range of 70 to 100 meter diameter and operating at wave-
lengths as short as 3  mm ranged from less than $50 million to more than 
$100 million.
Following the 2–3 December Green Bank meeting, there was little agree-
ment among members of the NRAO user community. Many argued for a very 
large dish operating at wavelengths of a few centimeters to replace the fallen 
300 Foot for VLBI (especially in conjunction with a space-borne antenna), H 
I (21 cm) and OH (18 cm), pulsar, SETI, and studies of radio galaxy and qua-
sar radio source distributions, luminosity functions, variability, and evolution. 
Others favored a smaller aperture that would work well at the shorter wave-
lengths needed for the rapidly growing field of molecular spectroscopy and 
searching for cosmic microwave background anisotropies. The proponents of 
the “big dish” argued that Green Bank was a terrible site for millimeter wave 
observations. The counter argument noted that important millimeter observa-
tions were being made at the FCRAO in central Massachusetts, where the 
weather conditions were comparable to those found in Green Bank. 
Spectroscopists and 21 cm workers argued for a clear aperture offset design to 
minimize reflections and sidelobes; others pointed out that no large offset 
antenna had ever been built and that it would be unreasonably costly to pursue 
this concept. Tor Hagfors, Director of the Arecibo Observatory, expressed 
concern about the impact that a new fully steerable radio telescope might have 
on the Arecibo Observatory, but noted that if the Arecibo Observatory were 
to be upgraded, the impact might be minimized.77
Yet others, such as Richard McCray from the University of Colorado and 
NOAO Director Sydney Wolfe, worried that any funds spent on a new NRAO 
antenna might come at the expense of other high priority programs or their 
own pet project, and argued against any 300 Foot replacement. Among the 
broader astronomical community, it had not escaped notice that the last two 
major NSF astronomy projects were for radio telescopes: the VLA and the 
VLBA which was still under construction. Optical astronomers had been wait-
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ing for the start of a national 8 meter telescope and wanted assurance that the 
“Byrd Antenna” would be “coupled with an overall improvement of funding 
for ground-based astronomy.”78
There were also clear applications of a large radio telescope to spacecraft 
tracking and to various military uses, with implications for possible broader 
funding support. To address some of the concerns of the astronomical com-
munity, NRAO actively solicited interest in supporting the construction of a 
new radio telescope from NASA, the US Naval Observatory, and the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). However, this raised the possibility that with 
reduced NSF funding, Green Bank might ultimately perish as a radio astron-
omy facility, a specter that would resurface several decades later. Nevertheless, 
following the Green Bank meeting, Vanden Bout wrote to the NSF Director 
apprising him of the strong scientific support for replacing the 300 Foot 
Antenna with a modern 100 meter class fully steerable radio telescope. Noting 
the “important role in the missions of other agencies,” such as NASA and the 
US Naval Observatory, Vanden Bout suggested that it might be appropriate to 
share the construction cost and use of the telescope.79
Meanwhile, the NRAO scientific staff and external radio astronomers con-
tinued to debate the design options of a new radio telescope. In a 12 December 
1988 staff meeting, the New Mexico VLA staff argued that a compact array of 
smaller dishes would be more powerful than a single large antenna. But Vanden 
Bout quickly dispensed with the array concept on the largely non-technical 
grounds of higher operating costs and the need for NRAO to maintain excel-
lence in both arrays and single dishes.80 A particularly controversial topic was 
the relative merits of an unblocked aperture with its greater cost and potentially 
poorer pointing precision but lower sidelobes, better aperture efficiency, and 
relative immunity to interference versus cheaper and better understood, more 
conventional designs. Conventional radio telescopes have the feed81 or sub- 
reflector mounted at the center of the dish supported by two, three, or four 
supporting legs. But, the feed or subreflector, as well as the feed supporting 
structures, partially block the aperture, decreasing the gain or sensitivity. Even 
more important, with conventional radio telescopes, the blocking structures 
set up reflections, or standing waves, between the dish and subreflector, which 
cause frequency ripples that greatly compromise spectroscopic observations. 
Moreover, the blockage generates antenna sidelobes that extend well outside 
of the main beam. Typically, about one third of the power received by a con-
ventional radio telescope comes in through the sidelobes. This seriously impacts 
studies of widely distributed radiation, such as 21 cm studies of galactic hydro-
gen. Additionally, with lower sidelobes of an off axis feed/subreflector system, 
the telescope would be less subject to interference from satellites and aircraft. 
Off axis antennas had been built and were widely used in the  telecommunications 
industry and for consumer satellite TV reception, but in 1989, the largest 
known antenna ever built with an unblocked aperture was only 7.5 meters in 
diameter. The construction of a large unblocked aperture antenna was a formi-
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dable challenge, as it required an asymmetric dish design, and many predicted 
a large but uncertain cost impact and likely reduction of antenna pointing accu-
racy due to inadequate stability of the feed-subreflector support structure. 
A significant question was whether it was more appropriate for NRAO, 
the national radio observatory, to build a low cost specialized antenna or a 
general purpose antenna that would satisfy the needs of the large and diverse 
NRAO user community. Some argued that a general purpose instrument 
involves compromise so that it is not optimum for anything, while special 
purpose antennas, such as the old 300 Foot antenna, can have applications 
that often extend beyond the original design goals. Many letters were writ-
ten to NRAO and to the NSF arguing one way or another. The arguments 
boiled down to a large dish of the order of 100 meters or larger but operat-
ing only at centimeter and longer wavelengths vs. a smaller but more precise 
antenna capable of operating at millimeter wavelengths. Green Bank astron-
omer and later NRAO Assistant Director for Green Bank operations, Jay 
Lockman, was probably the most vocal supporter of what he called a “Big 
Floppy Dish” (BFD) with an unblocked aperture and low sidelobes that 
would, among other advantages, be a unique instrument to study galactic 
H I, since all existing instruments suffered from stray radiation that contami-
nates 21 cm spectra. Burke protested that this was contrary to the consensus 
of the 2–3 December Green Bank meeting. With considerable prescience, he 
pointed out that a clear aperture asymmetric structure would introduce 
many design problems, cost risks, more complex feeds, and a delay in com-
pletion, which he argued NRAO and the radio astronomy community could 
ill afford.82
No matter how well designed, the effectiveness of optical telescopes is in 
practice limited by the environment, clouds, and “seeing,”83 while the perfor-
mance of radio telescopes depends on locally generated radio frequency inter-
ference (RFI) and increasingly at shorter wavelengths to atmospheric water 
vapor. Although the location of the proposed new dish was in a sense a non-
issue if NRAO wanted to exploit the enthusiasm of the West Virginia Senators, 
this did not dissuade the purists. While there was general support for locating 
the new dish at one of the existing NRAO sites to minimize site development 
and operating costs and to exploit the presence of a highly trained technical 
staff, many radio astronomers argued for locating the antenna at the 7,000 foot 
elevation VLA site, with its clear skies and low water vapor content needed for 
effective operation at millimeter and short centimeter wavelengths. On the 
other hand, due to its location in the National Radio Quiet Zone, the Green 
Bank site was probably the best place in the US for doing radio  astronomy at 
longer wavelengths where protection from RFI is an issue. It was also realized 
that if the 300 Foot replacement were to be built in New Mexico, this would 
likely expedite the migration of NRAO activities to New Mexico and thus lead 
to the closing of the Green Bank facility and the subsequent loss of the unique 
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capabilities of the National Radio Quiet Zone.  However, with an average 
cloud cover rivaling the Northwest and upper Great Lakes areas, it was argued 
that the Appalachian Mountain area is a poor location for millimeter observa-
tions. George Seielstad mounted a vigorous defense of the Green Bank site, 
pointing out that on a clear cold winter night, the short wavelength observing 
conditions can be excellent. Although it was understood that there are not too 
many clear cold winter nights each year that could support short millimeter 
wavelength observations, realistically the choice was between a radio telescope 
in Green Bank or LIGO.
NRAO Director Paul Vanden Bout actively solicited support from American 
radio astronomers, support which ranged from enthusiastic to lukewarm. 
There was a wide range of opinions about how much the replacement tele-
scope should cost and about the relative priorities of wavelength coverage and 
size. In a hastily convened presentation to the NSF on 21 December 1988, just 
five weeks after the collapse of the 300 Foot Antenna, and less than three weeks 
after the Green Bank meeting to define the proposed telescope, Vanden Bout 
discussed the long history of planning for a large steerable radio telescope and 
presented a conceptual plan for a 70 meter diameter radio telescope at an antic-
ipated cost of about $50 million dollars. In an effort to recognize the interests 
of millimeter astronomers, Vanden Bout suggested that the proposed antenna 
could have useful performance at millimeter wavelengths. Vanden Bout’s strat-
egy was to make the NSF comfortable with the Senate initiative. Bautz and 
others were clearly nervous about the appearance of pork and the expected 
resistance from the optical astronomy community, and from radio astronomers 
more interested in millimeter astronomy or arrays of smaller antennas, along 
with those concerned about the growing concentration of US radio telescopes 
at NRAO. In particular, the proposed 300 Foot replacement might threaten 
the planned Millimeter Array, also proposed by NRAO, or the planned upgrades 
of the Haystack and Arecibo radio telescopes. The latter was a particular con-
cern, as Bloch and Bautz  did not want to cause trouble with Cornell President 
Frank Rhodes, who was a member of the NSF National Science Board.84 Closer 
to home, even the AUI Board of Trustees was less than enthusiastic about 
exploiting Congressional interest in a non-peer reviewed project that might 
impact other planned astronomy or physics programs.
A week later Byrd and Rockefeller announced that they wanted to see a 
proposal for the replacement of the destroyed telescope by January.85 At the 
same time, NRAO learned that the NSF was seriously considering how to best 
exploit Senator Byrd’s interest in Green Bank to satisfy the Foundation’s own 
goal of building LIGO in Green Bank and perhaps closing down the radio 
astronomy operation. Vanden Bout was summoned by Byrd to appear in the 
Senate Appropriations Committee Room on 5 January 1989, along with NSF 
personnel. To their chagrin, Seielstad and AUI President Bob Hughes were 
initially not invited, but both managed to lobby for inclusion and ultimately 
did participate in the meeting. While waiting for Senator Rockefeller’s late 
arrival, Senator Byrd explained to the NRAO/AUI participants how he had 
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risen to such a powerful position in the Senate.86 He made it clear that he 
expected to get whatever he wanted in Congress and from the NSF.
When the meeting began, the NSF presented their proposal to build LIGO 
in Green Bank instead of a new radio telescope. Vanden Bout produced a letter 
from Tony Tyson, a well-known astrophysicist from Bell Labs and long-time 
opponent of LIGO, who argued that LIGO was poorly conceived, but other-
wise NRAO refrained from speaking against LIGO.87 NRAO’s position was 
difficult, as previously Seielstad had used his Caltech connections to try to 
convince Caltech’s LIGO Director and former Provost and Vice President for 
Research, Robbi Vogt, to bring LIGO to Green Bank. But this was before the 
300 Foot collapse and the threat that LIGO would compete with the proposed 
300 Foot replacement radio telescope. Before the NRAO/AUI contingent was 
excused, Seielstad declared his preference for the new radio telescope over 
building LIGO in Green Bank. Nevertheless, following the meeting, Byrd’s 
staff leaked that “NRAO blew it,” by not coming down hard on LIGO.88 
Subsequent discussions with Byrd’s Director of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, Terry Sauvain, indicated Sauvain’s strong preference for LIGO, 
and that he had discussed with the NSF’s Ray Bye how to best achieve their 
goal. However, Carol Mitchell of Byrd’s personal staff leaned toward the radio 
telescope and kept Seielstad and Byrd informed of the behind the scenes 
maneuvering by Sauvain and Bye, all of which infuriated Byrd, who did not 
tolerate any disagreements among his staff.
Having second thoughts about not having been more critical of LIGO, and 
not informing anyone else, Seielstad arranged a private meeting with Byrd to 
explain that he had been too meek because NRAO did not want to offend 
Caltech. Byrd, in return, explained that he didn’t have the knowledge to dis-
criminate between the value of LIGO and a radio telescope, and depended on 
the scientists.89 Meanwhile, NRAO was instructed by Bloch to cooperate with 
a planned Caltech visit to evaluate the feasibility of placing LIGO in Green 
Bank. Not only was the proposed 300 Foot replacement telescope in danger, 
but Vanden Bout worried that NRAO would be “slaughtered” by Bloch in 
future NSF budgets. Another meeting was scheduled for 23 February, but no 
one was clear what that would achieve.
Hearing about the NSF proposal to “forego the building of a successor 
radio telescope to the lost 300 Foot Antenna at Green Bank, and instead to site 
one of the elements of the LIGO gravity experiment there,” MIT’s Bernard 
Burke, flexing his muscle as a new member of the National Science Board, 
wrote to Bloch addressing the unique importance of the National Radio Quiet 
Zone. Burke argued that the continuation of the NRQZ would be uncertain 
without a replacement telescope as well as important scientific contributions 
that would result from constructing a state-of-the-art 100 meter telescope in 
Green Bank.90 Seielstad and Vanden Bout were regularly kept informed by 
Byrd staffers Terry Sauvain and Carol Mitchell about the continuing discus-
sions between Byrd and Bloch on the merits of building LIGO in Green Bank. 
Aside from producing the letter from Tyson, NRAO refrained from criticizing 
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the Caltech/MIT LIGO project, but Bloch and the NSF continued to resist 
the idea of building a new radio telescope in Green Bank. NSF head of Math 
and Physical Sciences, Richard Nicholson suggested to Byrd that LIGO would 
produce a Nobel Prize for West Virginia. Bloch and Nicholson were certainly 
not oblivious to the fact that Byrd’s counterpart Chair of the House 
Appropriations Committee was from Livingston Parish in Louisiana where one 
of the LIGO elements was to be sited. Following his visit to Green Bank, Vogt 
was impressed with the infrastructure although concerned about access, and 
reported back to Bloch that Green Bank was indeed a suitable site for LIGO.
Input from the Congressional Research Service The US Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) was originally organized in 1914 as a special reference unit 
within the Library of Congress. In 1946 it was renamed the Legislative 
Reference Service and in 1970, it received its present name. The CRS offers 
bipartisan confidential research assistance to Members of Congress and their 
staffs. Their reports, while not classified, are not public unless the requesting 
Member of Congress chooses to make them public. According to the CRS web 
site,91 the CRS is available to Congress 24/7 to offer authoritative, confiden-
tial, and objective analysis of current policies and present the impact of pro-
posed policy alternatives.
Richard Rowberg was the Chief of CRS Science Policy Division when, on a 
Saturday night, he received a telephone call at his home from Terry Sauvain. 
Senator Byrd, explained Sauvain, wanted the CRS to tell him which was better 
for West Virginia, LIGO or a radio telescope.92 Rowberg’s background was in 
plasma physics, but he knew who was who in physics and astronomy. To 
respond to Byrd’s request, he talked to a lot of people, including Tor Hagfors, 
director of the Arecibo Observatory, as well as scientists at the Lawrence 
Berkeley Laboratory in California.
On 17 February Rowberg sent Senators Byrd and Rockefeller a memoran-
dum addressing the question of whether LIGO or a radio telescope would best 
benefit West Virginia.93 The CRS report made clear that the issue was not 
about the scientific merits of building LIGO, but the benefits to West Virginia 
and the nation’s scientific enterprise, and argued that “LIGO is likely to be 
built in any case, so the principal scientific question centers on the conse-
quences to radio astronomy of not replacing the 300 Foot Telescope.” Rowberg 
went on to discuss the issues of the number of personnel that would be involved 
in each project; the attention and scientific prestige that each project would 
bring to Green Bank and West Virginia; the impact to astronomy of not replac-
ing the 300 Foot; the number of scientific users; and the potential for including 
West Virginia University in collaborative research. Describing LIGO as “a high 
risk experiment,” the report noted that the successful detection of gravity 
waves would be “a major step in physics,” but that it “will require a substantial 
advance to the limits of current technology.”
Meanwhile, Caltech’s LIGO Director Robbi Vogt was not going to let an 
opportunity for a Congressional earmark slip past. In a 24 February telephone 
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call with Rowberg, Vogt suggested that perhaps their previous concern about 
ground noise in Green Bank was unfounded and that one of the LIGO ele-
ments could be built on the Green Bank site. Since only signals detected by 
both LIGO elements would be considered as due to gravity waves, Vogt sug-
gested that any ground noise generated by only one element of the observatory 
would be unimportant. The Green Bank site was attractive to Vogt since there 
appeared to be local opposition to constructing LIGO in Maine. Moreover, 
argued Vogt, it would save the NSF a lot of money if LIGO could make use of 
the infrastructure that would be provided by the Green Bank radio observa-
tory. But he also worried that unless a new radio telescope were to be built, the 
Green Bank site might likely be closed.  In a 27 February memo to Byrd and 
Rockefeller’s staff, the CRS reported that for this reason Vogt “hopes that a 
replacement telescope is built” in Green Bank. However, others argued that 
ground noise must be reduced as much as possible, and that activities sur-
rounding the operation of the radio telescope would have significant impact to 
the effectiveness of LIGO, and so even the 140 Foot would need to be closed 
if LIGO were located in Green Bank.94
As initially planned by Sauvain, a 23 February meeting, presumably to dis-
cuss the input from the CRS, was to exclude NRAO. The meeting was post-
poned to 6 March, and at Byrd’s insistence Hughes, Seielstad and Vanden 
Bout did finally attend, along with Bloch and Ray Bye, head of the NSF 
Legislative Affairs staff. This meeting was held not in Byrd’s Office, but in the 
luxurious Senate Appropriations Hearing Room. Again Rockefeller was late, 
which gave Byrd time to tell more stories about the Presidents he had worked 
with. As expected, Bloch made a strong push for LIGO, referring to potential 
prestige and increased jobs for West Virginia. NRAO countered with the 
important science anticipated from the new radio telescope and the many pres-
tigious discoveries already made by radio astronomers. Vanden Bout played 
hardball, pointing out that without a new radio telescope in Green Bank, in the 
face of declining budgets and commitments to the VLA and VLBA, the 
Observatory would be forced to leave Green Bank. The meeting closed with 
the NRAO representatives being excused while the Senators and their staffs 
continued to speak with the NSF.  Apparently it didn’t go well for Bloch, 
because he stormed out of the meeting room ignoring Vanden Bout and 
Seielstad on the way out.
On 7 March, the Senators issued a joint statement extolling the virtues of 
both LIGO and a replacement radio telescope, but argued that the collapse of 
the 300 Foot “radio telescope created an emergency situation … that requires 
replacement at the earliest possible time.” Working from the CRS report, they 
went on to point out that “replacing the telescope is also important to West 
Virginia from the standpoint of jobs, payroll, education, tourism and scientific 
prestige.” Byrd was quoted as saying that he intended to “aggressively pursue 
funding” for the telescope.95 Two days later the West Virginia Legislature 
unanimously passed a joint resolution urging Congress and the NSF to provide 
funding for a state-of-the-art fully steerable 100 meter diameter telescope to 
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replace the collapsed 300 Foot. Discussion of the proposed bill on the floors of 
the WV House of Delegates and the Senate emphasized the economic impact 
to West Virginia and the additional jobs that the new telescope would bring to 
Pocahontas County.
On 14 March, the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 
held hearings on the NSF’s 1990 budget request. Four radio astronomers, 
including Arecibo Director Tor Hagfors, testified on astronomy issues. There 
was agreement on the importance of replacing the 300 Foot, but concern that 
there were other higher priorities in astronomy that were already in the budget 
request. However, if new money were to be added to the FY1990 budget, the 
group felt that this would not be considered as circumventing the peer review 
process.96 A week later, in a private note to Terry Sauvain, Rowberg pointed 
out that the NSF FY1990 budget request included $10 million for safety and 
environmental upgrades to the US Antarctic facility, as well as $250,000 for the 
start of repairs to the 25 year old Upper Atmospheres Facilities, neither of 
which had undergone formal peer review.
Although Robert Byrd ruled the Senate with an iron fist and usually got his 
way, he had two potential challengers to his plans for Green Bank: Representative 
James Whitten (D-MS), Byrd’s counterpart as Chair of the House Appropriations 
Committee, and NSF director Erich Bloch. While the NRAO director and AUI 
president were kept in the dark about where Byrd and Whitten stood on the 
issue of LIGO vs. the radio telescope, George Seielstad claimed only he, Byrd, 
and an unnamed informant knew that the decision had already been made in 
favor of the radio telescope. But Seielstad was worried that due to the lack of a 
public statement about the future of Green Bank, his staff were leaving, and he 
was anxious to get started on constructing the new telescope.
Each year the US Congress passes an emergency supplemental funding bill 
which normally covers the cost of repair and recovery from things like torna-
does, earthquakes, floods, and fires that had occurred during the previous year, 
but is also used as a catch-all for a variety of other funding issues of special 
interest to Members of Congress. The Dire Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations and Transfers, Urgent Supplementals, and Correcting Enrollment 
Errors Act of 1989 or HR-2402 included, among other things, a prohibition on 
the use of Department of the Interior funds to place the Al Capone House in 
Chicago, Illinois, on the National Register of Historic Places.
Based on the NLSRT report, Seielstad and Vanden Bout had stated that a 
new telescope would be 70 meters (230 feet) in diameter and would cost about 
$50 million. Either Byrd misunderstood, or deliberately chose to appear that 
he misunderstood, and with the agreement of White House Office of 
Management and Budget Director, Richard Darman, Robert Byrd inserted 
$75 million into the FY1989 Senate Dire Emergency Act for the replacement 
of the NRAO 300 Foot Radio Telescope. In the House of Representatives, the 
radio telescope was competing with a pet project of the House Appropriations 
Committee Chair Jamie Whitten and a White House initiative for the 
war on drugs.
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In a compromise with the House of Representatives, the final bill, which 
became Public Law 101-45, spread funds for the radio telescope over two 
years. A similar amount was included for Whitten’s project in Mississippi, as 
well as funds for the war on drugs. On 23 June 1989, the House bill passed by 
a vote of 316-8 and the Senate approved it by a voice vote.97 A week later, it 
was signed into law by President George H. W. Bush. However in 1990, as a 
consequence of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings sequestration for FY1990, the 
GBT construction funds were reduced to $74,490,000.
Trying to avoid the stigma of apparent “pork” that the NSF and especially 
Erich Bloch were so strongly opposed to, Byrd noted when introducing the bill 
in Congress the priority placed by radio astronomers in replacing the fallen 
telescope, which he described as a “calamity.” In fact, replacing the 300 Foot 
was not the highest priority in radio astronomy, even at NRAO, which was try-
ing to obtain funds to construct a new array that would give astronomers an 
unprecedented opportunity to study the Universe at millimeter wavelengths. 
Meanwhile, the NSF was faced with a quandary. To oppose the powerful 
Senators might risk future budget allocations, but to agree to building a new 
telescope apparently meant compromising their stated priority for LIGO as the 
next major NSF construction project, as well as their commitment to the mer-
its of peer review and their opposition to Congressional “earmarks.”
Unlike NASA, the NSF for years did not have a standing budget line item 
for new facilities. However, by unwritten agreement, the 1989/90 GBT fund-
ing became the first funding for what later became the NSF’s Major Research 
Equipment (later called Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction 
or MREFC) budget, which later funded LIGO, the Atacama Large Millimeter 
Array (ALMA), the Next Generation Solar Telescope (NGST), and most 
recently the Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST). At first the MRE/
MREFC budget line was confined to the NSF’s Directorate for Mathematical 
and Physical Sciences (MPS), but with time soon covered all of the 
NSF. Nevertheless, the NSF has always been on record as being opposed to 
Congressional earmarks, and subsequent declining NRAO budgets and con-
sideration of closing the Green Bank facility as well as the Very Long Baseline 
Array (VLBA) may have reflected the Foundation’s resentment of the per-
ceived political pressure brought to bear in funding the new Green Bank 
Telescope. 
9.7  builDing thE grEEn bank tElEscopE (gbt)
Typically, before a large new scientific instrument is built, it takes years of pro-
posals and committee reviews, accompanied by forceful lobbying of lawmakers, 
as well as getting other scientists on board, each of whom have their own 
 priorities. Especially in the case of proposed national observatory projects by 
NRAO and NOAO, university-based scientists are particularly skeptical and 
concerned that the national observatory project may come at the expense of 
their individual research grants. Although NRAO had managed to finesse 
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funding in what was surely a record time of only about six months, its problems 
were only beginning. By April 1989, with input from several prospective man-
ufacturers, NRAO had completed a re-evaluation of the technical options for 
100 meter antennas with both blocked and unblocked apertures. The goal was 
to have good performance at 7 mm wavelength, and perhaps at 3 mm wave-
length under the most benign conditions of wind and solar illumination. 
Recognizing that the largest unblocked aperture antenna which had ever been 
built was only 7.5 meters effective diameter, the NRAO study group recom-
mended that a more detailed structural analysis be carried out. A homologous 
design did not appear feasible due to uncertainties in the computer modeling, 
fabrication tolerances, and the high cost of fabricating the large number of 
different-sized back-up structure members.
In late April 1989, Vanden Bout appointed a small team under the leader-
ship of Seielstad to prepare a proposal. On 30 June, the same day that Congress 
authorized GBT funding, AUI submitted a hastily prepared formal proposal to 
the NSF for the construction of a fully steerable radio telescope with an “aper-
ture of at least 100 meters,” two arcsec pointing accuracy under good condi-
tions, an active surface control, and operating wavelengths from 3 millimeters 
to meter wavelengths.98 The proposal discussed, as an option, an unblocked 
aperture with an offset feed. It was no secret that, as a result of Senator Byrd’s 
deft maneuvers in Congress, a total of $74.5 million was available for the pro-
ject. NRAO engineers estimated that the construction costs would be about 
$58 million leaving somewhat less than the $20 million needed for project 
management and to build state-of-the-art receivers and other instrumentation 
for the new radio telescope. But it was unusual that a project that was expected 
to take years to build would be funded over just two years. This meant that 
inflation would eat into the budget, especially if the design and construction 
were to take longer than anticipated, so there was some pressure to avoid delay 
in the subsequent procurement and construction process.
Although it was clear that the NSF would support the project and funds had 
already been appropriated by Congress, the NSF went through the motions of 
a formal peer review and appointed a review panel that met in Washington on 
31 July–1 August 1989. Panel members noted the potential strong scientific 
impact, the value of the NRQZ, and the unequaled potential of a 100 meter 
unblocked aperture working to 3 mm wavelength. Both the mail reviews and 
the reports of review panel members gave strong endorsement to the GBT 
program. Indeed, none of the 15 reviewers who ranked the proposal gave it a 
grade below that of “excellent.” Knowing that the project was already funded, 
the reviewers concentrated on technical tradeoffs such as frequency coverage, 
size, and the nature of the optics. Interestingly, nearly all reviewers argued for 
an unblocked aperture, despite the current existence of nothing with an 
unblocked aperture larger than the Bell Labs 7.5 meter mm antenna (Fig. 9.12).
Just six weeks after the proposal submission, the NSF added $500,000 to 
NRAO’s 1988 budget to “allow NRAO to begin a preliminary design study 
for the Green Bank Telescope.”99 However, it wasn’t until 13 October 1989 
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
507
that the NSF National Science Board got around to approving the funding for 
the preliminary design phase, after which a further $4.4 million was added to 
the NRAO budget to complete the design phase of the GBT. A year later, the 
NSB unanimously approved the GBT construction for an amount not to 
exceed $69,590,000 for a period of five years. Still nervous about the 300 Foot 
collapse, they requested “a complete design and structural review … before 
manufacture and assembly of the telescope begins.”100 
NRAO did not want to merely duplicate existing radio telescopes, so pro-
posed to build a novel state-of-the-art instrument that would have many years 
of productive life to deal with the wide range of scientific topics of interest to 
potential users. NRAO planned that the surface panels be controlled by a set of 
motorized actuators which would adjust the surface to compensate for the 
changing gravitational deflections as the telescope was moved in elevation, and 
ultimately to also compensate for the effects of wind and of thermal effects due 
to solar heating. In this way, it was argued the new telescope could be large and 
also have the precision to work at short wavelengths. More controversial was 
the issue of a well-understood conventional feed-sub-reflector support mecha-
nism versus an asymmetric unblocked aperture. The asymmetric unblocked 
aperture offered reduced interference, improved spectroscopic capability, and 
higher efficiency, but at the expense of increased cost and complexity, as well as 
uncertain stability of the offset support structure which could introduce point-
ing uncertainties. The default was for a conventional symmetric structure, 
which was shown on the cover of the proposal to the NSF, but the possibility 
of an unblocked aperture and offset feed and asymmetric dish structure was 
Fig. 9.12 100 meter telescope concepts. Right: axially symmetrical design; Left: off-
set reflector 100 design. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
9 THE LARGEST FEASIBLE STEERABLE TELESCOPE 
508
also presented. It was estimated that an unblocked structure would cost about 
12 percent more than for a conventional antenna of the same effective dimen-
sions, but this would turn out to be far too optimistic. The main message from 
the astronomical community was to provide good high-frequency (i.e. 3 mm) 
performance. Although a radome-enclosed structure was not seriously consid-
ered, Herbert Weiss, who played a major role in the design of the earlier 
CAMROC/NEROC 440 foot enclosed antenna, later argued that a radome- 
enclosed antenna with the same effective sensitivity would be as much as a fac-
tor of four less expensive. Weiss’s argument, however, was based on an overly 
conservative estimate of receiver sensitivity resulting in a unrealistically small 
fractional increase in system noise from the radome.101
Due to the fast-track funding of the Green Bank Telescope, NRAO was in 
the probably unique but unenviable position where the funding was ahead of 
the design. Vanden Bout appointed a GBT Specifications Working Group, 
chaired by Seielstad, which met every two weeks. But it would be a year before 
NRAO was able to submit a call for proposals to construct a 100 meter equiva-
lent projected area clear aperture telescope with an actively controlled surface. 
The manufacturer was held responsible for achieving an overall surface accu-
racy better than 1.25 mm rms. NRAO was to be responsible for the active 
controlled surface which had a goal of overall accuracy of 0.4 mm rms. Under 
perceived pressure to complete the construction and start a research program, 
the RFP called for the unrealistic completion of construction and the start of 
operations in 1995.102 During the debates about the antenna design parame-
ters, the cumbersome term “NLSRT” was gradually replaced by reference to 
the generic “Green Bank telescope.” When it came time to solicit proposals, 
George Seielstad declared, for the lack of a better name, that it be called the 
“Green Bank Telescope” or GBT, and that name stuck. 
Former NRAO Director Dave Heeschen became the interim GBT project 
manager and stayed on as a consultant and advisor throughout the construc-
tion project. Heeschen made two difficult and far reaching decisions. Arguing 
that NRAO should not build just another telescope, he decided to go for the 
controversial off-axis asymmetric structure to give an unblocked aperture, and 
also to install an active surface that could be adjusted to compensate for gravity 
and ultimately the effect of solar heating induced effects of thermal gradients. 
Although there were some advantages to having the feed arm located at the 
bottom, such as improved accessibility and reduced spillover noise, the antici-
pated added cost of about $3 million argued for placing the feed arm at the top 
of the structure. The additional complexity, weight, and cost suggested that a 
fully homologous structure be dropped, as the active surface could compensate 
for gravitational deflections to form a best-fit parabola on a partially homolo-
gous structure.
Faced with demanding antenna specifications and a fixed budget, NRAO 
needed an experienced person to oversee the GBT construction. Out of 40 
applicants, NRAO appointed Robert Hall as the GBT Project Manager. Hall, 
who had been an infantry commander during WWII, had previously designed 
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the NRAO 85 foot antennas and consulted on the design of the 140 Foot 
Telescope while working at Blaw-Knox, the NRAO 36 Foot mm Radio 
Telescope while working at Rohr Corporation, and contributed to the design 
of NRAO 300 Foot Transit Radio Telescope. Hall had also overseen the con-
struction of a number of antennas of the JPL Deep Space Network, including 
the 210 foot antennas at Goldstone, California; Tidbinbilla, Australia; and 
Madrid, Spain. As was done for the VLA and VLBA antennas, NRAO, under 
the leadership of the Observatory’s structural engineer, Lee King, and with 
support from JPL, prepared an engineering design which the prospective man-
ufacturer was free to use. However, as was the case for the VLA and VLBA 
antennas, the request for proposals specified that the manufacturer would be 
responsible for all aspects of the design and for meeting the performance speci-
fications. This aspect of the GBT proposal process was later controversial and 
part of the basis for claims against NRAO/AUI and the NSF for payments of 
nearly $30 million, resulting from alleged changes in the GBT design made by 
NRAO after the construction contract had been signed.
On 1 June 1990, NRAO mailed a Request for Proposals (RFP) to prospec-
tive bidders, and three weeks later held a Preproposal Conference in 
Charlottesville. By this time, NRAO had become convinced that an unblocked 
clear aperture antenna was highly desirable and was feasible within the antici-
pated $55 million construction budget. Some 60 individuals with interest in 
some aspect of the GBT construction participated in the Charlottesville confer-
ence. Proposals were due on 1 October. NRAO received three bids for the 
construction of the GBT: from Brown & Root Services Corp., from the Fru- 
Con Corp, and from Radiation Systems Inc. (RSI), which had contracted with 
Ted Riffe, the retired NRAO Associate Director for Administration, to help 
prepare their bid. The bids ranged from a low of $57 million from RSI, to a 
high of $103 million from the Fru-Con Construction company. Fru-Con had 
teamed with the German MAN and Krupp consortium that had designed and 
built the MPIfR 100 meter Effelsberg radio telescope, while RSI partnered 
with Ford Aerospace and Electrospace Industries. The third proposal came 
from another consortium led by the Brown & Root Services Corporation. 
Brown & Root were joined by TIW Systems and the Vertex Communications 
Corporation to propose building the GBT for $83 million. The large spread in 
bids raised flags, but with no prospects for an increased Congressional appro-
priation, the three “prime proposers” were asked to reconsider their bids and 
to suggest appropriate cost savings by 9 November. Although some changes 
were subsequently made, only the RSI bid was within the available funding, 
although in many areas, one or other of the competing but more expensive 
proposals were judged to be superior.103
Under the leadership of its dynamic and ambitious president Raymond 
(Dick) Thomas, RSI had considerable experience in constructing radio tele-
scopes and had been involved in the 1970 resurfacing of the Green Bank 300 
Foot and the 1973 resurfacing of the 1000 foot Arecibo radio telescope. RSI 
also constructed the panels for the 28 VLA antennas and was the prime con-
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tractor for the ten VLBA antennas. RSI itself was composed of a number of 
fiscally independent subsidiaries located in Texas, Illinois, Florida, New Jersey, 
Nevada, and Georgia, as well as at their headquarters in Sterling, Virginia, and 
an office in the UK. Antenna fabrication was done primarily at the Universal 
Antennas Division, which was licensed in Nevada but had its construction facil-
ity in Richardson, Texas. Interestingly, Thomas was first inclined to bid for the 
full $75 million, which was widely known to be NRAO’s budgeted amount, 
but Riffe pointed out to Thomas that the $75 million would need to include 
instrumentation for the telescope as well as NRAO’s project management 
costs, so Thomas reduced his bid first to $57 million, and then under pressure 
from NRAO to $55 million.104
On 6 December 1990, the NSF added $65 million to the AUI cooperative 
agreement for the Green Bank Telescope project,105 and on 19 December, AUI 
signed a contract with RSI for a firm fixed price of $55 million with an aggressive 
completion date of 31 August 1994.106 To keep within the $55 million cost con-
straint, NRAO and RSI agreed to divide the project into two parts. First, a basic 
telescope that would be built by RSI using well understood engineering and 
construction practices and would operate up to 15 GHz, and second, a supple-
mentary system designed and built by NRAO to enable operation first to 43 GHz 
then to 100 GHz. To achieve the required performance, NRAO proposed to use 
a system of actuators to adjust the surface to compensate for gravitational defor-
mations as the telescope was tilted. A second phase would compensate for ther-
mally induced deformations. The even more demanding task of accurately 
pointing the huge structure at the desired position in the sky and maintaining 
that position as the Earth rotates was also divided into two phases; the first using 
“conventional techniques” to be implemented by the antenna manufacturer, and 
the second to be developed by NRAO, using an elaborate system of lasers and 
retroreflectors to achieve the “precision pointing” and surface accuracy required 
for operation at the shorter wavelengths. It later turned out the RSI concept for 
the GBT did not meet the required surface accuracy by an order of magnitude, 
and RSI had underestimated by a significant amount the weight of the antenna.107 
Recalling the embarrassing collapse of the 300 Foot Telescope, members of the 
NSF’s National Science Board Committee on Programs and Plans expressed 
concern about the structural integrity of the GBT design and called for a design 
and structural review that was held at the NSF on 10 October 1991. In order to 
provide scientific support to the GBT project, Jay Lockman was appointed as 
GBT Project Scientist, but was later replaced by David Hogg after Lockman 
replaced Seielstad as Green Bank Site Director in 1993.
Behind Schedule, Over Budget Groundbreaking for the ambitious GBT project 
occurred on 1 May 1991, and construction work began a few weeks later 
(Fig. 9.13). However, it would be ten years before the GBT was completed, 
and even longer before the challenging project was fully instrumented and 
operational at the planned shortest wavelengths. Not having adequate in-house 
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engineering expertise, RSI sub-contracted the design to the California-based 
Loral Aerospace Corporation (previously Ford Aerospace), which had exten-
sive experience in the design of radio telescopes. The Loral design, according 
to NRAO, did not meet the contract performance specifications, and NRAO 
offered its own optimized design.
In early 1991, Dave Heeschen expressed concern about “various sugges-
tions to modify and/or expand some of the telescope specs” and cautioned 
against trying to evaluate or optimize the RSI design.108 In 1992, NRAO called 
attention to a number of apparent deficiencies in the RSI design, and expressed 
“concern about the marginal aspects of the designs presented.”109 Already in 
Fig. 9.13 Groundbreaking for the Green Bank Telescope on 1 May 1991. From left 
to right are Senator Byrd, NSF Director Walter Massey, and AUI President Robert 
Hughes. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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1992, in view of the optimistic completion date in 1994, Green Bank staff were 
building receivers and other instrumentation, and optimistically planned to 
return the NRAO GBT project team back to Green Bank operations by the 
end of 1994. But by now problems began to appear with the telescope con-
struction. The actuators needed to correct the surface for deformations due to 
gravity were found to be causing radio frequency interference (RFI) which if 
not corrected would limit the performance of the radio telescope. Also, testing 
of the actuators indicated that they would not meet the lifetime specifications 
due to excessive internal wear. In mid-1992, Loral discovered that some of the 
tipping structure members would collide with the fixed alidade structure, 
requiring an altered geometry of the tipping structure, which in turn led to 
overstress in some structural members. By mid-1993, the design of the tipping 
structure by Loral was still not complete, and in June, RSI informed NRAO 
that the GBT completion would be delayed by a year until the end of 1994. In 
response, NRAO/AUI sent RSI a notice that RSI had defaulted on the con-
tract, to which RSI reacted by sending a similar notice of default on the design 
contract to Loral. In an effort to mitigate the Loral design deficiencies, NRAO, 
with the assistance of JPL, offered an optimized design which met all specifica-
tions and was incorporated by Loral/RSI, ostensibly with RSI assuming 
responsibility for the design. Later this proved to be contentious as RSI inter-
preted the NRAO/JPL optimized design as a change order that they argued 
increased the construction costs and should be at the expense of NRAO/
AUI. Within NRAO, the impending delay was not considered all that bad, as 
it would give NRAO more time to develop, fabricate, and test all the electron-
ics systems including the active surface and precision pointing system. 
Even with the projected delays, it was not expected that these in-house tasks 
would be completed by the antenna delivery time, although as noted by GBT 
business manager William Porter, “they will be more mature than if there were 
no delay.”110 Nor was the delay completely unexpected, since as early as 1989, 
following discussions with TIW’s Louis Becker, NRAO Engineer Larry 
D’Addario had called attention to the unrealistically short planned construc-
tion schedule. He then predicted that it would be late 1995 before the antenna 
would be completed. In 1994, the antenna contractor reported a new comple-
tion date in late 1996, which was later further delayed to March 1997. 
Following a series of review meetings, the re-baselined schedule placed the 
GBT delivery date at 15 December 1996, which later slipped to April 1998, 
and then due to safety issues with the derrick needed to lift the structural 
 members “no sooner than the end of 1998.” By April 1998, RSI reported that 
the GBT would be completed in October 1999, which became the end of 
1999. These delays naturally resulted in increased personnel costs which NRAO 
had to absorb outside the fixed GBT project budget. In spite of the numerous 
delays in completing the antenna structure by the contractor, NRAO realized 
that due to poor NRAO management, it would be difficult to have the neces-
sary software ready in time to support the commissioning of the GBT.111 
Moreover, development of receivers, spectrometers, and other ancillary instru-
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mentation was delayed, as the small Green Bank engineering staff was continu-
ally called upon to support existing and ongoing Green Bank telescope 
operations at the expense of developing GBT instruments. The GBT was not 
handed over by RSI to NRAO/AUI until the end of 2000, some months after 
the formal dedication, whose schedule was apparently set by Senator Byrd’s 
reelection campaign.
With the new design, the weight of the moving structure was only slightly 
over 9 million pounds, roughly 15 percent less than the Loral design, and was 
estimated to save RSI more than $1 million in the cost of steel. But a problem 
appeared following the analysis of the dynamic pointing model which indicated 
that following the repositioning of the antenna, the off axis feed arm would 
vibrate for up to one minute with an unacceptably large amplitude that would 
limit the performance of the telescope, particularly at high frequencies where 
the primary beamwidth is as small as ten arcseconds. It would be years before 
this problem was adequately resolved. As described by Dave Heeschen, “new 
problems arise as fast as older ones get resolved, and it is not at all clear that any 
real progress is being made.” With great prescience, Heeschen added, “in the 
case of RSI we need a paper trail in case we ever get into a legal hassle 
with them.”112
Meanwhile, the AUI Board of Trustees requested a written report from the 
NRAO director to explain the “causes and consequences of the delay in the 
GBT schedule.”113 The Board also noted with some unease the use in the GBT 
construction project of personnel paid from NRAO operating funds. A routine 
audit of the project by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) expressed 
alarm about statements in a letter from Hall to RSI “regarding the unaccept-
ability of portions of the design and NRAO’s concern about the overall safety 
and performance of the structure.”114 Hall defended his letter by telling Vanden 
Bout that “such statements are characteristic of tough contract management 
and should not be over interpreted by those outside the project,” and con-
cluded that “the final design will show a structure which is safe and will per-
form to specification.”115
The construction of the unconventional complex structure presented many 
unanticipated challenges. Two-thirds of the welders applying for jobs were 
deemed not qualified for the task. During the course of construction, an unfor-
tunate accident led to the tragic death of one of the RSI ironworkers. On 16 
November 1993, as several workers were lowered from the structure, they lost 
communication with the crane operator, apparently due to the failure of the 
batteries in their radio. While changing batteries, the basket carrying the work-
ers apparently hung up on a rope safety line. The basket tilted, and one of the 
workers fell 120 feet to the ground and was killed. The subsequent investiga-
tion by OSHA uncovered a variety of alleged safety violations, mostly unrelated 
to the accident, but which incurred various monetary penalties.
In a rush to demonstrate that they were on schedule for the proposed 1994 
completion date, RSI hastily began work by building the telescope foundation, 
just four months after the start of the Loral design work and well before the 
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design was finalized. The foundation design was based on an estimated moving 
weight of about 12 million pounds. However, the foundation was only margin-
ally adequate for a 12 million-pound load, and by the time the design was fin-
ished another 5 million pounds had been added to the structure, in the form 
of welding, paint, and the additional members needed to strengthen the struc-
ture to meet performance specifications. Pressured to meet the ambitious con-
struction schedule, joints and backup structure beams were fabricated before 
the design was optimized by NRAO, creating a challenge to find appropriate 
locations to place the prefabricated members. This led to later litigation about 
whether NRAO’s introduction of the optimized design constituted a change 
order leading to increased costs. In a further effort to speed up the construc-
tion, RSI did not accept Bob Hall’s urging to trial-erect some of the antenna 
substructures at their plant in Mexia, Texas, and as predicted by Hall, this 
resulted in schedule delays and further increased costs. Tensions between 
NRAO and RSI staff, as well as among Green Bank Site Director Jay Lockman, 
Project Scientist Harvey Liszt, and Project Manager Bob Hall became a further 
challenge to completing the radio telescope and meeting the design specifica-
tions. Meanwhile, a heated debate arose within NRAO about the location of 
the GBT control building. Some argued for a location well removed from the 
telescope to minimize interference by people coming and going; others, led by 
Jay Lockman, argued for a more conventional location close to the telescope, 
where scientists and engineers could best interact with the instrumentation. In 
the end, a committee appointed by Vanden Bout recognized that there were 
no funds for a separate control building, and opted to place all the control in 
the new wing of the Jansky Laboratory, a decision which led to the resignation 
of Lockman as the Green Bank Site Director.
In June 1993, when RSI acknowledged that the GBT delivery date would 
be delayed by one year to 31 December 1995 and hinted that even this might 
be optimistic, NRAO refused to approve the delay, telling RSI to find a way 
within two weeks to explain what measures RSI would take to recover the 
schedule. RSI responded that they had already taken all possible options to 
reduce the completion time, and that the end of 1995 represented a reasonable 
schedule. Already, NRAO and RSI were setting the stage for what would prove 
to be a lengthy and costly litigation.
Faced with schedule slippage and escalating costs, in June 1994 RSI was 
acquired by the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) which 
formed COMSAT RSI Technical Products (CRSI or CRSI-TP) to handle their 
antenna business, including the completion of the GBT.  But in July 1996, 
COMSAT CEO Bruce Crockett was ousted by the controversial Betty Alewine, 
who had her own agenda for COMSAT. Within a year, half of the 3,000 mem-
ber COMSAT staff had left. Faced with their own financial troubles, and unable 
to find buyers for its shares in the Denver Nuggets basketball and Colorado 
Avalanche hockey teams, COMSAT sold CRSI to a subsidiary of TBG 
Industries Inc. But COMSAT was unable to divest the GBT contract which 
was then transferred to a newly formed COMSAT subsidiary, COMSAT 
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Radiotelescopes Inc.116 However, CRSI-TP still retained the subcontract for 
the 2004 precision surface panels as well as for the drive motors and servo sys-
tems. COMSAT Radiotelescopes Inc. set up a new office in Herndon, VA, 
close to the CRSI facility in Sterling, whose sole responsibility was to oversee 
the completion of the GBT.  John Evans, the former director of the MIT 
Haystack Observatory and one of the pioneers of radar astronomy, became the 
COMSAT Vice President and Chief Technology Officer and was given direct 
responsibility for the GBT construction until its completion in 2000. In 1998 
COMSAT became part of Lockheed-Martin Global Telecommunications 
which had previously absorbed Loral, the company that did the complex GBT 
engineering design for RSI.
Claims and Counterclaims In the autumn of 1995, CRSI lodged a claim that, 
as a result of multiple continuing design changes, NRAO/AUI was responsible 
for a significant cost overrun of $14 million. Later, CRSI increased their claim 
to $29 million. Not receiving any resolution of their claim after more than a 
year, the new CRSI president Raymond Thomas (no relation to the former RSI 
President Dick Thomas) first threatened to stop work on the telescope, but 
then wrote to NSF Director Neal Lane, suggesting that the NSF provide addi-
tional funding for the GBT project, and that COMSAT would not be able to 
complete the telescope without additional funding.117 A few months later, 
Thomas followed up with a letter to Senator Byrd arguing that NRAO had 
modified the specifications and “requesting your support for increased funding 
of approximately $29,000,000 … for the GBT.”118 The COMSAT claim was 
based on alleged unnecessary design work, an unreasonable life cycle specifica-
tion, and inappropriate wind-load requirements. In response, NRAO/AUI 
argued that the design changes were necessary to meet the performance speci-
fications as outlined in the construction contract. Moreover, parts were shipped 
to Green Bank in the wrong order, and poor workmanship resulted in time 
consuming repeated welds, structural elements that needed to be returned to 
the factory for reworking, or work that had to be done in the air after beams or 
joints had been erected. A particularly contested item was the number of 
expected antenna cycles and the corresponding impact to metal fatigue. 
NRAO/AUI countered with claims of $12 million for six years of increased 
project management costs, lost research time, the cost of operating the 140 
Foot Radio Telescope for an additional six years, and the impact to science and 
NRAO’s reputation.119 Dave Heeschen described what he referred to as CRSI 
“bungles,” which led to a 30 percent increase in weight, which in turn led to a 
greatly increased cost and a “telescope dangerously close to its survival and 
performance limits.”120 
Nevertheless, NRAO/AUI realized that the legal costs associated with a 
protracted dispute could well approach $5 million, and suggested that it might 
consider settling at a level of “something more than one million dollars,” but 
not at “the thirty odd million dollars sought,” and then only if it led to an early 
completion of the telescope construction.121 In August 1997, Vanden Bout 
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offered to settle for $4.5 million, but this was rejected by COMSAT, which 
made a counter-offer to settle for $15 million.122 NRAO later offered to settle 
for $9 million, but it was rejected by COMSAT as being insulting.123 To sup-
port their position, NRAO/AUI contracted with the accounting firm of Ernst 
& Young to audit CRSI’s records to determine the merit of the claimed 
increased GBT construction costs. A later dispute arose when AUI accused 
Ernst & Young of excessive charges. Meanwhile, CRSI was involved in a similar 
dispute with Cornell University. CRSI had contracted with Cornell to upgrade 
the Arecibo radio telescope, but claimed that their cost overrun of $7 million 
was because Cornell had not fully disclosed “complete and accurate” informa-
tion about the upgrade project and associated site limitations.124
During this same period, there was a major upheaval at AUI. For decades 
NRAO had enjoyed the valuable stewardship of AUI, which also managed the 
much larger Brookhaven National Laboratory under a contract with the 
Department of Energy. Brookhaven had about ten times as many employees as 
NRAO and a corresponding budget that was an order of magnitude larger than 
the NRAO budget. Not surprisingly, the membership of the AUI Board was 
dominated by scientists with interests and experience in nuclear physics, and 
many of the activities of the AUI Board were devoted to Brookhaven affairs. 
But traditionally, the AUI Board members, and especially the AUI President, 
were always available to help with particular issues that might arise at 
NRAO.  Since 1980, Robert Hughes had served as AUI President working 
effectively with the NSF and Department of Energy (DOE) to help both 
Brookhaven and NRAO. Prior to assuming his position at AUI, Hughes had 
been a Professor of Chemistry at Cornell University, and in 1975 he became 
NSF Assistant Director for Astronomical, Atmospheric, Earth and Ocean 
Science, until he returned to Cornell in 1977. Hughes stepped down as AUI 
President in 1996, and Lyle Schwartz, who was formerly at the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology and the University of Maryland, became 
the new AUI President in March 1997.
By this time, rumors were circulating around Long Island that Brookhaven 
was dumping radioactive tritium which was contaminating the local drinking 
water. New York Senator Jacob D’Amato took up the war against Brookhaven, 
which argued that even if one drank a bathtub full of the local water every day, 
the radiation exposure would be less than that of a dental x-ray. But D’Amato 
persevered and following an investigation, the new DOE Secretary Frederico 
Pena, acting under pressure from the Senator, unilaterally dismissed AUI as the 
manager of Brookhaven, citing careless handling of a 12 year leak of radioactive 
tritium into the local ground (drinking) water.125 The loss of 90 percent of its 
financial basis and embarrassing discredit raised questions at the NSF as to 
whether AUI would be able to continue to perform its obligations to NRAO.126 
The subsequent defections of a number of AUI Board members led to a 
restructuring of the AUI corporate structure as a self-perpetuating not-for- 
profit corporation. No longer were Board members representing their home 
universities, but rather were independent scientists and administrators. With 
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only NRAO left to manage, the Board became more dominated by astrono-
mers, some of whom had their own agendas, and after the Brookhaven experi-
ence, AUI naturally took a heavier hand in managing NRAO. Within a year, 
Schwartz resigned as AUI President, and Cornell Professor and AUI Trustee 
Martha Haynes became Interim President in April 1998, in the midst of the 
NRAO/AUI-CRSI dispute. Following a national search, Riccardo Giacconi, a 
pioneer of x-ray astronomy and later winner of the 2002 Nobel Prize in Physics 
for his pioneering work leading to the discovery of cosmic x-ray sources, was 
appointed AUI President in July 1999. Giacconi was well known as a strong- 
willed, no-nonsense individual who had previously served as the first director 
of the Space Telescope Science Institute and later the director of European 
Southern Observatory.
In case of dispute, the NRAO-RSI contract called for binding arbitration in 
lieu of a lawsuit. AUI had hired William (Randy) Squires, who later joined the 
Seattle based Summit Law Group, to represent NRAO/AUI. By the end of 
1997, CRSI had submitted a demand for arbitration to settle their claim of $29 
million. NRAO/AUI denied responsibility for any increased CRSI costs and 
submitted a counter claim for $3.8 million that CRSI moved to dismiss and 
which Squires described as “bereft of legal gunpowder.”127 Paul Vanden Bout 
recognized the need to keep the litigation issues from impacting ongoing con-
struction work, so he appointed Dave Heeschen to lead a separate litigation 
team, which included NRAO scientists Dave Hogg and Harvey Liszt. They 
worked for several years with the legal team attorneys and staff to gather all 
relevant materials to reconstruct the decade-long record of design changes, 
delays, and communications between the manufacturer and subcontractors as 
well as between NRAO and the manufacturer. This included internal commu-
nications within NRAO and within RSI/COMSAT. Altogether NRAO/AUI 
spent over $5 million to prepare their legal defense.
Jacob Pankowski, of McKenna & Cuneo L.L.P., was the primary attorney 
for COMSAT, but at various times COMSAT used two other Washington, 
DC-based law firms to develop their case. COMSAT argued that “the require-
ment for 400,000 antenna cycles was unreasonable and unprecedented and 
that the impact to the design greatly increased the weight of the structure and 
extended the schedule,” thus adding to the cost. Moreover, COMSAT claimed 
that the 400,000 cycles requirement was not specified in the request for pro-
posals, that they were given inadequate guidance on how to calculate wind 
loads on the structure, and that after the design was nearly complete, AUI 
imposed an additional optimization process that was not a contract require-
ment and caused additional design effort which stretched out the program. 
COMSAT also rejected AUI’s claim for damages suffered as a result of addi-
tional management costs associated with the delay and for the costs of using 
the less effective 140 Foot Telescope on the grounds that AUI would be reim-
bursed for these costs by the NSF.128
AUI contended that based on “excessive pride and self-confidence RSI had 
aggressively sought the contract to design and build the GBT, although they 
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appeared to lack the understanding of the project’s requirements and the capa-
bility to complete the design and construction of the GBT. Specifically, AUI 
argued that RSI/COMSAT’s claims were “afterthoughts, dreamed up” to per-
mit COMSAT to recoup their losses and argued that “RSI burdened its ill- 
conceived concept with a combination of poor or non-existent planning, 
lengthy and ineffective lines of communication and inexperienced managers.” 
Furthermore, contended AUI, “RSI was hamstrung by the fact that its various 
subsidiaries utilized different, and apparently irreconcilable cost accounting 
systems that prevented project management from receiving accurate project 
fiscal performance information,” and that “RSI did not recognize the magni-
tude of its overruns as they occurred.”129
NRAO’s Associate Director for Administration, James Desmond, summed 
up AUI’s position:
It is not often that the complexities of construction resolve in a way that permits 
a bona fide argument that a particular claims [sic] should be denied in its entirity 
[sic]. This is one of those unusual cases. Under the circumstances, COMSAT can-
not be blamed for hoping that the size of its loss would overcome the paucity of 
its proof. It has failed to make the required showing, however, and the claims 
should be rejected.130
COMSAT responded, “Only now, without a shred of evidentiary or other sup-
port, does AUI make its mean-spirited and bizarre attack.”131
As part of the “discovery” process, all records, notes, correspondence, tech-
nical calculations, etc. relevant to the GBT construction at both COMSAT 
and NRAO/AUI were made known to the other side. This involved copying 
costs at NRAO amounting to more than $100,000. More than 100 boxes of 
papers lined the halls at NRAO’s Charlottesville headquarters waiting for CRSI 
staff and their attorneys to review and copy as needed. Following some admin-
istrative reshuffling within the American Arbitration Association, the AUI-
CRSI case was moved from the Washington Regional Headquarters to a new 
Case Management Center in Atlanta, Georgia, and placed on the “Large 
Complex Case Track.” In January 1998, Alan Kent, who was an experienced 
government procurement attorney, was appointed by the American Arbitration 
Association as the Arbitrator. The arbitration hearing, which was scheduled to 
last only four weeks, was originally scheduled to begin on 18 January 1999 
(later realized to be a federal holiday), but was repeatedly delayed at the request 
of the COMSAT attorneys. The hearing finally began on 23 October 1999 at 
a Hyatt hotel in Reston, Virginia, and did not conclude until late January 
2000. During the hearing, it was revealed that Judge Kent and AUI Trustee 
Claude Canizaries had been college roommates, which almost resulted in a 
mistrial. Perhaps more important, Judge Kent was a WWII history buff and 
relished Bob Hall’s tales of how he had served as an infantry officer under 
General George Patton.
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
519
NRAO/AUI presented nearly 50 depositions taken from various experts 
and non-experts. Preparation of post-hearing briefs and responses to the post- 
hearing briefs took nearly another six months, and review and deliberations by 
the Arbitrator yet a further six months. Finally, on 8 February 2001, Kent 
awarded COMSAT $6.62 million for its claim and NRAO $2.55 million for its 
counter claim. The Arbitrator recognized AUI’s claim of the additional project 
management costs due to the COMSAT delays, but denied the claim of lost 
scientific data. Although the net cost to NRAO/AUI was only $4.07 million, 
the real cost to CRSI for building the GBT was independently estimated by 
both NRAO and COMSAT to be about $120 million, or $65 million over the 
contract value. COMSAT received only the $55 million contracted construc-
tion fee plus the $4 million arbitration award. Vanden Bout noted that $4 mil-
lion amounted to only 5.5% of the total project cost and it was just that amount 
that he had offered COMSAT to settle in lieu of arbitration. But NRAO/AUI 
had also spent over $5M in preparing for the defense, most of which was in 
legal costs. The fee for the arbitration alone was $230,000 and was equally 
shared by AUI and COMSAT. The NSF took a hard line, and refused Vanden 
Bout’s request for supplemental funding in FY98 and FY99 to cover the litiga-
tion expenses. While AUI agreed to loan NRAO $750,000 in FY98 to cover 
some of the litigation expenses, even more of a concern at that time was the 
possibility of an unfavorable judgment against AUI/NRAO of as much as 
$29 million.
Following the relatively modest adverse judgement, in early 2001 NRAO/
AUI still faced bills totaling more than $9 million. Aside from issues of whether 
or not the cost of settling the claim was allowable under the terms of the AUI- 
NSF Cooperative Agreement, there were no funds available within the NSF 
Astronomy Division to cover such a large unplanned cost. Nor could budget 
funds be moved from other NSF divisions without express approval from the 
cognizant Congressional appropriation committees. There was a real possibil-
ity that NRAO/AUI would need to find the $9 million within the NRAO 
annual operating budget or from AUI corporate funds, and Vanden Bout 
started to implement a number of NRAO budget adjustments to at least cover 
the litigation expenses. However, following extensive strategy discussions, the 
NSF deftly adjusted the 2002 NRAO fiscal year to begin on 1 October 2001 
instead of 1 January 2002, so in calendar year 2001, NRAO received 15 
months of funding or an effective budget supplement of 25%. This was enough 
to pay the litigation costs, as well as to support other long overdue activities at 
the Observatory. Much to the chagrin of Che Kim, the powerful Clerk of the 
Senate Appropriations Committee, who was already at odds with NSF Director 
Rita Colwell, the NSF had cleverly and legally maneuvered a budget change 
without the required Congressional approval.
To their credit, even during the ongoing lengthy and sometimes bitter liti-
gation process, COMSAT and NRAO engineers continued to work together 
to finally bring the GBT construction to a satisfactory completion by the end 
of 2000. Vanden Bout wisely allowed the project team to focus on completing 
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the antenna, while enlisting others to support the lengthy legal proceedings. 
When finally dedicated in August 2000, the GBT became the largest movable 
structure on the surface of the Earth, weighing 17 million pounds and extend-
ing 100 x 110 meters across.132 It has an unblocked aperture containing 2004 
surface panels positioned by 2209 remotely controlled actuators or jack screws 
to constantly adjust the surface to compensate for thermal and gravitational 
distortions and keep the surface sufficiently accurate to a few tenths of a milli-
meter to allow operation at 86 GHz (3.5 mm). The planned innovative preci-
sion pointing system and adaptive surface, based on the use of lasers to measure 
the path length from various parts of the structure to fixed points on the 
ground, was never perfected. However, the finite element analysis gave such a 
good description of the structural behavior that the dish distortions under the 
effects of gravity are effectively removed by the active surface and a straightfor-
ward look-up table. Precision pointing is achieved by the use of tilt sensors 
located at strategic points in the structure, and feeding this information back 
into the pointing equations achieves a pointing accuracy of about one second 
of arc, equivalent to the thickness of a human hair at a distance of 15 feet. 
Paradoxically, when rejecting an application for funds to make a documentary 
film about the GBT construction, the NSF responded that, “unlike an optical 
telescope, a radio telescope is not very visual.”133 (Fig. 9.14).
Due to the various design changes implemented during the construction 
process, and the non-negligible weight of the weldings that had been neglected 
in the early weight calculation, the GBT, as delivered from the manufacturer, 
weighed between 17.0 and 17.5 million pounds, or about 30% more than the 
original design weight. Although the weight was thought to be within the 
required safety margins at the mid-span of each track segment, there had been 
no consideration of stresses at the joints or dynamic loading effects. Owing to 
the excess weight, some of the azimuth track plates began to slip and show 
excessive wear shortly after the completion of the GBT; numerous hold down 
bolts were shearing off, and gaps in the grout were filling with water and drain-
ing off grout particulate. As a result, the azimuth wheels were tilting and caus-
ing even more excessive wear of the track. NRAO engineers were concerned 
that, without repairs, the rate of track degradation would lead to a shutdown 
of GBT operations in 6–12 months.
Following a series of reviews of the extent of the damage, AUI submitted a 
claim to Lockheed Martin for $9,053,126.35 to cover their accrued costs and 
the expected cost of repairs. Lockheed Martin responded that AUI had been 
the “windfall beneficiary” of a telescope that cost $110 million to build and yet 
for which AUI paid only approximately $55 million but “regrettably took a 
‘throw in the kitchen sink’ approach and that the AUI was unreasonable.”134 
Lockheed claimed that the proposed AUI repairs were actually an upgrade of 
the original specifications for which they were not responsible.
Noting that the proposed upgrades were necessary to meet the original 
20-year warranty, AUI was unwilling to settle for the $1.5 million offered by 
Lockheed. But following a visit to Lockheed by AUI Vice President Pat 
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Donahue, Green Bank Assistant Director Phil Jewell, and the AUI attorney 
Randy Squires, AUI accepted Lockheed’s check for $4 million to cover the 
cost of the track repairs.
Epilogue After the completion of the project, NRAO held a postmortem to 
evaluate how and why the GBT problems occurred.135 Basically, it was agreed 
that nothing like this had ever been done before, and no one at NRAO, AUI, 
RSI, or the NSF, nor the distinguished members of the advisory committees, 
had ever built a 100 meter clear aperture structure with an active surface and 
with the GBT’s exacting specifications. Clearly the initial cost estimates and 
schedule agreed to by both NRAO and RSI were overly optimistic. But the 
bidders proposed to meet the schedule because that is what the RFP demanded. 
Only RSI came even close to meeting the NRAO budget allocation, whether 
in ignorance or naivety, or perhaps in expectation of later negotiating a new 
cost. It was clear from the size of the Brown & Root Services Corp. and from 
the Fru-Con Corp. bids that the RSI bid was unrealistically low. However, 
NRAO’s hands were tied. They could have rejected the RSI bid and redesigned 
Fig. 9.14 Completed Green Bank Telescope. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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the antenna, but RSI wanted the job and had apparently submitted a respon-
sible bid consistent with the publically known budget and NRAO’s own esti-
mate. Had NRAO rejected the RSI bid, RSI would likely have protested. 
Alternately, NRAO could have gone back to the NSF for more funds, but 
considering the history of the funding process, that was not a viable choice. So 
NRAO chose to go ahead with RSI, which had a good reputation and whose 
bid was close to the NRAO budget estimate. On several occasions, NRAO 
threatened to hold RSI in default, but this was never a real option, since an 
alternate contractor would have required at least as much money, and the 
appropriated funds were already largely gone. NRAO took a calculated risk 
that RSI would not just walk off the job, as they were dependent on other 
existing and future government contracts. GBT Business Manager Bill Porter 
speculated that had there been time for a proper Design and Development 
phase, it would have been realized that the construction cost would be much 
higher than the RSI bid, but, he added, “had the real price been known, we 
might never have built the GBT.”136
It took nearly half a century of discussion and debate, and numerous NSF 
and National Academy committees, but in the end it was a freak accident, 
coupled with the ambitions of a powerful Senator, a fiercely competitive radio 
astronomer with political connections, and a hungry, possibly naïve or unscru-
pulous contractor, to finally build the largest and most powerful fully steerable 
radio telescope in the world.
Why did it take half a century before the United States could finally build a 
large fully steerable radio telescope? As pointed out by John Findlay in April 
1988, it was not for the lack of design effort nor the lack of skilled people either 
in industry or academia.137 But the NRAO 140 Foot and the 600 foot Sugar 
Grove fiascos were both embarrassments to the US radio astronomy commu-
nity, from which it would take decades to recover. The 140 Foot itself was 
smaller than the Jodrell Bank or Parkes radio telescopes, both of which had 
been in operation for several years before the 140 Foot was finally completed, 
and the 140 Foot structure turned out to have serious limitations which 
impacted its short wavelength performance. The proposals for building a large 
fully steerable telescope in the US were led, or were perceived to be led, by 
engineers, not by an astronomer prepared to put his or her reputation on the 
line. By the mid-1960s, planning for the VLA was already dominating discus-
sions at NRAO and AUI, and the LFST project was on the back burner. Finally, 
the scientific returns from the interferometric arrays at Cambridge, then 
OVRO, Westerbork, and later the VLA dwarfed the productivity of the large 
fully steerable radio telescopes at Jodrell Bank, Haystack, Effelsberg, and 
Algonquin Park, although the 210 foot Parkes antenna has been widely recog-
nized as highly productive. Within both NRAO/AUI and the broader US 
radio astronomy community, the top priority was first the VLA, then the 
VLBA, and finally a millimeter array. A large fully steerable radio telescope for 
centimeter wavelengths remained a high priority for over a half a century, but 
never rose to first priority, normally a necessary, but by no means sufficient 
condition for obtaining federal funding for constructing a new scientific facility.
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
523
It is perhaps interesting to speculate that if Jim Condon had been able to 
inspect his 300 Foot survey data on a daily basis, he would have spotted the 
changing performance of the 300 Foot Telescope, which might have immedi-
ately been recognized as due to the increasing deformations of the structure. 
Further observations would have been halted; the 300 Foot Telescope, which 
was already earmarked for closure, would probably not have collapsed, but 
would have been closed for lack of funding and dismantled; Senators Byrd and 
Rockefeller would not have been alarmed; and the GBT would have never 
been built.
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In 1962, Frank Drake recruited Texas Instruments physicist Frank Low to 
come to Green Bank to develop bolometer receiver systems for use at millime-
ter wavelengths. Under Low’s leadership, NRAO contracted with the Rohr 
Corporation to manufacture a 36 Foot Telescope designed for use at wave-
lengths as short as 1 mm. To minimize the effects of tropospheric water vapor, 
NRAO located the telescope at the Kitt Peak National Observatory near 
Tucson, Arizona. Fabrication errors led to long delays, and before the 36 Foot 
Telescope was finished, Low left NRAO to join the University of Arizona, 
where he could pursue his interests in infrared astronomy. Low’s bolometers 
never reached the anticipated sensitivity at 1 mm, and manufacturing errors 
limited the performance of the 36 Foot dish. However, the unanticipated dis-
covery of powerful 2.6 mm radio emission from interstellar carbon monoxide 
(CO), and later from other molecular species, led to a greatly increased interest 
in millimeter astronomy. Despite many technical and administrative concerns, 
the 36 Foot Telescope became the most oversubscribed NRAO telescope. In 
1983, NRAO replaced the faulty 36 Foot dish with a more precise 12 Meter 
surface. Arguably, the 36 Foot/12 Meter Telescope became the most produc-
tive instrument in the world for millimeter spectroscopy until it was eclipsed by 
more powerful facilities both in the US and abroad.
An ambitious plan to build a 25 meter millimeter wave telescope on Mauna 
Kea in Hawaii was never funded, and it would be another quarter of a century 
before the NRAO would return to the forefront of millimeter wave radio 
astronomy with the completion of the Atacama Large Millimeter/submillime-
ter Array (ALMA) as a joint NRAO-ESO-NAOJ facility in northern Chile.
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10.1  First Attempts
Although the 1961 Pierce Panel report (Keller 1961) emphasized high resolu-
tion radio imaging, the Panel also drew attention to the potential opportunities 
at millimeter wavelengths noting that “the exploitation of wavelengths from 
3  cm down through the millimeter range should be encouraged and sup-
ported.” They also pointed out that “Such work can best be carried out at 
altitudes above 13,000 feet1 with highly accurate dishes of moderate size (less 
than 100 feet).” But the Pierce Panel was primarily motivated by the drive for 
higher angular resolution, which they argued could be achieved with relatively 
small and therefore inexpensive dishes operating at millimeter wavelengths. 
Indeed, the highest resolution filled aperture radio telescope at the time was 
the Naval Research Laboratory’s (NRL) 50 foot dish, which had a 3 arcmin 
beam at 8 mm wavelength.
As a physicist working for Texas Instruments, Frank Low (Fig. 10.1) devel-
oped sensitive liquid helium cooled germanium bolometer detectors that 
promised greatly improved sensitivity at infrared and short millimeter wave-
lengths (Low 1961). Since bolometer systems respond to all incoming radia-
tion, including the warm radiation from the ground and atmosphere, the 
challenge was to develop effective filters that could isolate the desired wave-
band and attenuate everything outside the reception band by at least a factor 
of a million, while, at the same time, not introducing significant noise. This 
meant that the filters as well as the bolometer needed to be cooled to liquid 
helium temperatures. Frank Drake became aware of Low’s work,2,3 and 
Fig. 10.1 Frank Low 
came to NRAO from 
Texas Instruments in 
1962 to begin a 
millimeter astronomy 
program in Green Bank. 
Credit: NRAO/AUI/
NSF
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recruited Low to come to Green Bank to develop millimeter wavelength 
receiver systems. Following his short visit to Green Bank in March 1962, Joe 
Pawsey warmly endorsed Drake and Low’s millimeter initiative and also noted 
that Low’s bolometer was “an ideal instrument for infra-red spectroscopy.”4
After arriving in Green Bank in 1962, Low worked on 1.3 mm and infrared 
bolometer systems. He and Drake set up a 5 foot plastic dish with a gold plated 
surface and began the first astronomical observations in the 1.3 mm band (Low 
and Davidson 1965). This was NRAO’s first experience with liquid helium 
cooled receivers, and the bolometer contract with Texas Instruments included 
two weeks of training in cryogenic techniques for Observatory personnel.5 
However, with their limited sensitivity, all Low and Drake could observe at 
1.3  mm was the Moon, and they began to develop plans to build a larger 
antenna on a mountain site to minimize the absorption due to atmospheric 
water vapor.
Dave Heeschen shared their enthusiasm, and expressed the opinion that 
“Millimeter wavelength observations constitute a vast unexplored region of 
radio astronomy,” and said he did not believe the Observatory should leave the 
millimeter wavelength field to others because this work could be done effec-
tively only by a strong balanced group such as was available at Green Bank.6 
Although still struggling to complete the 140 Foot construction, Heeschen 
boldly proclaimed that the millimeter wavelength telescope ranked third in 
priority for NRAO “after the very large dish [LFST] … and the interferometer 
array [VLA].”
10.2  the NrAO 36 FOOt millimeter WAve telescOpe
As part of its 1964 budget submission to the NSF, NRAO included a request 
for $600,000, later increased to $800,000, to obtain a 36 foot diameter 
antenna designed to work at wavelengths as short as 1.3 mm. Frank Drake later 
recalled that it was a last minute thought, and that he added just a few para-
graphs of explanation to NRAO’s annual budget submission to support the 
request for a new millimeter wave telescope.7 Prior to starting the 36 Foot 
project, Low and Drake embarked on a development program to build a series 
of smaller antennas ranging up to 12 feet in diameter (Fig. 10.2).8 Although 
Heeschen was successful in the getting the NSF funds, it soon became clear 
that it was going to be a challenge to achieve the required surface accuracy of 
0.002 inches (0.05 mm), less than the thickness of a sheet of paper, and 2 arc-
sec pointing accuracy, about the angle subtended by newsprint seen across a 
football field.9 Moreover, in 1964, “in view of the relatively small initial cost 
and the scale of the operation,” the AUI Board raised questions about whether 
or not a millimeter wave telescope was more appropriate for a university than 
for NRAO.10 But Heeschen claimed that there were no universities prepared to 
invest in the technology development needed for observing at millimeter 
wavelengths.
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In order to accommodate his 1.2 mm bolometer system, Low argued for an 
unusually long feed support structure. This made the optics for the conven-
tional heterodyne receivers used at longer wavelengths more complex than 
would be the case for a more conventional f/D ratio of about 0.4, and was “the 
subject of prolonged discussion” within NRAO.11 Also, as argued by Peter 
Mezger, the longer feed support legs were more subject to wind and thermal 
effects which compromised the pointing accuracy.12 The controversy was finally 
resolved by adopting a compromise geometry, but as Mezger had anticipated, 
this still created problems in using the telescope at longer wavelengths.
After recruiting Low to start a millimeter program at NRAO, Drake left 
NRAO in 1963 to join the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Two years later, after 
Fig. 10.2 Frank Low (on the left) supervises the installation of his 1 mm bolometer 
on a 12 meter diameter dish behind the Green Bank Jansky Laboratory. Credit: NRAO/
AUI/NSF
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getting NRAO to agree to these unusual antenna specifications, Low left to 
join the University of Arizona Lunar and Planetary Laboratory. Low was 
already spending a lot of time in Tucson pursuing his interests in infrared 
astronomy, and suggested setting up an NRAO laboratory in Tucson to sup-
port the 36 Foot operation. Apparent in Low’s request was his interest in 
remaining in Tucson instead of living in Green Bank or Charlottesville. 
Responding to Low, Heeschen firmly replied, “We do not intend to set up, 
instrument, and staff a lab in Tucson. This is a firm decision and applies to you 
and everyone else on the NRAO staff.”13 Later Heeschen added, “the Tucson 
site will always be—for the NRAO—purely an observing site. We will not have 
any appreciable staff there, no development lab there, and no scientists perma-
nently in residence there…. It will not be possible for us to indefinitely main-
tain you in Tucson. At some time you should return to Charlottesville or 
affiliate with some other organization.”14 Low elected, instead, to join the 
University of Arizona, where he went on to have a very distinguished career as 
one of the pioneers of infrared astronomy. He also formed his own company to 
build and market infrared detectors for astronomical, industrial, and military 
use, and he liked to tell stories of dark-suited customers who would pay for 
bolometer systems with thousands of dollars in cash.
The departure of Drake and Low left NRAO with a novel but challenging 
millimeter wave telescope project, but without the two scientists who had initi-
ated it. John Findlay took over as the project director, but he left in 1965 for a 
year’s leave-of-absence to become director of the Arecibo Observatory in 
Puerto Rico, leaving Hein Hvatum, NRAO Assistant Director for Technical 
Services, in charge of the millimeter telescope effort. Peter Mezger, who was 
on the Green Bank Scientific Staff, assumed the role as the scientific leader of 
NRAO millimeter wave astronomy. In a thoughtful report,15 Mezger noted 
that the few sources likely to be strong enough to study with the planned 36 
Foot Telescope included the Sun, the Moon, and some of the planets. Although 
he noted that “there is some evidence of radio sources of very small apparent 
diameters with flat or increasing spectra which may become ‘visible’ at very 
short wavelengths,” he commented, “it seems to be very doubtful if observa-
tions at 3  mm wavelength or shorter can contribute anything to the radio 
astronomy of galactic and extragalactic sources.” He also went on to speculate 
on the possibility of observing atomic Radio Recombination Lines from high 
order electron transitions. In the same report, Mezger compared the short 
wavelength capabilities of the 36 Foot antenna with other facilities and reviewed 
the range of available millimeter wave amplifiers. 
NRAO solicited proposals from eight potential suppliers and received three 
firm bids to construct the complete telescope.16 Following evaluation of the 
proposals under Findlay’s leadership, including visits to the three finalists’ 
plants, NRAO chose the Rohr Corporation in Chula Vista, California to build 
the 36 Foot telescope. This was not NRAO’s first experience with the Rohr 
Corporation. In 1963, when NRAO and Rohr were discussing a possible 
design contract for a 400 foot transit radio telescope, Rohr engineer Bob Hall 
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had casually remarked that Rohr had recently completed a 15 foot dish designed 
for operation up to 140  GHz.17 In order to protect the antenna from the 
weather, Rohr proposed enclosing the telescope in a 95 foot diameter rotating 
astrodome, allowing observations to be made through a 40 foot slit, much in 
the manner typical of optical telescopes.
Although Low and Drake had succeeded in making millimeter observations 
in Green Bank, the 36 Foot Telescope clearly needed to be located at a better 
site with less atmospheric water vapor. Two sites near Tucson, Arizona were 
considered: one on Kitt Peak Mountain, home of the Kitt Peak National 
Observatory (KPNO) and located about 50 miles to the west of Tucson, the 
other on Mount Lemmon, northwest of Tucson, home of the University of 
Arizona optical and infrared telescopes. Other sites near Climax, Colorado and 
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico were also discussed, the 
latter being pushed by some of the AUI Trustees with their atomic physics 
backgrounds. The Mount Lemmon site was located at an altitude of 9,000 feet, 
about 2,000 feet higher than the Kitt Peak site, but there were powerful radio 
transmitters, as well as other activities, on Mount Lemmon, which were a 
potential source of interference to millimeter astronomy. NRAO chose Kitt 
Peak, as KPNO agreed to provide logistical and administrative support for 
NRAO’s millimeter telescope.  Interestingly, there was no attempt made to 
evaluate any of the other potential sites, as Heeschen argued that “the differ-
ence between a so called ‘good’ site and a somewhat better one from the water 
vapor point of view is so much less than the difference between a good site and 
a bad site [Green Bank] as to make it unnecessary in his judgment to embark 
on detailed studies.”18 However, in spite of Heeschen and Findlay’s reassur-
ances about the adequacy of the Kitt Peak site and the attraction of collaborat-
ing with the optical astronomers at KPNO, the AUI Board continued to press 
the issue of seeking a more favorable site. On the other hand, the NSF Director 
Leeland Haworth cautioned Heeschen about the difficulties of operating such 
a distant site but otherwise supported the project.19 Heeschen acknowledged 
that “a split operation presents real difficulties,” but pointed out that the 
planned large array would also involve an additional site for NRAO. 
Construction Challenges Construction of the dish itself, which took place at 
the Rohr plant in Chula Vista, was a challenge. In order to meet the 0.002 inch 
rms accuracy required for operation at 1.3 mm, Rohr decided to fabricate the 
surface in one piece rather than use multiple panels as for the Green Bank 
antennas, and machined the surface from welded sections of aluminum plate. 
The precision cutting procedure was so sensitive to vibrations that to avoid the 
effect of passing trucks and the effects of ocean tides, the cutting could only be 
done at night and at low tide. Moreover, the welding process distorted the 
structure, so that to achieve the desired parabolic shape, the thickness of the 
dish surface would then be less than the “desired minimum surface thickness.” 
To correct for this, Rohr engineers sprayed additional metal to the low areas of 
the reflector surface. But the sprayed areas contained contaminants that dam-
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aged the cutting tool and probably contributed to the resultant poor thermal 
characteristics of the dish.20
The dish surface was finally complete in late February 1966 and the 13,000 
pound 36 foot dish was transported by road from the Chula Vista factory to 
the base of Kitt Peak (Fig. 10.3), accompanied by California and Arizona State 
Police escorts. The 425-mile trip took ten days and the entire Rohr convoy 
included eight truckloads of telescope components. Due to problems and 
delays in completing the dome, concerns about the impact of inclement 
weather conditions on top of the mountain, and ongoing repairs to the road up 
the mountain, the dish structure remained at the bottom of Kitt Peak for many 
months—under guard lest it be stolen or used as target practice by Arizona 
locals. Even after the dish was mounted, difficulties with the drive system, the 
azimuth bearing, control of the dome motion, and the on-line computer con-
trol delayed the start of telescope operations for another year. The 36 Foot 
Telescope (Fig. 10.4) was finally turned over to NRAO in April 1967, although 
a variety of problems remained, including the flexure of the bi-pod feed sup-
port, which could be mitigated by tightening the cables securing the legs, but 
there was a concern that this would lead to dish distortions. On one occasion, 
the cables were inadvertently loosened and the feed legs crashed into the dish, 
but fortunately there was no serious damage to either the telescope or person-
nel, except perhaps for the great embarrassment of the senior engineer who 
caused the accident.21 
Fig. 10.3 The 36 Foot dish was transported by road from the Chula Vista factory to 
the base of Kitt Peak. Credit: John Hungerbuhler/NRAO/AUI/NSF
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The 36 Foot millimeter wave telescope was novel for the time, as it was the 
first NRAO telescope to be designed from the start to be operated under the 
control of a digital computer. However, programing the computer introduced 
new challenges. Although the 85 foot, the 140 Foot, and the 300 Foot anten-
nas all ended up being computer-controlled, it was only after years of experi-
ence with an operator interacting with analogue control systems. The 85 foot 
and 140 Foot telescopes were equatorially mounted and so needed no coordi-
nate conversion, while the 300 foot was a simple transit telescope. The 36 Foot 
was NRAO’s first alt-az telescope that required coordinate conversion between 
celestial right ascension-declination and altitude-azimuth, and indeed the con-
cerns raised a decade earlier in the debates surrounding the design of the 140 
Foot Telescope resurfaced (Sect. 4.4). Other alt-az radio telescopes such as 
those at NRL, Dwingeloo, Jodrell Bank, and Parkes used an analogue conver-
sion system. The 36 Foot was one of the first telescopes anywhere to use a digi-
tal computer for the coordinate conversion. As a new experience, and due to 
errors in the operating system along with faulty hardware interfaces, it took 
several trips to Tucson by Green Bank engineers, and a new programmer, 
before the telescope was able to accurately point and track a celestial target. An 
interesting by-product of the later attempts to improve the computer control 
of the 36 Foot Telescope and real-time data analysis was the introduction of 
the FORTH22 language developed by Charles (Chuck) Moore. After bringing 
FORTH to both Green Bank and Tucson, Moore left NRAO to form FORTH 
Fig. 10.4 The completed 36 Foot Telescope in its rotating dome enclosure on Kitt 
Peak
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Inc., which developed FORTH applications for a wide variety of end users 
including the space shuttle, medicine, oceanography, engineering, music, the 
San Francisco BART metro system, and the Boeing 777 avionics system.
Getting Going in Tucson The original scientific justification for the 36 foot mil-
limeter wave telescope was marginal. It was not built to solve any specific sci-
entific problem or to investigate any known phenomena, but rather to explore 
the opportunities for new discoveries that might be possible by working in this 
almost unexplored region of the electromagnetic spectrum, and in particular to 
exploit Frank Low’s 1.3 mm bolometer system. A realistic estimate of what one 
might expect to observe with Low’s bolometer and the 36 Foot telescope 
would have included the Sun, the Moon, the thermal emission from a few 
planets, and a few H II regions with thermal spectra. Only a few extragalactic 
sources were known to have spectra that when extrapolated to millimeter wave-
lengths might be detected with the 36 Foot. The class of compact “flat spec-
trum” radio sources were still unknown, and, ironically, there was no 
consideration of any spectroscopic observations.
Reflecting the anticipated nature of the 36 Foot operation as an experimen-
tal instrument, and perhaps realizing that the 36 Foot Telescope appeared to 
have limited attraction for outside users, Heeschen planned to keep the Tucson- 
based NRAO support staff to a minimum and the operation informal. After the 
telescope went into operation, George Grove, who had served in a variety of 
roles in Green Bank, transferred to be Head of Tucson Operations in August 
1967 to support the 36 Foot operation and to provide some observing assis-
tance. Initially, unlike at Green Bank, observers were for the most part expected 
to run the telescope and take care of the instrumentation themselves, but in 
1968 Don Cardarella, who had been a Green Bank 300 Foot operator, moved 
to Tucson and became the first 36 Foot telescope operator. 
When the telescope was finally placed in operation in the summer of 1967, 
there was no immediate rush of observers waiting to use the instrument. Drake 
and Low, who had started the project with great enthusiasm, were gone. Unlike 
the 140 Foot and 300 Foot Green Bank telescopes, the 36 Foot was conceived 
of as an experimental instrument and not a user facility. The telescope was 
scheduled informally, first by Heeschen and later by Bill Howard, then Assistant 
to the NRAO Director, with large blocks of time going to individuals or to 
small teams who would be in residence in Tucson for several weeks at a time. 
Much of the early observing was devoted to calibrating the pointing and learn-
ing how the focus and gain changed with elevation and temperature. However, 
the poor sensitivity resulting from the small antenna size, low efficiency, and 
high system temperatures made calibration challenging. Only the Sun and the 
Moon, and two planets, Venus and Jupiter, gave sufficient signal-to-noise ratio, 
and solar heating limited observations to the nighttime. When under computer 
control, the telescope moved very slowly, so large azimuth motions resulted in 
a lot of lost observing time. An adventurous and courageous observer knew 
how to unlock the computer and manually drive the telescope at high speed to 
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a new position, hoping that the brakes would work, and risking tearing off the 
connecting cables if the telescope were not stopped in time. 
Although Low continued to attempt 1.3 mm bolometer observations, the 
uncertain antenna pointing, poor aperture efficiency, and thermal distortions 
of the dish limited results. Scientific observing by NRAO staff, as well as by 
visitors, at 3 mm and 9 mm wavelength using simple mixer continuum radiom-
eters to study extragalactic radio sources and thermal emission from compact 
H II regions were not productive. It was clear that the 36 Foot was not going 
to meet its design specifications, and, already, Heeschen was contemplating 
replacing the dish structure.23 But AUI first called for a review to explain the 
increased cost, the delay in completion, and the failure to meet the anticipated 
specifications.24 
The local oscillator systems for both the 3 and 9 mm receivers, were derived 
from klystron oscillators. Not only did they have limited lifetimes, but they 
were expensive, and not all of the klystrons lasted for their full 500-hour adver-
tised lifetime. Since the klystrons were manufactured by the Canadian branch 
of the Varian Corporation, replacements were delayed by the need to get 
exemptions from the Buy American Act. More than one replacement klystron 
oscillator was hand carried across the border to minimize bureaucratic delays. 
Mark Gordon (2005, pp.  99–100) recalled the Charlottesville attempts to 
build a cooled parametric amplifier for millimeter spectroscopy. When finally 
delivered after years of development, it only worked over a narrow band around 
49  GHz, where there were no spectral lines of interest, and where it was 
uncomfortably close to the atmospheric O2 absorption feature. Gordon esti-
mated that NRAO probably spent at least $500,000 on the amplifier project. 
NRAO also obtained a new bolometer system that was fabricated at the 
University of Oregon and designed to operate at 1, 2, and 3 mm by using dif-
ferent filters. The new bolometer also had limited success.25 
By 1968, there were a few external users observing the Sun and planets as 
well as bright H II regions and the Crab Nebula. In spite of its limitations, the 
36 Foot Telescope was probably the most productive millimeter wave radio 
telescope in existence. Even with its low 10–15 percent efficiency at 1.3 mm, 
the 36 Foot had more collecting area, and better resolution than the Palomar 
200 inch. However, problems operating the telescope with limited staff, 
inclement weather, and power failures continued to plague millimeter observ-
ers. A not uncommon visitor experience was, “Our run was pretty frustrating 
but not entirely unproductive.”26 Another observer asked for “some reasonable 
imitation of a working system.”27 In October 1968, Heeschen decided to stop 
scientific observing and give priority to long neglected repairs and better cali-
bration of the efficiency and pointing. As he informed one potential observer, 
“The 36-ft has many problems associated with it: pointing calibration is diffi-
cult, other calibrations are difficult, the receivers have been unreliable, there 
have been mechanical problems with the dome, dish parameters—focus, point-
ing, gain—are unknown functions of temperature.”28 He finally realized that 
some of the problems in Tucson were the result of trying to manage the 
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 program from a distance and, in order to provide more effective local manage-
ment, he hired Edward (Ned) Conklin in October 1969 as the first Tucson 
resident member of the NRAO scientific staff to act as the Tucson site man-
ager. Conklin had received his PhD in electrical engineering at Stanford work-
ing with Ron Bracewell, and brought a new level of technical expertise to the 
Tucson group.
Local logistical support for NRAO’s Tucson operations was provided by 
KPNO, which rented Tucson office and laboratory space and allocated several 
rooms in the KPNO mountain dormitory to NRAO. NRAO staff and observ-
ers on the mountain ate their meals at the KPNO cafeteria, which provided a 
pleasant opportunity to informally interact with observers using the KPNO 
optical telescopes, especially when poor weather prevented both radio and 
optical observing. However, with the introduction of spectroscopic capability 
in late 1969, there was growing pressure to use the telescope, even in the day-
time, even if the gain and pointing were uncertain due to thermal deformations 
of the structure. As a result, the radio and optical astronomers kept different 
hours, and each complained of noise generated by those working at the other 
end of the spectrum. NRAO installed trailers, later upgraded to permanent 
buildings near the telescope itself, where the operators and observers were able 
to sleep in quiet, but instead of the noise, they then had to deal with the local 
scorpion and skunk population.
When Ned Conklin left NRAO in 1973 to join the Arecibo Observatory, he 
was replaced by Mark Gordon, who served as the first NRAO Assistant Director 
for Tucson Operations, with a charge to convert the 36 Foot from an experi-
mental facility to a more user-friendly facility of the kind NRAO observers were 
familiar with in Green Bank. Gordon, who had spent a winter in Antarctica as 
part of the US Antarctic Research Project, brought a dynamic new leadership 
perspective to the 36 Foot operations. Soon the NRAO support staff in Tucson 
had grown to 20 people, including a full complement of telescope operators. 
However, the limited size of the Tucson Electronics Division, which perhaps 
reflected its original development as an experimental rather than a user facility, 
meant staff felt overworked maintaining the telescope and cryogenics, as well 
as the receiver instrumentation.29 New receivers were built in Green Bank or 
Charlottesville, and a common complaint was that they would arrive untested 
only days before being scheduled on the telescope. However, the engineers in 
Charlottesville saw it differently, and complained about the misuse of their 
receivers by the Tucson engineers. The long commute between Tucson and 
Kitt Peak, especially in response to nighttime callouts, added to the low morale 
and likely contributed to the heavy turnover in the NRAO technical staff 
in Tucson.
Faced with growing tensions with KPNO and lack of adequate space result-
ing from the increased level of NRAO operations, Gordon moved the NRAO 
Tucson staff from their downtown KPNO offices to a free-standing facility in an 
industrial office complex some five miles away. But in October 1984, by agree-
ment with the University of Arizona, the NRAO Tucson operations moved 
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back to the university campus to occupy an upper floor of the new Steward 
Observatory building. 
Interstellar Carbon Monoxide and Molecular Spectroscopy The possibility of 
observing narrow band radio emission from atomic and molecular transitions 
was discussed as early as 1955 by Charles (Charlie) Townes at the Jodrell Bank 
Symposium on Radio Astronomy (Townes 1957, p.  92). A few interstellar 
molecules, e.g., hydroxyl (OH), formaldehyde (H2CO), water (H2O), and 
ammonia (NH3) had been detected at centimeter wavelengths (Sect. 6.2), but 
the transition probability of typical interstellar molecules increases rapidly 
toward higher rotational energy levels which occur primarily at millimeter 
wavelengths. Although there was no discussion of any spectroscopic capability 
when planning for the 36 Foot Telescope, by 1970 NRAO had installed a 40 
channel spectrometer. However, in addition to the long-standing reliability 
and gain stability issues, spectroscopic observers were limited by the lack of any 
local data reduction capability at the telescope, and they had to wait until the 
next day to learn if they had discovered anything.
In February 1969, Arno Penzias from Bell Laboratories wrote to NRAO 
requesting eight weeks of observing time to search for “in descending order 
of our interest CN [cyanide], CO [carbon monoxide], and HCN [hydrogen 
cyanide].”30 The CN observations were justified by the well-known detection 
of optical absorption lines (Field and Hitchcock 1966) but Penzias added 
that, “although CO has a much smaller dipole moment than CN, it is proba-
bly worth looking for.” Heeschen granted Penzias only four weeks, but indi-
cated that the other four weeks would likely follow. The Bell Labs group fully 
anticipated that any molecular lines would be weak and require long integra-
tion times to detect any signal. So in addition to bringing their own low noise 
front end to Kitt Peak, they also brought their own computer in order to 
average and display the results at the telescope. By this time, their main inter-
ests had shifted from CN to CO, but everyone was surprised when they 
pointed the telescope toward the Orion Nebula and saw a very strong CO 
signal in real time on the chart recorder. Robert Wilson et al. (1970) then 
went on to detect CO from a total of eight other Galactic sources including 
the Galactic Center.
The surprisingly strong CO emission discovered by Wilson et al. opened the 
door to the discovery of many other molecular species. Suddenly the 36 Foot 
Telescope was in heavy demand, and the competition to be the first to detect a 
new molecule or isotopic species was intense and not entirely cleanly fought. 
By this time Gordon had taken over the difficult task of scheduling observers 
with competing proposals. Although each proposal was sent to multiple refer-
ees for review, the referees were not always consistent in their comments, and 
there was considerable overlap between the referee pool and the observers. 
Complaints of unfairness or referee incompetence were not uncommon. With 
an oversubscription rate of about 5:1, only a small fraction of the proposals 
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could be scheduled, but every proposer felt that their proposal was well above 
average. One group even threatened to go elsewhere to make their observa-
tions and thus deprive NRAO of the discovery of interstellar glycine 
(NH2CH2COOH).31 But as Kellermann wrote to Heeschen, “the situation 
would be much worse if the available observing time exceeded the requested 
time by a factor of five.”32
In order to search for a new molecule, observers needed to know the fre-
quency, which could be calculated with some uncertainty, or in some cases 
determined from laboratory spectroscopy. Competing observers maneuvered 
to establish collaborations with theoreticians or laboratory spectroscopists to 
learn the correct frequencies needed to search for their favorite molecule; some 
then kept their search frequencies secret from other observers or even leaked 
false information. In principle, observers were supposed to follow their 
approved observing program, but some strayed into territory which had been 
staked out by other observers. Sometimes the frequency of a new line would 
become public, or at least known to competing groups. Whoever was the next 
observer could “discover” a new line. At least one observer was known to pur-
posely enter an incorrect frequency in the telescope logbook in order to misdi-
rect the next competing observer. Others misstated the sources they were 
observing or claimed that the reason they were observing a source not in their 
proposal was to use it as a calibrator. A particularly divisive situation arose in 
connection with the first detection of extragalactic CO. Competing observers 
argued among themselves and with NRAO that the other group had been 
approved for a different program and had acted unethically. Another observer 
recalled that, suspecting that someone was going through his desk at night, he 
invented a false molecule and a bogus observing proposal. Another observa-
tory apparently spent considerable time looking for this molecule. When mul-
tiple groups discovered new molecules or new isotopes, there was a rush to 
publish before the other group, independent of who had actually made the first 
detection. These were arguably the most exciting times for millimeter astron-
omy but also perhaps the darkest days for millimeter astronomers. 
As Mark Gordon (2005, p. vii) later wrote, molecular spectroscopy at Kitt 
Peak “revolutionized our understanding of the nature of interstellar gas, chem-
istry at extremely low temperatures, and how stars form and galaxies evolve.” 
A whole new field of astrochemistry was largely born at the NRAO Kitt Peak 
millimeter wave telescope. Over one hundred different molecular and isotopic 
species had been detected, and NRAO was under considerable pressure to 
exploit this rapidly developing new field of astronomy. Moreover, millimeter 
astronomy was also being used to study the thermal radio emission from plan-
ets and other solar system bodies, as well as from stars and the energetic milli-
meter wave bursts from quasars. The 36 Foot Telescope had more than met the 
modest expectations of Drake and Low and was probably the most oversub-
scribed telescope in the world. 
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10.3  replAciNg the 36 FOOt telescOpe
Although the 36 Foot Telescope had been responsible for many important 
discoveries, and, arguably, defined millimeter astronomy, it still had limited 
performance. The technical troubles remained, and observer complaints con-
tinued—along with a steady flow of advice on how to improve the 36 Foot 
operation. Not only did the surface distort due to differential thermal heating, 
but the pointing was erratic and non-reproducible, in part due to thermal dis-
tortions, but also to problems with the servo system. This made the telescope 
nearly useless for daytime observations. Even during nighttime, it was difficult 
to get quantitative results, although the competing astronomers were more 
interested in discovering a new molecule than in quantitative results that 
depended on accurately knowing things like the antenna gain and pointing. 
Various innovative attempts to shield the telescope from daytime heating 
proved less than effective (Gordon 2005, pp. 119–124). In 1973, the 36 Foot 
Telescope was converted to Cassegrain operation in order to facilitate the use 
of large cryogenically-cooled receivers and to permit beam switching using a 
nutating sub-reflector, but this did not address the more fundamental prob-
lems of telescope performance and safety. Perhaps the most serious issue arose 
in July 1972, when the 40 foot dome door jammed, driving the chief telescope 
operator to “declare the 95-foot radome housing the NRAO 36-foot radiote-
lescope [sic] condemned,” and “you can consider this my formal resignation if 
the situation described herein is not corrected to my satisfaction.”33
The 65 Meter Millimeter Wave Telescope In Sect. 9.4, we discussed how the 
growing interest in millimeter molecular spectroscopy led the LFST project to 
converge to a 65 meter antenna good to 3 mm under favorable observing con-
ditions (Findlay and von Hoerner 1972). The proposed 65 meter telescope 
was designed to be homologous, although it was otherwise a conventional 
symmetric alt-az structure (See Fig. 9.7). Support for a major NRAO initiative 
in millimeter astronomy got a boost from the Greenstein (1973) Decade 
Review Committee, when it briefly appeared that there might be funds in the 
NSF FY1972 budget for a new millimeter wave radio telescope, but, as it 
turned out, the budget information was incorrect. Moreover, by this time, 
interest had moved to even shorter millimeter wavelengths, and there was no 
further attempt to fund the NRAO 65 meter telescope.
The Rise and Fall of the 25 Meter Millimeter Telescope Responding to the grow-
ing interest in the new field of astrochemistry, in 1974 Dave Heeschen estab-
lished an NRAO committee to consider options for replacing the 36 Foot 
Tucson Telescope. He appointed Barry Turner as Project Scientist and chair of 
the committee, which included Findlay and von Hoerner as well as Mark 
Gordon and one of the present authors (KIK). Following a series of meetings, 
Turner’s committee concluded that NRAO should build a 25 meter diameter 
telescope capable of operating down to 1 mm wavelength.34 Heeschen then 
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established an external committee to give advice and to provide support for the 
new NRAO initiative. 
By this time VLA construction was well underway, and in September 1975 
NRAO submitted a formal proposal to the NSF to build and operate a 25 meter 
radome-enclosed telescope that would be good to wavelengths of 1 mm and 
shorter (Fig. 10.5). The main scientific motivations were for molecular spec-
troscopy to study star formation, the physical conditions (temperature, den-
sity) in interstellar clouds and in the atmospheres of cool stars, as well as tracers 
of galactic structure free of optical obscuration. Turner decided that his job was 
done and that he wanted to return to his research, and Mark Gordon replaced 
Turner as the 25 meter Project Manager and committee chair.
Discussions about where to site the 25 meter telescope became very contro-
versial. Many committee members argued for a high altitude site with low 
water vapor content, important for the short millimeter and submillimeter 
wavelengths. The NRAO committee considered mountain sites in the conti-
nental US as well as the summit of Mauna Kea in Hawaii at nearly 14,000 feet 
elevation. A 12,470 foot high site on White Mountain, in the California Inyo 
Mountains near the OVRO appeared attractive, but access was limited, 
Fig. 10.5 Artist’s conception of the 25  meter millimeter wave telescope. Credit: 
NRAO/AUI/NSF
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 especially in the winter. The 9,000 foot high Mount Lemmon Observatory was 
a convenient, excellent observing site where the University of Arizona had 
many optical and infrared telescopes, but the radio and TV transmitters were a 
potential source of RFI.  Mauna Kea has clear skies, low water vapor, and 
offered the best access to the galactic center and the southern hemisphere, but 
the projected construction and operations costs were much greater than for a 
continental site. One distinguished NRAO user commented that since the 
2.6 mm CO transition was more important than the 1.3 mm band, a very high 
altitude site was not so important, and so it would be more cost effective to go 
to a less expensive site in Arizona.35 However, citing the importance of low 
water vapor content to best exploit the capabilities of the telescope for observ-
ing near 1 mm, Gordon argued for Mauna Kea, and was supported by the 
NRAO Director, Mort Roberts, who felt that NRAO should provide the best 
possible instrument for the community.
After another two years of further design studies of the surface panels and 
the dome, as well as further analysis of potential sites, in 1977 NRAO submit-
ted a revised proposal to the NSF to locate the telescope near the summit of 
Mauna Kea on the big island of Hawaii. The 1977 proposal differed from the 
earlier one in that NRAO now proposed an astrodome configuration, similar 
to that used for the 36 Foot or traditional optical telescopes, instead of a 
radome. The telescope would thus be protected from winds and inclement 
weather, but not suffer from the absorption characteristic of completely 
radome-enclosed telescopes such as Haystack (Sect. 6.6) and FCRAO (Sect. 
10.4). But no rotating dome with an open aperture large enough to house a 
25 meter diameter telescope had ever been built, and this added considerably 
to the estimated construction cost of $12.5 million and the annual operating 
cost of $1.35 million. The 25 meter antenna differed in an important way from 
all previous NRAO antennas which were “design and build” contracts based 
on performance specifications. Since the 25 meter specifications were so tight 
and difficult to measure, NRAO accepted the responsibility for the design and 
overall performance of the telescope, although William (Bill) Horne later noted 
that “while [NRAO] may possess the engineering capability, [it] certainly does 
not possess the engineering capacity … for the required design work.”36 Six 
months later, Horne became the Project Manager for the 25 meter construc-
tion project.
As was the practice for all telescopes on Mauna Kea, the University of 
Hawaii, which operated the Mauna Kea site, expected that ten percent of all 
observing time would be given to University astronomers. However, there 
were no radio astronomers at the University of Hawaii, and NRAO was unwill-
ing to compromise its Open Skies policy, especially in this very competitive 
field of millimeter spectroscopy. Instead, NRAO agreed to provide a one-time 
contribution toward a buried power line to the summit, as well as an annual 
contribution equivalent to the salary of a University of Hawaii Associate 
Astronomer to support the mountain astronomical infrastructure. This added 
another $2 million to the already expensive proposal. Later, when the University 
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appeared to renege on the deal reached between Gordon and the U of H 
Institute for Astronomy Director, John Jefferies, Gordon threatened to re- 
open negotiations to locate the telescope in Arizona.37 To complicate the situ-
ation, local environmental and cultural advocates, who by then opposed all 
astronomical facilities on Mauna Kea, especially objected to the 25 meter tele-
scope because of its very large size and visibility compared with the Mauna Kea 
optical telescopes.
As described by Gordon (2005, p. 140), the university millimeter astron-
omy community was somewhat ambivalent about the 25 meter telescope.  On 
the one hand, it promised a powerful new observing opportunity. But unlike 
the situation at longer wavelengths where there were no viable university facili-
ties, university millimeter astronomers perhaps saw the proposed NRAO 
25 meter telescope as competition to existing and planned university facilities 
at Berkeley, Harvard-Smithsonian, Caltech, and the Universities of Arizona, 
Massachusetts, and Texas. Typical of the university astronomers, Peter 
Strittmatter, Director of the University of Arizona Steward Observatory and 
Chair of the NSF Astronomy Advisory Committee, wrote, “I also believe that 
the committee will need to discuss how long the 25 m should remain as astron-
omy’s No 1 new start priority if it is effectively blocked. Should other smaller 
projects be slipped in ahead of it?”38
Then, in 1979, Cornell’s Frank Drake proposed a low cost 35 meter fixed 
spherical reflector alternative to the NRAO 25 meter telescope. By this time 
the 25 meter cost had risen to between $22 and $27 million, depending on the 
funding schedule. To advise them on deciding between the NRAO and Cornell 
proposals, the NSF appointed a sub-committee chaired by Alan Barrett to 
review the two projects. Following their meeting on 16 and 17 July 1979, the 
sub-committee unanimously and unambiguously “recommended without res-
ervation that the NSF fund immediately the 25-meter millimeter wave tele-
scope, as proposed by NRAO,” and that “It is the unanimous judgment of the 
committee that the 35-meter fixed spherical telescope … is not a realistic alter-
native to the 25-meter fully steerable telescope.”39
The 25 meter project was saved, but it would only be a temporary reprieve. 
Bill Howard, now at the NSF as Astronomy Division (AST) Director, antici-
pated that with the ending of the VLA construction in 1980, the VLA funding 
level of about $10 million per year would remain in the AST budget and he 
could use these funds for the 25 meter telescope. Unfortunately, AST did not 
get to keep the VLA funding level, so AST proposed the 25 m telescope as a 
new start with new money in FY1981. As was described in Sect. 8.7, following 
the OMB cut to the proposed FY1981 NSF budget, the NSF director dropped 
the 25 meter telescope. It was included again in Jimmy Carter’s final FY1982 
budget proposal, but was killed when Ronald Reagan became president and 
froze all new starts for the new fiscal year. The 25 meter millimeter wave radio 
telescope then fell victim to the VLBA following the selection of the VLBA 
over the 25 meter telescope, first by the Decade Review Field (1982) Committee 
and then by the NSF Astronomy Advisory Committee. Lew Snyder at the 
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University of Illinois initiated a last desperate effort to save the telescope by 
sending the NSF a petition signed by many of the prominent workers in 
the field.40 
It is a matter of speculation whether or not the telescope might have actually 
been built, if, instead of opting for the best site, NRAO had chosen one of the 
less expensive and more accessible sites in Arizona or New Mexico. Mark Gordon 
(2005, p. 146) later made a valiant effort to resurrect the 25 meter telescope by 
suggesting a less expensive surface structure and dome, and siting the telescope 
in the Santa Catalina mountain range near Tucson instead of on Mauna Kea. But 
it was too late; the millimeter astronomers had moved on to consider arrays. In 
stark contrast to the easy funding of the 36 Foot Telescope in the early 1960s, 
the level of effort that went into the 25 meter project was enormous. Over a 
decade of time NRAO staff had prepared dozens of funding plans and more 
than 150 internal reports dealing with everything from structural analysis to the 
electromagnetic properties of various paints, as well as detailed site and tropo-
spheric water vapor studies; numerous contracts were negotiated but never 
implemented. Doing business at the NSF as well as at NRAO had changed, and 
would become even more complex during the long and difficult international 
negotiations leading to the construction of ALMA (Sect. 10.7).
The 12 Meter Upgrade Discouraged by the lagging progress with the proposed 
25 meter telescope and the anticipated competition from the new millimeter 
telescopes being constructed by Caltech, Harvard-CfA, UC Berkeley, the 
University of Massachusetts, the Nobeyama Observatory, and IRAM, Gordon 
urged that the 36 Foot dish be replaced with a better reflector.41 As Gordon 
(1984) later noted, “the popularity of the 36-foot was being killed by its very 
success.”
Following a hastily called meeting in Charlottesville,42 John Findlay was 
given the responsibility of replacing the 36 Foot dish structure.  Instead of just 
matching the size of the existing 36 Foot (11.0 meter) diameter dish, Findlay 
elected to increase the size to 12 meters (39.4 feet), which he felt was the larg-
est size compatible with the 12.5 meter (40 foot) dome slit (Fig. 10.6). As it 
turned out, this was probably a bad decision, as the telescope sidelobes did 
“see” the dome structure, limiting the performance, especially for sensitive 
continuum observations. Perhaps more important than the increase of 19 per-
cent in collecting area, the focal ratio was changed to the more conventional 
value of 0.42, greatly facilitating the design of high efficiency feeds for millime-
ter wavelengths. After rejecting the possibility of obtaining a dish from Caltech 
(Sect. 10.4), NRAO solicited bids from 16 commercial sources, and awarded a 
contract to Central Fabricators, Inc. for $71,145 to fabricate a new reflector 
structure.43 At the same time, the feed/subreflector bipod support was replaced 
by a quadripod to give better pointing stability. Unlike the solid 36 Foot dish, 
the 12 Meter reflector consisted of 72 aluminum petal-shaped panels manufac-
tured by the ESSCO Corporation. When the new 12 Meter telescope went 
into operation in early 1983, it finally met the specifications originally set out 
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for the 36 Foot telescope and gave NRAO a badly needed competitive tele-
scope with a surface that could support observations down to wavelengths as 
short as 0.8 mm.
Gordon stepped down as head of Tucson Operations in 1984 to return to 
full time research. He was followed as Tucson site director by Bob Brown, then 
Dave Hogg in 1985, and Darrel Emerson in 1986. But now a new cloud 
appeared on the horizon. For five consecutive years, NRAO had absorbed bud-
get cuts and many of the new costs of operating the VLA by applying the bud-
get cuts uniformly across all parts of NRAO. Everyone suffered and everyone 
complained, leading the new NRAO Director, Paul Vanden Bout, to announce 
that NRAO could no longer continue to do everything and that he might need 
to close the NRAO 12 Meter Telescope. Nearly fifty letters of protest from the 
user community as well as from NRAO staff were fired off to the NSF and to 
Vanden Bout.44 Graduate students complained that their dissertation research 
was being arbitrarily terminated midway. But no one suggested any viable 
money-saving alternative, although some NRAO users suggested that there 
would be no loss if the Charlottesville headquarters were to be closed. 
Fortunately, as described later by Gordon (2005, p. 187), Gordon was able 
to convince Arizona Senator Dennis DeConcini to use his influence to get suf-
ficient funds restored to the NRAO budget. The NSF was not pleased with this 
political intervention, but as a result NRAO was able to keep the 12 Meter in 
operation until July 2000 when it was turned over to the University of Arizona 
to be used in their radio astronomy program. Some members of the NRAO 
Fig. 10.6 John Findlay (right) and John Payne (left) discuss using the template to 
fabricate accurate surface panels for the 12 Meter Telescope
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Tucson staff relocated to Charlottesville and become involved in the planning 
for ALMA; others retired, joined the University of Arizona program, or left 
NRAO to pursue other opportunities.
10.4  Us iNdUstriAl ANd UNiversity millimeter WAve 
AstrONOmy prOgrAms
The NRAO 36 Foot/12 Meter telescope had opened up the new area of mil-
limeter astronomy with its rich content of molecular transitions. Unlike other 
areas of radio astronomy, which were dominated by the large expensive tele-
scopes and arrays, millimeter spectroscopy was much like optical spectroscopy, 
and limited more by observing time than by access to the most powerful facili-
ties. It attracted not only traditional radio astronomers, who wanted to get 
away from their dependence on national facilities, but also laboratory spectros-
copists such as Charlie Townes and Patrick (Pat) Thaddeus who saw opportu-
nities to apply their skills in new ways.
Unlike centimeter to meter wavelength radio astronomy, states such as 
California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Texas, and at least two indus-
trial groups, contributed to the construction and operation of a wide range of 
millimeter dishes and arrays, sometimes with additional support from the 
NSF.  Perhaps motivated by their inability to fund the proposed NRAO 
25  meter millimeter telescope and the recognition that the US was falling 
behind Europe in this emerging new area of astronomy, the NSF was particu-
larly generous in supplementing both private and state funding for millimeter 
astronomy. But the NSF support came at a price: up to half of the observing 
time had to be made available to outside users.
Aerospace Corporation 15 Foot Millimeter Wave Antenna One of the first mil-
limeter wave radio telescopes in the US was the 15 foot diameter dish operated 
by the Space Radio Systems Facility of the Aerospace Corporation. The antenna 
was located on top of the Aerospace building at the Los Angeles Air Force 
Station a few miles from the Los Angeles Airport and the Pacific Ocean, and 
had a surface accuracy of 0.09  mm rms. William Wilson, Robert (Bob) 
Dickman, and other Aerospace staff designed and built both continuum and 
spectroscopic receivers. In spite of the less than optimum location for millime-
ter observing, they, along with Eugene Epstein, used the telescope over a num-
ber of years for some of the first millimeter observations of quasars and planets, 
as well as for observing CO in the interstellar medium. (Stacey and Epstein 
1964; Epstein 1977; Sargent 1979).
Bell Laboratories 7 Meter Millimeter Wave Antenna The Bell Labs Crawford 
Hill 7.5 meter millimeter wave antenna was built for propagation studies using 
the COMSTAR satellite beacons and for radio astronomy at frequencies up to 
300 GHz. It was used over a period of years by Tony Stark, John Bally, and 
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others, including many visitors. Highlights were studies of the Galaxy includ-
ing a 13CO survey of the plane (e.g., Stark et al. 1988), the Galactic Center 
region, and also studies of the structure and chemistry of molecular clouds. At 
the time it was probably the largest off-axis antenna ever built and remained so 
until the construction of the GBT (Chu et al. 1978).
University of Texas Millimeter Wave Observatory (MWO) The University of 
Texas 16 foot millimeter wave telescope was built in the early 1960s primarily 
for continuum studies of the planets and bright radio sources such as the Crab 
Nebula, the galactic center, and the Orion Nebula (Tolbert and Straiton 1965; 
Tolbert et  al. 1965; Tolbert 1966). Although originally erected on the 
University of Texas campus in Austin in 1971, the antenna was moved to a 
better site at 2070 meters on Mt. Locke, the site of the University’s McDonald 
Observatory. Motivated by the discovery of CO by Wilson et al. (1970), Paul 
Vanden Bout led an effort to bring the resources of the University of Texas, 
Harvard-CfA, Bell Laboratories, and the Columbia University/Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies to the MWO, and with support from NASA and the 
NSF, the MWO became a major player in millimeter wave spectroscopy. As 
described by Vanden Bout et al. (2012), “the amicable relations at the MWO 
stood in contrast to the NRAO 36-ft Radio Telescope where astronomers 
engaged in a vigorous competition to gain what was typically a few days of 
observing time, often to search for a new interstellar molecule.” Rather than 
try to compete with NRAO observers in the race to discover new molecules, 
the MWO observing programs were largely devoted to using the strongest 
molecular lines to probe the physical conditions of their environment and to 
address questions posed by the discovery of an entirely new phase of the inter-
stellar medium, including the nature of molecular clouds. Many of the future 
leaders of millimeter astronomy in both the US and Europe were trained at the 
MWO either as students or postdoctoral workers. In 1985, Vanden Bout left 
Texas to become the Director of NRAO, where he oversaw the construction 
of the VLBA and the GBT, and then spearheaded the US participation in 
ALMA. 
Columbia University/Goddard Institute for Space Studies Shortly after the dis-
covery of interstellar carbon monoxide (CO) by Wilson et al. (1970), Columbia 
University Professor Pat Thaddeus built a small 1.2  meter radio telescope 
which he placed on the roof of the Columbia physics building. In 1982 he 
installed a second telescope at the Cerro Tololo Observatory in Chile. When 
Thaddeus moved to Harvard-CfA in 1986, he took the Columbia instrument 
with him and placed it on top of a Harvard building. Over a period of many 
years, Thaddeus, together with numerous colleagues and students, used these 
two small radio telescopes to map out the 2.6 mm CO emission in the entire 
Galactic plane (e.g., Dame et al. 2001).
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University of Arizona Steward Observatory Millimeter wave astronomy at the 
University of Arizona started with Frank Low’s 1965 move from NRAO to 
Tucson, but stagnated as Low turned his attention toward infrared astronomy. 
In 1978, Peter Strittmatter, the Director of the UofA’s Steward Observatory, 
spent a year at the MPIfR and began a discussion with Peter Mezger about 
millimeter and submillimeter wavelength astronomy. Mezger had hoped to 
build a submillimeter telescope on the summit of Pico Veleta above the 30 
meter IRAM telescope, but access to the summit was hazardous, and Mezger 
was unable to gain permission for a summit site. Moreover, the Max Planck 
Gesselschaft (MPG) made it clear that they would not provide the additional 
annual funds which would be needed to operate the telescope. Strittmatter and 
Mezger then agreed to build and operate a 10 meter diameter submillimeter 
wavelength telescope at an altitude of 3180 meters on Mount Graham in east-
ern Arizona. The MPIfR—UofA Submillimeter Telescope (SMT), later 
renamed the Heinrich Hertz Telescope (HHT), has a surface accuracy of 
0.015 mm rms and tracks to better than 1 arcsec. The HHT pioneered the use 
of carbon fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP) to minimize thermal effects in preci-
sion telescope structures (Baars et  al. 1999) and operates at wavelengths as 
short as 0.35 mm.
Five College Radio Astronomy Observatory (FCRAO)45 In 1976, FCRAO inau-
gurated a 14 meter diameter radome-enclosed antenna built by the ESSCO 
Corporation on the shores of the Quabbin Reservoir in central Massachusetts. 
Support for the construction and operation of the telescope came from a com-
bination of NSF, private, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts funding. Until 
it closed for lack of operating funds in the spring of 2006, the FCRAO antenna 
was one of the largest millimeter wave telescopes in the US. During this period 
FCRAO scientists, engineers, and students designed and built a variety of inno-
vative instrumentation, including a 16-element (QUARRY), then 32-element 
(SEQUOIA), MMIC arrays. The FCRAO receivers were among the best in the 
world, at times perhaps a factor two more sensitive than NRAO’s 36 Foot/12 
Meter receivers, and for many years FCRAO had a near-monopoly on struc-
tural studies of nearby galaxies. Many of the subsequent leaders in US millime-
ter wave science and instrumentation worked at or were trained at the FCRAO, 
and went on to distinguished careers in radio astronomy. Starting in the late 
1990s, the FCRAO staff devoted their efforts toward building the LMT in 
Mexico. A 144 element bolometer 1.1 and 2.1 mm array known as AzTEC was 
developed at FCRAO in collaboration with others, and was used first on the 
James Clerk Maxwell Telescope (JCMT), then on the Japanese ASTE 10 meter 
submillimeter wave telescope in Chile, before being installed on the LMT in 
Mexico. 
The Large Millimeter Telescope (LMT)46 Planning for the 50 meter (164 foot) 
Large Millimeter Wave Telescope (LMT) on a high altitude site in Mexico as a 
joint effort between the University of Massachusetts and Mexico was already 
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underway at the time of the 1990 Decade Review of Astronomy, but there 
were a number of competing proposals for what were considered “Moderate 
Programs.” NRAO had proposed to fill the gap between the VLA and VLBA 
by constructing four new antennas in New Mexico. The Bahcall Committee 
Radio Panel was sensitive to the need to maintain viable university-based radio 
astronomy facilities in the US, and reluctant to allocate too much of the NSF’s 
limited resources to NRAO, so it identified “A Large Millimeter Radio 
Telescope Working to at Least 230 GHz” as the highest priority for moderate 
sized projects. The expected federal share of the LMT cost was claimed to be 
only $15 million dollars, representing about half of the total cost (Kellermann 
1991, p. I-9).
Normally, the parent committee of a Decade Review is tasked with inter-
weaving the recommendations coming from the various wavelength panels, 
and it is rare for the parent committee to overturn the panel’s ordered recom-
mendations. However, in this case, the parent committee was apparently not 
impressed by the proposed LMT.  The VLA extension proposed by NRAO 
appeared sixth and last among the recommended “Moderate Programs” 
(Bahcall 1991, p. 17), but the LMT was not mentioned at all in the Bahcall 
Committee report. The proposed VLA expansion was never funded, although 
an extensive refurbishing and modernization of the aging infrastructure, cor-
relator, and other VLA instrumentation was later supported by the NSF, lead-
ing to the upgraded Karl G. Jansky Very Large Array (Sect. 7.8).
The reports of the Astronomy and Astrophysics Survey Committee 
Wavelength Panels have no formal status as recommendations of the 
NAS.  However, based on the Radio Panel Report (Kellermann 1991), the 
University of Massachusetts working with the Mexican Instituto Nacional de 
Astrofísica, Óptica y Electrónica (INAOE) was able to obtain funding from 
Massachusetts and Mexican resources to build the LMT on the summit of 
Volcán Sierra Negra at an altitude of 4,600 meters (15,000 feet) in the Mexican 
state of Puebla. Following a series of technical and administrative disputes, 
compounded by funding delays, the LMT was finally completed in 2018 (Baars 
2013). It operates at wavelengths as short as 0.85 mm on an excellent site. It 
is the world’s largest filled aperture steerable telescope operating at such short 
millimeter wavelengths and is the largest, most complex, and most expensive 
scientific instrument ever built in Mexico. 
Harvard-Smithsonian Sub-Millimeter Array (SMA) Planning for the SMA 
began in 1983. Motivated in part by the Field (1982) Committee recommen-
dation, the new CfA Director Irwin Shapiro appointed a committee to study 
the feasibility of submillimeter interferometry. The committee, chaired by 
James (Jim) Moran, recommended the construction of an array of six 6 meter 
diameter dishes on a high dry site (Moran et al. 1984), but there were technical 
challenges in developing low noise receivers and movable antennas with suffi-
cient precision to operate at submillimeter wavelengths. In 1987, CfA set up a 
laboratory for the development of submillimeter receiver technology and 
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investigated potential sites in Arizona, Chile, and Hawaii. Under Moran’s lead-
ership, construction of a six element array of 6 meter diameter dishes near the 
summit of Mauna Kea at 13,350 feet elevation began in 1999. Two additional 
elements were added by the Taiwan Academia Sinica Institute of Astronomy 
and Astrophysics (Ho et  al. 2004), and the eight element SMA with up to 
172,000 spectral channels, 2 GHz of continuum bandwidth, and angular reso-
lution up to 0.1 arcsec was completed in 2003. In 2008, the SMA was linked 
with the JCMT and California Submillimeter Observatory (CSO) to form a 10 
element interferometer with baselines up to about 800 meters.
The SMA was the first imaging array to operate at sub-millimeter wave-
lengths. It made the first resolved radio images of the thermal emission of the 
Pluto-Charon system, of CO and HCN in the atmosphere of Titan, of the un- 
scattered polarized continuum emission from Sgr A∗, and of the extremely high 
velocity and low velocity collimated SiO outflows from a low luminosity proto 
star (Ho et al. 2004; Moran 2006). Unlike many of the other millimeter facili-
ties, the SMA follows an Open Skies policy and observing time is available to 
all qualified scientists based on peer-reviewed proposals. 
The Hat Creek Radio Observatory and the Berkley-Illinois-Maryland Association 
Millimeter Array (BIMA) Starting in the 1970s, University of California 
Professor Jack Welch built what was probably the world’s first millimeter wave 
interferometer at the Hat Creek Radio Observatory in northern California. 
Under Welch’s leadership, the initial two-element variable spacing interferom-
eter was first expanded to three, then six dishes, each 20  feet in diameter. 
Starting in 1987, the array was operated by the Berkeley-Illinois-Maryland 
Association (BIMA). In 1993, the 85 foot diameter telescope at the Observatory 
collapsed during a violent wind storm. Instead of replacing the 85 foot tele-
scope, Welch used the University insurance money to build new 20 foot diam-
eter antennas to form a ten-element array that could be reconfigured to give 
angular resolutions up to 0.4 arcsec at 100 GHz (Welch et al. 1996). BIMA 
used cooled SIS mixers to operate up to 270 GHz or 1.1 mm. Data analysis 
was based on the MIRIAD (Multichannel Image Reduction, Image Analysis, 
and Display) software package developed by the BIMA group (Sault et  al. 
1995). Financial support for BIMA came from the states of California, Illinois, 
and Maryland, as well as from the National Science Foundation and the Taiwan 
based Academia Sinica Institute for Astronomy and Astrophysics (ASIAA). 
Thirty percent of the observing time at BIMA was made available on an Open 
Skies basis to users from outside the BIMA collaboration.
The Hat Creek interferometer and later BIMA were used to study H2O 
masers, the HCN emission surrounding the galactic center, SiO masers in 
Orion, for a survey of CO in normal galaxies, for observations of the Sunyaev- 
Zelodvich effect, and the first millimeter VLBI observations (Plambeck 2006). 
BIMA also pioneered the use of mosaicked observations where observations 
based on hundreds of array pointings were combined to image a large extended 
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area. In 2004, the BIMA antennas were moved to Cedar Flats to form part of 
CARMA (see below).
Caltech Submillimeter Observatory (CSO) and the Owens Valley Millimeter 
Array When it became clear in the early 1980s that they would not have a 
major role in the construction or operation of the VLBA, Caltech turned its 
attention to millimeter and submillimeter astronomy. Led by Professors Robert 
(Bob) Leighton, Alan Moffet, and Thomas (Tom) Phillips, Caltech developed 
two major facilities for millimeter/submillimeter astronomy. The Caltech pro-
gram in millimeter wave astronomy was based on a novel antenna design by 
Leighton used to construct a series of 10.4 meter diameter dishes. Leighton’s 
dishes were fabricated using 84 hexagonal aluminum honeycomb tiles which 
were figured after mounting on a steel backup structure using a custom-
designed cutting machine installed at the same facility that was used to grind 
the Palomar 200 inch mirror. After surfacing, the dishes could be disassembled 
and reassembled in the field with a typical accuracy better than 0.035 mm rms.
A total of seven dishes were fabricated by Leighton and his colleagues. The 
most precise dish was the basis of the CSO located just below the summit of 
Mauna Kea at an altitude of 13,350 feet. The Mauna Kea antenna was mounted 
in a rotatable dome to provide protection from wind and weather. Under the 
direction of Phillips (2007), the CSO went into operation in 1987. It was used 
at wavelengths as short as 0.35 mm using a variety of bolometer arrays and 
coherent SIS mixer receivers to exploit the relatively high transition probability 
of molecules at higher frequencies, as well as the increased thermal emission 
from cold dust which peaks at infrared and submillimeter wavelengths. Due to 
a lack of operating funds from the NSF, the CSO was closed in 2015.
The other six dishes were erected in the Owens Valley to form a versatile 
imaging millimeter array operating in the 1.3 and 2.6 mm bands using cooled 
SIS mixers with an angular resolution of 1 arcsec at the shorter wavelength 
(Scoville et al. 1994). The Owens Valley millimeter array was used for a variety 
of spectroscopic observations ranging from studies of planetary atmospheres, 
evolved protostars, protoplanetary disks, nuclear starbursts, and luminous and 
ultraluminous high redshift galaxies, and was later absorbed into CARMA.
Combined Array for Research in Millimeter-Wave Astronomy (CARMA) It 
had been clear for some time that the BIMA and Caltech Millimeter Arrays 
would be much more powerful if they were combined into a single array, but 
both Caltech and BIMA resisted any change which threatened their indepen-
dence. However, threatened by the potential loss of NSF funding, Caltech and 
the three BIMA institutions finally agreed to combine their facilities to form a 
more powerful 15-element array consisting of the six OVRO antennas plus 
nine BIMA antennas. Tony Beasley was recruited from NRAO to serve as the 
project manager to build CARMA at Cedar Flats in the Inyo Mountains east of 
the Caltech Owens Valley site at an altitude of 7,200 feet. An innovative aspect 
of CARMA was its use of the eight 3.5 meter antennas of the former Sunyaev-
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Zeldovich Array, which were placed close to the CARMA antennas and used to 
simultaneously observe phase calibration sources. Beginning in 2007, CARMA 
provided a powerful northern hemisphere complement to ALMA, but it was 
closed in 2015 as the NSF concentrated its support for millimeter wave astron-
omy on ALMA. 
10.5  iNterNAtiONAl chAlleNges
The James Clerk Maxwell Telescope (JCMT) Starting in 1983, the UK, together 
with the Netherlands and Canada, built a 15 meter diameter antenna near the 
summit of Mauna Kea close to the CSO. The JCMT is enclosed in a rotatable 
dome and observes through a slit covered with a membrane that is nearly trans-
parent at millimeter and submillimeter wavelengths. With a surface accuracy 
about 0.025 mm rms, the JCMT had good efficiency at wavelengths as short 
as 0.3 mm. For many years the main instrument on the JCMT was the power-
ful Submillimetre Common-User Bolometer Array (SCUBA) which gave high 
sensitivity in both the 0.45 and 1.3 mm atmospheric windows with arrays of 91 
and 37 pixels respectively, and was supplemented by single pixel bolometers at 
1.1, 1.3, and 2 mm for photometry (Holland et al. 1999). SCUBA was used 
for both deep imaging and wide field mapping, and discovered the important 
new population of star forming galaxies (Barger et al. 1998). A 16-pixel SIS 
heterodyne receiver array was used for spectroscopy at 350 GHz. In 2011, 
SCUBA was replaced by SCUBA-2, with a 10,000-pixel bolometer camera 
cooled to 0.1 K and operating at the same 0.45 and 0.85 mm atmospheric 
windows as SCUBA (Holland et al. 2013). SCUBA-2 was able to map the sky 
about 100 times faster than its SCUBA predecessor.
SEST and APEX When Roy Booth became Director of the Onsala Space 
Observatory in Sweden, he combined forces with IRAM millimeter wave 
astronomers and Peter Shaver at ESO to build the Sweden ESO Submillimetre 
Telescope (SEST). SEST was an open air 15 meter diameter telescope located 
at the ESO Observatory on La Silla in northern Chile at an altitude of 
7,550 feet. The Cassegrain telescope was similar to the IRAM interferometer 
antennas, but was mounted on a fixed base, and was designed and built by 
IRAM in collaboration with French and German industrial partners (Booth 
et al. 1989). The antenna had a surface accuracy of only 0.07 mm rms and 
pointing accuracy of 3  arcsec. The construction and operating costs were 
shared equally by ESO and Onsala. Onsala was responsible for the technical 
operation and provision of the receivers and other instrumentation, while the 
operation on La Silla was managed by ESO along with their optical telescopes 
on the mountain. Starting in 1988, the SEST telescope was used primarily in 
the 1.3, 2.6, and 3.5 mm bands for spectroscopic observations of extragalactic 
interstellar molecules, especially CO, as well as for continuum observations of 
quasars. Observing time was shared equally between Swedish astronomers and 
ESO’s European user community. The operation of SEST was ESO’s first 
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
559
involvement with millimeter astronomy, and opened the door for ESO’s later 
participation as a partner in ALMA. SEST was closed in 2003 when it was 
superseded by the Atacama Pathfinder Experimental Telescope (APEX).
APEX is a 12 meter diameter modified North American ALMA (Sect. 10.7) 
prototype antenna located at 16,500 feet altitude on the Chilean Atacama des-
ert on the site of the ALMA telescope (Güsten et  al. 2006). With its more 
precise surface of 0.017 mm rms and high altitude location, it replaced SEST, 
and operates primarily in the wavelength range between 0.2 and 1.5 mm, or 
between the radio and infrared parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. APEX 
was built as joint collaboration of the MPIfR, the Onsala Observatory, and 
ESO and, like SEST, is operated by ESO. NRAO was invited to join APEX, but 
declined due to the need to concentrate its limited resources on the MMA. 
Due to the high altitude location, the antenna is routinely operated from San 
Pedro de Atacama via a radio link. A particularly notable feature of APEX is its 
295-element 345  GHz liquid helium cooled bolometer array known as 
LABOCA (Large Apex Bolometer Camera) (Siringo et al. 2009). LABOCA is 
the latest in a series of bolometer cameras developed by the MPIfR radio 
astronomer Ernst Kreysa, and has been used primarily to investigate star forma-
tion in the Milky Way Galaxy and in nearby galaxies.
The Institut de Radio Astronomie Millimétrique (IRAM) As early as the mid- 
1960s, Emile Blum began in France to develop plans for a millimeter wave-
length interferometer (Encrenaz et al. 2011). During his 1967 visit to NRAO, 
he met Peter Mezger, then still on the NRAO scientific staff, but about to leave 
to become a Director at the MPIfR, where he would be in charge of the new 
Effelsberg 100 meter telescope. Perhaps based on his early exposure to the 
embryonic attempts in Green Bank by Frank Drake and Frank Low to experi-
ment with millimeter wavelength astronomy in the early 1960s, Mezger had a 
long-time ambition to build a precise radio telescope to work at short millime-
ter wavelengths. With the support of the French Centre National de la 
Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) Director, Bernard Gregory, and the MPG 
President Reimar Lüst, Mezger, and Blum respectively, developed plans for a 
30 meter antenna and a multi-element interferometer as parts of a joint obser-
vatory known as SAGMA.47 The MPIfR group found an attractive site on Pico 
Veleta in the Spanish Sierra Nevada for their 30 meter antenna, while Blum and 
colleagues located a flat site on the Plateau du Bure in the French Alps suitable 
for an interferometer. But the Plateau de Bure site was only at an altitude of 
2,550  meters, 300  meters lower than the proposed 30 meter site on Pico 
Veleta, and, more important, was further north, limiting access to the Galactic 
center.
Mezger was unyielding, arguing that the Plateau de Bure site was unaccept-
able for the 30 meter telescope, while Blum was equally firm that Pico Veleta 
could not accommodate an interferometer, especially if the baseline were to be 
expanded. Meanwhile, Gregory and Lüst were adamant that there would be no 
funding from CNRS or the MPG unless the two instruments were built as part 
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of a joint French-German project. The issue was not so much a matter of saving 
money by a joint project, but a strong desire on the part of both CNRS and the 
MPG Max Planck Gesselschaft (MPG) in this post-World War II era to estab-
lish firm evidence for French-German collaboration. A radio astronomy project 
was perceived to be more straightforward than, for example, an agreement on 
agricultural subsidies. But Blum and especially Mezger were obstinate and held 
firm to their positions. Mauna Kea, on the big Island of Hawaii, was mutually 
acceptable to both Mezger and Blum, but was considered logistically unrea-
sonable unless NRAO joined the project to provide local support and if signifi-
cant funding came from the US.48 The NRAO staff debated the idea of joining 
SAGMA on Hawaii and concluded that it would compromise its own plans for 
the 25 meter millimeter wave antenna (Sect. 10.3), and rejected the European 
proposal.49
Faced with an impasse, in early 1977 Gregory and Lüst convened an inter-
national committee of three so-called “wise-men” to adjudicate the siting issue. 
One of the present authors (KIK) served on the committee, along with Bernard 
Burke from MIT and Paul Wild from CSIRO in Australia. After meeting with 
MPG and CNRS and visiting the proposed sites, the committee met at the 
Paris CNRS headquarters to prepare their report and to deliver it to Gregory. 
Recognizing that the Plateau de Bure was by far the better of the two sites to 
locate the interferometer even though the latitude was higher than ideal, and 
that the Pico Veleta was by far the better of the two sites to locate the 30 m 
telescope, the committee noted that it would be inappropriate to favor one site 
over the other and recommended that the common center of the cooperative 
program should be located in an observatory headquarters in Grenoble, France. 
Recognizing the need to ease tensions and maintain the delicate balance 
between the French and German interests, the committee refrained from sug-
gesting that the Director of the new joint observatory be German and that the 
chef be French. Following the Paris meeting, Burke and Kellermann traded in 
their first class plane tickets plus $50 each to purchase tickets for an unforget-
table flight to Washington on the Air France Concorde.
The MPG Max Planck Gesselschaft (MPG) and CNRS accepted the recom-
mendation, which led to the formation of IRAM, with headquarters in 
Grenoble, the three- (later expanded to six-) element interferometer on the 
Plateau de Bure and the 30 meter telescope on Pico Veleta (Baars et al. 1987). 
Peter de Jonge became the first director of IRAM, and established IRAM as a 
more independent and self-standing organization than either Mezger or Blum 
anticipated or found comfortable. In 1990 Spain became a full member of 
IRAM. Unlike in the US, where the NSF was not able to provide operating 
funds for CARMA at the same time as ALMA, IRAM, starting in 2014, con-
structed four more antennas with a goal of reaching a total of 12 by 2020 as 
part of the NOrthern Extended Millimeter Array (NOEMA), thus providing a 
powerful northern hemisphere complement to ALMA.
Both the 30 meter telescope and the Plateau de Bure interferometer  
operate up to 350 GHz (0.85 mm). The 30 meter is equipped with both multi-
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feed spectrometer and bolometer cameras and, due to careful thermal control, 
operates well even in the daytime. A fatal accident with the cable car to the 
Plateau in 1999 killed 20 people, limiting access to the plateau to foot or heli-
copter, but was followed six months later by a helicopter crash which took the 
lives of another five people. Since then the rebuilt lift has been used only for 
transporting equipment, while IRAM staff and observers use a newly built road.
Japanese Millimeter Astronomy Under the leadership of Masaki Morimoto, 
Japanese radio astronomers built two world-class facilities at their Nobeyama 
Observatory, 150 km from Tokyo. The 45 meter dish is used at wavelengths 
down to 2.6 mm, and until the completion of the GBT (Sect. 9.7) was the 
largest telescope in the world operating at short millimeter wavelengths. A 
broad band 16,000 channel acoustical optical spectrograph was the heart of 
the 45 meter spectroscopic system. The millimeter interferometer, which con-
tained six 10 meter diameter movable dishes operating between 1.2 mm and 
1.3 cm, was closed for astronomical observing in 2007 as Japan devoted its 
resources to ALMA. The performance of both the 45 meter dish and the inter-
ferometer was limited by the modest 1,350 foot elevation and correspondingly 
high water vapor content.
 As a prototype for their Large Millimeter and Submillimeter Array (Sect. 
10.7), Japanese radio astronomers have also built the precision 10 meter 
diameter Atacama Submillimeter Telescope Experiment (ASTE) located near 
the ALMA site on the Atacama Desert in northern Chile. With its 0.02 mm 
rms precision surface and excellent site, ASTE is used (Kohno 2005) at fre-
quencies up to 850 GHz (0.35 mm). Until it was moved to the LMT, ASTE 
used the FCRAO 144-element AzTEC bolometer for 1.1  mm continuum 
observations.
10.6  the NrAO millimeter ArrAy (mmA)
The millimeter wavelength facilities described in Sect. 10.4 brought new life to 
the US university radio astronomy programs, but the developing ambitions in 
Europe and Japan threatened US leadership in millimeter and submillimeter 
astronomy. Although the NRAO 36 Foot dish on Kitt Peak may have opened 
the field of millimeter astronomy, even after the 12 Meter upgrade it was no 
longer competitive with many of the other emerging millimeter wave facilities, 
which were larger, worked to shorter wavelengths, and were located on better 
sites. With the demise of the 25 meter project, NRAO was no longer a major 
player in this rapidly developing and promising field of millimeter astronomy.
The 1982 Astronomy Survey Committee (Field 1982) had assumed that the 
25 meter telescope would be built, so they did not make any recommendations 
for any other major millimeter facility. Thus, following the April 1982 NSF 
Astronomy Advisory Committee decision to abandon the 25 meter telescope, 
there were no US plans to exploit this rapidly growing area of astronomy that 
had been pioneered in the US. The US millimeter astronomy community was 
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not happy with NRAO’s leadership, or perceived lack thereof, in selling the 
25 meter to the NSF or to the broader astronomical community. Although 
many millimeter wave astronomers had gotten their start as a result of NRAO’s 
pioneering efforts in millimeter wave astronomy, they now held NRAO respon-
sible for the fall of the 25 meter telescope, in part due to what some felt was a 
stubborn insistence on sticking to the expensive Mauna Kea site, and in part for 
apparently abandoning the millimeter wave telescope in favor of the VLBA.
The Barrett Report In order to develop a strategy for moving forward after the 
collapse of the 25  meter project, Robert (Bob) Wilson (Bell Labs), Phil 
Solomon (Stony Brook), and Lewis Snyder (Illinois) convened a small meeting 
at the Crawford, New Jersey offices of Bell Laboratories on 28–29 October 
1982 “to discuss future U.S. national instruments for mm-wave astronomy.”50 
No one from NRAO was invited. The meeting participants acknowledged that 
the 25 meter telescope “would have been a world leading instrument when 
first proposed,” but in view of “similar large instruments being built overseas 
in Europe and Japan, the time for the 25 meter telescope had passed.”51 The 
eighteen participants all signed a strong letter to NSF AST Director Pat Bautz 
and NSF Assistant Director for AAEO Frank Johnson presenting the case for 
building a “millimeter wave aperture synthesis instrument” based on a scaled 
down VLA and consisting of about 30 roughly 6 meter-sized antennas with a 
maximum baseline less than 3 km.52 There was no mention in the letter of who 
should build the array or where it should be located.
Previously unaware of the Bell Labs meeting, and also concerned about the 
future of US millimeter astronomy, Bautz “convened a Subcommittee of the 
NSF Astronomy Advisory Committee [chaired by MIT’s Alan Barrett] to 
advise on the future needs of millimeter and of submillimeter wavelength 
astronomy.”53 Barrett called an open meeting of the Subcommittee at the NSF 
on 3 December 1982. The Subcommittee heard reviews of existing mm wave-
length interferometry and single dish facilities, as well as possibilities for future 
developments. The Bell Labs and NSF groups agreed to work together and 
met again at Bell Labs on 9–10 February 1983, primarily to review and formu-
late the scientific case for millimeter interferometery.54
 The April 1983 report of the NSF Subcommittee, which became known as 
the “Barrett Report,” recognized the advanced millimeter wave facilities 
already operating at IRAM and Nobeyama, and noted that the more modest 
interferometers at Caltech and Hat Creek were “unsuitable for general visitor 
use by a large segment of the mm-wave astronomers.”55 The first recommenda-
tion of the committee was the initiation of a design study of a millimeter wave-
length aperture synthesis array with a minimum useable wavelength of 1 mm, 
an angular resolution of 1 arcsec or better at a wavelength of 2.6 mm, and a 
total geometric collecting area of 1,000–2,000 square meters. The NSF 
Subcommittee also did not specify who should build the array, but noted, “A 
project of this magnitude would be a national facility,” and that, “It may well 
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be that such an instrument would be situated with the present VLA in New 
Mexico in order to take advantage of the great expertise of the VLA staff.”
Planning for the Millimeter Array The first serious discussions about building 
a millimeter array at NRAO took place at an internal workshop on future 
instrumentation held in Green Bank in October 1982. As input to the work-
shop, Frazer Owen prepared a memo calling attention to the millimeter wave 
dishes and arrays around the world “in the late planning or the construction 
stage,” arguing that “the single dishes being planned seem likely to supersede 
the capabilities of the NRAO 12 meter fairly quickly,” and that the time had 
come for NRAO to take the initiative.56 Owen argued that the infrastructure 
already available at the VLA and the moderately high and fairly flat VLA site 
made it an ideal location for millimeter interferometry. He also pointed out 
that, in addition to the obvious drivers for spectroscopic imaging, interferom-
eters were more effective than large single dish telescopes in suppressing the 
effects of ground and tropospheric emissions. Mort Roberts was impressed by 
Owen’s presentation, and after the workshop asked Owen to form a small 
internal committee to review the scientific justification for millimeter interfer-
ometry,57 but Owen was more concerned about the technical challenges of the 
array configuration.58
Encouraged by the Barrett report, Roberts formed a series of technical review 
committees to examine the configuration, siting, and antenna structures for a 
millimeter array. Potential sites in Antarctica, Arizona, Chile, Colorado, Hawaii, 
and Utah, were studied, along with the existing Owens Valley, Hat Creek, and 
VLA sites, as well as the nearby South Baldy site in New Mexico’s Magdalena 
Mountains at 10,600 feet. A regular Millimeter Array Newsletter was issued, 
with Frazer Owen as Editor, and separate Millimeter Array technical and scien-
tific memo series were begun.59 NRAO Scientist Edward (Ed) Fomalont spent 
six months at the Nobeyama Observatory to implement AIPS on their interfer-
ometer and also to bring back to NRAO experience learned from working with 
the Nobeyama millimeter array. Following traditional NRAO procedure, a 
Millimeter Array Technical Advisory Committee, chaired by Bob Wilson, was 
established to solidify support from the university community.
Millimeter Array design work continued throughout the 1980s, with NRAO 
Associate Director Bob Brown as MMA Project Director, and included site 
testing in New Mexico, Arizona, and Hawaii. During this period, NRAO held 
a series of scientific and technical workshops to address a variety of technical 
issues and to tighten the scientific case for a Millimeter Array.60 Interestingly, 
when asked about South America as a potential site, the MMA Advisory 
Committee responded, “This is not an attractive idea.”61 However, Mark 
Gordon expressed concern that in view of planned expansions of existing mil-
limeter arrays in Japan, at IRAM, Caltech, and Hat Creek, the proposed NRAO 
Millimeter Array would not be sufficiently unique, and would be more attrac-
tive if located in Chile close to the CTIO facilities near La Serena.62 NRAO 
staff also met with a group from the Smithsonian Institute to discuss possible 
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collaboration between the MMA  and the SMA. Joint Working Groups dealing 
with science, antennas, site selection, receivers, and management were formed. 
However, other than NRAO support for testing the Mauna Kea SMA site, the 
proposed collaboration did not materialize.
In January 1988, NRAO issued a two volume MMA Design Study. Volume 
I, Science with a Millimeter Array (Wootten and Schwab 1988), contained the 
Proceedings of the Green Bank Workshop held in October 1985 to define the 
scientific goals which a millimeter array might address. Volume II, MMA 
Design Study (Brown and Schwab 1988) discussed the design principle for a 
forty-element array using 7.5 meter antennas, instrumentation, and computing 
requirements. The estimated construction cost, including a 20% contingency, 
was $66 million.
Following another workshop, held in Socorro from 15 to 18 January 1989, 
to assess the scientific progress in millimeter wave astronomy, and after six years 
of planning, design, and prototyping, in July 1990, AUI/NRAO finally sub-
mitted a proposal to the NSF for the construction of a Millimeter Array  (Brown 
1990). The proposed MMA consisted of 40 transportable dishes, each 8 meters 
in diameter, to give a total collecting area of about 2,000 m2 (Fig. 10.7). The 
planned frequency bands were 30–50 GHz, 70–115 GHz, 120–170 GHz, and 
200–350 GHz. At its highest frequency of 350 GHz (0.85 mm) and in the 
largest 3 km diameter configuration the resolution was 0.06 arcsec. No site was 
specified, but the proposal reviewed the search for a suitable high dry site suf-
ficiently large to hold the 3 km sized array. The attraction of a site in Chile was 
Fig. 10.7 Artist’s conception of the Millimeter Array, with 40 transportable 8 meter 
dishes. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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discussed but, due to the much greater construction and operating costs that 
would be involved, it was dismissed in favor of sites in Arizona and one in New 
Mexico, close to the VLA.
By this time, the anticipated MMA construction price had risen to $120 
million, including 15% contingency. Annual operating costs were estimated as 
$6.5 million. However, there were still many unanswered questions. The 
NRAO’s MMA proposal to NSF was reviewed by 20 US and foreign scientists, 
who recommended that NRAO proceed with the MMA, but raised concerns 
about the site selection process and the estimated costs of construction and 
operation. Several reviewers noted that NRAO had no experience in millimeter 
interferometry.63 In April 1991 the NSF brought a committee to Socorro to 
assess the project. The proposal reviews, the site visit, and the long range plan-
ning committee of the Advisory Committee for the NSF Division of 
Astronomical Sciences (ACAST) all “overwhelmingly endorsed the NRAO 
Millimeter Array,”64 but ACAST raised concerns about where the operating 
funds would come from.65
The Bahcall Committee Responding to the growing threat from IRAM, the 
MMA also received the important blessing of the 1990 Decade Review of 
Astronomy (Bahcall 1991) in order to “recapture the once dominant position 
of the United States in millimeter astronomy.”66 There were no other “large” 
radio astronomy proposals competing with the MMA, so, unlike the earlier 
bitter battles over the VLA and VLBA which occurred in the 1970s and 1980s 
Decade Reviews, the 1990s Radio Panel quickly reached a consensus to recom-
mend “as the highest priority for new construction a Millimeter Wave Array 
with sub-arcsecond resolution, comparable to that of the VLA, and having 
good image quality, a sensitivity adequate to study faint continuum and line 
emission, and a flexible spectroscopic capability in all of the millimeter wave-
length windows between 30 GHz and 350 GHz.” (Kellermann 1991, p. I-9).
In the parent Survey Committee, the MMA faced competition from the two 
8 meter optical telescopes recommended by the OIR Panel, one located on 
Mauna Kea, optimized for infrared astronomy, and the other to be built in the 
Southern Hemisphere, optimized for optical and near ultraviolet wavelengths. 
Although there was a broad consensus that after the VLA, VLBA, and then the 
GBT, it was time to support other wavelengths, after vigorous debate within 
the Committee, the MMA was still given second priority, following the Mauna 
Kea infrared telescope, but far ahead of the Southern Hemisphere telescope 
(Bahcall 1991, p.  11). However, even during the Committee deliberations, 
before any decisions had been reached, NSF Director Erich Bloch reported 
that he had negotiated a deal with the UK Science and Technologies Facilities 
Council (STFC) to jointly build both of the 8 meter telescopes with the US 
and the UK each paying for half the cost. John Bahcall, the Survey Committee 
Chair, was incensed and argued that since the Committee had not yet reached 
any conclusions about the relative priorities of the various projects under 
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 consideration by the Committee, such an agreement was premature. But 
Bloch, not to be intimidated, retorted that if he had to wait for committees to 
decide anything, nothing would ever get built.67
NSF Approval In response to the issues raised by the reviewers, NRAO sub-
mitted a new proposal for a “Millimeter Array Design and Development Plan,” 
requesting $22.3 million over three years to continue site evaluation, to pro-
vide final engineering design for the antennas and instrumentation, and for 
algorithm development.68 As usual, things moved slowly in Washington, and it 
was not until November 1994, at the request of NSF Director Neal Lane, that 
the National Science Board (NSB) approved a project development plan for 
the MMA. In May 1995, the NSB authorized the expenditure of $26 million 
for a three-year MMA design and development program. To jump start the 
development program, NSF AST Director Hugh Van Horn added $1 million 
to the NRAO 1995 budget from AST funds to begin site studies and further 
planning. The three-year MMA Design and Development Program began in 
1996 and included a prototype antenna, configuration studies, SIS mixer, and 
HFET amplifier design. By this time, the antenna concept for the MMA had 
evolved from a conventional on axis design to an offset configuration with an 
unblocked aperture constructed of carbon fiber instead of steel to reduce the 
effects of thermal deformations.69 An additional requirement, which was to 
lead to increased cost, was the need to be able to quickly slew the antennas 
between the region under study and a nearby reference source.
As with the 25 meter telescope, community support was ambivalent, par-
ticularly from Caltech, Berkeley, Illinois, and Maryland, who saw the MMA as 
not only an exciting scientific opportunity, but also as a threat to their own 
ambitions. Recognizing the concern about the lack of millimeter interferome-
ter experience at NRAO, and the opportunity to better engage the university 
community, Vanden Bout invited Caltech and BIMA radio astronomers to join 
an MMA Development Consortium (MDC). This was perhaps NRAO’s first 
use of an embedded acronym. Meanwhile, in 1998 the NSF established their 
own MMA Oversight Committee (MMAOC) to provide further advice and 
oversight of the MMA project.  NRAO scientists and engineers were spending 
more time writing reports and attending meetings than they were in designing 
the MMA, but it would get worse.
Just like the previous radio telescope projects we have discussed, a particu-
larly challenging and controversial aspect of the MMA was choosing a site. 
With the growing interest in sub-millimeter wavelengths, the primary criteria 
was for a high dry site, but like the VLA, the MMA required a large flat area 
within which the antennas could be moved to different array configurations. 
The most desirable locations appeared to be in the Atacama Desert in northern 
Chile, which seemingly offered unmatched opportunity for low water vapor 
content, large flat areas, and unrivaled views of the southern sky. In fact, it was 
claimed that the Atacama Desert had the lowest precipitable water vapor of 
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anywhere in the world. Unsubstantiated (and untrue) stories circulated that 
the proposed site received only 1 cm of precipitation each century. 
NRAO recognized that a Chilean site would come with many practical 
logistical challenges and at a greater cost of construction, and especially opera-
tion. However, following an exhaustive study by Mark Gordon, and as the 
MMA development progressed, there was increasing interest in  locating the 
MMA in Chile. NRAO needed to convince the NSF that Chile was worth the 
additional cost as well as the added administrative burden involved in spending 
federal funds in another country. In 1994, Paul Vanden Bout escorted NSF 
AST Director Hugh Van Horn and MPS Assistant Director William Harris on 
a visit to potential sites in Chile in the hope that they would be sufficiently 
impressed to ignore the negatives (Fig. 10.8). Apparently they were, but work-
ing in Chile turned out to be more expensive and more difficult than anyone 
anticipated.
Fig. 10.8 NSF MPS Assistant Director William Harris, NSF AST Director Hugh Van 
Horn, and NRAO Director Paul Vanden Bout standing on level ground at the 
16,500 foot MMA—later ALMA—site, with 20,000 foot mountains rising in the back-
ground. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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10.7  the AtAcAmA lArge millimeter/sUbmillimeter 
ArrAy (AlmA)
Although strongly endorsed by every review committee and enthusiastically 
supported by the NSF Astronomy Division, the MMA first needed the addi-
tional blessing of the National Science Board before it could be considered by 
the Administration or by Congress for construction funding. Largely as a result 
of the Congressional initiative to fund the GBT, the NSF had been able to 
establish the new Major Research Equipment (MRE) funding line to fund the 
construction of large new projects without impacting the operation of ongoing 
programs or grants to Individual Investigators.70 However, by the time the 
MMA Development Plan was presented to the National Science Board in 
1994, “the Federal funding landscape [had] changed substantially. In particu-
lar, Congress [had] made it increasingly clear that the viability of projects as 
large as the MMA may depend on the extent to which they are based on inter-
national partnerships.”71 International projects presented both opportunities 
and challenges. Vanden Bout declared at the start that NRAO was not inter-
ested in establishing an international partnership for the MMA just to save 
money or for the sake of satisfying the perceived Congressional wishes, but 
would do so only if a joint international program were to result in a more pow-
erful capability. Conveniently, at the same time that NRAO was planning for 
the MMA, both European and Japanese scientists were developing their own 
plans for millimeter and submillimeter wave arrays. Both projects, as well as the 
MMA, were looking at potential sites in the Atacama Desert in northern Chile.
Japanese radio astronomers were discussing a Large Millimeter and 
Submillimeter Array (LSMA) to consist of fifty 10 meter antennas operating in 
six bands up to 500 GHz or 0.6 mm wavelength (Ishiguro et al. 1994). In 
order to explore a possible joint effort with Japan, Brown and Vanden Bout 
met with members of the Nobeyama Observatory and they “agreed on a 
 memorandum to explore the possibility of a collaboration.”72 Initially, the two 
observatories discussed only the separate construction and operation of the 
MMA and LMSA on the same site, but perhaps with periodic joint operation 
of the 90 element array to give increased sensitivity, resolution, and image 
quality.73
There was also some earlier discussion of a Dutch participation in the US 
MMA.74 But the potential Dutch collaboration became tied to an additional 
contribution to CARMA and conflicted with the Dutch aspirations for the 1hT 
(later called the SKA), and so the prospects for a Dutch collaboration evapo-
rated.75 Nevertheless, with a then estimated cost of $175 million, NRAO set 
out in a confidential memo the terms and conditions under which partners 
who contributed to the capital and operating costs could become MMA 
Associates with appropriate prorated shares of the observing time. Notably, the 
long standing NRAO Open Skies policy was being threatened by the statement 
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that “aside from [Associates], U.S. observing time will not be available to non- -
U.S. observers.”76
Meanwhile in Europe, IRAM, ESO, Sweden, and the Netherlands were 
developing their own plans for the Large Southern Array (LSA) to have a 
 collecting area of 10,000 m2, about five times that of the MMA, and to work 
to wavelengths only as short as 3 mm (Downes 1995). Early strawman con-
cepts were for an array of fifty 16 meter dishes or one hundred 11 meter dishes 
with an estimated cost of 270 million Ecu ($360 million).77 The European 
planning program was initially led by IRAM, and then later by ESO under its 
charismatic strong-minded Director, Riccardo Giacconi.
Collaboration between NRAO and ESO appeared attractive to both sides, 
and in June 1997, Giacconi (for ESO) and Vanden Bout (for NRAO) signed a 
resolution agreeing to an LSA/MMA Feasibility Study. Three Joint Working 
Groups, Science, Technology, and Management, were established to continue 
the design and planning. At NRAO, the design work continued using the $26 
million that had been authorized for the MMA design. Both sides understood 
the complexities and delays of their ambitious plans that would be introduced 
by a joint project, and agreed they would insist on a project that was more 
powerful than either the MMA or the LSA. Ironically, at the end of his term as 
ESO director in 1999, Giacconi returned to the US where he accepted a posi-
tion as President of AUI (Sect. 6.8), during which time he oversaw the AUI/
NRAO negotiations with ESO to establish the governing structure of the joint 
facility in Chile.
In early 1999, Bob Brown ran a competition asking for ideas to name the 
new facility and received 33 suggestions. Following a ballot sent to about 100 
individuals to choose among the 33 names, Brown presented the top eight 
candidates to a 30 March 1999 meeting of NSF, ESO, and PPARC representa-
tives in Garching. The name ALMA appeared only sixth on the list, but accord-
ing to Brown, Ian Corbett from PPARC, declared “ALMA is the best.  I like 
acronyms I can pronounce.” The entire room mumbled in agreement and the 
committee went on to the next agenda topic.78 ALMA also means “soul” or 
“spirit” in Spanish.
In June 1999, just weeks before Giacconi joined AUI, the NSF signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with European institutions for a joint “design 
and development phase of a large aperture mm/sub-mm array to be known as 
the Atacama Large Millimeter Array (ALMA).” ALMA joined the MMA (40 
eight meter dishes working to 1.3 mm) with the European Large Southern 
Array (50 sixteen meter dishes working to 3 mm) to build an array containing 
64 twelve meter diameter antennas with an angular resolution up to 0.005 arc-
sec at the shortest operating wavelength of 0.35 mm.79 On the European side, 
the MOU was signed by Giacconi for ESO, CNRS, the MPG, the Netherlands 
Foundation for Research in Astronomy (NFRA), and the British Particle 
Physics and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC). But not everyone was 
enthusiastic. IRAM in Europe and CARMA in the US were building powerful 
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millimeter wave arrays of their own that they knew would be threatened by the 
proposed plan for ALMA.
The first construction funding in the US for the joint ALMA project was 
approved by Congress in November 2001. Initially an ALMA Executive 
Committee (AEC), with Bob Brown as chair, was established to coordinate the 
ESO and NRAO activities. But establishing ALMA as an international project 
was not straightforward. ESO, NRAO, and later Japan, all came to the table 
with different goals. The ESO LSA emphasized a large collecting area to enable 
extragalactic spectroscopy, while the NRAO MMA stressed image quality, and 
the Japanese LSMA highlighted submillimeter wavelengths. Agreements 
among the five European partners, on one hand, and among the North 
American partners, US and Canada, on the other hand, and between the US 
and Europe were followed by separate agreements between the ALMA part-
ners and the government of Chile and Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y 
Technologia (CONACyT). As part of the NAPRA (North American Program 
in Radio Astronomy) agreement, Canada agreed to work with the NSF in 
funding and supporting ALMA. But NRAO/AUI and the NSF first had to 
establish their own rules of engagement.
For various reasons, including the ongoing funding of the Japanese 8.2 meter 
Subaru optical telescope, Japan was unwilling or unable to enter into a firm 
agreement to participate in a combined telescope on the same time scale as 
Europe and the US. Japan, Europe, the US, and Canada agreed on a resolution 
expressing the intent to jointly construct ALMA and starting as early as 1999, 
a US-European-Japanese ALMA Liaison Group had met regularly to exchange 
technical progress and to establish the foundations for an “Enhanced ALMA.” 
Bob Brown and Peter Napier represented NRAO at these discussions.80 Japan 
did not formally join the ALMA project until funds became available in 2004 
when Japan proposed to build a “Compact Array, a new correlator and new 
receivers, as well as to contribute to the infrastructure and operation.”81 By this 
time, the NSF/AUI/NRAO and ESO had already agreed on the legal struc-
ture and the basic parameters of the Array.
ESO and the NSF had different legal status with the government of Chile 
for the operation of ESO and CTIO respectively, and these agreements had to 
be respected with the joint ALMA project. In 1998, NRAO/AUI hired 
Eduardo Hardy, a native of Argentina, as the AUI representative in Chile, and 
in 2006, Hardy became the NRAO Assistant Director for Chilean Affairs. The 
2006 Management Agreement for the construction and early operation of 
ALMA was a bilateral agreement between ESO and AUI acting as the NSF 
Executive. The management of the ALMA project was first overseen by an 
ALMA Coordinating Committee (ACC), and since 2017 by the ALMA Board, 
which includes representatives from the NSF, NRAO/AUI, the Canadian 
NRC, ESO, NOAJ, Chile, and ASIAA (Taiwan) as well as at-large members 
from Europe and Japan. A Joint ALMA Office (JAO) was established in Chile 
and managed by the ALMA Director to oversee the construction, commission-
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ing, and operation of ALMA.  Within Europe, the partners had their own 
European Coordinating Committee. 
Due to the high 5,000 meter altitude of the ALMA site, it was clear that, to 
the extent possible, supporting activities should take place a lower altitude. An 
Operations Support Facility (OSF) was established not far from the town of 
San Pedro de Atacama at 9,500 feet elevation. Ground-breaking for the OSF 
took place in November 2003 (Fig.  10.9), and ground-breaking at the 
16,500 feet Array Operations Site occurred in October 2005.
Paul Vanden Bout became the first ALMA Director and stepped down from 
his role as NRAO Director to concentrate on building ALMA. He served as 
ALMA Director between June 2002 and March 2003, during which time he 
led the negotiations between ALMA and the Chilean partners (Chilean 
Government and CONICYT). Massimo Tarenghi from ESO was the ALMA 
Project Scientist, and he succeeded Vanden Bout as ALMA Director in 2003. 
Tarenghi was followed by Thijs de Graauw from the Netherlands, Pierre Cox 
from France, and Sean Dougherty from Canada. In 2004, Anthony (Tony) 
Beasley returned to NRAO as the ALMA Project Manager. Beasley had previ-
ously been an Assistant Director at NRAO, after which he went to California 
to be Project Manager for CARMA. As the ALMA Project Manager, he inher-
Fig. 10.9 Groundbreaking for the ALMA Operations Support Facility. NSF’s Bob 
Dickman is pouring Chilean wine in a tribute to the earth goddess Pachamama. Standing 
from left to right are Eduardo Hardy (AUI), Fred Lo (NRAO Director), Bob Brown 
(NRAO), Catherine Cesarsky (ESO Director General) and Daniel Hofstadt (ESO). 
Credit: I. Dickman/NRAO/AUI/NSF
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ited a project that was headed for a major cost overrun due to the unforeseen 
large cost of the antenna elements, the unanticipated complexity and cost of 
the international partnership, the unappreciated cost of building on the remote 
and challenging site, and unfavorable changes in the value of the Chilean peso. 
Following an agreement to “re-baseline,” in December 2004, ALMA was 
downsized to 50 antennas, 25 each to be provided by NRAO/AUI and by 
ESO, and the number of frequency bands was reduced. Some of these were 
later restored when Japan joined the project. 
 Building a state of the art scientific instrument at this altitude was a chal-
lenge. At 16,500 feet elevation, the air density is only about half of that at sea 
level. Aside from the well-known impact to human performance, many elec-
tronic components do not function properly at this elevation. The ALMA cor-
relator is among the faster supercomputers in the world, operating at about 
2 × 1013 operations per seconds. Like all large computing systems, it needs to 
be cooled, but at 16,500 feet it takes twice as much cooling as it would at sea 
level. Ordinary computer disk drives do not work at the ALMA site, so solid 
state disks are used on all computers. Many other electronic components, such 
as electrolytic capacitors, are not rated for these altitudes. Another continuing 
problem is so called, “Single Event Upsets” (SEUs) which are the random flip-
ping of a bit (zero to one, or one to zero) when a chip is hit by a cosmic ray 
particle. These SEUs are more common at ALMA than at sea level.
It was clear that the biggest challenge, and certainly the biggest technical 
risk facing ALMA, was in meeting the exacting specifications for the construc-
tion of the high precision antenna elements. In order to obtain a competitive 
design and cost, AUI/NRAO and ESO agreed to procure two separate proto-
types for evaluation. ESO contracted with the French Alcatel-EIE consortium 
for their prototype, while AUI/NRAO chose the California based Vertex 
Antenna Systems, LLC for the design and construction of their prototype. 
Alcatel-EIE was the result of a complex series of mergers including the US 
Lucent Technologies, the successor of AT&T Bell Laboratories. Later Alcatel- 
Lucent became part of the Finnish Nokia Networks, and more recently was 
sold to a Chinese consortium. Vertex Antenna Systems was formed from 
 mergers including TIW (Toronto Iron Works) and RSI, which had been 
involved in earlier NRAO antenna projects. The design and much of the fabri-
cation of the AUI/NRAO prototype antenna actually came from the German 
based Vertex Antennentechnik subsidiary of Vertex Antenna Systems which 
had its origins in the Krupp group that was involved in building the Effelsberg, 
Pico Veleta, and HHT telescopes. 
The two prototype 12 meter diameter antennas were erected at the VLA site 
where their performance was evaluated by a joint NRAO/ESO Antenna 
Evaluation Group (AEG), led by Jeff Mangum from NRAO. Although, at the 
time, Japan had not yet formally joined the ALMA project, a third prototype 
was built by the Japanese Mitsubishi Electric Company and was also erected at 
the VLA site, but was independently evaluated by a Japanese team. Owing to 
the late delivery of both the Alcatel and Vertex antennas to the VLA site, the 
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evaluation (Mangum et al. 2006), especially for the Alcatel antenna, was not 
fully complete by the time the two partners had agreed to try to select a single 
contractor for the production antennas.82
Nevertheless, NRAO/AUI and ESO each issued a separate Request for 
Proposals, anticipating that the evaluation of the two prototypes would be 
completed in time to make a coordinated decision on the contractor. Both 
requests had common performance specifications but different business terms 
and considerations which were necessitated by their respective procurement 
policies. NRAO/AUI received bids from both Vertex RSI, which was later 
acquired by General Dynamics during the procurement process, and from 
Alcatel, which now included the German MAN, the former partner of Krupp 
in building the Effelesberg antenna. ESO received bids from Alcatel, the 
German based Vertex Antennentechnik as well as from the Italian contractor, 
Alenia Aerospace. Based on cost and performance, NRAO/AUI chose General 
Dynamics. In order to meet the July 2005 deadline before both of the General 
Dynamics pricings expired, NRAO/AUI signed a contract for $169 million for 
the construction of 25 antennas, fully anticipating that ESO would contract 
with Vertex for the other 25 antennas.83 Previously, ESO had selected Vertex 
Antennentechnik, even before the NRAO/AUI/NSF decision to choose 
Vertex RSI (General Dynamics), but a last minute revised bid from the newly 
reorganized European-led Alcatel was lower than the Vertex bid, and ESO 
signed a separate contract with Alcatel for the other 25 ALMA antennas. 
Although the engineering design of the NRAO/AUI production antennas was 
led by Vertex Antennentechnik in Germany, fabrication actually took place in 
many countries. The project was managed by General Dynamics C4 Systems in 
Texas, where each antenna was first assembled and tested, then broken into 
sub-assemblies for shipment by boat from Houston to Chile. 
Neither ESO nor NRAO/AUI management, scientists, and engineers were 
pleased with the separate contracts which involved different designs including 
different drive systems and a different sub-reflector support structure. Each 
side blamed the other for ending up with two different antennas. ESO consid-
ered that NRAO/AUI had acted prematurely in signing a contract with 
General Dynamics before the prototype evaluation was fully complete, while 
NRAO/AUI suspected that Alcatel had lowered their price below the Vertex 
price to make their bid more attractive to ESO. One can only speculate whether 
or not the Vertex bid was leaked to Alcatel, allowing them to undercut the 
Vertex price.
As it has turned out, many of the concerns about the operation and perfor-
mance of two different antenna structures were unfounded, although the 
Vertex and Alcatel antennas do require different maintenance procedures. To 
complicate the situation, when Japan formally entered the project, they con-
tracted with the Japanese Mitsubishi Electric Company to build four more 12 
meter diameter antennas, as well as the twelve 7 meter antennas for the so- 
called “Compact Array” to provide critical short baselines. The Mitsubishi 12 
meter dishes are yet a different design from either the ESO or NRAO/AUI 12 
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meter antennas. Although all of the Japanese antennas are primarily intended 
for use in the separate “Compact Array,” in principle they can be used together 
with the AUI and ESO antennas as part of a single 54 or even 64 element array.
ALMA scientific observations officially started on 30 September 2011, and 
on 13 March 2013 ALMA was formally inaugurated after nearly three decades 
of planning, engineering, and construction at NRAO (Fig. 10.10), as well as in 
Europe and Japan. ALMA operates at wavelengths from 0.32 mm to 1 cm in 
configurations ranging from 150 meters to 16 km. By agreement, scientists 
from North America (US, Canada, and Taiwan) and the 14 ESO member 
states each get 33.75 percent of the observing time; East Asia (Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan) 22.5 percent; and Chile 10 percent. Taiwan participates in ALMA, 
not only through the Japanese East Asia group, but is also part of the North 
American group along with the US and Canada.
Interestingly, ALMA, which was the most expensive ground based telescope 
facility ever built, was itself never proposed to the NSF or reviewed in competi-
tion with other facilities by a US Decade Review Committee. Rather, it was 
only the more modest MMA that was recommended by the Bahcall (1991) 
committee at a projected construction cost of $115 million. The final cost of 
constructing ALMA was about $1.4 billion, with ESO and the NSF each pay-
ing 37.5 percent and Japan the other 25 percent.84 The official cost to the NSF 
was $499 million. 
Fig. 10.10 The completed Atacama Large Millimeter-Submillimeter Array (ALMA) 
shown in a compact configuration. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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The operation of ALMA is perhaps unique among astronomical observato-
ries. Instead of proposing for a specific amount of observing time, ALMA users 
propose to achieve a certain sensitivity, resolution, image quality, etc., and the 
ALMA staff determines the appropriate amount of observing time and the 
antenna configuration needed to meet the observer’s requirements. In this 
way, observers (if one can still use that name) are not adversely impacted by bad 
weather or instrumental failures traditional to conventional telescope 
 scheduling. Another innovative aspect of ALMA is that instead of raw data, the 
observers are given essentially science ready data products. ALMA Regional 
Centers (ARCs) were established to handle proposal review, scheduling, data 
reduction, and analysis, as well as archive support. The North American ALMA 
Science Center (NAASC), located at the NRAO in Charlottesville, is the North 
American ALMA Regional Center (ARC). In Europe, ALMA is supported by 
a central node at ESO in Garching, Germany, as well as eight ALMA regional 
nodes and centers of expertise. Other ARCs are located in Chile, Japan, 
and Taiwan. 
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CHAPTER 11
NRAO and Radio Astronomy in the Twenty- 
First Century
Following the inauspicious experience with the 140 Foot Telescope, NRAO 
apparently learned to manage big projects. The VLA and VLBA were built on 
schedule and on budget. But the Green Bank Telescope project was funded 
before the design was complete and was prematurely rushed into construction 
with unfortunate consequences to the cost and schedule. However, by the 
beginning of the twenty-first century NRAO was operating the most powerful 
radio telescopes in the world, the VLA, the VLBA, and the GBT, and had 
become the acknowledged leader in the evolution of radio astronomy from a 
technique to an astronomical-based science. As radio telescopes became more 
sophisticated and computer-aided, observations and reduction became more 
automated; radio astronomers evolved from experimenters to observers to data 
analysts. By the turn of the century, the traditional breed of radio astronomers 
was disappearing. NRAO users often no longer participated in the observing, 
and with the start of ALMA observations in 2011, often did not even partici-
pate in the planning of the observations or the reduction of data.
As the operation of the powerful new NRAO facilities demanded a greater 
and greater share of the National Science Foundation (NSF) astronomy bud-
get, the university radio observatories were gradually closed, exacerbating the 
community’s long standing love-hate relationship with NRAO. Many univer-
sity researchers, unable to get sufficient NSF grants to observe with their stu-
dents at NRAO, turned their attention elsewhere. The pressure for observing 
time gradually diminished, and the NSF began to discuss the partial divestment 
of the NRAO, once the NSF poster child.
11.1  New Discoveries aND New Problems
Radio astronomy provided the first observations of the cosmos outside the 
traditional narrow optical window characteristic of all previous astronomical 
studies extending over many millennia. Today, astronomers study the infrared, 
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ultraviolet, X-ray, and gamma-ray portions of the electromagnetic spectrum as 
well as radio and optical observations, and are beginning to explore the non- 
electromagnetic Universe of gravity wave and neutrino astronomy. However, 
radio astronomy was the first of the new astronomies and captured most of the 
new discoveries. Karl Jansky and Grote Reber started it all in the 1930s, and 
after WWII, discoveries and recognitions followed, highlighted by Nobel 
Prizes awarded to eight different radio astronomers.1
These exciting new discoveries of the previously unrecognized nonthermal 
universe were largely outside the main stream of optical astronomy, with its 
traditional emphasis on solar and stellar astrophysics and other thermal phe-
nomena. For many years, radio astronomy in the US developed separately from 
the astronomical community, primarily by people with backgrounds in radio-
physics rather than astronomy. There was strong support from the federal gov-
ernment, first from the Department of Defense (DOD), in particular the Office 
of Naval Research (ONR) and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research 
(AFOSR), and later the NSF. Radio astronomers shared both an appreciation 
of instrumentation as well as a common feeling of not being fully accepted by 
the traditional astronomy community. Although competing with each other 
for limited funds, the real “enemy” was perceived to be the “optical astrono-
mer.” US radio astronomers became united in pursuing expensive new facili-
ties, and they felt more at home within the URSI Commission J on Radio 
Astronomy rather than the American Astronomical Society (AAS) or the 
International Astronomical Union (IAU) (Sullivan 2009, p. 418).
The middle of the twentieth century saw the construction in the US of 
many DOD-funded university-based facilities, particularly the very successful 
Caltech Owens Valley Radio Observatory (Sect. 6.6). Later, the NSF funded 
the NRAO in Green Bank, the 36 Foot mm wave telescope, the VLA, the 
VLBA, and the GBT, and, starting in 1971, the Arecibo Observatory, but 
many other projects, some very promising, died somewhere along the complex 
funding route. These included the Owens Valley Array (Sect. 7.2), the 
Associates for Research in Astronomy 100 meter dish (Sect. 9.5), the 
CAMROC/NEROC 440 foot radome enclosed dish (Sect. 9.5), and the 
NRAO 25 meter millimeter-wave project (Sect. 10.3).
Due to limited NSF funds for facility operations, the big projects began to 
eat the ongoing smaller university radio astronomy programs. Those university 
programs were the breeding ground for the new generation of radio astrono-
mers who designed, built, and operated the large new national facilities, and 
also provided the opportunity for developing the innovative new techniques 
and telescopes. The struggle between NRAO and the university-operated radio 
observatories continued throughout the history of NRAO, beginning in the 
mid-1950s during the lengthy debates about forming a national radio observa-
tory. However, it was the big VLA and VLBA projects in the 1970s and 1980s 
that had the biggest impact on the university facilities.
As a result of the greatly improved sensitivity of radio telescopes (Fig. 11.1), 
radio astronomy was no longer constrained to study radio sources discovered 
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by radio surveys, but could study the radio emission from known cosmic 
objects. This was especially attractive to the large stellar astronomy community 
who could use observations of the thermal emission to determine the rate at 
which stars were losing mass. With the introduction of the VLA, astronomers, 
for the first time, could make images with resolutions comparable to those 
obtained from the biggest optical telescopes. VLA users studied solar system 
objects, stars, supernovae, the interstellar medium, galaxies, quasars, and cos-
mology. Radio observations became a tool for all astronomers, not just those 
trained in radio astronomy, and NRAO encouraged the growth of this broader 
user base. However, the VLBA, with its unique angular resolution, had no 
parallels at other wavelengths, and so had a limited user base, not only because 
it was perhaps more difficult to use, but also because the science was so 
different.
Early radio spectroscopy involved the laborious tuning of a single narrow- 
band instrument over a wide frequency range. With the subsequent enormous 
increases in sensitivity and the introduction of powerful multi-channel digital 
spectrometers, the impact to astronomy of the 140 Foot and later the 36 Foot 
and 12 Meter millimeter-wave telescopes was huge. They opened the new field 
of astrochemistry, exploring extreme conditions of temperature and pressure 
not easily duplicated in the laboratory, and the study of cold giant molecular 
Fig. 11.1 Plot showing the weakest detected radio source as function of time since 
Jansky’s 1933 radio detection of the Milky Way. The points refer in sequence to Jansky, 
Reber, the Australian Sea Interferometer, the Cambridge 1C, 2C, and 3C surveys, the 
Owens Valley Interferometer, the Cambridge 5C survey, the Westerbork Synthesis 
Radio Telescope, and the VLA. The last two points show the expected sensitivities of 
SKA-1 mid and the ngVLA respectively. In less than 100 years the sensitivity of radio 
telescopes has improved by a factor of about 100 million. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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clouds where new stars are formed. Using the VLA and eventually ALMA, the 
radio astronomy emphasis has slowly shifted from radio galaxies and quasars 
(Fig. 11.2) to the problems connected with the formation of stars, protostars, 
and planetary systems in dense regions obscured to light that can only be stud-
ied at radio wavelengths (Fig. 11.3).
11.2  raDio astroNomy aND oPtical astroNomy
Since their founding in the 1950s, NRAO and its optical counterpart KPNO/
NOAO2 have developed in very different directions. From its beginning, 
NRAO concentrated on major facilities too costly for a single university, while 
KPNO/NOAO was founded to provide access to telescopes and clear skies 
access to astronomers without their own telescope or from eastern universities 
with cloudy skies.
Fig. 11.2 JVLA radio image of the strong radio galaxy known as Hercules A superim-
posed on a Hubble Space Telescope optical image. The multi-frequency radio image 
made at 6 and 8 GHz (5 and 3.75 cm) shows the two-sided radio jet feeding a multiple 
bubble-like structure extending nearly one million light years from the supermassive 
black hole located at the center of the parent galaxy, suggesting a history of multiple 
outbursts. The lighter colored regions along the jet represent synchrotron emission 
from higher energy electrons and the darker red colors from lower energy electrons in 
the bubble rings. Credit: W.  Cotton and R.  Perley (NRAO/AUI/NSF), S.  Baum 
(NASA) and C. O’Dea (RIT), and the Hubble Heritage Team (STScI/AURA)
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The VLA, VLBA, GBT, and ALMA are all unique facilities, unrivaled any-
where else in the world. By contrast, the national optical astronomy facilities 
are less competitive. The two 8 meter (315 inch) Gemini telescopes are smaller 
than the Caltech/University of California 10 meter (394 inch) telescopes. The 
largest telescope at KPNO, the 4 meter (158 inch) Mayall Telescope, went into 
operation nearly two decades after the larger 5 m (200 inch) Palomar tele-
scope. As was noted in the minutes of the November 1967 meeting of the AUI 
Executive Committee, “The Kitt Peak observatory has adopted the policy of 
acquiring additional small scale observing equipment whenever existing equip-
ment is overloaded, but Dr. Heeschen does not consider this to be a function 
of NRAO”.3
There are perhaps three reasons why NRAO and NOAO/KPNO developed 
along these different paths. For optical telescopes, the sensitivity depends only 
linearly on telescope diameter, whereas at radio wavelengths the sensitivity 
depends on the area of the aperture or the square of the diameter (Ekers 1978). 
Secondly, there are a very large number of stars in the sky with a wide range of 
astrophysical conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure, element abundance) that 
can be studied by modern optical spectroscopy using only moderate size tele-
scopes, thus allowing significant research using only modest facilities. The third 
Fig. 11.3 ALMA image of the dusty circumstellar disk surrounding the young Sun- 
like star HL Tau, located about 450 light-years from the Earth. This image made at 
1 mm wavelength (300 GHz) covers an area about the size of our solar system and 
shows evidence for the early formation of a planetary system. Credit: ALMA (NRAO/
ESO/NAOJ); C. Brogan, B. Saxton (NRAO/AUI/NSF)
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reason is perhaps more related to the historical and sociological development 
of radio and optical astronomy rather than to astrophysics. In the US, optical 
astronomy developed and thrived with support from philanthropists such as 
Charles Tyson Yerkes, William Johnson McDonald, and James Lick, as well as 
from the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations, and in a some cases state gov-
ernments (e.g., Arizona, California). The philanthropists, of course, wanted 
their money to go to big noticeable telescopes. Yet only a privileged few astron-
omers at Yerkes, McDonald, Lick, Mount Wilson, and Palomar Observatories 
had access to these giant telescopes in the 60–200 inch class that were required 
to explore the exciting new developments in galaxy research and cosmology. 
Others had to be satisfied with using more modest facilities in generally less 
than ideal locations. Not surprisingly, by the middle of the twentieth century 
there was increasing tension between the “have” and “have not” optical astron-
omers, with the former being primarily at the large Mt. Wilson, Mt. Palomar, 
and Lick observatories which did not encourage competition from 
NOAO/KPNO.
Unlike optical astronomy which, as result of dramatic improvements in 
detector technology, has been able to effectively use telescopes as much as 
100 years after their initial deployment, the US closed radio telescopes when 
they became less productive, sometimes when operating funds were no longer 
available, and in a few cases where acts-of-God led to the closing of otherwise 
competitive facilities. NRAO closed the 4-element Green Bank Interferometer, 
the Green Bank 140 Foot Telescope, and the NRAO 12 Meter mm dish4 so 
that limited resources could be devoted to newer facilities, the VLA, GBT, and 
ALMA respectively. Many other, still productive US radio telescopes were 
closed due to the loss of operating funds.
11.3  Nrao aND the Us raDio astroNomy commUNity
Since the first ideas were floated about establishing a national radio astronomy 
observatory, the “love-hate” relationship between the university-operated 
radio observatories and national radio astronomy facilities has been the power-
ful background against which US radio astronomy developed during the latter 
half of the twentieth century. For the most part, NRAO facilities were used and 
appreciated by the many radio astronomers located at universities aspiring to 
do research in the rapidly developing field of radio astronomy, but which had 
no facilities of their own. Indeed, some schools, such as the Universities of 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Iowa, and Virginia Tech, started new radio 
astronomy programs and hired new faculty based on the opportunity for their 
faculty and students to use NRAO telescopes. On the other hand, places such 
as Caltech, Stanford, Ohio State, and the University of Illinois with ambitious 
projects of their own, saw NRAO as a direct competitor for limited funds. It 
was again a case of “haves” and “have-nots.” There were many more “have- 
nots” than “haves,” but the “haves” had more clout in Washington.
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This dichotomy came to a head with the NRAO/Caltech controversy, first 
over the VLA (Chap. 7) and then the VLBA (Chap. 8). In the end, even the 
“haves,” sensing the growing competition from abroad, combined with their 
strong interest in having the best possible facilities for their research, supported 
funding for NRAO, even if it might be at the expense of their own facility. For 
example, as discussed in Sect. 7.4, MIT’s Bernie Burke provided critical sup-
port in getting the VLA funded, even at the expense of the proposed MIT- 
Harvard CAMROC 440 foot dish. Similarly, as related in Sect. 8.7, Marshall 
Cohen and others at Caltech supported and helped design the VLBA, knowing 
that it would lead to the loss of funding for the Caltech/JPL VLBI correlator, 
then the leading instrument of its kind in the world.
The 1969 amendment to the 1970 Military Authorization Act, introduced 
by Washington Senator Mike Mansfield, limited the use of Defense Department 
funds to research that included “a direct and apparent relationship to a specific 
military function.” The Mansfield Amendment had an immediate and long 
lasting impact on the future funding of US radio astronomy, and ultimately on 
all US astronomy. Although the amendment formally applied only to the 1970 
DOD Authorization Bill, both military and civilian funding agencies were 
apparently unclear on the interpretation. Military laboratories were fearful of 
risking their military programs, so did not contest the amendment. The NSF 
was faced with absorbing new university-led activities previously supported by 
DOD, with an uncertain level of funding to support these new activities. The 
NSF struggled for years to keep a balance between operating the university 
radio astronomy observatories and NRAO. Nevertheless, with continued bud-
get challenges resulting from the need to operate the powerful new instru-
ments being constructed, NSF support of still-productive university radio 
observatories gradually declined, and with time so did the support for NRAO 
facilities. Some of the unique US radio telescopes that lost NSF funding 
included the University of Maryland Clark Lake decameter array, the Stanford 
5 element array, the Owens Valley Interferometer and 130 foot antenna, the 
University of Arizona Radio Observatory, and the Caltech Sub-Millimeter 
Observatory. As discussed in Sect. 10.4, threatened with closure in 2007, the 
Berkley-Illinois-Maryland Millimeter Array at Hat Creek and the Caltech 
OVRO Millimeter Array combined to form CARMA, the Combined Array for 
Millimeter Astronomy, but it too was closed for lack of operating funds in 2015.
11.4  coNflict aND collaboratioN
David Munns (2013) has characterized the development of radio astronomy as 
the result of friendly collaborations by scientists united by a common culture, 
an appreciation of technical matters, and a need to deal with a perceived com-
mon “enemy,” optical astronomers. While collaborations have been important 
in some areas such as VLBI (Kellermann and Cohen 1988; Kellermann and 
Moran 2001), the intense competition between Australian and UK radio 
astronomers and between Cambridge and Manchester radio astronomers in 
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the 1950s and 1960s (Sect. 2.1) (Edge and Mulkay 1976) reflects an alterna-
tive interpretation, as does the continuing tension between NRAO and some 
US university-based radio observatories.
For example, the deferral by Doc Ewen and Ed Purcell to the Dutch and 
Australian H I teams to simultaneously publish their H I discovery is described 
by Munns (2013) and Sullivan (2009, p. 414) as evidence of the cooperative 
culture of radio astronomy. Only after their success did Ewen and Purcell offer 
to wait for a joint publication, knowing full well that they were the first and 
that they would be so recognized, as indeed they have been. It is perhaps 
reflective of the sense of competition and priority, that when Jan Oort wrote to 
Grote Reber in 1945 asking his advice on building a radio telescope, he only 
mentioned his interest in the distribution of interstellar gas in the Galaxy. Oort, 
of course, was already aware of the possibility of detecting the 21-cm line, and 
that was clearly much of his motivation.5 But he apparently held that close to 
his chest.
As described in Chap. 7, VLBI, especially earth-to-space VLBI, has perhaps 
been the poster child for a technically complex, and successful scientific coop-
eration among individual scientists, institutions, and countries, including some 
of the earliest serious scientific collaborations between the US and the Soviet 
Union. Perhaps these collaborations were successful because they were not 
driven by a political desire to collaborate or build bridges between countries 
and political systems, but because the science required it. The first VLBI exper-
iments came about following friendly, but nevertheless intense, competition 
between Canadian and US radio astronomers who can (and still do) argue 
about who was first, depending on one’s definition of success and what consti-
tutes VLBI.
As discussed by DeVorkin (2000), Harwit (2015), Sullivan (2009) and oth-
ers, much of the early support for radio astronomy, particularly in the US, came 
from military interests. With the end of the Cold War and the reduced threat 
of a major war between super-powers, the political forces have moved in the 
direction of international collaboration in the construction of expensive new 
scientific research instruments. Radio astronomy, with its long history of inter-
national collaborations, has been well poised to exploit these opportunities. 
The European VLBI Network (Sect. 8.5) has been successfully driven by a 
combination of scientific goals, European unity, and competition with the 
US. ALMA (Sect. 10.7), with a price tag in excess of 1 billion US dollars, is the 
most recent example of a successful large global collaboration involving coun-
tries from four continents. The Square Kilometre Array (Sect. 11.7) is a very 
ambitious multi-billion Euro international program that has been challenged 
by the international aspect, differing views on the technical implementation, 
and national ambitions.
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11.5  the NatioNal raDio QUiet ZoNe aND raDio 
freQUeNcy sPectrUm maNagemeNt6
Since its earliest years, radio astronomy has needed to deal with interference 
from both intended radio broadcast and communication transmissions as well 
as from unintended radio noise, generated, for example, by automobile igni-
tions, radars, or computers. As early as the 1930s, Karl Jansky reported radio 
interference from passing motor boats and from nearby medical diathermy 
machines. Grote Reber could only observe at night at 160 MHz, due to day-
time interference from automobiles. Reber recognized the sensitivity limita-
tions imposed by radar and the FM broadcast services, and was probably the 
first person to urge the creation of protected bands to study the astrophysical 
lines which he predicted might be observed in emission or in absorption. With 
the increasing use of the radio spectrum for a wide variety of communication 
and data transfer applications, the competition for frequency allocations has 
become intense. Radio frequency spectrum management has developed an 
extensive, often contentious, bureaucracy, with a rich collection of national and 
international agencies, committees, and acronyms.
Radio waves do not respect international borders, and since 1906 the alloca-
tion of the radio spectrum has been guided by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), now a specialized agency of the United 
Nations. The 1927 Washington Conference established the International 
Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) to coordinate technical studies and to 
develop international standards which are reviewed every three to five years at 
a World Radiocommunication Conference7 (WRC). National administrations 
enable their own frequency allocations, generally, but not always, respecting 
the ITU/WRC guidelines.8 Within the US, radio frequencies are assigned by 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for non-federal government 
use and, for federal use, by the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) based on input from the government Interdepartmental 
Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC).
In the early 1950s both URSI and the IAU discussed the need to protect 
some frequencies for radio astronomy. Although URSI passed a 1950 resolu-
tion asking that frequencies be reserved for radio astronomy, it was not initially 
adopted by the CCIR. In 1957, URSI set up the Sub-Commission on Radio 
Frequency Allocation for Radio Astronomy under the leadership of NRAO’s 
John Findlay to prepare for the 1959 Geneva Administrative Radio Conference. 
With input from Findlay’s committee, as well as from the IAU, the CCIR rec-
ommended that (1) radio telescopes should be located at sites as free as possi-
ble from interference, (2) governments should protect frequencies used for 
radio astronomy in their countries, and (3) that there should be complete 
international protection from interference in the bands around the 327 MHz 
deuterium frequency, the 1420  MHz H I frequency, and the 1667  MHz 
hydroxyl (OH) frequency, as well as seven bands between 40 MHz (7.5 m) and 
1 GHz (30 cm) reserved for continuum observations.
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At the WRC meeting later that year in Geneva, radio astronomers made the 
case to reserve frequencies for passive radio astronomy. Jan Oort represented 
the IAU and Lloyd Berkner represented URSI as non-voting delegates. John 
Findlay was part of the official US delegation, which was dominated by com-
mercial interests and so provided less than enthusiastic support for radio 
astronomy (Sullivan 1959). Following long and contentious negotiations, for 
the first time, largely due to the pressures from the Dutch delegation, the 
Radio Astronomy Service was recognized as a legitimate user of the radio spec-
trum. The 1959 WRC recommended that multiple bands covering about one 
percent of the radio spectrum be allocated for radio astronomy, with special 
protection in the 1420 to 1427 MHz hydrogen band (Findlay 1960, 1991). In 
1992, the ITU also defined the level of harmful interference not be exceeded 
in the radio astronomy bands, but with the great improvements in the sensitiv-
ity of radio telescopes since that time, these approved levels were no longer 
adequate to protect radio astronomy from harmful interference.
After the 1959 WRC, following a recommendation from the US President’s 
Science Advisory Committee, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) held a 
series of meetings to begin a dialog between radio astronomers and the govern-
ment. This resulted in the creation of the NAS Committee on Radio Frequencies 
(CORF) to represent the US radio astronomy community in reacting to FCC 
“Proposals of Proposed Rule Making.” Starting with John Findlay and Hein 
Hvatum, CORF has nearly always included someone from NRAO to provide 
advice on proposed new threats to radio astronomy such as satellite broadcast-
ing and communications, airport radars, and most recently the pervasive auto-
mobile collision control radars. In addition to CORF, the NSF Astronomy 
Division, like other government agencies and military branches, includes at 
least one person expert in spectrum management issues to protect from threats 
to each agencies’ use of the spectrum. On the international front, the Inter- 
Union Committee on the Allocation of Frequencies (IUCAF) was set up in 
1960 by the three international scientific unions, URSI, the IAU, and 
COSPAR,9 to coordinate the requirements for the protection of radio astron-
omy, and to convey these priorities to the national and international bodies 
responsible for frequency allocations. Both CORF and IUCAF have paid par-
ticular attention to the protection of frequencies corresponding to especially 
interesting spectral lines.
In Sect. 3.4 we described the establishment of the West Virginia Radio 
Astronomy Zoning Act which was passed by the West Virginia legislature to 
protect NRAO from unintended radio noise. This was followed on 19 
November 1958 by the FCC establishment of The National Radio Quiet Zone 
(NRQZ) to provide protection from radio transmissions that might cause 
harmful interference to NRAO and to the US Naval Station at Sugar Grove 
(Sect. 9.3). It is centered around Sugar Grove, West Virginia, and covers an 
area of approximately 13,000 square miles in Virginia and West Virginia. All 
applications for fixed radio transmissions located within the NRQZ are reviewed 
for potential interference to either the Green Bank or the Sugar Grove facilities 
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before being licensed by either the FCC or NTIA. The combination of the 
regulatory protection afforded by the NRQZ, the low population density, and 
the geographic protection provided by the surrounding mountains have been 
crucial in keeping Green Bank radio astronomy observations relatively free 
from radio frequency interference (RFI).
However, with the increasing demands on the radio spectrum from com-
mercial, government, personal, and military activities, RFI has become an even 
greater problem than ever for radio astronomy. Moreover, the proliferation of 
satellite-based transmissions, high-powered radio and TV broadcasts, and 
equally high-power global communications satellites, has left no place on earth 
immune from RFI. At the same time, radio astronomers are no longer content 
with observing around a few protected spectral line frequencies or within the 
narrow bands allocated for continuum observations. Spectroscopic observa-
tions are subject to redshifts due to the expansion of the Universe. The region 
just below 1.4 GHz is of particular interest for observing atomic hydrogen in 
distant galaxies, but this is an especially crowded part of the radio spectrum. 
Continuum observations are even more difficult. The JVLA, for example, now 
covers the entire spectrum between 1 and 50 GHz. A typical continuum obser-
vation may cover several GHz of bandwidth, but the protected radio astron-
omy bands are typically only a few tens of MHz wide and do not provide 
meaningful protection.
On the other hand, there are only a few radio observatories left in the US, 
and to a lesser extent in the world, and they do not each observe in all of the 
protected bands all of the time. Modern radio astronomy needs only local pro-
tection around each observatory, and only in those bands and for those times 
that they are being used. Fortunately, above a few hundred MHz, radio propa-
gation is limited to about one hundred miles, so selective protection is possible. 
Except for a few bands containing important spectral lines such as the 
1420–1427 MHz band or the 1.6 GHz OH band, the protected radio astron-
omy bands have become no more than bargaining chips. However, fearing that 
the powerful commercial interests will gobble up anything put on the table, 
CORF, IUCAF, and the radio astronomy community, have been reluctant to 
offer up these narrow protected bands in return for local, time-sensitive, pro-
tection over much larger bands. While it seems inevitable that the current para-
digm for radio spectrum management will be replaced by a shared use of the 
spectrum policy, it remains to be seen who gets what share.10
11.6  the traNsitioN to “big scieNce”
Following the early work of Karl Jansky and Grote Reber, radio astronomy in 
the United States has been largely supported by federal or state funds with little 
contribution from universities, industry, or private supporters. There were few 
obstacles to pursuing new initiatives, and few formalities to inhibit creative 
ideas. As described in Sect. 8.1, the NRAO VLBI program was initially funded 
by the NRAO Director with no formal proposal or committee review, and has 
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developed into a global industry and one of NRAO’s major facilities (Sects. 8.8 
and 8.9). The 36 Foot millimeter wave (Sect. 10.2) telescope was initially 
funded on the basis of a few paragraphs added to NRAO’s 1964 budget 
request, although based on what was known at the time, there were only a few 
objects in the sky known to be strong enough to be detected with the proposed 
telescope. No one anticipated the explosion in millimeter wave spectroscopy 
that would result in an international billion dollar ALMA program (Sect. 10.7).
Since those early years of the 1930s through the 1950s and the golden years 
of discovery of the 1960s, the landscape has changed. Whether for building a 
new instrument, an individual research grant, or for observing time, proposals 
are expected to give the expected results in some detail, almost obviating the 
need for the proposed activity. Risky but high potential payoff projects are dif-
ficult to get through the success-oriented peer review system. Some researchers 
have learned to play the system by proposing projects that are already nearly 
done, and using the new resources to attack more speculative projects.11 
Proposals to the NSF, even for modest research grants, need to supply a detailed 
technical description, a budget, a discussion of the “Broader Impact” to soci-
ety,12 as well as the expected scientific results. Indeed, even before submitting 
a proposal to the NSF, one has to be familiar with the 181 page NSF “Proposal 
& Award Policies and Procedure Guide” as well as other instructional material.
Combined with the increasing cost and complexity of radio telescopes, the 
modern administration of science provides fewer opportunities for individual 
initiative or opportunity to make new discoveries. The early pioneers were able 
to develop a new idea, build their own equipment, observe, and interpret the 
results. There were few, if any previous papers that had to be read, understood, 
and cited. Single or two or three author papers were common. By contrast, 
modern radio astronomy programs often involve large teams of scientists, engi-
neers, and software experts, sometime located in different countries. The four-
level peer review filter of facility or instrument proposal, research grant proposal, 
telescope time preproposal, and journal referees often represents a significant 
challenge to new research ideas, new facilities, or publishing new ideas. At the 
same time, the responsibilities of reviewing proposals for grants, telescope 
time, and journal reviewing represent a significant burden on the community.
While it is tempting to look back on those early years with rose-colored 
glasses, it is sobering to recall that Karl Jansky (Sect. 1.1), George Southworth 
(Sect. 2.1), and John Bolton (Sect. 6.6), to name a few, were constrained from 
pursuing their radio astronomy interests by the more immediate needs of their 
employer. Grote Reber had to deal with an editor who delayed publication of 
his pioneering paper because the editor did not have the background to under-
stand and appreciate it (Sect. 1.3). The personal sacrifices of people like Lovell, 
Bowen, Hachenberg, and Heeschen in taking on the challenges and risks of 
building the Jodrell Bank, Parkes, Effelsberg, and VLA telescopes respectively 
should not be minimized.
The early ideas of Menzel and Berkner that led to the formation of NRAO 
reflected a departure from the individualism of the pioneering radio  astronomers 
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such as Reber, Ryle, Lovell, Pawsey, Bolton, Wild, Mills, and Christiansen. The 
NRAO founders had envisioned a facility where university scientists would 
bring their own instrumentation to install and use on the large NRAO tele-
scopes. To an extent this happened during the early years in Green Bank with 
the 300 Foot and then 140 Foot Telescopes as well as the 36 Foot millimeter 
antenna on Kitt Peak. All this changed with the VLA.  As Dave Heeschen 
(1991) noted,
Most radio astronomy in those days was done by radio physicists and engineers 
who invented, built, and then used their own instruments. New telescopes usu-
ally came about either because someone had a bright idea, developed it and then 
did whatever radio astronomy he could with it, or because someone asked a par-
ticular scientific question and then designed an instrument to answer it. These 
both proved very fruitful ways to proceed, especially, when the practitioners were 
as talented and clever as those of the 50’s and 60’s. The VLA did not come about 
this way, however. Our motives and goals were quite different. We set out from 
the beginning to build a flexible, general-purpose instrument for a broad scien-
tific purpose, to be used by a lot of people other than, or in addition to, the 
designers. Many people considered that approach inappropriate, unimaginative, 
undesirable, overly expensive, and unneeded, and we had to cope with these criti-
cisms for 10 or 15 years.
Obtaining government funding for big science projects remains challeng-
ing. At best there is a long series of hurdles that must be passed; at any point a 
project can be killed. At a 1963 Green Bank meeting to discuss options for 
building a large steerable radio telescope, Dave Heeschen listed the “filters” 
that any project must pass through as (a) the NSF, (b) the Office of Science and 
Technology, (c) the Bureau of the Budget, (d) the President’s Science Advisory 
Committee, (e) Congress, and (f) the President. Of these, Heeschen consid-
ered the NSF, even with its multiple reviews “the easiest” and the Bureau of 
the Budget “the toughest.”13
From the earliest years, NRAO pioneered the use of digital data and com-
puter aided analysis. When John Bolton visited Green Bank in late 1964 he 
wrote back to Taffy Bowen in Australia,
Green Bank is now very impressive as far as facilities are concerned, very depress-
ing as far as surroundings and social life are concerned, has a large working staff 
who are expending a lot of energy but, considering the resources, is not over- 
productive. It is probably over-automated and over-digitized. If you make your 
observation by writing a set of instructions for a telescope operator to carry out, 
then write a set of instructions for a computer to extract some data from the 
results, then it is rather unlikely that you are going to find anything other than 
what you are looking for.14
Ironically, it was John Bolton who led the effort at Parkes to transition from 
analyzing chart recordings to the use of computer analysis of digitized  telescope 
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output. But his 1964 warning would be prophetic. At first, radio astronomers 
wrote their own programs to reduce the burden of manual data analysis. With 
time, the software became sufficiently sophisticated that it was written by oth-
ers, often teams of people rather than a single individual, and increasingly the 
software teams included more people trained in computer science than in phys-
ics or astronomy. Observers were able to use these software packages to reduce 
their data, but were increasingly ignorant about how they worked. Indeed, 
with rare exceptions, no one person understood everything. NRAO was satisfy-
ing its expected role to provide easy-to-use facilities for students and scientists 
not trained in radio astronomy techniques. Multi-wavelength astronomy 
became the norm, and NRAO was expected to produce so-called “science- 
ready- data-products.” Astronomers are no longer radio, optical, or X-ray 
astronomers. Instead, they are galactic or extragalactic astronomers, or they 
perhaps concentrate on planetary astronomy or exoplanets—and are equally 
familiar, or perhaps unfamiliar, as the case may be, with techniques at all wave-
lengths. The ambitious goal of providing science-ready-data-products for data 
of increasing complexity and sophistication remains a challenge.
Bolton’s warning about computers inhibiting discoveries is debatable. 
Certainly many of the scientific areas of contemporary radio astronomy would 
not be possible without modern high-speed digital computers. This certainly 
includes essentially all interferometric arrays such as the VLA, ALMA, IRAM 
(NOEMA), the Westerbork telescope, Murchison Widefield Array (MWA), 
and the Australia Telescope Compact Array, and especially VLBI; but also most 
single-dish studies, including pulsar searching and timing, spectroscopy, and 
mapping of extended structures, would not be possible without modern digital 
data analysis. Further, there has been an explosion in the volume of data associ-
ated with many radio astronomy programs. Sophisticated computer clusters 
have replaced laptops, and multi-person software development teams have 
replaced individual programmers.
At the 1997 dedication of the Jansky Memorial monument at the former 
Bell Labs Holmdel site, Paul Vanden Bout pointedly summarized the situation.
Large facilities require large teams to keep them going. We have moved very far 
from the days of Jansky and Reber where a lone individual made a big contribu-
tion.…. [Users] treat these facilities as vending machines. They put in a proposal, 
decide whether they want their M&Ms with or without peanuts. They pull the 
right lever and out comes data. Preferably calibrated data. It’s all too much for 
those of us who grew up thinking real radio astronomy was done with a chart 
recorder. So we sit around and lament this. On the other hand, I’ve noticed that 
the people who complain the loudest, are the very people who are lobbying for 
the big new telescopes. I guess that means that we recognize that it is inevitable 
that we should seize the future and get on with it. After all, if this is what it takes 
to make the field go, then we ought to do it. There will be surprises and 
discoveries.15
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11.7  the sQUare Kilometre array (sKa)
Discussions about building a radio telescope with a very large collecting area 
go back at least to the early design of the Benelux Cross (Sect. 7.1) that had a 
collecting area of 600,000 square meters (Christiansen and Högbom 1961). 
Barney Oliver’s Cyclops concept of one thousand 100 meter dishes (Oliver and 
Billingham 1973) had a geometric collecting area of about 10 million square 
meters. Later, Govind Swarup (1981, 1991) proposed the Giant Equatorial 
Radio Telescope (GERT) with more than 100,000 square meters of collecting 
area, while in the USSR, Yuri Parijskij (1992) discussed radio telescopes “with 
a collecting area of about 1 million square meters.” A half a century ago, Grote 
Reber actually built an array in Tasmania with about a square kilometer of col-
lecting area (Reber 1968). Reber’s 2.1 MHz (144 m) array contained 192 half- 
wave east-west dipoles arranged in a 1075 meter (3526 foot) diameter circle. 
By properly phasing the elements, he could steer the 8 degree wide beam any-
where along the meridian. Reber’s array had, and still has, the largest collecting 
area of any radio telescope ever built.16
First Years The start of the modern discussions directed toward building a 
next generation radio telescope, with an effective collecting area of one million 
square meters or one square kilometer, is generally considered to be Peter 
Wilkinson’s (1991) paper on the “Hydrogen Array,” which he discussed at a 
symposium held in Socorro, New Mexico, on the occasion of the tenth anni-
versary of the VLA dedication. Even earlier, Dutch radio astronomers, led by 
Robert Braun, were discussing a Square Kilometre Array Interferometer 
(SKAI) (Noordam 2013). In 1993 and 1994, URSI and the IAU set up the 
Large Telescope Working Group and the Future Large Scale Facilities Working 
Group, respectively, to coordinate discussion and planning among groups con-
sidering large scale radio and optical telescope projects. It was soon realized 
that the description of a “Square Kilometre Array Interferometer” was redun-
dant and the term Square Kilometre Array or SKA was adopted. By agreement, 
the British spelling “kilometre” was adopted rather than the American spelling 
“kilometer.”
The early strawman SKA concept consisted of a condensed nearly filled array 
for high sensitivity to low surface brightness complemented by three sparsely 
filled arms to improve the angular resolution. There was no shortage of ideas 
about how to implement the SKA, but most turned out to be unrealistic. The 
most straightforward approach considered was to build an array of parabolic 
dishes, much like the VLA or the Westerbork Synthesis Radio Telescope 
(WSRT), but with a much larger number of elements, perhaps taking advan-
tage of Swarup’s GMRT SMART concept (Sect. 6.6) to reduce costs. The 
Dutch proposal for a so-called “aperture array” of a very large number of sim-
ple antenna elements appeared very attractive. By properly combining the sig-
nals from the different elements, it would be possible to create multiple beams 
in the sky, and, moreover, to generate nulls in the response in the direction of 
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interference. Australian radio astronomers suggested a field of Luneberg 
lenses17 or parabolic cylinders. Canada proposed to build an array of 200 meter 
Large Adaptive Reflectors, each illuminated by feeds and receivers suspended 
from a tethered floating aerostat. China proposed to build some ten Arecibo- 
like spherical reflectors.
The challenge with all of these approaches was to keep the cost down to a 
level that could be realistically funded. An early cost estimate suggested that 
the aperture array could be built for $100–$200 million, but further develop-
ment work indicated that the true cost of the SKA could be much higher. As 
the estimates of the construction costs continued to grow, there was agreement 
to revisit the specifications. Noting that the original requirement of a million 
square meters of collecting area was based on the 1991 assumption that the 
system temperature was likely to be about 50 K, the requirement was restated 
that the ratio of collecting area divided by system temperature (A/T) would be 
20,000 m2/deg. With anticipated system temperatures of 20 K, the required 
collecting area to meet the new specification was reduced to 400,000 square 
meters but the name “Square Kilometre Array” was nevertheless retained.
Although the SKA started out as the “Hydrogen Array,” it was clear that 
with the planned sensitivity of the SKA it would impact almost every area of 
astronomy. Successive publications advertised the growing science case (Taylor 
and Braun 1999; Carilli and Rawlings 2004), culminating in the massive, two- 
volume, 1996-page book edited by Tyler Bourke (2015). Complementing the 
science publications, Hall (2005) and Smolders and Haarlem (1999) updated 
the status of the engineering design.
In his foreword to Peter Hall’s book, Richard Schilizzi reported that
The current schedule for the SKA foresees a decision on the SKA site in 2006, a 
decision on the design concept in 2009, construction of the first phase (interna-
tional pathfinder) from 2010 to 2013, and construction of the full array from 
2014 to 2020. The cost is estimated to be about 1000 M€.
International Organization Starting in 1999, an informal group of scientists 
from the US, the Netherlands, Australia, and Canada began to meet to develop 
plans for building the SKA. As there was no existing international structure to 
accommodate a multi-national project, one had to be created. At the IAU 
General Assembly in 2000 in Manchester, representatives from nine countries 
interested in the SKA signed a Memorandum of Understanding establishing 
the International SKA Steering Committee (ISSC) to provide broad oversight 
to the project. Ron Ekers (Fig. 11.4) from Australia, who had been the key 
person in getting the SKA program off the ground and in generating interest 
from the various national funding agencies, was elected as the first Chair of the 
ISSC. Four years later the ISSC created the International SKA Project Office 
(ISPO), with Richard Schilizzi (Netherlands) as ISPO Director, and a year later 
Peter Hall (Australia) became the Project Engineer. In 2008, a new 
Memorandum of Agreement created the SKA Science and Engineering 
 K. I. KELLERMANN ET AL.
599
Committee (SSEC) and SKA Project Development Office (SPDO) replacing 
the ISSC and ISPO respectively, with Schilizzi continuing as SPDO Director.
The ISSC/SSEC met twice a year to review progress on the planning, cost-
ing, and siting of the SKA. Initially the Committee consisted of 18 members 
but was later expanded to 24 to accommodate the growing global interest in 
the SKA. One-third of the membership represented Europe, one-third the US, 
and one-third the rest of the world, reflecting the anticipated cost sharing. The 
ISSC/SSEC received input from international Science, Engineering, and Site 
Selection Advisory Committees, while the ISPO/SPDO was supported by a 
number of Working Groups and Task Forces within the ISPO.
The US SKA Consortium Recognizing the growing interest in the SKA, both 
internationally and within the United States, NRAO organized a meeting in 
Green Bank in 1998 to discuss how the US might participate in planning for 
the SKA. A few months later, a small group met at MIT and agreed to form the 
US SKA Consortium (USSKAC) to coordinate US participation in the 
SKA. Jackie Hewitt from MIT was elected as the Consortium Chair and Jill 
Tarter from the SETI Institute as the Vice Chair. Hewitt soon stepped down as 
Chair due to her other responsibilities, and was replaced by Tarter, then Yervant 
Terzian followed by James (Jim) Cordes, both from Cornell, and finally Patricia 
(Trish) Henning from the University of New Mexico.
Fig. 11.4 Ron Ekers 
was as strong advocate for 
building the SKA as an 
international collaborative 
activity. He became the 
first Chair of the 
International SKA 
Steering Committee 
(ISSC). Credit: CSIRO 
Radiophysics photo 
archives
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The initial USSKAC membership consisted of Caltech, Cornell University, 
MIT/Haystack, NRL, the University of California, Berkeley, Ohio State 
University, and the SETI Institute. NRAO did not join originally due to some 
uncertainty about whether joining such an organization was allowed under the 
NRAO-NSF Cooperative agreement. Instead, Rick Fisher and one of the 
authors (Kellermann) were appointed as At-Large members of the USSKAC. In 
October 1999 AUI became a formal member of the USSKAC, and Fisher and 
Kellermann then continued as the AUI/NRAO representatives. Nevertheless, 
due to NSF concerns about NRAO’s responsibilities to ALMA and the EVLA 
program, as well as community desire to keep the US SKA development within 
the university community, NRAO did not play a leadership role in the USSKAC 
activities, reflecting the continuing tensions between NRAO and the univer-
sity groups.
The US SKA Technology Development Program (TDP), funded by the 
NSF and totaling about $13.5 million, supported the USSKAC between 2000 
and 2011. The TDP was administered by Cornell with Jim Cordes as the 
PI. The USSKAC developed an antenna concept, investigated possible feeds, 
receivers, and backends, and studied the array configuration and RFI mitiga-
tion. In addition to the funded programs at Caltech, Cornell/NAIC, MIT/
Haystack, the SETI institute, and the Universities of California and Illinois, 
in-kind support of technology development was provided by JPL, NRL, 
NRAO, and the University of New Mexico. For about a decade, the USSKAC 
met twice a year to review the progress with the TDP and to adopt a US posi-
tion for the various issues being considered by the ISSC/SSEC. In addition to 
supporting technical developments within the US, the TDP also provided the 
funds to hold the semi-annual USSKAC meetings as well as to send six (then 
eight) representatives to the ISSC/SSEC meetings.
As one of its goals, the USSKAC developed a “strawman design” to build 
the SKA as an array of 4400 twelve meter diameter dishes known as a Large-N 
Small-D array. The antenna elements were configured to include 2,320 anten-
nas within a 35 km diameter, and 160 stations, each containing nine antennas 
spread across North America, with baselines up to 3,500 km. Unlike the straw-
man proposals developed in other countries, the US concept included the full 
costs of instrumentation, site development, program management, software, 
etc., and was optimistically estimated to cost $1.41 billion. The US also 
included an operations plan based on VLA operations that included an opera-
tions budget of $61.5 million per year.18
Management and Funding From the beginning the SKA was planned as an 
international project, with the US, Europe, and the “rest-of-the-world” each 
contributing one-third of the costs. Owing to the anticipated NSF commit-
ments to ALMA, Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST), and Daniel 
K.  Inoue Solar Telescope (DKIST), as well as to a large (24–30 m) optical 
telescope, it was understood by all that the NSF would not be able to contrib-
ute to SKA construction on the same time scale anticipated by other countries, 
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but that a phased contribution seemed feasible, possibly with a US emphasis on 
the higher frequencies in a possible second phase of construction. Both NASA 
and the Department of Energy were approached, but showed little or no inter-
est. The US Department of State expressed interest, but offered no money.
Financial support for SKA technical development came partly from the US 
TDP, as well as from other national sources, but the driving support came from 
the European Commission funding for the Square Kilometre Array Design 
Studies (SKADS, 2004 to 2009) led by Arnold Van Ardenne from the 
Netherlands and the Preparatory Phase for the SKA (PrepSKA, 2008 to 2012) 
program led by Phillip Diamond from the UK. PrepSKA was organized into 
seven Work Packages covering Management, SKA Design, Site Studies, 
Governance, Procurement, Funding, and Implementation. As the planning 
proceeded, there was a wide range of opinion on the SKA technology, the sit-
ing, and the organizational structure, leading to escalation in both the scope 
and cost of SKA.
Concerned that, due to other priorities, the national funding agencies could 
not meet the growing cost of the SKA on the ambitious time scale planned by 
the ISPO, the ISSC decided to split SKA construction into three phases. Phase 
1, or SKA-1, would comprise only five to ten percent of the full SKA, and prob-
ably cost 15 to 20 percent of the full SKA, which was to be completed in Phase 
2. It was clear that no single technology could cover the entire frequency range, 
so in 2005, the SKA was divided into SKA-Low, below a few hundred MHz, 
and SKA-Mid, up to a few GHz, using an aperture array and dish array respec-
tively. A vaguely defined Phase 3 covering the higher frequencies, up to few 
tens of GHz, primarily financed by the US, was part of the longer term planning.
Reflecting the broad international interests and with the encouragement of 
ISSC members, in 2005 representatives of the various national funding agen-
cies began to hold their own meetings, and in 2006 they formed the Informal 
Funding Agencies Group (IFAG). From the NSF, Wayne van Citters, Vernon 
Pankonin, and Jim Ulvestad participated at various times in IFAG meetings. 
Pankonin, in particular, was an active participant in many of the committees 
and working groups. In 2009, the funding agencies further formalized their 
role and created the Agencies SKA Group (ASG).
The ISPO Director reported to the ISSC/SSEC Chair, the Chair of the 
IFAG/FAWG, and the Chair of PrepSKA Board, each with their own goals 
and ambitions. This created an organizational challenge, not only for the ISPO 
Director, but for the broader project management issues as well. Management 
by committee, in this case multiple committees, was reminiscent of the com-
mittee management of the Green Bank 140 foot Telescope (Sect. 4.4), with 
the added challenge of international membership, each with their own agenda.
Open Skies The concept of Open Skies was widely accepted by the interna-
tional radio astronomy community. Most the world’s major radio telescopes, 
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including Westerbork and the Australia Telescope Compact Array, as well as the 
European VLBI Network and all of the NSF-funded radio observatories in the 
US, welcomed proposals from all scientists independent of their national affili-
ation. The ISSC naturally assumed that an Open Skies policy would carry over 
to the SKA, so was surprised that the national funding agencies expressed 
strong reservations. In 2007, the SSEC presented a resolution to the FAWG 
for an Open Skies concept for the SKA which read,
Recognizing that open access to all qualified scientists, independent of institu-
tional, national, or regional affiliation will give the best scientific returns, the 
ISSC believes that the allocation of SKA observing time or access to data obtained 
with the SKA should be based solely on merit, without regard to quotas, finan-
cial, or in-kind contributions to the construction or operation of the SKA.19
However, the IFAG responded that they could not sell this to their govern-
ments, who would ask what they were getting in return for spending tax money 
if their scientists did not have priority access to the SKA. While this same ques-
tion is often asked of NRAO, as a matter of national policy, the Open Skies 
concept has remained in effect in the US for essentially all federally funded 
science projects.
Prototypes, Precursors, and Pathfinders Trying to demonstrate the merits of 
their proposed technology, a number of countries set out to build what were 
variously called SKA prototypes, precursors, or pathfinders. Others, seeing an 
opportunity to exploit the growing visibility of SKA, declared already planned 
or ongoing new facilities as SKA pathfinders.
The US Large-N Small-D concept grew out of the series of SETI Workshops 
held between 1997 and 1999 (Ekers et al. 2002) which led to the plan for the 
Allen Telescope Array (ATA) as an SKA Pathfinder for SETI as well as for radio 
astronomy. However, as a result of over-optimistic cost estimates, only 42 of 
the originally planned 350 six meter hydroformed dishes were built at the 
University of California’s Hat Creek Observatory. China was able to build the 
Five-hundred-meter Aperture Spherical Telescope (FAST), which has the larg-
est collecting area of any filled aperture radio telescope in the world20 LOFAR21 
in the Netherlands and the MWA22 in Western Australia, PAPER/HERA,23 
and the LWA24 have all demonstrated the aperture-array technology at meter 
wavelengths. The Australia SKA Pathfinder (ASKAP)25 is a novel array of 36 
parabolic dishes, each containing a focal plane array. Perhaps the most impres-
sive SKA Pathfinder is the South African MeerKat array of 64 antennas each 
13.5 m in diameter which rivals the VLA in sensitivity.
Siting the SKA The competition for siting the SKA was intense and for nearly 
eight years drove much of the SKA discussion and planning. Australia, South 
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Africa, and Argentina each proposed sites with very low population densities 
and free of locally generated RFI. China proposed a site in the karst region in 
southern China in order to accommodate their proposed array of large spheri-
cal reflectors. The proposed US SKA Consortium Large-N Small-D concept 
was located in the US desert southwest and centered near the VLA, but with 
elements located throughout North America.
In 2004, the ISSC called for proposals to host the SKA. Due to a lack of 
resources, and perhaps lack of interest, the USSKAC, in spite of all its earlier 
work, did not respond with a formal proposal.26 After careful review, the ISSC 
reduced the potential sites to Western Australia and the Karoo area of South 
Africa. The Chinese plan contained too few elements for satisfactory imaging 
and had high cloud cover, while the proposed Argentina site between two 
mountain ranges was too small to accommodate the planned configuration, 
and was located too close to the geomagnetic equator with corresponding 
ionospheric instabilities.
In 2011, both Australia and South Africa submitted extensively documented 
proposals to host the SKA and vigorously promoted the merits of their sites in 
the political as well as the scientific arena. Vernon Pankonin (NSF) chaired the 
SKA Siting Group (SSG) charged with overseeing the confrontational process. 
Following RFI tests at the two sites, extensive review by the SPDO, the SSEC, 
as well as by an external international SKA Site Advisory Committee (SSAC) 
chaired by James Moran from Harvard, the SKA was faced with a problem. 
Both Australian and South African radio astronomers had already invested 
huge resources in developing their sites, in getting their governments on board, 
and in preparing their proposals. Concerned that if the SKA were built in only 
one of these countries, the other country might drop out of the program, the 
new SKA Organization Board, after considering input from yet another advi-
sory committee, the SKA Site Options Working Group (SSOWG), recom-
mended a two-site solution. SKA-1 would include a mid-frequency array of 
dishes in South Africa, while Australia would host the low frequency aperture 
array as well as a survey telescope patterned after ASKAP.
Choosing the location of the SPDO and later the SKA Organization 
Headquarters was equally contentious. Cornell, Dwingeloo, and Manchester 
each put in a bid to host the SPDO. NRAO had submitted a Letter of Intent 
but withdrew, recognizing that the PrepSKA funding was not going to be 
spent in the US. In 2007, Manchester narrowly beat out Dwingeloo to host 
the SPDO, largely due to concerns that Dwingeloo was too far from an inter-
national airport. At this time, the SPDO optimistically anticipated that Phase I 
construction would begin by 2012. Manchester again narrowly defeated 
Dwingeloo and Bonn in 2011 to host the SKA Project Office during the pre- 
construction era, and UK funding enabled the construction of an elaborate 
£3.34 million headquarters building at Jodrell Bank. In a later competition to 
host the SKA permanent headquarters, the selection advisory panel27 gave a 
close nod to Padua, Italy over Manchester, but the UK flexed its political 
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 muscle, and following a not too subtle threat to withdraw from the project, the 
SKA Global Headquarters ended up at Jodrell Bank (Nature editorial 2015).
The SKA Sans the US The first USSKAC TDP was funded following a favor-
able endorsement from the 2000 Decade Review, Astronomy and Astrophysics 
in the New Millennium (McKee and Taylor 2001), which suggested $22 mil-
lion for SKA technology development among the top half of its recommenda-
tions for Moderate Initiatives, and specifically called attention to the significant 
nature of the international SKA collaboration. The 2005 report of the NSF 
Radio, Millimeter and Submillimeter Planning Group, chaired by Martha 
Haynes from Cornell, stated that “it is imperative for the future of meter to 
centimeter wave astronomy that the U.S. play a leadership role in the design 
and development of the SKA. To accomplish this, NSF must provide adequate 
support for the U.S. SKA technology development and demonstrator instru-
ment programs”.28 In 2008, the AUI committee on Future Prospects for US 
Radio, Millimeter, and Submillimeter Astronomy, chaired by Richard McCray 
from the University of Colorado, gave further endorsement to “Develop the 
technologies for the era of Square Kilometer Array science, Develop, test, pro-
totype, and implement the technologies required to achieve SKA-class science, 
[and] Review and assess the progress of the international SKA effort on a con-
tinuing basis.”29
Encouraged by these earlier endorsements and the growing worldwide 
attention to the SKA, the USSKAC and the international SKA partners were 
optimistic that the SKA would get a green light from the 2010 Decade Review, 
New Worlds New Horizons (Blandford 2010). However, NRAO, the USSKAC, 
and the SPDO apparently sent mixed messages to the Blandford Committee. 
Knowing that the NSF was already committed to other large construction 
projects, NRAO led a proposal for a $40 million plan for technology develop-
ment only for a North America Array (NAmA) that could lead up to construc-
tion of the high frequency component of the SKA with construction not 
starting until sometime after 2020. The proposed NAmA30 had ten times the 
collecting area of the VLA with baselines comparable to those of the VLBA 
spread throughout the US. Meanwhile the SPDO and the SSEC were discuss-
ing a much earlier start of SKA construction and were not considering any sites 
in the US.
The National Academy’s report (Blandford 2010) gave a strong endorse-
ment to the scientific opportunities presented by the SKA as well as to the 
international nature of the project. But the Blandford Committee was con-
cerned about the short time scale being discussed by the SKA project, and by 
the 1.7 billion Euro construction cost which they calculated to be underesti-
mated by a factor of five or six.31 As a result, the Committee’s report did not 
include any recommendation for funding for either the SKA or the NAmA, 
which effectively eliminated any possibility of significant US participation in 
the SKA. The Committee did recognize that further development work was 
needed, and suggested that the SKA be revisited at a mid-term review. 
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Jacqueline Hewitt from MIT chaired a mid-term review in 2015, but the 
Committee only discussed the status of approved projects, and did not con-
sider the SKA or any other new project.32 
Earlier, the SKA had been better received by the European funding agen-
cies, which placed the SKA and the planned Extremely Large ESO telescope on 
an equal basis, and, of course, both Australia and South Africa were committed 
to hosting their share of the SKA. While concerned about the absence of US 
expertise and funding, the international partners also recognized an opportu-
nity to seize leadership in radio astronomy away from the US. In 2011, the 
funding agency representatives from Australia, Canada, Italy, New Zealand, the 
Netherlands, South Africa, and the UK33 formed a new not-for-profit legal 
entity in the UK to be known as the “SKA Organization” with responsibility to 
oversee the “Pre-Construction” era SKA activities. The SSEC and the SPDO 
were dissolved effective 31 December 2011. The new SKAO Board that 
replaced the ASG agreed that SKA-1 should have a cost cap of 650 million 
Euros, a value not that different from what had been presented a few years 
earlier to the Blandford Committee for the full SKA project.
Each SKA Organization member country was expected to contribute 50,000 
Euros to the activities of the SKAO, as well as to pledge in-kind technical 
development within their country using their own national resources. Although 
the USSKAC had no prospect of contributing money or significant in-kind 
resources, AUI President Ethan Schreier sent out some feelers to allow AUI to 
contribute to the SKAO and, on behalf of the USSKAC, to propose to the NSF 
for funding for the required technical development contribution. However, the 
AUI initiative was coolly received by both the SSEC and by the 
USSKAC. Reflecting the earlier agencies group concerns about Open Skies, 
the Founding Board adopted a no-pay no-play policy. Only scientists living and 
working in one of the SKA member countries would have access to the future 
SKA or to data from the SKA. US scientists were excluded from using the SKA, 
although it was noted that scientists from the SKAO Member countries tradi-
tionally had, and continued to have, free access to the NRAO VLA, VLBA, 
and the GBT.
John Womersley from the UK became the Chair of the new SKA Organization 
Founding Board, and in 2013, Phil Diamond became the new Director- 
General of the SKA Organization. In 2015, faced with continued project esca-
lation and increasing cost, the SKAO was forced to a major re-baselining in 
order to keep to the original 650 million Euros (later inflated to 690 million) 
cost limit. Both SKA-1 Mid in South Africa and SKA-1 Low in Australia were 
descoped. Instead of starting fresh in South Africa, the SKAO decided instead 
to add 133 new SKA 15 m dishes to the 64 MeerKat 13.5 m dishes to form a 
197 element array of dishes of mixed design. The planned survey telescope in 
Australia using phased array feeds based on the ASKAP Pathfinder was deferred, 
leaving Australia with only a descoped low frequency aperture array.
In March 2019, Ministers from Australia, China, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, South Africa, and the UK met in Rome to sign a treaty which 
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 established the Square Kilometre Array Observatory as an intergovernmental 
organization to build and operate the SKA. Guests from seven other countries, 
including NRAO Director Tony Beasley, were also present at the signing, but 
there was no official representation from the US. The agreement will enter into 
force after the governments of five signatories, including the hosts, Australia, 
South Africa, and the UK, have ratified the treaty.34
11.8  the Next geNeratioN vla (Ngvla)
Following the disappointing rejection of Phase II of the EVLA proposal (Sect. 
7.8) and the lack of endorsement of either the NAA or SKA by the Blandford 
Committee, the future of US centimeter radio astronomy appeared uncertain. 
The JVLA was, by any measure, the most powerful radio telescope in the 
world, but faced with the unclear future of the GBT and VLBA, as well as the 
growing prominence of the SKA, Tony Beasley, the new NRAO Director, was 
concerned about where US radio astronomy would be in 20 or 30 years. In 
order to delineate the science goals and help define US radio astronomy for the 
2030s and beyond, Beasley organized a series of three national meetings 
between 2016 and 2018 on U.S.  Radio/Millimeter/Submillimeter Science 
Futures in the 2020s, which was supported in part by the Kavli Foundation. The 
first Kavli meeting concentrated on defining the key science questions. Kavli II 
reviewed the various large and intermediate scale projects proposed to address 
the science questions posed in the first meeting, and Kavli III concentrated on 
defining the next generation VLA (ngVLA) which had emerged from the two 
earlier meetings.35
Starting in 2015, with funding from the NSF, NRAO, working with the US 
radio astronomy community, developed the science case (Murphy 2018), the 
performance specifications, and a reference design for the ngVLA, which will 
operate from 1.2 to 116 GHz (2.6 mm to 25 cm). With a total of 244 eighteen 
meter offset parabolic antenna elements spread throughout the US and 19 six 
meter dishes in a compact configuration, the ngVLA (Fig. 11.5) will have up 
to ten times better sensitivity than the JVLA and several times better sensitivity 
than SKA-1 Mid. In order to cover a wide range of surface brightness sensitiv-
ity and angular resolution, the antenna elements will be configured in four tiers 
and will have an angular resolution as good as 0.1 milliarcsec at the shortest 
wavelength.36 When completed, the ngVLA will replace the current NRAO 
JVLA and VLBA.
Assuming both the ngVLA and SKA-1 are constructed, they will provide 
complementary science opportunities with locations in each hemisphere. 
SKA-1 Low in Australia will cover the frequency range from 50 to 350 MHz. 
SKA-1 Mid in South Africa will cover 0.35 to 15 GHz. The ngVLA will work 
from 1.2 GHz to 116 GHz with emphasis on the higher frequencies, and will 
fill in the gap between SKA-1 Mid and ALMA. In order to fully exploit these 
new opportunities, representatives of the SKA and ngVLA met in 2019  in 
Reykjavik, Iceland, to begin a discussion of a global alliance to allow the 
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exchange of observing time between the ngVLA and SKA-1, effectively con-
tinuing the Open Skies approach.
11.9  DivestmeNt
As discussed in Sect. 8.10, following the NSF Senior and Portfolio Reviews, for 
two years the VLBA was operated separately from NRAO as the Long Baseline 
Observatory (LBO), but on 1 October 2018, the LBO was reintegrated into 
NRAO. As a result of the same NSF exercise, starting 1 October 2016, the 
Green Bank facilities became part of the new Green Bank Observatory (GBO), 
but was not later reintegrated into NRAO. Karen O’Neill, longtime NRAO 
Assistant Director for Green Bank Operations, became the Director of the 
GBO reporting to AUI Vice President Tony Beasley.
To help plan for any future GBO actions, the NSF initiated an Environmental 
Impact Study for five possible alternatives ranging from the preferred alterna-
tive of “Collaboration with Interested Parties for Continued Science and 
Education-focused Operations with Reduced NSF Funding” to the drastic 
“Demolition and Site Restoration.”37 Like the LBO, with the help of AUI the 
GBO was able to raise outside funds to help support its operations. GBO sup-
porters included the Breakthrough Listen project (Sect. 5.7) and a contract with 
West Virginia University to support their GBT pulsar program, as well as vari-
ous programs related to Space Situation Awareness. Although the non-NSF 
support for the GBO did not reach the NSF target goals, on 26 July 2019 the 
Fig. 11.5 Artist’s conception of the ngVLA. Credit: NRAO/AUI/NSF
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NSF issued a Record of Decision that the GBO would continue science and 
education-focused operations but with reduced NSF funding.38
The NSF divestment of the GBO came at a price for radio astronomy. As a 
result of the decreased NSF funding, not only will astronomical observing with 
the GBT be reduced, but there will be less support for innovative new astro-
nomical instrumentation such as PAFs and wideband spectrometers. Since the 
external funders are paying for GBT observing time, this means less time for 
Open Skies observing and, with time, it may get worse. The GBT is not only 
the largest fully steerable radio telescope in the world, it is the largest fully 
steerable microwave and millimeter wave antenna in the world, with a wide 
range of potential commercial, space, and defense related applications unre-
lated to radio astronomy. The pressure to use the GBT for other purposes, 
especially if defense related, combined with the NSF interest in constraining its 
related operating budget for astronomy, could lead to further loss of the GBT 
for astronomy.
NRAO started in Green Bank and for many years NRAO was synonymous 
with Green Bank. Hopefully, the visions of people like Lloyd Berkner, Richard 
Emberson, Dave Heeschen, and Alan Waterman will prevail, and Green Bank 
will to continue to provide world-leading radio astronomy facilities.
11.10  lessoNs learNeD
The near fatal consequences of the 140 Foot experience (Sect. 4.4) served as a 
good lesson for future NRAO projects. The VLA and VLBA were built only 
after years of design, development, and prototyping combined with broad 
community involvement. They were finished on budget and on schedule, more 
than met their design specifications, and with later enhancements have contin-
ued to provide unique capabilities for research. The 36 Foot millimeter tele-
scope was finished within the budget allocation, but the completion was 
significantly delayed due to manufacturing challenges. Like the 140 Foot, the 
36 Foot did not perform to the design specifications, but due to its excellent 
instrumentation provided by the Charlottesville CDL, along with competitive 
scheduling, it opened up a whole new field of millimeter-wave radio astron-
omy. By the time the GBT was built, NRAO apparently had forgotten the les-
sons of the 140 Foot Telescope, and the GBT construction was fraught with 
many of the same problems reflecting the same ambitious goals, over optimism 
about the complexity, cost, schedules, and perceived urgency that resulted in 
prematurely starting construction before the design was complete.
The GBT and VLA experiences were different. NRAO management ran a 
tight ship with the declared determination to finish the VLA on time and on 
budget. That they not only succeeded, but ended up with an instrument better 
in almost every way than specified in the proposal, is largely credited to Dave 
Heeschen’s determination, but the tight control by Hein Hvatum, and some 
innovative contracting by Jack Lancaster were also crucial to the success of the 
VLA. The VLA also differed from the 36 Foot, 140 Foot and GBT projects, in 
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that, aside from the commercial procurement of the relatively straight forward 
antenna elements, the VLA project was largely run “in-house,” with NRAO as 
the prime contractor. If a small sub-contractor did not perform, they could be 
replaced. The VLBA, except for the record-playback system and the correlator, 
was a straightforward extension of existing instrumentation and practices. 
Many of same people involved in the VLA construction played the same role 
with the VLBA, which also was completed essentially on budget.
ALMA was a much more complex project. Interestingly, there was never any 
proposal for ALMA, nor was it ever considered by a decade review committee. 
Starting out in the ashes of the proposed 25 meter millimeter-wave telescope, 
ALMA began as the NRAO Millimeter-Array (MMA). As described in Sect. 
10.7, following a series of trilateral negotiations with Japan and Europe, the 
MMA morphed into the more ambitious Atacama Large Millimeter/
Submillimeter Array (ALMA). While ALMA was clearly a remarkable scientific 
success, the complexities of an international project, possibly coupled with 
unrealistic cost estimates, resulted in the 2004 so-called “re-baselining,” with 
a reduction in the number of antenna elements, decreased initial instrumenta-
tion, delayed completion, and a large increase in the construction costs. 
Although the nature of the international ALMA agreement provides some 
long-term funding security, it is unlikely that the NRAO would again enter 
into an international project as an equal partner, but would likely be more 
favorably inclined toward participation either as the leading partner or as a 
minor partner.
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NRAO with NSF funding ceased in July 2000. However, with the support from 
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11 NRAO AND RADIO ASTRONOMY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
610
9. The Committee on Space Research was established by the International Council 
of Scientific Unions (ICSU) in 1958 to promote international scientific research 
is space. During the Cold War period, COSPAR served as an important non- 
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former-virginia-tech-professor-found-guilty-grant-fraud-false-statements-
obstruction
12. Described in the NSF Proposal & Award Policies and Procedures Guide 
https://www.nsf.gov/publications/pub_summ.jsp?ods_key=nsf18001 as “full 
participation of women, persons with disabilities, and underrepresented minori-
ties in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM); improved 
STEM education and educator development at any level; increased public scien-
tific literacy and public engagement with science and technology; improved 
well- being of individuals in society; development of a diverse, globally competi-
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others; improved national security; increased economic competitiveness of the 
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Antenna Planning, Box 2.
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to Jansky.
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17. A Luneburg lens is made from a spherical dielectric with an index of refraction 
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emission at point that can then be detected with a horn and conventional radi-
ometer. The idea for the SKA was to have a large number of feed-receiver 
arrangements all looking in different directions. However, the cost of building 
sufficiently large Luneburg lenses and the losses in the dielectric were both too 
great to seriously consider this technology for the SKA.
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19. SKA Report 84, Report of the SKA Operations Working Group, https://www.
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radio telescope, FAST has about twice the effective collecting area as Arecibo. 
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300  m diameter parabolic surface pointing as much as 40 degrees from the 
zenith. https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1105/1105.3794.pdf
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more sensitive to cost estimates than was the case for previous Decade Reviews, 
and commissioned the Aerospace Corporation to provide independent cost esti-
mates for projects being considered by the Committee. The Aerospace 
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California from 2–4 August 2017, http://www.cvent.com/
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AbbreviAtions And Acronyms Used in the text
1hT One hectare Radio Telescope
AAC Astronomy Advisory Committee [NSF]
AAEO Astronomy, Atmospheric, Earth and Ocean Sciences [NSF 
Division]
AAS American Astronomical Society
ACAST Advisory Committee for the NSF Division of Astronomical 
Sciences
ACC ALMA Coordinating Committee
AEC ALMA Executive Committee
AEG Antenna Evaluation Group [ALMA]
AFOSR Air Force Office of Scientific Research [US]
AGN Active galactic nuclei
AHB Alan H. Bridle
AIO Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory
AIL Airborne Instruments Laboratory
AIPS Astronomical Image Processing System
ALMA Atacama Large Millimeter Array, Atacama Large 
Millimeter/submillimeter Array
alt-az Alt-azimuth
ANAS Archives of the National Academy of Sciences
AOC Array Operations Center [NRAO, see also DSOC]
AORG Army Operational Research Group [UK]
APEX Atacama Pathfinder Experimental Telescope
ARA Associates for Research in Astronomy
ARC ALMA Regional Center
 Appendix A
616 APPENDIX A
ARISE Advanced Radio Interferometry between Space and Earth
ARO Algonquin Radio Observatory
ARPA Advanced Research Project Agency, later DARPA [US]
ASC Astro Space Center [Russia]
ASG Agencies SKA Group
ASIAA Academica Sinica Institute for Astronomy and Astrophysics
ASICs Application Specific Integrated Circuits
ASKAP Australia SKA Prototype
AST NSF Astronomy Division
ASTE Atacama Submillimeter Telescope Experiment
ATA Allen Telescope Array
ATM Alan T. Moffet
AUI Associated Universities, Inc.





BOB Bureau of the Budget [US]
BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory
BOB Bureau of the Budget
BSS Beyond Southern Skies
CA California
CAMROC Cambridge Radio Observatory Committee
CARMA Combined Array for Research in Millimeter-Wave 
Astronomy
CASA Common Astronomical Software Application
CCIR International Radio Consultative Committee
CDL Central Development Laboratory [NRAO]
CfA Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics
CFRP Carbon fiber reinforced plastic
CIW Carnegie Institution of Washington
CLBA Canadian Long Baseline Array
CMW Campbell M. Wade
CNRS Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
COMSAT Communications Satellite Corp
CONACyT Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Technologia
CORF Committee on Radio Frequencies
COSPAR Committee on Space Research
COSPUP Committee on Science and Public Policy [NAS]
CRPL Central Radio Propagation Laboratory [NBS]
CRS Congressional Research Service
CRSI-TP COMSAT-RSI Technical Products
CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research [Australia]
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CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organization [Australia]
CSO Caltech Submillimeter Observatory
CTS Communications Technology Satellite [Canada]
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [US]
DEW Distant Early Warning
DKIST Daniel K. Inoue Solar Telescope
DoD Department of Defense [US]
DSH David S. Heeschen
DSOC Domenici Science Operations Center [see also AOC]
DTM Department of Terrestrial Magnetism of the Carnegie 
Institution of Washington
ELT Extremely Large Telescope
ENB Ellen N. Bouton
EoR Epic of Reionization
ESA European Space Agency
ESO European Southern Observatory
ESSCO Electronic Space Systems Corporation
EVLA Expanded Very Large Array
FAST Five hundred meter Aperture Spherical Telescope
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FCRAO Five College Radio Astronomy Observatory
FET Field Effect Transistor
FIRST Fast Imaging Survey of the Twenty Centimeter Sky
GaAsFET Gallium Arsenide Field Effect Transistor
GAS George A. Seielstad
GBI Green Bank Interferometer
GBO Green Bank Observatory
GBT Green Bank Telescope
GERT Giant Equatorial Radio Telescope [India]
GJS Gordon J. Stanley
GMRT Giant Metrewave Radio Telescope [India]
GMT Giant Magellan Telescope
GR Grote Reber
GRT Giant Radio Telescope [Australia]
GSMT Giant Segmented Mirror Telescope
GVWG Global VLBI Working Group
HALCA Highly Advanced Laboratory for Communications and 
Astronomy
HEAO High Energy Astronomy Observatory
HEMT High Electron Mobility Transistor
HERA Hydrogen Epoch of Reionization
HHT Heinrich Hertz Telescope
HPBW Half power beam width
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HRMS High Resolution Microwave Survey [previously called 
MOP]
HSA High Sensitivity Array
IC Integrated circuit
ICSU International Council of Scientific Unions
IFAG Informal Funding Agencies Group [SKA]
IKI Institut Kosmicheskih Issledovanyi (Space Research 
Institute) [Russia]
INAOE Instituto Nacional de Astrofísica, Óptica y Electrónica 
[Mexico]
IRAC Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee
IRAM Institut de Radioastronomie Millimétrique
ISAS Institute of Space and Astronautical Science [Japan]
ISM Interstellar medium
ISPO International SKA Project Office
ISSC International SKA Steering Committee
ITU International Telecommunications Union
IUCAF Inter-Union Committee on the Allocation of Frequencies
IVC International Video Corporation
IVS International VLBI Satellite
JAO Joint ALMA Office
JCMT James Clerk Maxwell Telescope
JVLA Jansky Very Large Array
JIVE Joint Institute for VLBI in Europe
JLG Jesse L. Greenstein




L-SAT [European] Large Satellite
LABOCA Large Apex Bolometer Camera
LAD Lee A. DuBridge
LADWP Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
LIGO Laser Interferometer Gravity-Wave Observatory
LMT Large Millimeter Telescope
LNSD Large Number Small Diameter
LOC Library of Congress
LOFAR LOw Frequency ARRay
LORAN Long Range Navigation
LSA Large Southern Array
LSMA Large Millimeter and Submillimeter Array [Japan]
LSST Large Synoptic Survey Telescope
LWA Long Wavelength Array
MA Massachusetts
MAG Mark A. Gordon
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MDC MMA Development Consortium
MERLIN Multi-element Radio Linked Interferometric Network
MIRIAD Multichannel Image Resolution, Image Analysis, and 
Display
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MK Mark [MK I, MK II, MK III]
MMA Millimeter Array
MMAOC MMA Oversight Committee [NSF]
MoA Memorandum of Agreement
MOP Microwave Observing Project (later called HRMS)
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MPG Max Planck Gesellschaft
MPIfR Max-Planck-Institut für Radioastronomie
MPE Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Research [NSF 
Directorate]
MPS Mathematical and Physical Sciences [NSF Directorate]
MRE Major Research Equipment [NSF]
MREFC Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction 
[NSF]
MSR Morton S. Roberts
MUSA Multiple Unit Steerable Array
MWA Murchison Widefield Array
MWO Millimeter Wave Observatory [Univ. Texas]
MWPO Mount Wilson and Palomar Observatories
NAmA North American Array
NAASC North American ALMA Science Center
NAIC National Astronomy and Ionospheric Center
NAPRA North American Program in Radio Astronomy
NAS National Academy of Sciences [US]
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASEM National Academies of Science, Engineering, and 
Medicine [US]
NBS National Bureau of Standards [US]
NEON National Ecological Observatory Network
NEROC North East Radio Observatory Corporation
NFRA Netherlands Foundation for Research in Astronomy
NGST Next Generation Solar Telescope
ngVLA next generation Very Large Array
NIOC Navy Information Operations Command [US]
NLSRT New Large Steerable Radio Telescope
NM New Mexico
NOAO National Optical Astronomy Observatory
NOEMA NOrthern Extended Millimeter Array [IRAM]
NOO National Optical Observatory
NRAO National Radio Astronomy Observatory
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NRC National Research Council [US]
NRL Naval Research Laboratory
NRQZ National Radio Quiet Zone
NSB National Science Board [US]
NSF National Science Foundation
NTIA National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration
NTT New Technology Telescope
NUG Network Users Group
NV Nevada
NVSS NRAO VLA Sky Survey
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development
OIR Optical and Infrared
OMB Office of Management and Budget [US]
ONR Office of Naval Research [US]
ORINS Oak Ridge Institute for Nuclear Studies
OSF Operations Support Facility [ALMA]
OSO Onsala Space Observatory
OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy [US]
OVA Owens Valley Array
OVI Owens Valley Interferometer
OVLBI Orbiting Very Long Baseline Interferometry
OVRO Owens Valley Radio Observatory
PAF Phased Array Feed
PAPER Precision Array to Probe the Epoch of Reionization
PPARC Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council [UK]
PrepSKA Preparatory Phase for the SKA
PVB Paul A. Vanden Bout
PSAC President’s Science Advisory Committee
QUASAT Quasar Satellite
RFB Robert F. Bacher
RFI Radio frequency interference
RFP Request for Proposals
RH Robyn Harrison
RISC RadioAstron International Science Council
RLB Robert L. Brown
RRL Radio recombination lines
RSI Radiation Systems, Inc.
SAGMA Scientific Advisory Group for Millimetre Astronomy
SAMURAI Science of AGNs and Masers with Unprecedented 
Resolution in Astronomical Imaging
SAO Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory
SCUBA Submillimetre Common-Use Bolometer Array
SDRA Serendipitous Discoveries in Radio Astronomy
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SDSS Sloan Digital Sky Survey
SEB Sierra E. Brandt
SEST Swedish ESO Submillimetre Telescope
SERENDIP Search for Extraterrestrial Radio Emissions from Nearby 
Developed Intelligent Populations
SETI Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence
SEU Single event upsets
SIRTF Space Infrared Telescope Facility
SIS Superconductor-Insulator-Superconductor
SKA Square Kilometre Array
SKADS SKA Design Studies
SKAI SKA Interferometer
SKAO SKA Organization
SMA Sub-Millimeter Array [Harvard-Smithsonian]
SMART Stretched Mesh Attached to Rope Trusses
SMT Submillimeter Telescope [MPIfR-UoA]
SPDO SKA Project Development Office
SRI Stanford Research Institute
SSAC SKA Site Advisory Committee
SSB Space Studies Board (of the NAS)
SSG SKA Siting Group
SSOWG SKA Site Options Working Group
SSTWG SETI Science and Technology Working Group
STFP Science and Technology Facilities Panel [UK]
SURA Southeastern Universities Research Association
TAC Time Allocation Committee
TDP Technology Development Program [US SKA]
TDRSS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
TMT Thirty Meter Telescope
TSS Targeted Search System
TRR Theodore R. Riffe
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
TX Texas
UK United Kingdom
UNAM Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México
UoA University of Arizona
URSI International Union of Radio  Science
US United States [of America]
USNO United States Naval Observatory
USSKAC US SKA Consortium
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VA Virginia
VCR Video Cassette Recorder
VISC VSOP International Steering Committee
VLA Very Large Array
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VLBA Very Long Baseline Array
VLBI Very Long Baseline Interferometry
VLD Very Large Dish
VLT Very Large Telescope [ESO]
VSOP VLBI Space Observatory Program
WIDAR Wide-band Interferometric Digital Architecture
WRC World Radiocommunication Conference
WSRT Westerbork Synthesis Radio Telescope
WTS Woodruff T. Sullivan III
WV West Virginia
WVRAZA West Virginia Radio Astronomy Zoning Act
WW II World War II
citAtion AbbreviAtions for nrAo/AUi 
Archives mAteriAls
AUI-BOT AUI Board of Trustees Minutes
AUI-BOTXC AUI Board of Trustees Executive Committee Minutes
NAA NRAO/AUI Archives
NAA-AHB NRAO/AUI Archives, Papers of Alan H. Bridle
NRAO-AUI NRAO/AUI Archives, Records of Associated Universities 
Inc.
NAA-BFB NRAO/AUI Archives, Papers of Bernard F. Burke
NAA-DSH NRAO/AUI Archives, Papers of David S. Heeschen
NAA-GR NRAO/AUI Archives, Papers of Grote Reber
NAA-JDK NRAO/AUI Archives, Papers of John D. Kraus
NAA-JWF NRAO/AUI Archives, Papers of John W. Findlay
NAA-KIK NRAO/AUI Archives, Papers of Kenneth I. Kellermann
NAA-MAG NRAO/AUI Archives, Papers of Mark A. Gordon
NAA-MSR NRAO/AUI Archives, Papers of Morton S. Roberts
NAA-NRAO NRAO/AUI Archives, Records of the National Radio 
Astronomy Observatory
NAA-NRAO DO NRAO/AUI Archives, Records of the National Radio 
Astronomy Observatory, Director’s Office
NAA-PVB NRAO/AUI Archives, Papers of Paul A. Vanden Bout
NAA-RLB NRAO/AUI Archives, Papers of Robert L. Brown
NAA-WTS NRAO/AUI Archives, Papers of Woodruff T. Sullivan III
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citAtion AbbreviAtions for other ArchivAl mAteriAls
CITA California Institute of Technology Archives
CITA-ATM Papers of Alan T. Moffet, California Institute of Technology 
Archives
CITA-GJS Papers of Gordon J. Stanley, California Institute of Technology 
Archives
CITA-JLG Papers of Jesse L.  Greenstein, California Institute of 
Technology Archives
CITA-LAD Papers of Lee A. DuBridge, California Institute of Technology 
Archives
CITA-RFB Papers of Robert F. Bacher, California Institute of Technology 
Archives
DDE Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
DTMA Radio Astronomy Program Records, 1950–1976, Department 
of Terrestrial Magnetism, Carnegie Institution of Washington
HLA-IB Papers of Ira Bowen, Huntington Library Archives
HUA Harvard University Archives
LOC-ATW Papers of Alan T. Waterman, Library of Congress
LOC-IIR Papers of I.I. Rabi, Library of Congress
NAAustrl National Archives of Australia
NAS-NRC-A National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, 
Archives
RCA Research Corporation Archives
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nrAo timeline
5 May 1933 Karl G. Jansky’s detection of radio waves announced in the New York 
Times.
Summer 1937 Grote Reber constructs first parabolic radio telescope in Wheaton, IL.
1940 Reber publishes Cosmic Static papers in ApJ and Proc. IRE.
18 July 1946 Charter from NY Board of Regents establishes AUI.
30 July 1946 Edward Reynolds becomes first AUI President.
19 November 1948 Frank D. Fackenthal becomes AUI President.
16 February 1951 Lloyd V. Berkner becomes AUI President.
April 1951 Alan T Waterman becomes first NSF Director.
26–27 December 
1953
AAAS meeting in Boston includes review papers on radio astronomy.
4–7 January 1954 Washington Conference on Radio Astronomy discusses US radio 
astronomy.
3 May 1954 NSF establishes an Advisory Panel for Radio Astronomy.
20 May 1954 Berkner proposes asking NSF for money; Ad Hoc committee 
established.
8 February 1955 AUI receives $85K from NSF to begin work on radio astronomy facility.
13 December 1955 Steering Committee recommends Green Bank WV for observatory site.
26 July 1956 NSF plans to purchase land in Green Bank; appropriates initial $3.5 
million.
9 August 1956 WV Radio Astronomy Zoning Act becomes first-ever protective 
legislation.
17 November 1956 NSF/AUI agreement establishes NRAO with AUI as the managing 
agency; Lloyd Berkner becomes Acting Director of the NRAO.
14 May 1957 Offices opened on Green Bank site.
17 October 1957 Dedication of Observatory in Green Bank.
Summer 1958 Construction begins on 85 Foot, Little Big Horn, first buildings.
14 August 1958 Ground breaking for 140 Foot Telescope.
16 October 1958 Dedication of the Howard E. Tatel 85 Foot Telescope.




13 February 1959 First observations with Tatel 85 Foot Telescope.
1 July 1959 Otto Struve becomes first NRAO Director.
11 April 1960 Project Ozma, first observations.
1 December 1960 Leland J. Haworth becomes AUI President.
1 April 1961 Edward Reynolds becomes AUI President.
21 April 1961 Isidor I. Rabi becomes AUI President.
27 April 1961 Ground breaking for 300 Foot Telescope.
1 December 1961 Otto Struve resigns as NRAO Director; David S. Heeschen becomes 
Acting NRAO Director.
17 December 1961 J.L. Pawsey appointed as NRAO Director, effective October 1, 1962.
March 1962 Pawsey visits Green Bank; first symptoms of illness appear.
1 October 1962 300 Foot Telescope operational with continuum receivers for 750 and 
1400 MHz.
19 October 1962 Gerald F. Tape becomes AUI President.
19 October 1962 David S. Heeschen becomes NRAO Director.
30 November 1962 Pawsey dies after extended illness.
1962 Funding request for ~30 foot mm-wave telescope.
1963 First digital autocorrelator built by Sander Weinreb, used on Tatel 
Telescope.
July 1963 Leland J. Haworth becomes NSF Director
1 July 1963 Hein Hvatum becomes Head, Electronics Division; John W. Findlay 
becomes Deputy Director.
10 July 1963 Edward Reynolds becomes AUI President.
1964 Ground-Based Astronomy: A Ten-Year Program issued.
1 June 1964 First observations with 2-element interferometer.
1 December 1964 Theodore P. Wright becomes AUI President.
February 1965 140 Foot Telescope construction completed.
11 February 1965 NSF gives final approval to locate 36 Foot Telescope on Kitt Peak.
1 July 1965 Hein Hvatum becomes Asst. Director for Technical Services; Theodore 
R. Riffe becomes Asst. Director for Administration.
1 October 1965 T. Keith Glennan becomes AUI President.
13 October 1965 Dedication of 140 Foot Telescope in Green Bank.
20 October 1965 Sander Weinreb becomes Head, Electronics Division.
20 December 1965 NRAO takes occupancy of new building in Charlottesville.
Fall 1966 VLA Design Group begins work.
January 1967 2-volume VLA proposal submitted to NSF; 3rd volume added, January 
1969.
Spring 1967 3-element interferometer completed in Green Bank.
8–9 May1967 First successful VLBI observations between Green Bank and Maryland 
Point.
1 October 1967 John W. Findlay becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank Operations.
January 1968 36 Foot Telescope begins operation on Kitt Peak.
January 1968 First international VLBI observations, between 140 Foot and Onsala, 
Sweden.
1 July 1968 Franklin A. Long becomes Acting AUI President.
1 July 1968 George Grove becomes Head, Tucson Operations.
1 May 1969 Gerald F. Tape becomes AUI President.
June 1969 Dicke panel recommendations include beginning VLA construction.
July 1969 William D. McElroy becomes NSF Director.
1 October 1969 Morton S. Roberts becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank Operations.
December 1969 Greenstein Committee advocates start of VLA in 1971.
1 January 1970 Edward (Ned) K. Conklin becomes Head, Tucson Operations.
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1 October 1970 David E. Hogg becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank Operations.
Spring 1971 Greenstein Committee final report names VLA as its highest priority.
February 1972 H. Guyford Stever becomes NSF Director.
August 1972 Congress approves VLA Project.
24 October 1972 Hein Hvatum becomes Associate Director for Technical Services.
25 October 1972 John (Jack) H. Lancaster becomes VLA Project Manager.
1 January 1973 VLA Construction Project begins.
1 October 1973 Mark A. Gordon becomes Asst. Director for Tucson Operations.
18 October 1973 E-Systems, Inc. awarded subcontract to design and fabricate VLA 
antennas.
1974 Introduction of cryogenic Schottky diode mixers for radio astronomy.
1 July 1974 William E. Howard III becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank 
Operations
31 March 1975 Service Building and Antenna Assembly Building completed at VLA site.
May 1975 VLA Project staff move from Charlottesville to VLA site and Socorro 
offices.
23 December 1975 Theodore R. Riffe becomes Associate Director for Administration.
18 February 1976 VLA antennas 1 and 2 obtain first fringes with 1.24 km baseline.
August 1976 Richard C. Atkinson becomes Acting NSF Director.
18 October 1976 Four-element array of VLA antennas obtains first fringes.
27–28 Nov. 1976 First real-time satellite-linked interferometry between Green Bank 140 
Foot antenna and Algonquin Park 150 foot antenna.
1 January 1977 Kenneth I. Kellermann becomes Acting Asst. Director for Green Bank 
Operations.
May 1977 Richard C. Atkinson becomes NSF Director.
July 1977 25 Meter Telescope for Millimeter Wavelengths proposal submitted to 
NSF.
1 July 1977 Robert L. Brown becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank Operations.
7 August 1978 Campbell M. Wade becomes Acting Asst. Director for VLA Operations.
1 October 1978 Morton S. Roberts becomes NRAO Director.
1 December 1978 Campbell Wade becomes Asst. Director for VLA Operations.
March 1979 Creation of FITS (Flexible Image Transport System).
July 1979 Work begins on writing AIPS (Astronomical Image Processing 
Software).
1980 First use of cryogenic field-effect transistor (FET) amplifiers.
July 1980 Donald N. Langenberg becomes Acting NSF Director.
18 August 1980 J. Richard Fisher becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank Operations.
28 August 1980 Ronald D. Ekers becomes Asst. Director for VLA Operations.
10 October 1980 VLA dedication.
10 October 1980 Robert E. Hughes becomes AUI President.
November 1980 First public release of AIPS (Astronomical Image Processing Software).
December 1980 John B. Slaughter becomes NSF Director.
24 March 1981 First meeting of Working Group to upgrade 36 Foot Telescope.
14 September 1981 Martha P. Haynes becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank Operations.
1982 Field Committee recommends VLBA.
April 1982 NSF Astronomy Advisory Committee favors VLBA over 25 meter 
telescope.
May 1982 Proposal to construct and operate VLBA submitted to NSF.
15 July 1982 36 foot telescope closes for resurfacing and upgrade to 12 meter.
28–29 October 
1982
First US workshop on synthesis array for mm-wave astronomy.
November 1982 Edward A. Knapp becomes NSF Director.
17 January 1984 First observations with 12 Meter Telescope.
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1 June 1984 Robert L. Brown becomes Asst. Director for Tucson Operations.
September 1984 Erich Bloch becomes NSF Director.
30 September 1984 Hein Hvatum becomes Acting NRAO Director.
1 October 1984 George A. Seielstad becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank Operations.
1 January 1985 Paul A. Vanden Bout becomes NRAO Director.
January 1985 Decision to build a combined VLA/VLBA operations center in Socorro.
7 February 1985 Robert L. Brown becomes Associate Director for Operations.
5 July 1985 David E. Hogg becomes Asst. Director for Tucson Operations.
February 1986 Construction on first VLBA antenna begins at Pie Town, NM.
1 November 1986 Darrel T. Emerson becomes Asst. Director for Tucson Operations.
1 September 1987 Michael Balister becomes Asst. Director for CDL.
1988 Introduction of niobium SIS mixers for radio astronomy.
February 1988 David S. Heeschen becomes Acting Asst. Director for VLA Operations.
April 1988 W. Miller Goss becomes Asst. Director for Socorro Operations.
15 November 1988 300 foot telescope collapses.
8 December 1988 Dedication of Array Operations Center, Socorro, NM.
July 1989 Green Bank Telescope (GBT) design funds received.
24 August 1989 Telemetry from Voyager Neptune flyby received by VLA.
July 1990 Millimeter Array proposal submitted to NSF.
September 1990 Frederick M. Bernthal becomes Acting NSF Director.
December 1990 GBT construction funds received.
March 1991 Walter E. Massey becomes NSF Director.
1 May 1991 Ground breaking for the GBT.
May 1991 Bahcall Committee recommends MMA as #2 ground-based astronomy 
project.
19 May 1992 David E. Hogg becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank Operations.
15 February 1993 F. Jay Lockman becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank Operations.
April 1993 Frederick M. Bernthal becomes Acting NSF Director.
April 1993 Construction finished on 10th and final VLBA antenna on Mauna Kea 
HI.
20 August 1993 VLBA dedication.
October 1993 Neal F. Lane becomes NSF Director.
November 1994 National Science Board (NSB) approves project development plan for 
MMA.
1996 Design of single-chip balanced and sideband-separating SIS mixers.
June 1996 NASA contracts with NRAO to design and build amplifiers WMAP.
8 July 1996 John Webber becomes Asst. Director for CDL.
18 March 1997 Lyle H. Schwartz becomes AUI President.
9 April 1998 Martha P. Haynes becomes Interim AUI President.
May 1998 National Science Board authorizes $26M for MMA design & 
development.
August 1998 Rita R. Colwell becomes NSF Director
1 January 1999 Philip R. Jewell becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank Operations.
June 1999 NSF/ESO sign MOU for joint design and development phase of 
ALMA.
1 July 1999 Riccardo Giacconi becomes AUI President.
7 February 2000 Robert L. Brown becomes NRAO Deputy Director.
May 2000 McKee/Taylor Committee supports ALMA and EVLA.
25 August 2000 Dedication of the GBT.
November 2000 EVLA Phase I Proposal submitted to NSF.
November 2001 U.S. Congress appropriates $12.5 million to initiate construction of 
ALMA.
15 November 2001 National Science Board approves construction of EVLA Phase I.
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15 December 2001 James S. Ulvestad becomes Asst. Director for New Mexico Operations.
1 June 2002 W. Miller Goss named Interim NRAO Director.
July 2002 End of NSF support for NRAO 12 Meter Telescope on Kitt Peak.
1 September 2002 Fred K.Y. Lo becomes NRAO Director.
May 2003 David E. Hogg becomes Interim Deputy Director.
6 November 2003 Groundbreaking for ALMA Operations Support Facility.
February 2004 Arden L. Bement, Jr. becomes Acting NSF Director.
1 September 2004 James J. Condon becomes Interim Deputy Director.
22 October 2004 Ethan J. Schreier becomes AUI President.
November 2004 Arden L. Bement, Jr. becomes NSF Director.
April 2005 Addition to NRAO’s Edgemont Rd. building in Charlottesville 
completed.
20 June 2005 Philip R. Jewell becomes NRAO Deputy Director.
21 June 2005 Richard Prestage becomes Interim Asst. Director for Green Bank 
Operations.
1 February 2006 Richard Prestage becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank Operations.
1 October 2007 Robert L. Dickman becomes Asst. Director for New Mexico Operations.
10 May 2008 Karen O’Neill becomes Interim Asst. Director for Green Bank 
Operations.
1 October 2008 Karen O’Neill becomes Asst. Director for Green Bank Operations.
June 2010 Cora B. Marrett becomes Acting NSF Director.
October 2010 Subra Suresh becomes NSF Director.
1 January 2011 Richard Prestage becomes Asst. Director for CDL.
1 April 2011 Clair J. Chandler becomes Interim Asst. Director for New Mexico 
Operations.
1 August 2011 Dale A. Frail becomes Asst. Director for New Mexico Operations.
31 August 2011 Shing-Kuo Pan becomes Acting Asst. Director for CDL.
30 September 2011 ALMA begins Early Science observations.
31 March 2012 VLA is re-dedicated as the Karl G. Jansky Very Large Array (JVLA).
18 May 2012 Anthony Beasley becomes NRAO Director.
March 2013 Cora B. Marrett becomes Acting NSF Director.
13 March 2013 ALMA formally inaugurated.
8 February 2014 Robert L. Dickman becomes Interim Asst. Director for CDL.
March 2014 France A. Córdova becomes NSF Director.
7 October 2014 Robert L. Dickman becomes Asst. Director for CDL.
September 2015 Mark M. McKinnon becomes Interim Asst. Director for New Mexico 
Operations.
2 September 2016 Brent Carlson becomes Asst. Director for CDL.
1 October 2016 New 10-year NSF/AUI cooperative agreement for operation of VLA, 
NAASC, CDL; GBO and LBO each have separate NSF/AUI 
agreements.
31 October 2016 Bill Randolph becomes Interim Asst. Director for CDL.
December 2016 Mark M. McKinnon becomes Asst. Director for New Mexico 
Operations.
10 July 2017 Bert Hawkins becomes Asst. Director for CDL.
13 September 2017 ngVLA receives $11M in FY2018 NSF funding for design/
development.
November 2017 Adam Cohen becomes AUI President.
23 October 2018 VLBA is reintegrated into NRAO.
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